Will Pyongyang Make Tokyo Arm Up?

North Korea’s latest missile test has put Japan on edge once again, after Pyongyang launched an intermediate missile over the island of Hokkaido on Friday morning and warned that Japan’s four islands should be “sunken into the sea.” The second missile test over Japan in a month is also reviving thorny debates about Japan’s pacifist constitution and military readiness, notes the New York Times:

Officials in Japan who may have considered intercepting the missile faced two immediate constraints — the country’s missile defenses are limited, and the Constitution limits military action only to instances of self-defense.

Those same constraints have weighed heavily on the debate in recent weeks over how Japan should be responding to the North’s rapidly advancing nuclear program, including what role it should play as an American ally and to what extent it should upgrade its armed forces. […]

In recent months, the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has revived a long-simmering discussion over whether to acquire cruise missiles — which can be fired from land, air or sea — that would allow it to strike a launch site in North Korea if it detected signs of an imminent attack.

With missiles now regularly flying over Japan, and its current systems virtually incapable of intercepting mid-flight missiles, it might seem a no-brainer for Tokyo to acquire cruise missiles and a THAAD-like missile-defense system. But even those measures are a matter of considerable controversy, and not only because of Japan’s pacifist constitution.

For one, Abe knows that acquiring the U.S.-built THAAD system would infuriate Beijing and could provoke aggressive economic retaliation, a boycott of the sort that China unleashed on South Korea after it deployed THAAD. Beefing up missile defense could also sour relations with Russia, which sees THAAD as merely an extension of the U.S. missile defense network and has promised to “counterbalance” any additional deployments. Abe enjoys a good relationship with Putin and is still hopeful about a deal to resolve the Kuril Islands dispute; he is thus wary about antagonizing Moscow unnecessarily. And Abe has only recently recovered from an influence-peddling scandal that sent his approval ratings into a nosedive. Given that political climate, the Prime Minister may be hesitant to rush toward controversial new military capabilities that risk retaliation from powerful neighbors.

And yet, slowly but surely, Abe is steering Japan toward a more militant posture. He has announced plans to acquire the American-built Aegis Ashore missile defense system, provoking some concern from Moscow. He is still determined to revise the pacifist clause of the constitution by 2020. And his allies have been gingerly introducing the idea of cruise missiles and first-strike capabilities into public debates, while steering clear of more extreme proposals, like an independent nuclear deterrent for Japan (which only 9 percent of Japanese support).

In all of this, Abe has to walk a fine line: clearly anxious about the North Korean threat and eager to stake out a tough stance, he is nonetheless limited by public opinion, constitutional constraints, and the high-risk uncertainties of how China and Russia might respond. He may also be puzzled by what exactly the United States wants out of Japan. President Trump seems torn between his instinct to back up American alliances vigorously and his longstanding disdain for “free-riders” whom he feels should develop their own capacities and handle their own security threats.

Ultimately, the U.S. may need to split the difference, reinforcing the alliance with Japan while simultaneously encouraging Tokyo to responsibly beef up its own defense posture. We certainly do not want Japan left helpless by the constraints of a constitution written seventy years ago, or incapable of intercepting a missile that could be headed for the U.S. homeland. But we also do not want a rapid rearmament that could trigger an arms race in Asia. We may indeed want Japan to acquire stronger military capabilities, but we surely want to be on the inside of that process, doing the diplomatic legwork with Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, and Moscow to ease regional concerns and prevent a full-fledged security competition.

Getting that balance right will require a trust-based relationship with Tokyo, long-term strategic thinking, and the kind of care and feeding of allies that has not proven to be Donald Trump’s strong suit. Let us hope his administration is up to the task.

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