The Putin Paradox
Vladimir Putin’s policies are a paradox. On the one hand, he is facing many problems that would be eased by improved relations with the West. On the other, he is pursuing aggressive polices designed to undercut Western and especially American interests. What explains this?
President Putin is beset by many challenges. His not-so-covert war in Donbas has been stalled for three years without destabilizing the government in Kyiv, and his people oppose Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. His economy is barely growing even as oil prices rise to $80 per barrel. A growing number of his cronies and the Russian financial elite are under Western sanctions, which cost his economy at least half a percentage point in GDP per year. His popularity ratings, which once topped 80 percent, have dropped to their levels prior to his military seizure of Crimea in 2014, and a majority of Russians believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction. Recent Kremlin efforts to deal with its straightened financial circumstances by raising the age for pension payments have led to demonstrations across the nation. And, of course, Russia remains isolated internationally because of its aggressive foreign policy.
Given the formidable list of domestic problems, it would be sensible for Mr. Putin to seek to break out of his current isolation. That would give him pause to deal with his domestic problems, to get rid of the economic and political burden of Western sanctions, and even to acquire Western technology and financing to promote stronger economic development. Indeed an April poll by Moscow’s Levada Center shows that by a nearly two-to-one margin, the Russian people would like to improve relations with the West. So a breakthrough here would also bring President Putin immediate political benefits.
This explains the eagerness and constancy with which Mr. Putin has pursued a summit with President Trump. The Kremlin strongman has been trying since early 2017 to make this happen. Last year he had to settle for meetings with the American President on the margins of other international events. Next week, he gets his own, stand-alone summit.
The paradoxical thing about Putin’s effort to meet with Trump is that has not been accompanied by any easing of the aggressive policies that have led to Russia’s international isolation. Moscow continues its war in Donbas and has even opened a new front. In recent months, the Russian navy has been regularly stopping ships heading to and from Ukraine’s ports on the Sea of Azov to impose additional costs on the economy of eastern Ukraine. Moscow’s interference in the U.S. presidential election was followed by interference in the French and German elections, and in Spain’s Catalonia issue. In Syria, Russian mercenaries attacked U.S. allies and U.S. soldiers. In the United Kingdom, Moscow tried to assassinate a former Russian spy with a highly sophisticated poison that continues to endanger the British public. Moscow is in violation of several arms control agreements with the United States. And in Afghanistan the Kremlin has been supplying weapons to the Taliban.
Even after it was announced that National Security Adviser Bolton would visit Moscow to discuss summit details, President Putin could not restrain himself from issuing another challenge to the United States. He broke the ceasefire that Moscow and Washington had established in southwest Syria. Not only did the U.S. government let this provocation pass without any apparent response, after it occurred the White House finalized details for Putin’s long-sought summit. At least in the short run, this is good politics for the Russian strongman. He is signaling to the entire world that he is the alpha male in the relationship with his American counterpart.
Here we may find the answer to Putin’s paradoxical policies. He is romancing the White House even as he challenges American interests globally because he thinks he can. We do not know the origins, but it has been clear for over two years that President Trump has a not-quite-comprehensible soft spot for Moscow and Mr. Putin. We saw this in the first days of the Trump presidency—when the White House wanted to “review” sanctions policy—and we have seen it recently with the Mr. Trump’s peculiar comments on Crimea and Russian participation in the G-7.
Whatever President Trump’s predilections, to date the policy of his Administration towards Moscow has been stronger than his predecessor’s. Thanks largely to Congressional action, sanctions policy is tougher, but President Trump himself took the long overdue decision to send defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine.
But Mr. Putin is hoping at this summit to play to President Trump’s predilections. This is evident in the preparations for the event. President Trump has a strong national security team that well understands the dangers that Kremlin policies pose for American interests. That is why the Kremlin has pushed for the main meeting to be a one-on-one with just the two leaders. Mr. Putin will probably try to arrange that only his interpreter joins them.
Moscow has also been keen to make it politically easier for President Trump to offer concessions – particularly regarding sanctions. The Kremlin understands that Congress has played an important role in toughening U.S. policy. So it invited a delegation of Republican Senators to Moscow over the July 4 congressional recess. Putin shrewdly calculates that if he can get at least a few Republican legislators to talk about the importance of improving relations with Russia or to talk about easing sanctions, that would give President Trump running room to launch a new relationship. President Putin may try to feed this at the Helsinki Summit by offering an apparent concession on one or two items. Perhaps he broke the Syrian ceasefire in June to offer it with new wrapping as a summit concession.
While this may be good politics for President Putin, it is not good politics for President Trump; and it could be a disaster for the United States. The United States is much stronger than Russia. The Kremlin is working overtime against American interests. A closer relationship with Moscow is only to Washington’s advantage once the Kremlin ceases its destructive policies. Talking prematurely about easing sanctions or other U.S. concessions feeds Mr. Putin’s hopes that he can end his international isolation, by altering only slightly, if at all, his efforts to undermine the U.S. position globally. Why would Washington want that?
The post The Putin Paradox appeared first on The American Interest.
Peter L. Berger's Blog
- Peter L. Berger's profile
- 227 followers
