Befehl-staktik (IV): Here is why you should always keep a FRAGO and a captain between you and the problem

I have a lot of
respect for Col. Paul Yingling, who I know from Iraq, and whose thinking about
today's military has had a lot of influence on me. He actually is the first
person quoted in the book I am writing right now, as the manuscript currently
stands. So I was pleased to get this from him.

There is lots of
memorable stuff in this short essay. I was especially struck by his third
sentence: "Mission command takes intelligent and courageous senior officers
accountable for battlefield results." I also liked this one: "Great leaders
do not rely on favorable conditions; they create them." And this one: "When a small unit gets in trouble, senior
commanders find cover in SOPs thick enough to stop an OER bullet." And his bottom line: "Far from prohibiting
mission command, the conditions of modern combat demand it."

So it is a real
pleasure to recommend this to you. I think it is one of the best columns this
blog has ever had:

By Paul Yingling

Best Defense chief correspondent of lost causes

MAJ Niel Smith is a
good friend and a superb officer, but he's
wrong about mission command. Auftragstaktik doesn't require highly
trained junior officers, reforms in personnel management or professional
military education, or time to integrate the latest technology. Mission command
takes intelligent and courageous senior officers accountable for battlefield results.
If we identify and promote such officers, the rest will fall into place. If we
don't, the best trained captains in the Army's history won't save us from
failure.

There is plenty of
historical evidence to contradict MAJ Smith's claim that "mission command
requires stable, highly trained staffs and company/troop commanders, proficient
in their specialty and job." Scipio's centurions didn't have 3.5 years of
brigade staff time to learn their trade before fighting Hannibal. Sherman's
cavalry troops were not made audacious by rigorous PME. Guderian's race to the
English Channel was not preceded by a year of stability in ARFORGEN. Patton's
tank companies were not the product of enlightened personnel policies. These
officers succeed because they had the intelligence to see the battlefield
clearly, and the courage to act on their convictions. In any war worthy of the
name, the delicate conditions MAJ Smith requires to implement mission command
have never existed. Great leaders do not rely on favorable conditions; they
create them.

Claims that today's wars are somehow more complex than previous conflicts
will draw belly laughs from historians. Is sectarian conflict in Iraq somehow
more politically complex than Rome's civil wars? Does the rate of technological
change in the last ten years in Afghanistan exceed that of the last two years
of World War I? Even if we accept the dubious proposition that today's wars are
unparalleled in complexity, successful brigade commanders have demonstrated
that mission command works. Colonel Sean McFarland helped turn the tide in
Anbar Province thanks in large part to the autonomy he granted to Captain
Travis Patriquin. Colonel H.R. McMaster's success in Tall Afar was attributable
to a command climate in which thinking was required and PowerPoint was not. Have
new and unparalleled complexities transformed warfare since 2006?

MAJ Smith's defense of detailed planning doesn't stand up to empirical
scrutiny. Thick orders and elaborate SOPs haven't eliminated costly, stupid mistakes. Consider
two of the most heavily regulated activities on the modern battlefield  -- air strikes and detainee operations. Air
strikes have killed civilians and ground troops have abused detainees, even
when the SOPs regulating these activities ran to several hundred pages. Each
crime and blunder adds another chapter to the tome, but none of it seems to
matter. Leaders prone to crimes and blunders are not dissuaded by elaborate
checklists or sternly worded prose.

Yet the production of highly prescriptive
orders and SOPs, what Germans call Befehlstaktik, continues unabated;
why?  The primary purpose of detailed
orders is not battlefield success, but rather the protection of field-grade and
flag officer careers. In ten years of war, no Army general has relieved a
fellow flag officer for battlefield failure. Why so many failures and so little
accountability? When a small unit gets in trouble, senior commanders find cover
in SOPs thick enough to stop an OER bullet. (I told the troops not to beat
detainees; it's right here on page 11.) Rather than preventing battlefield
failure, detailed planning often enables it. Senior officers can survive almost
any debacle so long as there's a FRAGO and a captain between them and the
problem.

Detailed planning
can be useful in understanding problems, anticipating opportunities and risks
and synchronizing activities. Prescriptive orders and SOPs have their place in
performing routine mechanical tasks. However, these techniques are often
counterproductive in the fog and friction of combat. Modern combat requires
junior leaders capable of exercising judgment and initiative, and senior
officers capable of fostering these qualities. It requires junior leaders
capable of acting on commander's intent, and senior officers capable of clearly
expressing their intent. It requires junior leaders capable of taking prudent
risks, and senior officers willing to underwrite and reward risk-taking. Far
from prohibiting mission command, the conditions of modern combat demand it.

Most importantly of
all, Auftragstaktik demands accountability for results rather than
adherence to procedures. Some will succeed and advance, while others will fail
and find employment elsewhere. These outcomes have little to do with time in grade,
PME or the complexities of the modern battlefield. Senior officers who wish to
exercise mission command shouldn't wait for favorable conditions; they should
create them.

Paul L. Yingling is a colonel in the U.S. Army and a
professor of security studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government or St. Jude.