Rupert Matthews's Blog, page 35
October 19, 2012
1941 - RAF Fighter Command faces a new threat
In late 1941 some RAF pilots had reported seeing a new type of German fighter that could fly faster, turn tighter and climb steeper than the then standard Messerschmitt Bf109. At first British intelligence officers could make little of the reports, based as they were on fleeting glimpses in combat situations. By the end of the year, however, it was clear that the Germans now possessed a fighter that was superior in every way to the Spitfires and Hurricanes of the RAF – and that it was entering service in increasing numbers. The RAF had a tiger by the tail.
The answer, or at least a partial answer, came in the form of the Spitfire MkIX. This had an uprated Merlin engine developing 1565hp, as opposed to the 1030hp of the engine in the Spitfire MkI. It was faster than the existing Spitfires, with an edge in terms of speed and height over the FW190. However, the Spitfire MkIX was less nimble than its opposition and could not climb as quickly. Each fighter had its advantages, but overall were evenly matched.
A second new fighter joining the RAF in 1942 was the Hawker Typhoon. This was a larger, heavier aircraft but mounted a massively powerful engine. The RAF had high hopes for this machine, but it soon proved to be less effective at high altitude than had been hoped. Its performance at low altitude was, however, superlative.
from Heroes of RAF Fighter Command in Kent by Rupert Matthews
The answer, or at least a partial answer, came in the form of the Spitfire MkIX. This had an uprated Merlin engine developing 1565hp, as opposed to the 1030hp of the engine in the Spitfire MkI. It was faster than the existing Spitfires, with an edge in terms of speed and height over the FW190. However, the Spitfire MkIX was less nimble than its opposition and could not climb as quickly. Each fighter had its advantages, but overall were evenly matched.
A second new fighter joining the RAF in 1942 was the Hawker Typhoon. This was a larger, heavier aircraft but mounted a massively powerful engine. The RAF had high hopes for this machine, but it soon proved to be less effective at high altitude than had been hoped. Its performance at low altitude was, however, superlative.
from Heroes of RAF Fighter Command in Kent by Rupert Matthews
October 17, 2012
The RAF in Lincolnshire in the 1930s
When war came to Lincolnshire in September 1939, it was already a bomber county so far as the RAF was concerned. And a bomber county it was to remain throughout the six long years of conflict. But it was never intended that the county would serve as the base for a massive bombing campaign, as in fact happened. The RAF had very different ideas about what should happen. To understand what happened in Lincolnshire and why, it is necessary to understand what was expected of the men who would fly from the county.
In 1934 the British government had decided to end its policy of defence cut backs that had seen the RAF shrink from 188 operational and 194 training squadrons in 1919 to just 16 front line squadrons. Prompted by the rapid growth of the German Luftwaffe, and the equally impressive Japanese and Italian air forces, the government began to build up the air force, with the aim of reaching 75 squadrons by March 1939, a target later uprated to 112 squadrons, of which 53 were to be bomber squadrons.
It was unfortunate for the crews of Bomber Command based in Lincolnshire, and elsewhere, that the rapid expansion of the force was based on a number of assumptions that turned out to be completely mistaken.
from HEROES OF RAF BOMBER COMMAND: LINCOLNSHIRE by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
At the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939,
such was the build-up of men and materials in the R A F that
Lincolnshire was already known as 'Bomber Country'. Its four main
airfields - Hemswell, Scampton, Waddington and Cottesmore - were home to
eight squadrons of Bomber Command under the legendary Arthur 'Bomber'
Harris. Night after night the skies of Lincolnshire reverberated with
the sound of aircraft taking off and landing. For the aircrews the
missions were very dangerous and physically exhausting. The chances of
surviving a full tour of 30 operations were only 50/50, less in the
first five sorties while aircrews gained valuable experience. Their
targets were roads, railways, bridges, harbours, dams, factories and oil
installations. Many medals were won - some of them posthumously. On the
Dambusters Raid alone, 36 were awarded; a VC for the leader Guy Gibson,
five DSOs, 14 DFCs, 12 DFMs and three Conspicuous Gallantry Medals. In
this well researched and excellently written book, Rupert Matthews -
himself the son of a Bomber Command sergeant who fought in the Second
World War - describes many of the operations in detail and tells the
story of courageous individuals who, despite the odds, flew mission
after mission - heroes every one of them.
In 1934 the British government had decided to end its policy of defence cut backs that had seen the RAF shrink from 188 operational and 194 training squadrons in 1919 to just 16 front line squadrons. Prompted by the rapid growth of the German Luftwaffe, and the equally impressive Japanese and Italian air forces, the government began to build up the air force, with the aim of reaching 75 squadrons by March 1939, a target later uprated to 112 squadrons, of which 53 were to be bomber squadrons.
It was unfortunate for the crews of Bomber Command based in Lincolnshire, and elsewhere, that the rapid expansion of the force was based on a number of assumptions that turned out to be completely mistaken.
from HEROES OF RAF BOMBER COMMAND: LINCOLNSHIRE by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
At the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939,
such was the build-up of men and materials in the R A F that
Lincolnshire was already known as 'Bomber Country'. Its four main
airfields - Hemswell, Scampton, Waddington and Cottesmore - were home to
eight squadrons of Bomber Command under the legendary Arthur 'Bomber'
Harris. Night after night the skies of Lincolnshire reverberated with
the sound of aircraft taking off and landing. For the aircrews the
missions were very dangerous and physically exhausting. The chances of
surviving a full tour of 30 operations were only 50/50, less in the
first five sorties while aircrews gained valuable experience. Their
targets were roads, railways, bridges, harbours, dams, factories and oil
installations. Many medals were won - some of them posthumously. On the
Dambusters Raid alone, 36 were awarded; a VC for the leader Guy Gibson,
five DSOs, 14 DFCs, 12 DFMs and three Conspicuous Gallantry Medals. In
this well researched and excellently written book, Rupert Matthews -
himself the son of a Bomber Command sergeant who fought in the Second
World War - describes many of the operations in detail and tells the
story of courageous individuals who, despite the odds, flew mission
after mission - heroes every one of them.
October 15, 2012
Noew Orders for Bomber Harris 1943
[image error]
The summer of 1943 saw some major changes for Bomber Command that would have a particular impact on Norfolk. The key event was the issuing of a new strategic directive by the Air Ministry to Sir Arthur Harris, head of Bomber Command, on 10 June. This directive was codenamed Pointblank and was the result of months of sometimes tortuous negotiation between the US and British governments over war aims and how to achieve them.
Bomber Command’s main objectives, Harris was told, was “The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened”. The more detailed instructions told Harris to concentrate on German aircraft and U-boat manufacturing centres as the top priority with oil, ball bearings, synthetic rubber and military vehicle factories being given secondary importance.
Harris was also told that he had to co-operate with the US 8th Air Force – ‘the Mighty 8th’ as the Americans called it. In theory the Americans would fly at daylight to bomb specified factories with deadly accuracy, after which the RAF would bomb the same area at night to destroy surrounding transport links and homes. In practice the Americans soon found that the German fighters were highly effective, and the German pilots equally skilled, at shooting down bombers operating in daylight. This aspect of Harris’s new instructions would remain an objective only for some months to come.
Finally, Harris was told, preparations were underway to invade France at some unspecified place and time in the future. To prepare for this the government believed that the light and medium bombers of 2 Group should be moved from Bomber Command to form a new 2 Tactical Air Force. This would put the aircraft under the command of those planning the invasion and allow for a greater and more careful emphasis on targets that would prove useful to the invasion. Harris would be left with the strategic task of grinding down Germany.
Harris asked that he be allowed to keep 105 and 139 Squadrons from 2 Group, both flying out of Marham, within Bomber Command. He argued that these two Mosquito squadrons were in practice undertaking missions more akin to those of the main bomber force than were the other squadrons of 2 Group, equipped as they were with Bostons, Mitchells and Venturas. Harris, as so often, got what he asked for.
from "Heroes of RAF Bomber Command - Norfolk" by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
This illustrated book pays tribute to the pilots and crews
who flew from Norfolk airfields during the last war and whose actions
displayed some of the finest examples of courage, professionalism and
devotion to duty.
October 13, 2012
The English Army at the Battle of Falkirk 1298
The English army was more professional and more mixed than that of the Scots. Many of the men were mercenaries or, at least, part time soldiers who were paid a wage when on campaign. In theory the King of England could call on able-bodied men to form a national army, like the Common Army of the Scots. In practice most English farmers preferred to pay a tax called scutage, or shield-money, instead. Those young men who did go to war could therefore be assured of good wages and would campaign for much longer than the 40 days expected of the militia.
It was these part-time semi-professional infantry who had formed the bulk of previous English armies. They were equipped with varying degrees of armour, a large triangular shield and an 8 foot spear as well as sword or dagger. As they spent many weeks together, these men could usually be relied upon to know basic formations and drills and to carry them out even in the heat of battle. In 1298, however, this armoured infantry was very much in a minority in Edward’s army. It is thought there were only about 3,000 of them.
Far more numerous were the Welsh and Irish mercenaries whom Edward had hired for the summer. These men had fought well for several seasons in France and served for hard cash only.
The Welsh were hired for their skills in archery. They came to battle effectively unarmoured, though most had helmets and many had light armour of various kinds. They were equipped with the longbow. This formidable weapon was up to six feet long and made of yew. It could shoot an arrow with startling accuracy and enormous power. A man needed years to learn to use a long bow effectively, but its arrows could pierce armour at ranges up to 100 yards and the aim was extremely accurate at such distances. Edward had about 8,000 Welsh archers with him at Falkirk.
The Irish lacked any such speciality. They fought unarmoured and were equipped with spear and knife. Their key weapon was the double-handed axe which they had borrowed from the Vikings. This formidable weapon could slice a man in half and bludgeon its way through any sort of armour, but it took great skill and long hours of practice to wield it effectively. The main use of these men on campaign was to guard camps and to raid the countryside through which the army passed, but they could be handy in a defensive battle. The numbers of Irish in Edward’s army is unknown.
Edward also had a large force of knights, perhaps as many as 2,000. Again these were, in theory, raised on the basis of a feudal levy but in practice many who held lands paid scutage instead. Most knights with Edward were paid fighters, but they were distinctly less professional than the infantry. Knights were more inclined to ignore orders and to make their own minds up about what needed doing. As proud aristocrats in a military society they were keen to win glory and honour in battle - especially younger sons who had little hope of inheriting family wealth.
from ENGLAND VS SCOTLAND by Rupert Matthews.
Buy your copy HERE
It was these part-time semi-professional infantry who had formed the bulk of previous English armies. They were equipped with varying degrees of armour, a large triangular shield and an 8 foot spear as well as sword or dagger. As they spent many weeks together, these men could usually be relied upon to know basic formations and drills and to carry them out even in the heat of battle. In 1298, however, this armoured infantry was very much in a minority in Edward’s army. It is thought there were only about 3,000 of them.
Far more numerous were the Welsh and Irish mercenaries whom Edward had hired for the summer. These men had fought well for several seasons in France and served for hard cash only.
The Welsh were hired for their skills in archery. They came to battle effectively unarmoured, though most had helmets and many had light armour of various kinds. They were equipped with the longbow. This formidable weapon was up to six feet long and made of yew. It could shoot an arrow with startling accuracy and enormous power. A man needed years to learn to use a long bow effectively, but its arrows could pierce armour at ranges up to 100 yards and the aim was extremely accurate at such distances. Edward had about 8,000 Welsh archers with him at Falkirk.
The Irish lacked any such speciality. They fought unarmoured and were equipped with spear and knife. Their key weapon was the double-handed axe which they had borrowed from the Vikings. This formidable weapon could slice a man in half and bludgeon its way through any sort of armour, but it took great skill and long hours of practice to wield it effectively. The main use of these men on campaign was to guard camps and to raid the countryside through which the army passed, but they could be handy in a defensive battle. The numbers of Irish in Edward’s army is unknown.
Edward also had a large force of knights, perhaps as many as 2,000. Again these were, in theory, raised on the basis of a feudal levy but in practice many who held lands paid scutage instead. Most knights with Edward were paid fighters, but they were distinctly less professional than the infantry. Knights were more inclined to ignore orders and to make their own minds up about what needed doing. As proud aristocrats in a military society they were keen to win glory and honour in battle - especially younger sons who had little hope of inheriting family wealth.
from ENGLAND VS SCOTLAND by Rupert Matthews.
Buy your copy HERE
October 12, 2012
Xerxes at Themopylae
Xerxes had provided carts to march alongside the army, but these were not intended for long distance transport. Instead they were expected to carry out short term duties only. Within the Persian empire they would have carried supplies from one pre-prepared supply dump to the next. In Greece, where there were no such prearranged food supplies, the carts would have been intended to carry food from a port where the fleet had put in to the army camped a short distance away. In hostile territory they could have carried supplies looted from the local populace.
Some idea of how seriously bad road transport was in the ancient world can be gathered from events in the Roman province of Coele, now northern Syria, in ad362. A drought struck the area and famine resulted. The drought had not affected the entire region and large stocks of food were available in granaries at Tyre some 70km away. But the drought that had caused the famine had also dried off all fodder crops, effectively halting the ox carts. Unable to transport food to the people, the government ordered the people to walk to the food. Thousands died along the road, but there was nothing that could be done to help them.
This then was the problem facing Xerxes. His food was running out and he had no way of getting any more except to batter his way through the Pass of Thermopylae to the rich, fertile plains of Boeotia beyond.
The time of waiting was over. The time of killing was about to begin.
from THE BATTLE OF THEMOPYLAE by Rupert Matthews.
Buy your copy HERE
About the book
Tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here obedient
to their laws we lie. One of the most remarkable actions in ancient or
modern military history took place at Thermopylae in 480BC. Rupert
Matthews has personally examined the battlefield in order to try to
explain how 300 Spartans could hold at bay the hordes of the Persian
Emperor Xerxes. This was no vain sacrifice; the delay gave breathing
space for the Greek states to organise their defence, and ultimately
defend successfully their homelands. Among other intriguing revelations
the author explains the importance of the half-ruined wall that
sheltered the Spartans against the onslaught. With concise diagrams and
maps of the entire campaign, the reader can begin to understand the
extraordinary, apparently impossible outcome of the war.
Some idea of how seriously bad road transport was in the ancient world can be gathered from events in the Roman province of Coele, now northern Syria, in ad362. A drought struck the area and famine resulted. The drought had not affected the entire region and large stocks of food were available in granaries at Tyre some 70km away. But the drought that had caused the famine had also dried off all fodder crops, effectively halting the ox carts. Unable to transport food to the people, the government ordered the people to walk to the food. Thousands died along the road, but there was nothing that could be done to help them.
This then was the problem facing Xerxes. His food was running out and he had no way of getting any more except to batter his way through the Pass of Thermopylae to the rich, fertile plains of Boeotia beyond.
The time of waiting was over. The time of killing was about to begin.
from THE BATTLE OF THEMOPYLAE by Rupert Matthews.
Buy your copy HERE
About the book
Tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here obedient
to their laws we lie. One of the most remarkable actions in ancient or
modern military history took place at Thermopylae in 480BC. Rupert
Matthews has personally examined the battlefield in order to try to
explain how 300 Spartans could hold at bay the hordes of the Persian
Emperor Xerxes. This was no vain sacrifice; the delay gave breathing
space for the Greek states to organise their defence, and ultimately
defend successfully their homelands. Among other intriguing revelations
the author explains the importance of the half-ruined wall that
sheltered the Spartans against the onslaught. With concise diagrams and
maps of the entire campaign, the reader can begin to understand the
extraordinary, apparently impossible outcome of the war.
October 11, 2012
Sir Francis Drake's Golden Hind
[image error]
The replica Golden Hind in Brixham, Devon, is open to the public and offers a good view of what life was like aboard these 16th century sailing ships.
The Golden Hind was a converted merchant ship adapted to carry heavy guns and a fighting crew. Although Drake remodelled her according to his new ideas on naval warfare, she was still very different from the race built galleons that were beginning to be produced at this time.
from "The Spanish Armada" by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
About the book
In this, the fourth book of Spellmount's "Campaign in Context" series,
Rupert Matthews looks to the ill-fated invasion of England by King
Philip II of Spain. The Armada of 22 warships and 108 converted merchant
vessels sailed under the command of the Duke of Medina Sidonia in 1588,
but found itself harried by storms, fireships, and the redoubtable
English fleet. In "The Spanish Armada", Rupert Matthews considers the
characters of the commanders such as Francis Drake, Medina, and the
opposing monarchs, and as with his previous titles in the series he
carefully balances the evidence from textual sources with knowledge of
the theatre and reconstructed weaponry in order to explain the events of
the battle to the general reader, and the context in which it took
place.
October 10, 2012
Feeding Alexander the Great's Army on the March
We do not know exactly how the different units organised their transport, but the system for the pezhetairoi at least is clear.
[image error]
Each file of 16 infantry men had a servant and a pack animal to carry their immediate equipment. We know that each man had to carry his own armour and weapons, but he was not expected to carry anything else. Tents, cooking pots, mugs, handmills and other equipment was left to the servant and horse. We don’t know how much all this gear weighed in the Macedonian army, but in the later Roman army - another ancient force famed for its logistics when marching - it came to about 200kg.
That left around 320kg of spare carrying capacity. On campaign, this would have been allocated for the food needed by the file unit. The carrying capacity of the horse and rate at which the food it carried was consumed would put a limit on how long the army could operate without replenishing the stores from ships, cities or other sources.
Average marching conditions can be assumed to consist of good weather, reasonably level tracks and a daily march rate of about 27km or so. Under such conditions the absolute minimum that a man would need when carrying the sorts of loads that a pezhetairoi had was about 1.5kg of grain. Ideally this should be supplemented by another 500g or so of dried fruit, dried fish, hard cheese or other foods to supply the nutrients lacking in grain. A fit man could do without these additional foods for a few days without suffering ill effects, but for no more than a week if his ability to march and fight were not to be impaired.
The horse, meanwhile, would need at least 4.5 kg of grain plus another 5kg or so of hay, chaff or straw. This could be reduced if the horse was allowed time to graze, but grazing would cut the daily march rate.
For a group of 16 pezhetairoi, one servant and one horse the daily requirement for food on the march adds up to a total of 43.5kg, which could be reduced to 35kg for short periods of a few days only. The 320 kg that could be carried on the horse would be consumed within seven days.
from "Alexander the Great at the Battle of the Granicus" by Rupert Matthews.
Buy your copy HERE
About the book
In this, the third book of Spellmounts Campaign in Context
series, Rupert Matthews looks to the first major campaign of Alexander
the Great. One of the most famous generals all time, Alexander was just
20 when he led his army into battle at Granicus. Despite his youth and
his army being heavily outnumbered, he was victorious, and it was this
victory that allowed him to conquer Asia Minor. The course of this key
battle remains controversial, owing to conflicting accounts in
contemporary sources. As with his previous titles in the series, Rupert
Matthews carefully balances the evidence from textual sources with
knowledge of the battlefield and reconstructed weaponry in order to
explain the events of the battle to the general reader, and the context
in which it took place.
[image error]
Each file of 16 infantry men had a servant and a pack animal to carry their immediate equipment. We know that each man had to carry his own armour and weapons, but he was not expected to carry anything else. Tents, cooking pots, mugs, handmills and other equipment was left to the servant and horse. We don’t know how much all this gear weighed in the Macedonian army, but in the later Roman army - another ancient force famed for its logistics when marching - it came to about 200kg.
That left around 320kg of spare carrying capacity. On campaign, this would have been allocated for the food needed by the file unit. The carrying capacity of the horse and rate at which the food it carried was consumed would put a limit on how long the army could operate without replenishing the stores from ships, cities or other sources.
Average marching conditions can be assumed to consist of good weather, reasonably level tracks and a daily march rate of about 27km or so. Under such conditions the absolute minimum that a man would need when carrying the sorts of loads that a pezhetairoi had was about 1.5kg of grain. Ideally this should be supplemented by another 500g or so of dried fruit, dried fish, hard cheese or other foods to supply the nutrients lacking in grain. A fit man could do without these additional foods for a few days without suffering ill effects, but for no more than a week if his ability to march and fight were not to be impaired.
The horse, meanwhile, would need at least 4.5 kg of grain plus another 5kg or so of hay, chaff or straw. This could be reduced if the horse was allowed time to graze, but grazing would cut the daily march rate.
For a group of 16 pezhetairoi, one servant and one horse the daily requirement for food on the march adds up to a total of 43.5kg, which could be reduced to 35kg for short periods of a few days only. The 320 kg that could be carried on the horse would be consumed within seven days.
from "Alexander the Great at the Battle of the Granicus" by Rupert Matthews.
Buy your copy HERE
About the book
In this, the third book of Spellmounts Campaign in Context
series, Rupert Matthews looks to the first major campaign of Alexander
the Great. One of the most famous generals all time, Alexander was just
20 when he led his army into battle at Granicus. Despite his youth and
his army being heavily outnumbered, he was victorious, and it was this
victory that allowed him to conquer Asia Minor. The course of this key
battle remains controversial, owing to conflicting accounts in
contemporary sources. As with his previous titles in the series, Rupert
Matthews carefully balances the evidence from textual sources with
knowledge of the battlefield and reconstructed weaponry in order to
explain the events of the battle to the general reader, and the context
in which it took place.
October 5, 2012
King Philip of France Challenges King Edward III of England
France 1339
By October Edward was camped outside St Quentin, yet another
city which he was failing to capture. Suddenly news came that King Philip was
approaching with the main French army to confront the invaders. A herald rode
into the camp of the English and their allies with a message from Philip. It
was couched in the hackneyed diplomatic phrases of the time. Philip condemned
Edward for his actions, repeated the condemnation of him as a rebellious vassal
and ended by challenging him to battle at a place and time of his choosing.
Ever wanting to be seen as the perfect knight of chivalry,
Edward promptly accepted the challenge and sent scouts out to select a suitable
battlefield. Philip was taken aback by the eagerness of the English king to
face the French army, and at once began to prevaricate. Excuses were found why
the battle had to be delayed, and then delayed again. Meanwhile, Edward’s allies
were getting nervous. A border raid was one thing, but facing up to the royal
army of France was something else entirely. Using the fact that supplies were
running low, the rulers of Brabant and Brandenburg forced Edward to fall back
out of France.
Philip watched the English retreat. As he had expected, the
English king had backed down when faced by the prospect of a pitched battle
against the full might of France. The event confirmed him and his subordinates
in the belief that they had by far the best army in Christendom, and that this
fact was recognised by the English. Philip must have believed that raids and
pillaging of undefended country areas could be expected of the English, but
successful attacks on major cities were beyond them. Still less would the
English dare face up to the French king and the French army.
Content that the war would grind on in desultory fashion and
end in a compromise peace, Philip went home.
from THE BATTLE OF CRECY by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
Rupert Matthews tells the story of the most dramatic
military campaign of the medieval world, a thrilling tale of action,
adventure, mystery and much more. Before the Crecy campaign began,
France was recognised to have the greatest, most powerful and most
modern army in all Christendom. England was thought of as a prosperous
but relatively backward kingdom lying somewhere in the sea off the
European coast. But six hours of bloodshed, slaughter and heroism beyond
imagining changed all that. The pride of France was humbled, her army
destroyed and her king a wounded fugitive fleeing for his life through a
foggy night. This book explains to the general reader the reality of
warfare in the year 1346. It seeks to recreate in our minds the tactics
used in the Crecy Campaign and to put them into the context of the time.
It shows what the weapons were like and how they were used in action.
It describes the tactics of the different military units involved and
how these would have impacted on each other in battle. Crucially, it
takes the reader inside the minds of the commanders to explain what they
did, why they did it and what they hoped to achieve. This is the
second in Spellmount's new series, "Campaign in Context".
By October Edward was camped outside St Quentin, yet another
city which he was failing to capture. Suddenly news came that King Philip was
approaching with the main French army to confront the invaders. A herald rode
into the camp of the English and their allies with a message from Philip. It
was couched in the hackneyed diplomatic phrases of the time. Philip condemned
Edward for his actions, repeated the condemnation of him as a rebellious vassal
and ended by challenging him to battle at a place and time of his choosing.
Ever wanting to be seen as the perfect knight of chivalry,
Edward promptly accepted the challenge and sent scouts out to select a suitable
battlefield. Philip was taken aback by the eagerness of the English king to
face the French army, and at once began to prevaricate. Excuses were found why
the battle had to be delayed, and then delayed again. Meanwhile, Edward’s allies
were getting nervous. A border raid was one thing, but facing up to the royal
army of France was something else entirely. Using the fact that supplies were
running low, the rulers of Brabant and Brandenburg forced Edward to fall back
out of France.
Philip watched the English retreat. As he had expected, the
English king had backed down when faced by the prospect of a pitched battle
against the full might of France. The event confirmed him and his subordinates
in the belief that they had by far the best army in Christendom, and that this
fact was recognised by the English. Philip must have believed that raids and
pillaging of undefended country areas could be expected of the English, but
successful attacks on major cities were beyond them. Still less would the
English dare face up to the French king and the French army.
Content that the war would grind on in desultory fashion and
end in a compromise peace, Philip went home.
from THE BATTLE OF CRECY by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
Rupert Matthews tells the story of the most dramatic
military campaign of the medieval world, a thrilling tale of action,
adventure, mystery and much more. Before the Crecy campaign began,
France was recognised to have the greatest, most powerful and most
modern army in all Christendom. England was thought of as a prosperous
but relatively backward kingdom lying somewhere in the sea off the
European coast. But six hours of bloodshed, slaughter and heroism beyond
imagining changed all that. The pride of France was humbled, her army
destroyed and her king a wounded fugitive fleeing for his life through a
foggy night. This book explains to the general reader the reality of
warfare in the year 1346. It seeks to recreate in our minds the tactics
used in the Crecy Campaign and to put them into the context of the time.
It shows what the weapons were like and how they were used in action.
It describes the tactics of the different military units involved and
how these would have impacted on each other in battle. Crucially, it
takes the reader inside the minds of the commanders to explain what they
did, why they did it and what they hoped to achieve. This is the
second in Spellmount's new series, "Campaign in Context".
October 3, 2012
Lucky Survivors - RAF Bomber Command
[image error]The Whitleys of No.77 Squadron were sent out on another such
raid in June 1940, this time to the Ruhr. The crew led by Pilot Officer Andrew Dunn soon
learned that these missions were to be very different from the earlier
“nickels”. Knowing that the British bombers had been carrying only leaflets,
the Germans made little real effort to intercept them. Nor did the Germans want
to give away the positions of their searchlight and flak batteries when the
only target on offer was a lone bomber that would be difficult to hit. When the
British bombers came over in numbers armed with bombs the German response was
very different.
As Dunn and his crew approached the Ruhr they were subjected
to prolonged flak fire while searchlights weaved across the night sky. Dunn
evaded the lights, but could not escape the flak. His aircraft was several
times hit by shrapnel, though none of the crew were injured and no serious
damage was done. The bombs were dropped and Dunn turned thankfully away from
the Ruhr to head back to base at Driffield.
Suddenly everything changed as a hail of bullets tore
through the Whitley. Sergeant J. Dawson, wireless operator, and Sergeant B.
Savill, navigator, were both seriously injured and the intercom was knocked
out. As Dunn glanced around in alarm the ominous dark shape of a Messerschmitt
Bf109 flashed by in the night. Seconds later Pilot Officer, Leslie Watt, the
rear gunner, saw a second Bf109 diving down to attack from behind the bomber.
Unable to alert Dunn to the new threat, Watt moved his turret to get his guns
to bear and opened fire. Flames burst from the cowling of the Bf109, which went
into a blazing dive toward the ground. The German had, however, knocked out one
of the bomber’s two engines.
Alone in the night sky once again, the Whitley droned
northwest on its sole engine. The second pilot, Pilot Officer Charles Montagu,
began to prepare the crew to abandon the aircraft, but found that Dawson was
too badly injured to be able to bale out with much chance of survival. A
hurried discussion followed as to what to do. It was decided that the crew
would risk trying to cross the North Sea on one engine, with the consequent
danger of ditching at night, rather than abandon Dawson.
The Whitley was losing height steadily and as the Englishcoast loomed into view it was down to only 400 feet. Rather than risk crossing
the coast and then failing to find a flat field in which to land, Dunn opted to
pancake down into the sea close to shore. In a Whitley this was an even
trickier proposition than in other aircraft as the bomber’s broad wings tended
to create a cushion of air against the ground or sea at low levels that
required a definite shove on the controls to overcome. Dunn managed to splash
down successfully and his crew took to their dinghy to paddle ashore. They all
survived.
from "RAF Bomber Command at War" by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
September 29, 2012
The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession
In 1700 King Charles II of Spain, the last of the Spanish branch of the Hapsburg Dynasty, died without children. His closest heir was Duke Philip of Anjou, his sister’s grandson. Unfortunately, Philip was also a grandson of King Louis XIV of France and so might conceivably inherit both crowns. Louis was delighted, but most other European countries were horrified. The prospects of the two most powerful states in the world being united was a direct threat. War broke out in 1701 with France, Spain and Bavaria being pitched against Britain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Dutch Republic and numerous smaller states. After much bloodletting the war ended with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Philip was allowed to become King of Spain, but only on condition that he renounced all claim to the French throne and gave Spanish lands in Italy and the Netherlands to the Austrian Hapsburg’s. Britain gained Gibraltar from the Spanish and various French colonies in North America and the Caribbean.
At this date, infantry were armed with smoothbore muskets to which bayonets could be fitted. The muskets had a range of about 100 yards, but were highly inaccurate. To get effective fire it was necessary to fire hundreds of muskets at the same time. For this reason infantry formed in formations three or four men deep and 200 men wide standing shoulder to shoulder. British infantry, such as Meredith’s Regiment, were proudly able to fire three times a minute which gave them the edge in a straight fire fight with most continental infantry. Like all British infantry, Meredith’s men wore a long red coat reaching to their knees over white trousers and black boots. To distinguish the regiments it was usual for the cuffs, collar and other “facings” to be of a distinctive colour. Meredith’s Regiment had bright yellow facings while button holes and the like were edged in white. Officers wore silver lace. Men and officers wore black felt tricorn hats, those of the men edged in white and officers in silver.
Cavalry were armed with carbines — even less accurate than muskets — and swords. They would skirmish with their carbines, or charge with swords. Artillery fired solid cannonballs over a ranges of up to 1,000 yards with reasonable accuracy. At short range cannon fired grapeshot, a bag containing dozens of musket balls that spread like shot from a shot gun.
from "The Battle Honours of the Royal Hampshire Regiment" by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
Buy your ebook version HERE
About the book
The history of the Royal Hampshire Regiment and its predecessors as traced through the Battle Honours won by the regiment.
At this date, infantry were armed with smoothbore muskets to which bayonets could be fitted. The muskets had a range of about 100 yards, but were highly inaccurate. To get effective fire it was necessary to fire hundreds of muskets at the same time. For this reason infantry formed in formations three or four men deep and 200 men wide standing shoulder to shoulder. British infantry, such as Meredith’s Regiment, were proudly able to fire three times a minute which gave them the edge in a straight fire fight with most continental infantry. Like all British infantry, Meredith’s men wore a long red coat reaching to their knees over white trousers and black boots. To distinguish the regiments it was usual for the cuffs, collar and other “facings” to be of a distinctive colour. Meredith’s Regiment had bright yellow facings while button holes and the like were edged in white. Officers wore silver lace. Men and officers wore black felt tricorn hats, those of the men edged in white and officers in silver.
Cavalry were armed with carbines — even less accurate than muskets — and swords. They would skirmish with their carbines, or charge with swords. Artillery fired solid cannonballs over a ranges of up to 1,000 yards with reasonable accuracy. At short range cannon fired grapeshot, a bag containing dozens of musket balls that spread like shot from a shot gun.
from "The Battle Honours of the Royal Hampshire Regiment" by Rupert Matthews
Buy your copy HERE
Buy your ebook version HERE
About the book
The history of the Royal Hampshire Regiment and its predecessors as traced through the Battle Honours won by the regiment.
