Christopher Zoukis's Blog - Posts Tagged "texas"
Everything’s bigger in Texas—except the willingness to prosecute prison rape
The federal Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) came into effect in 2003. A mere twelve years later, the state of Texas has finally seen fit to actually to take measures to ensure its compliance with the Act. After its passing, many will remember infamous then-Governor and one-time Presidential candidate Rick Perry’s callous disregard for rape victims, citing the onerous regulation and cumbersome costs as justification for not complying with the law, thus lending his tacit support to sexual assault in public institutions.
However, this past week, current Governor Greg Abbott registered his intent with federal authorities to ensure the state’s compliance with the Act, detailing the measures to be undertaken to do so, and providing a general budget. But some are concerned that simply registering the state’s intent is insufficient bond—especially given that the state was given a free ride for a dozen years. “’We actually don't think DOJ should have accepted this as an assurance," said Daley. ‘We just think there's clear statutory language and DOJ should have enforced that clear statutory language and should have not created a “Texas assurance.”’”
Texas’ incredible lag in implementing these measure is particularly confounding, given that sexual contact between staff and prisoners is a felony. Yet as Newsweek revealed earlier this year, officials frequently get a slap on the wrist when it comes to assaults, crowning the state with the dubious title of “Prison Rape Capital of the US.” The report highlights the gaps in PREA, which do not adequately address the issues of prosecuting prison staff. The result in the case of Texas was that “the PREA commission suggested adopting a rule that jails and prisons seek written agreements with local prosecutors, to encourage the pursuit of criminal charges. But the Justice Department ultimately declined this recommendation, saying it would cause ‘significant burdens’, particularly on resource-strapped counties and municipalities.”
The "significant burden" that resulted from the failure of Texas to take sexual assault in prison seriously, is that for over a decade Texas prison officials were given legal protection to sexually abuse, and/or allow the abuse of, inmates. That’s the kind of burden that’s not easily borne by its victims.
However, this past week, current Governor Greg Abbott registered his intent with federal authorities to ensure the state’s compliance with the Act, detailing the measures to be undertaken to do so, and providing a general budget. But some are concerned that simply registering the state’s intent is insufficient bond—especially given that the state was given a free ride for a dozen years. “’We actually don't think DOJ should have accepted this as an assurance," said Daley. ‘We just think there's clear statutory language and DOJ should have enforced that clear statutory language and should have not created a “Texas assurance.”’”
Texas’ incredible lag in implementing these measure is particularly confounding, given that sexual contact between staff and prisoners is a felony. Yet as Newsweek revealed earlier this year, officials frequently get a slap on the wrist when it comes to assaults, crowning the state with the dubious title of “Prison Rape Capital of the US.” The report highlights the gaps in PREA, which do not adequately address the issues of prosecuting prison staff. The result in the case of Texas was that “the PREA commission suggested adopting a rule that jails and prisons seek written agreements with local prosecutors, to encourage the pursuit of criminal charges. But the Justice Department ultimately declined this recommendation, saying it would cause ‘significant burdens’, particularly on resource-strapped counties and municipalities.”
The "significant burden" that resulted from the failure of Texas to take sexual assault in prison seriously, is that for over a decade Texas prison officials were given legal protection to sexually abuse, and/or allow the abuse of, inmates. That’s the kind of burden that’s not easily borne by its victims.
Intellectual Disability Test Methods in Texas Death Penalty Cases
In a 5-3 decision March 28, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the methods that Texas has been using to gauge whether a defendant’s intellectual ability should spare them the death penalty.
The appeal was for Bobby James Moore, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 1980 for fatally shooting an elderly Houston supermarket clerk during a botched robbery. Twenty years old at the time, Moore spent 19 years on Death Row before winning a new trial, due to ineffective assistance of counsel. But on retrial in 2001, he was again convicted and given a death sentence.
In 2014, Moore’s lawyers sought to persuade a state court he was intellectually disabled to a degree that made sentencing him to death unconstitutional. That court agreed, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected its recommendation, finding Moore was not severely impaired enough to be exempt from the death penalty.
On appeal, Moore’s lawyers challenged the state appeals court’s reading of constitution law. The leading federal case, Atkins v. Virginia, set down a basic rule in 2002: executing mentally disabled convicts violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Atkins didn’t set standards on how states should determine mental disability in capital cases, however.
In 2014, in Hall v. Florida, the Supreme Court rejected that state’s use of an IQ score of 70 as precluding mental disability, saying state determinations must be “informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.” So the central issue the Supreme Court faced in Moore v. Texas was whether the way Texas made that determination in Moore’s case squared with the high court’s earlier cases.
The majority opinion, from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, found it did not. The court which had recommended exempting Moore from the death penalty, it noted, used a generally accepted test, consistent with modern diagnostic standards, with three core parts – mental functioning defects, evidenced by such things as an IQ of roughly 70; adaptive deficits, such as inability to learn basic skills or change behavior to fit changed circumstances; and the onset of such deficits before the age of majority.
Ginsburg cited evidence the first court had found about Moore, a ninth-grade dropout who by age 13 could barely read, write or even tell time or understand common measurement units. In contrast, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied on state case law, which imposed added requirements, based on a 1992 psychology manual no longer accepted by most experts, and added seven “evidence factors” of its own devising, such as whether those who knew the individual treated him or her as mentally disabled. It also faulted the Texas criminal appeals court for relying on IQ scores Moore had received without considering those tests’ margins of error.
While the Court’s earlier decisions allow states leeway in making mental disability determinations, the majority vacated Moore’s death sentence, based on the state's use of outdated medical standards and other factors lacking scientific basis. A dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts, with Justices Alito and Thomas, would have accepted the state’s reliance on an IQ score of 74 for Moore, and complained the majority opinion gave states insufficient guidance on how to determine mental disability.
The appeal was for Bobby James Moore, convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 1980 for fatally shooting an elderly Houston supermarket clerk during a botched robbery. Twenty years old at the time, Moore spent 19 years on Death Row before winning a new trial, due to ineffective assistance of counsel. But on retrial in 2001, he was again convicted and given a death sentence.
In 2014, Moore’s lawyers sought to persuade a state court he was intellectually disabled to a degree that made sentencing him to death unconstitutional. That court agreed, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected its recommendation, finding Moore was not severely impaired enough to be exempt from the death penalty.
On appeal, Moore’s lawyers challenged the state appeals court’s reading of constitution law. The leading federal case, Atkins v. Virginia, set down a basic rule in 2002: executing mentally disabled convicts violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Atkins didn’t set standards on how states should determine mental disability in capital cases, however.
In 2014, in Hall v. Florida, the Supreme Court rejected that state’s use of an IQ score of 70 as precluding mental disability, saying state determinations must be “informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.” So the central issue the Supreme Court faced in Moore v. Texas was whether the way Texas made that determination in Moore’s case squared with the high court’s earlier cases.
The majority opinion, from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, found it did not. The court which had recommended exempting Moore from the death penalty, it noted, used a generally accepted test, consistent with modern diagnostic standards, with three core parts – mental functioning defects, evidenced by such things as an IQ of roughly 70; adaptive deficits, such as inability to learn basic skills or change behavior to fit changed circumstances; and the onset of such deficits before the age of majority.
Ginsburg cited evidence the first court had found about Moore, a ninth-grade dropout who by age 13 could barely read, write or even tell time or understand common measurement units. In contrast, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied on state case law, which imposed added requirements, based on a 1992 psychology manual no longer accepted by most experts, and added seven “evidence factors” of its own devising, such as whether those who knew the individual treated him or her as mentally disabled. It also faulted the Texas criminal appeals court for relying on IQ scores Moore had received without considering those tests’ margins of error.
While the Court’s earlier decisions allow states leeway in making mental disability determinations, the majority vacated Moore’s death sentence, based on the state's use of outdated medical standards and other factors lacking scientific basis. A dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts, with Justices Alito and Thomas, would have accepted the state’s reliance on an IQ score of 74 for Moore, and complained the majority opinion gave states insufficient guidance on how to determine mental disability.
