Richard Veryard's Blog, page 13

Dangling Conversation

@markhillary asks "When you follow company Twitter accounts, do you like being able to see who runs the account, like a named person on the profile?"



I think that depends how gullible you are. When I get a letter signed by an Important Person, I generally assume it was written by his staff and signed in his absence. And when I get a mass-produced "personal letter" from an Important Person, I assume it was generated by a computer and signed by a programmer.



I got an email recently, which claimed to be a "A Personal Message from Dr. Richard Soley, Chairman and CEO, OMG and Keith Steele, CEO, PrismTech and OMG Board Member". I wrote back and thanked Richard personally - not to the address on the email (which was omg_marketing@omg.org) but to his real email address. For some reason, he ignored this. I hope he's not ill or anything.



And corporate communications sometimes use a fictional identity. Gerald Kaufman MP once tried to phone a person in the Prime Minister's office who had responded to a letter, only to discover that "Mrs E Adams" didn't actually exist. [Source: John Walsh: Beware letters from fictional civil servants (Independent May 2011)]

This kind of thing is convenient for bureaucracies, because it allows incoming communications to be sorted by topic and redirected to whoever happens to be on duty that day. I'm sure the same thing often happens with Twitter, to prevent a corporate spokesperson ever being confused with a private individual.



As for company bosses, politicians and other celebrities, it would be naive to imagine that they always write their own tweets.

"Of course they don't", tweets @markhillary, "but allowing helpers to do broadcast stuff is surely OK if the conversational is genuine?"

Well, that depends on your idea of a genuine conversation.



It seems to me that there are some serious sociological and ethical problems here - of public/private identity, authenticity and trust - and we are only just learning how to operate in this new world.




@markhillary goes on to ask another question. "If you were interacting with a brand like Virgin Media, are you happy conversing with the brand?"



My answer to that question invokes Freud's concept of transference. Our psychological state (happiness, frustration) may depend on what we project onto a given brand or persona that we are conversing with. I generally try to separate my feelings about the company/brand from my feelings about the human being who is standing between me and the company/brand - but I don't always succeed. When we are really angry about something, it is difficult to avoid being rude or sarcastic to the junior employee that picks up the phone, even when we know it's not really their fault. Conversely, if the sales assistant is charming enough, it is tempting to buy something we don't really need.



Of course the CEO never picks up the phone herself. Funny that. When I'm conversing with the Virgin brand, I may fondly imagine that I'm getting Richard Branson's personal attention, but there is a little voice inside my head saying that's unlikely.



There is of course one thing that is likely to make me very unhappy indeed. Suppose I am naive enough to imagine I am having a personal conversation with Richard Branson or Richard Soley. Then the screen falls over and I see it is just some little functionary and not the Wizard of Oz at all. Isn't that just going to annoy me? Isn't it Richard, isn't it? #OMG.

OrgIntelligence in Iran

In my previous post, I reviewed Karl Albrecht's model of Organizational Intelligence. For some reason, this model is popular in Iran, and I have found numerous academic studies using Albrecht's assessment questionnaire as a research tool. Here are some of the findings.


A positive correlation between organizational
intelligence and knowledge management (Marjani and Arabi, Mooghali and Azizi, Yaghoubi et al 2011, Yaghoubi et al 2012)


A positive correlation between organizational
intelligence and staff performance (Marjani and Soheilipour)


A positive correlation between organizational intelligence and creativity (Mehrara et al) 


A positive correlation between organizational intelligence and organizational excellence (Ahadinezhad et al)



Zarbakhsh et al raise doubts about the robustness of the Albrecht questionnaire as a research tool. Using a self-assessment questionnaire to investigate differences between organizations requires careful interpretation, so that we don't simply measure the self-delusion of the organizations in question.



This is of course particularly problematic with organizational intelligence, because intelligence is often associated with a degree of self-criticism. An organization that perceives its own intelligence shortcomings may well be more intelligent than an organization that believes its intelligence is perfectly fit-for-purpose thank-you-very-much.



But there is a larger question. Albrecht's questionnaire is based on a list of characteristics that he thinks to be associated with organizational intelligence. Most of these researchers have merely run statistical tests to compare Albrecht's lists of characteristics with each other, and with lists of characteristics from other sources, supposed to be associated with things like knowledge management and creativity. What we are mostly missing is a critical investigation of whether Albrecht's model offers a reasonable measure of the strategic value that we might expect to follow from organizational intelligence.



I have also developed a self-assessment questionnaire for organizational intelligence, which I have used in consulting exercises but which has not yet been comprehensively tested. I should be most interested in any research that would help me callibrate this questionnaire against objective outcomes, and I invite these and any other researchers to contact me for a copy of the questionnaire.




Massoumeh Ahadinezhad, Rokhsareh Badami, Mina Mostahfezian, Organizational Intelligence and Excellence Based on EFQM Model Among the Isfahan Boards are Related (pdf) World Journal of Sports Science 6(4): 328-330 (2012) ISSN 2078-4724



Amir Babak Marjani, Parvin Arabi, The Role of Organizational Intelligence in Organizational Knowledge Management (The Case of The Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran) (pdf). European Journal of Social Sciences (EJSS) Vol.25 No.3 (2011), pp.49-58 ISSN 1450-2267



Amir Babak Marjani, Mojdeh Soheilipour, The Relationship between Organizational Intelligence and Staff Performance Based on the Model of Karl Albrecht (pdf) (The case of Iran Branch, China National Petroleum Company) International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 4 (February 2012) [Abstract]



Hassan Zarei Matin, Golamreza Jandaghi, Ali Hamidizadeh, Fateme Haj Karimi, Studying Status of Organizational Intelligence in Selected Public Offices of Qom (pdf) European Journal of Social Sciences – Volume 14, Number 4 (2010)



Asadollah Mehrara, Sonbollah Azami Saroklaei, Mojtaba Sadeghi, Afsaneh Fatthi, Relation between Organizational Intelligence and Creativity of Managers in Public Junior High Schools of East of Gilan Province (pdf) J. Basic. Appl. Sci. Res., 2(4)3311-3315, (2012) ISSN 2090-4304



A.R Mooghali, A.R. Azizi, Relation between Organizational Intelligence and Organizational Knowledge Management Development (pdf) World Applied Sciences Journal, Volume 4 Number 1, (2008)




Narjes Al-Sadat Nasabi, Ali Reza Safarpour, Key Factors in Achieving to an Intelligent Organization in the View of Employee in Shiraz University of Medical Science in 2008 (pdf) Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 3(4): 3492-3499 (2009) ISSN 1991-8178 [Abstract]



Nour-Mohammad Yaghoubi, Elham Behtarinejad, Saeed Gholami, Hamed Armesh, The relationship between strategic processes of knowledge management and organizational intelligence (pdf) African Journal of Business Management Vol. 6 (7), pp. 2626-2633, 22 February, 2012 
DOI: 10.5897/AJBM11.1398
ISSN 1993-8233




Nour-Mohammad Yaghoubi, Mahdi Salehi, Elham Behtari Nezhad, A Relationship Between Tactical Processes of Knowledge Management and Organizational Intelligence: Iranian Evidence (pdf) World Applied Sciences Journal 12 (9): 1413-1421 (2011) ISSN 1818-4952.



Mohammadreza Zarbakhsh, Hamidreza Alipour, Karim Dawabin Zahra, Mahrabi Taleghani, Standardization of Albrecht's Organizational Intelligence of the Personnel and Principals of the Junior High Schools of the West of Mazandaran Province (pdf). Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, 5(10): 990-995, (2011)
ISSN 1991-8178

Karl Albrecht on Organizational Intelligence

Karl Albrecht has defined seven characteristic features of an
intelligent organization, and has designed a self-assessment
questionnaire for creating a profile of the intelligence of an
organization.



1. Strategic Vision: do we know where we’re going?

2. Shared Fate: are we all in the same boat?

3. Appetite for Change: can we face the unexpected challenges?

4. Heart: do we have the spirit and energy to succeed?

5. Alignment and Congruence: do the organization’s “rules and tools”
help us succeed?

6. Knowledge Deployment: do we share our information, knowledge, and
wisdom?

7. Performance Pressure: are we serious about getting things done?



Some of his questions are useful, but I don't think they provide a
rounded view of the intelligence of an organization.



1. By strategic vision, Albrecht is referring to the capacity to
create, evolve, and express the purpose of the enterprise. This is
certainly an important aspect of sense-making, but overlooks an
equally important aspect of sense-making, which is to understand the
evolving demands of the environment and to align vision and purpose
to these demands. In Albrecht's model of organizational
intelligence, there is no explicit connection between vision and
reality, and no mention of the extent to which organizations (and
their leaders) understand and anticipate the present and future.



2. A stupid organization can still have a sense of community, and a
strong collective affiliation to an outdated or unrealistic vision,
leading to a collective refusal to face facts.



3. An appetite for change is important, but profound change also
requires a degree of patience and a willingness to tolerate
uncertainty and inconsistency. Albrecht talks about discomfort, but
many organizations try to avoid discomfort by rushing through
changes as quickly as possible, often resulting in a series of
failed initiatives.



4.  Heart. This may well be a consequence of organizational
intelligence - an organization that values and engages the
intelligence and creativity of its employees should end up with more
satisfied and engaged and committed employees. But this is also strongly connected to trust.



5. Alignment and congruence. This is to do with the architecture of
collaboration, which is perhaps the most difficult aspect of
organizational intelligence. The most intelligent organizations
typically don't display complete congruence, but manage with a degree of
creative tension and conflict between different functions or positions.




6. Knowledge deployment. Albrecht concentrates on generating and sharing
knowledge (flow of knowledge, conservation of sensitive information,
the availability of information at key points of need) but I see the key
capability for organizational intelligence in terms of linking
knowledge to action. How has this knowledge helped us do things better,
or to do better things?



7. Performance pressure - a preoccupation with the performance of the enterprise, in terms of the achievement of identified strategic objectives and tactical outcomes. This preoccupation is found
in many bureaucratic organizations, especially those dominated by the
so-called target culture which often militates against organizational
intelligence. I therefore cannot see any necessary correlation between
performance pressure and organizational intelligence.



A company like Enron would probably have scored fairly high on
Albrecht's questionnaire, but it also provided a spectacular illustration of
Albrecht's Law, namely that "intelligent people, when assembled into
an organization, will tend toward collective stupidity".



Albrecht identifies two kinds of stupidity, which he calls the
learned kind and the designed-in kind.


The learned kind prevails when people are not authorized to
think, or don't believe they are.
The designed-in kind prevails when the rules and systems make
it difficult or impossible for people to think creatively,
constructively, or independently.

I believe there is a third kind of stupidity, which I call the
disconnected kind. This is where there are many talented people, but
they don't talk to each other; where the feedback and learning loops are
broken; and where management fails to connect the dots. This is the
Enron model of organizational stupidity, and in my view it is the most
powerful explanation for the kind of organizational stupidity that
Albrecht identifies in his eponymous
law. But Albrecht's questionnaire is not designed to detect this
kind of stupidity.




Karl Albrecht, The Power of Minds at Work: Organizational
Intelligence in Action (2002)



Karl Albrecht, Organizational
Intelligence & Knowledge Management: Thinking Outside the
Silos. The Executive Perspective (pdf)



Karl Albrecht, Organizational
Intelligence Profile: Preliminary Assessment Questionnaire
(pdf 2002)



See also OrgIntelligence in Iran

Daoism and Rocket Science

Who is to say whether a scientific or technical discovery is accidental or planned? Historians of science often point out that there was some luck involved in Fleming's "accidental" discovery of penicillin. But Fleming and his assistants were already actively searching for anti-bacterial agents, and the discovery of penicillin followed a similar path to his earlier discovery of the anti-bacterial properties of egg-white (lysozyme), so it is misleading to describe the discovery of penicillin as a complete accident.



Some historians of science now suggest that the Chinese invention of rockets was an accident. They argue that Daoist thinkers would have understood explosion as a violent response to the combination of Yin and Yang, and that they would therefore have been unable to think systematically about a reaction involving three ingredients instead of two. In other words, a given mental model or frame constrains investigation. (Unlike the Fleming example.)



Of course we must be cautious about interpreting historical Daoist thought against either a modern understanding of the chemistry of gunpowder, or even against a modern interpretation of Daoist thought. Perhaps the ancient Chinese did not see any contradiction between a three-way chemical reaction and Daoism, and that this apparent contradiction is merely a modern projection. (In other words, the modern historians perceive the past using their own mental models or frames. None of us can escape this.)



However, it is still true that mental models can constrain what we perceive, as well as how we make sense of our perceptions and act upon them, and this has important implications for innovation and organizational intelligence.




Frank H. Winter, Michael J. Neufeld, Kerrie Dougherty, Was the rocket invented or accidentally discovered? Some new observations on its origins (Acta Astronautica, Volume 77, August–September 2012, Pages 131–137) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2012.03.014



Corrinne Burns, Oops, I invented the rocket! The explosive history of serendipity (Guardian, 4 May 2012)

Questions on OrgIntelligence

A student from the Middle East emailed me as part of his research into organizational intelligence in universities, and I sent him some brief answers.





1)   Is organizational intelligent a mental ability in the organization?



I would avoid the word "mental" because it raises too many philosophical
distractions. I prefer the word "cognitive". Yes, it is a cognitive
ability, or perhaps a set of cognitive abilities.



In my book I describe organizational intelligence in terms of six cognitive capabilities: Perception (Information Gathering), Sense-Making, Decision-Making, Memory, Learning and Communication. (We could argue whether Communication counts as a cognitive capability, but it is clearly related.)



See Does Organizational Cognition Make Sense?





2)   Whether organizational intelligent is a mechanism?




Organizational intelligence relies on a number of cognitive and cultural
mechanisms and instruments (tools), but I don't think it makes sense to
to regard organizational intelligence itself as a mechanism or instrument.



However, like human intelligence, organizational intelligence is one of those qualities that only exists if it is exercised, and disappears (atrophies) if it is not exercised. (Power is another one of those qualities.) But I don't regard the exercise of organizational intelligence as quite the same as using it purely as a means to an end.





3)   Is organizational intelligent connected to organization functions?




In my framework, organizational intelligence depends on six critical
organizational capabilities - see above. All other organizational activity is
dependent on organizational intelligence, in the sense that they should
perform better if there is greater org intelligence, and perform worse
if there is a lack of org intelligence. (This is what I call a soft dependency - obviously an organization can perform all sorts of functions unintelligently, but it may achieve better results if it can perform these functions intelligently.)





4)   Is organizational intelligent a planning method?




No. All planning activity may benefit from org intelligence. Conversely,
improvements to org intelligence can be planned methodically.



A planning method typically involves a perceived gap between an existing state or problem state (AS-IS) and a desired future state or solution state (TO-BE), and a series of interdependent actions to get from AS-IS to TO-BE.



For organizational intelligence, we might wish to assess the current level of organizational intelligence, as well as identify various inhibitors to organizational intelligence in a specific organization, and then plan a series of improvements that would remove these inhibitors and improve the overall level of intelligence. (I have a self-assessment checklist, designed for assessing current level and identifying problems.)





5)   Is it logical to examine organizational intelligent according to
the context of every organization?




Yes. Different organizations need different levels of org intelligence,
depending on their strategy and environment.






6)   According to these topics and dimensions what would be a
definition for organizational intelligent in universities?




The formal definition of organizational intelligence would be the same
for universities as for other organizations. The specific forms and
mechanisms would be different, because universities have a specific
environment, specific time dimensions, and specific outcomes.

The Science of Retail

#orgintelligence Liz McShane of @PortlandDesign tells @pollycurtis why Tesco's star has waned.

"Tesco has taken its eye off the ball for some time now, focusing more on the science of retail rather than the emotion of it. By that we mean the prioritisation of the loyalty card programme and harvesting customer data, which has lead to the fundamentals of good service being neglected, for example the first thing you are asked at the check-out is for your loyalty card, rather than a simple (but appreciated) hello. ... Reliance on discounts as a point of differentiation has in turn neglected the in-store experience."

Polly Curtis, Why are we falling out of love with Tesco? Guardian, 18 April 2012

In the past, I have praised Tesco for its mastery of the science of retail, and this is certainly one aspect of its organizational intelligence. This included the following elements.



The Loyalty Card innovation led to the creation of a new data class called Customer. (Retailers previously had no way of recognizing a customer as "the same again" - which is a fundamental requirement for a data class).
The collection and analysis of very large quantities of customer purchasing behaviour.
The planning and execution of very large numbers of pricing and marketing experiments, such as special offers.
Optimizing prices and promotions based on feedback.
In the old days, retailers ran special offers for a number of reasons.

To shift surplus inventory (either their own or further up the supply chain)
As loss leaders, to get customers into the store.
To attack other retailers.
All of these reasons are still valid, but we can now add a further reason.

To differentiate customer behaviour - e.g. testing the elasticity of demand for different products for different customer segments.


Many companies collect large quantities of data, but few companies seemed to be able to use the data as effectively and profitably as Tesco. Clearly this is not just about the IT systems but about integrating sophisticated management information and analytics into the business process. This is a big part of my Organizational Intelligence story.



And as Alan Mitchell explains, Tesco's Clubcard has benefited from a unique combination of favourable attributes, which other retailers cannot duplicate. Luck or intelligence?



But this must now be balanced against Tesco's neglect of other success factors, which several of Polly Curtis's correspondents have identified. It now becomes clear that Tesco was failing to respond to a number of other weak signals, and has fallen behind its competitors in some areas. Responding appropriately to weak signals is another key part of the Organizational Intelligence story.



Liz McShane seems to imply that Tesco's success in one area (loyalty card programme, data harvesting and differentiation) was a cause of its neglect of other success factors. There are two distinct reasons why this might have happened. Perhaps Tesco only has a finite amount of organizational intelligence, and deploying it in one area means that it is not available in other areas. Or perhaps Tesco's success in one area made it complacent in other areas.



Another hypothesis is that customers might be starting to become aware/wary of Tesco's cleverness - thanks in part to media coverage, as well as such anecdotes as pregnant women receiving targeted marketing before anyone else knew. This would either mean that this form of intelligence has diminishing returns, or that it requires continual leaps in intelligence to keep one step ahead of customer resistance.



Some commentators have seen the recent change of CEO as a proximate cause for Tesco's latest results, but I doubt that it will have made much difference, not yet at least. For many years, Sir Terry Leahy was one of the most respected CEOs in the UK; but then so (for a time) was Sir Fred Goodwin. We shouldn't confuse public reputation with real effectiveness, and we shouldn't be in any haste to assess the true contribution of any individual to a large company. In any case, the personality of the CEO may only have a marginal effect on organizational intelligence of the whole enterprise.



Nevertheless, in his Wikipedia entry, Sir Terry Leahy is credited with devising and implementing the Tesco Clubcard loyalty program "and also successfully monitoring the shopping habits, movements, and political opinions of Clubcard holders". Leahy only stood down as CEO in March 2011, so it is a bit unfair to blame his successor if it turns out that the overwhelming success of Clubcard programme has masked under-investment in other areas.



Some commentators have also noted that Leahy's successor, Philip Clarke, had been CIO of Tesco, although he did not have an IT background.

After graduating from Liverpool University with a degree in economics he joined the Tesco Management Training Programme which provided him with a perfect platform to work his way to the top. In 1998 he was appointed to the board with responsibility for the supply chain and a year later information technology was added to his brief. ... Six years into the role, Mr Clarke then became responsible for the businesses outside the UK, leading Tesco's entry into the huge markets of India and China.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13114113



My interpretation of this series of appointments is that the Tesco board (including Leahy and Clarke) saw supply chain, IT and international as the strategic capabilities for Tesco, and this may be a good indicator of Tesco's present strengths and weaknesses.



It is however worth pointing out that Tesco's profits have only fallen by 1%. Although this may be an unwelcome surprise for Tesco shareholders and senior management (especially as the stock market generally overreacts to this kind of news), it hardly signals the end of the road for Tesco just yet.





Rachel Shabi, The card up their sleeve (Guardian, 19 July 2003)



Glynn Davies, How Tesco became Britain's top supermarket (MoneyWeek, 9 May 2007)



Alan Mitchell, Why Tesco Clubcard is a dead end (Marketing Magazine, 16 April 2010)



Philip Clarke, Retail is detail: Tesco boss Philip Clarke explains new retail strategy (BBC Today, 18 April 2012)

Two Dimensions of Trust

In my post Magic Quadrant or Sorting Hat, I compared Gartner's Magic Quadrant (used to classify software vendors and products) with the Hogwarts Sorting Hat (used to classify young witches and wizards).

Leaders: Gryffindor
Challengers: Slytherin
Visionaries: Ravenclaw
Niche Players: Hufflepuff
Gartner's Magic Quadrant is a 2x2 matrix, whose two dimensions are Vision and Ability-to-Execute.



Following my previous post on Sharing Trust, I was thinking about a contrast between two key Hogwarts characters - Hagrid and Snape - based on the two dimensions of Trustworthiness and Ability-to-Execute.



Hagrid is regarded as extremely trustworthy. In the very first chapter of the first Harry Potter book, Dumbledore says he would trust Hagrid with his life. Professor McGonagall agrees, but points out that Hagrid can be a little unreliable. Later in the book, he is tricked by Voldemort into revealing a key vulnerability in the security arrangements protecting the Philosopher's Stone - security experts would call this "social engineering". So he doesn't score so well on ability-to-execute.



Snape, on the other hand, is a very accomplished and creative wizard, who scores extremely high on ability-to-execute. As we progress through the series, it becomes clear that he is successfully deceiving either Dumbledore or Voldemort - or possibly both. But this of course raises serious questions about his trustworthiness.



Trustworthiness - but for whom? Dumbledore trusts both Hagrid and Snape absolutely; other characters trust them with reservations, and only because Dumbledore does. And J.K. Rowling is careful not to present Dumbledore as omniscient - he is hoodwinked on several occasions, most notably by a clever impersonation in the Goblet of Fire.



So there are two ways of trusting people. We can regard them as trustworthy but fallible. Like Hagrid, or for that matter Dumbledore himself. Or we can regard them as reliable but remain suspicious of their true motivation and allegiance. Like Snape, or for that matter Voldemort. Ultimately, this is a question of authenticity.