Rumelt on strategy (V): Where he falters, and where he reminds me of Clausewitz in his discussions of 'the hard discipline'

As you might have guessed, I really liked reading Richard
Rumelt's book
on strategy. But I have to say that I found his military examples less
persuasive than his anecdotes drawn from the world of business. For example, he
slams as an waste of print the statement that the mission of the Defense
Department is to "deter conflict-but should deterrence fail, to fight and win
the nation's wars." I actually think that elevating deterrence to a mission
equal to fighting wars is hugely significant, with far-reaching consequences
for force structure and spending, especially on readiness and R&D.

On the other hand, Rumelt is positively
Clausewitzian when he advises that, "A great deal of strategy work is trying to
figure out what is going on. Not just deciding what to do, but the more
fundamental problem of comprehending the situation.'' That's an Americanized
version of Clausewitz's admonition that the foremost task of the commander is
to recognize the nature of the conflict in which he is engaged, and not to try
to make it something else.

Also, Rumelt reminds me a bit of those decisions
Marshall (and, to a lesser degree) Eisenhower had to make in World War II
when he writes that, "strategy is primarily about deciding what is truly
important and focusing resources and action on that objective. It is a hard
discipline because focusing on one thing always slights another."