John C. Wright's Blog, page 21

May 13, 2015

Superversive Blog: the Age of Nagging

My lovely and talented wife has written an eye-opening column, and one that explains much of the madness of modern moral hypocrisy, now that we live in the Age of Nagging.


Read the whole thing: http://www.ljagilamplighter.com/2015/05/13/superversive-blog-trigger-warning-or-smelling-salts/


The Victorians are renowned for their hypocrisy—but you have to shoot high, to have noble standards, to have whole portions of society bother trying to pretend to live up to them. And for all those who only pretended to be virtuous, or Christian, or caring, there were those who actually did live up to these noble goals. Those who helped fight slavery or poverty or a thousand other ills.


The Victorians might have been judgmental, but they valued rationality and carried themselves with dignity.


They had the virtues of their vices.


Not so the Neo-Victorians (Neo-Vics for short), by which I mean this new brand of social do-gooder that is so popular today. Like the Victorians, they make a career out of rushing around and trying to improve things by pushing their noses into other people’s business. Unlike the Victorians, they are totally lacking in dignity.


They do not have the virtues of their vices.


But there is another way in which the Neo-Vics are like their predecessors. Victorian women are famous for their delicacy. Women of earlier eras did not faint away at the sight of a mouse or at an uncouth word. (Pioneer women, for instance, did not faint away at anything.) Nor did the ladies of, say, Queen Elizabeth’s day.


Fainting spells and hysterics came from two things: one, tight corsets—not a problem we have today. (Thank, God!) Two, hysterics were a way to show disapproval. If one fainted away at the very mention of something, men at least had to keep it out of the drawing rooms.


Sadly, we are seeing that again today.


Colleges used to be a place where people went to confront daring ideas and learn from them. Now, even 2000 year old Ovid’s Metamorphoses is so objectionable that students are demanding that they not be asked to read it unless the university provides them with atrigger warning, to prepare them ahead of time for the vile humanity reflected within.


But is it really a trigger warning they need…or smelling salts?


My comment: The tight corsets things is a myth, by the way. Victorian women fainted because they were proud of their delicacy, in order to be proud of the manliness of their menfolk.


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Published on May 13, 2015 09:44

May 12, 2015

On the Unwritten Code

A meme currently circulating among the Social Justice Warriors in their relentless attempts to made poor, poor big-eyed puppies sad with their heaping awards upon talent-free uberleftist message fiction is that Larry Correia and Brad Torgersen and Vox Day, merely by asking fans to read and nominate worthy works, have violated the strict and scrupulously observed unwritten code of gentlemen forbidding the crassness of asking for votes in public.


Asking for votes in private, or if you are a Politically Correct leftist in good standing, of course, provokes no furor, as it is evidently not a violation.


I call it a meme because it is a thoughtless and absurd white noise of words, a self replicating sentence phrase that means nothing and says nothing. It is an accusation leveled because the accusers have run out of other, more credible, accusations, and they are not well behaved enough to shut their mouths with dignity after their case has been argued and lost.


Need I answer this hairball of absurdity they have coughed up?


No, but I shall:


I do not consider myself to be bound by an unwritten code that binds only me and leaves rivals and illwishers free to work their will as they see fit.


The unwritten code did not protect me when I and mine were grossly libeled in the Guardian, Slate, Salon, io9 and Entertainment Weekly with the most outrageous and perfidious defamation imaginable.


My crime is that I have a sufficient number of fans who admire my work to put me on the ballot. It was all aboveboard, scrupulously honest, legal, cricket, and according to Hoyle.


In return, I am accused of being a White Supremacist motivated by race-hatred, being a sexist motivated by misogyny,  being a homophone (or whatever their make-believe word is) motivated by a psychopathological paranoia, and being a flying purple people eater motivated by aerial aubergine anthropophagy.


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Published on May 12, 2015 21:03

johncwright @ 2015-05-12T09:59:00

From a disappointed fan of mine:


“I remember discovering your fantasy novel Last Guardians of Everness with a

great deal of delight. Here was a new author who could write with a fine

and imaginative hand. Then I came upon the Golden Oecumene series and was

totally blown away. What a great vision! This was classic stuff. I wondered

why I hadn’t heard more about you. So I picked up the Eschaton books and

read on.


Then came the Rabid Puppy/Sad Puppy debacle and I was heartbroken. Not

because your beliefs and mine are so different, but because you and your

fellow Puppies were so *rude*. You, Vox, Day, and Torgenson tore into the

heart of fandom out of sheer cussedness and that’s it. Your arguments for

nominating a slate and violating the unwritten code underlying the Hugos

were irrational and make no sense outside of the right-wing “reality

bubble.”


And as I use No Award to wipe the Hugo Awards clean of the lame and useless

Puppy nominees that you claim are “award-winning” (and I looked too), I

look back at the Golden Oecumene and remember when you were someone I

admired.


Yours,


Rob Thornton

Catonsville, MD”


It is a hard letter to read. I aim to please by readers, and when I fail, the fault is mine.


Nonetheless, it merits an answer. My answer is this:

http://www.apex-magazine.com/if-you-were-a-dinosaur-my-love/


and


http://www.scifiwright.com/2014/11/the-queen-of-the-tyrant-lizards/


 


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Published on May 12, 2015 06:59

Attach Watch – Reprise

The denial of service attack launched by parties unknown against my site has been fended off by the bravery and persistence of my webgoblin. However, host has not done what he requested as yet, so it’s possible that some of the recent commenters will not be able to log in. We hope that can be fixed tomorrow.


At the moment, we are back open for business.


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Published on May 12, 2015 06:26

May 8, 2015

Virtuous Atheism and Partial Truth

Part of an ongoing discussion. Regarding the debate over atheism and nihilism, a reader with the bold and military name of Stilicho comments:



The question here is whether the honest atheist who believes in an absolute and objective standard of morality is committing a logical contradiction?”


It comes down to whether you think that an atheist can deduce objective morality from nature without reference to nature’s God. I think our hypothetical atheist CAN do so, honestly and incorrectly. The problem lies in the fact that this atheist MUST choose a standard for what is good or moral. Utilitarian– most benefit for the most people? Selfish–most benefit for me? Natural order– this is what I can observe in how nature functions (leaving aside the question of the source of observable natural law)? Some other standard? These can all be viewed as rational, logical choices, but choices they remain.


“Ultimately, the atheist’s choice is self-referential because he chooses the standard that appeals to him. In that sense, the atheist is not a nihilist using your definitions above, but instead of saying there is no meaning, he says my choices impart meaning.”


Now here you raise a very interesting problem. The rational atheists I know or knew personally could both deduce, rationally and without error from first principles, either a duty-based or a pleasure-based system of ethics, that is, stoicism or hedonism.


The Stoic did not chose his metrics based on personal preference, but the Hedonist did. Both could (using different chains of reasoning) deduce and justify the classical virtues of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance.


But neither could explain acts of self-sacrifice, and both called them immoral rather than moral. Neither could deduce the Christian virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity.


If we define ‘ethics’ as including only the cardinal virtues and called the Christian virtues ‘super-ethics’ or some higher form of moral thinking, then we can say that an ethical atheist is possible.


If, however, we are a little more honest in our definition, and we call all virtues ‘ethics’ then the atheist is only able to deduce the pagan ethics which serve only on sunny days when self sacrifice is not called for. A peacetime ethics, as it were, but no good for storms or emergencies; an ethic good enough for every day of your life except the last.


Anyone persuaded that this is a valid approach must admit that an atheist can be mostly ethical, for example, as ethical as Aristotle, who famously fled Athens when the democracy turned on him. He can be a great souled man. He cannot rationally account for being as ethical as Socrates, who did not flee, and for whom truth was more important than life. He cannot be a saint.


But the harder argument to make is to show that the atheist, or, for that matter, the virtuous pagan, the great souled man, commits a logical self contradiction if he rejects nihilism. I have yet to see such an argument.


Stilicho concludes:


“A truly objective standard of morality, on the other hand, must be determined outside of influences that exist upon the stage where the standard is imposed. Our hypothetical atheist does not get to that level of inquiry because while he may deduce the existence of an objective morality, he does not pursue that to its origins, but, instead, stops his inquiry when he chooses his metrics.


Our hypothetical atheist does not get to that level of inquiry because while he may deduce the existence of an objective morality, he does not pursue that to its origins, but, instead, stops his inquiry when he chooses his metrics.”


I think this is exactly right, and have nothing to add. The virtuous atheist, like the virtuous pagan, sees part of the picture, and that part, he sees rightly.


But he lacks the whole picture. It is not illogical, but it is incomplete.


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Published on May 08, 2015 09:43

May 7, 2015

Convince me Logic is Useful

Only since departing from the august ranks of the “brights” have I noticed a breach in their wings. Some atheists are skeptics for logical reasons: the evidence available does not support a belief in God; He is not a necessary entity to explain the world; and the tales told of Him are mutually contradictory and self-contradictory. Those are the atheists I understand and admire.


I was unaware of a second wing. These atheists are skeptics for illogical reasons: evidence is not to be consulted in any case, since all things are merely relativistic social constructs; there is no explanation of the world possible; tales told of God are repellant because they are moralistic, and the bent of the modern intellectual, the point to which he drives all his powers, is to escape the judgments of morality.


Atheists of the right wing tend to be scientifically minded; atheists of the left wing tend to be anti-scientific, emotive: they are lovers of unreason.  They read Sartre and Wittgenstein and Skinner and other modern frauds who besmirch the name of philosopher with childish word-games. The game consists of using philosophy to disprove the possibility of philosophy, such as by showing words have no meaning, or abstractions no truth-value. The whole effort was exploded by one pithy comment by Epictetus back in the 2nd Century:



When one of his audience said, `Convince me that logic is useful,’ he said, Would you have me demonstrate it?

`Yes.’

Well, then, must I not use a demonstrative argument?

And, when the other agreed, he said, How then shall you know if I impose upon you? And when the man had no answer, he said, You see how you yourself admit that logic is necessary, if without it you are not even able to learn this much – whether it is necessary or not.


Discourses BkII, Chap XXV



The whole point of his discourse is usually lost on the audience.



The skeptic about reason, he himself, admits that logic is necessary. Epictetus does not provide any proof beyond this: You admit it, O skeptic. Why ask me to prove something to you that you already have proved to yourself?


The difficulty the postmodernist have with the discussions of the role of reason, is that they accept the categorical fallacy that no categories exists aside from science (which is objective) and faith or opinion (which is arbitrary).


They reason in this fashion: Science, either empirical or rational, assumes a verification principle. Whatever is not open to verification is not science; and whatever is not science is arbitrary. Ergo whatever is not open to verification is arbitrary. Again, the laws of logic (such as modes ponens) are not open to verification; ergo, by modes ponens, they are arbitrary.


When Epictetus points out that this argument itself employs the very rule it attempts to critique, the postmodernists just simper, suck their thumbs, and look coy, like Carmen Sternwood making eyes at Philip Marlowe.


The problem is that another category of thought does exist: wisdom. A thing can be wise without being scientific. There is reasoning that exists larger than and including scientific reasoning: this is called natural reason or common sense. Scientific reasoning includes empiricism and axiomatic logic. Empiricism has won such high regard that modern intellectuals dismiss axiomatic logic as unscientific (in other words, they take the axiom that axiomatic logic is not empirical; they take whatever is nonempirical to be mere opinion; and they conclude by Barbara that ergo axiomatic logic is mere opinion. The irony that they themselves use axiomatic logic to reach this conclusion, is, of course, lost on them).


With logic gone, natural reason is dismissed from academic discussion, and, with it, serious ethical reasoning. Common sense is banished from the discussion, and, with it, common sense. Wisdom is banished from the discussion, and, when it flies, all that is left is nonsense, either angry (Nietzsche) or despairing (Sartre).


I confess I have heard, offered in perfect seriousness, the faith that empiricism will one day explain all human mental and spirituals facts and aspirations, define the rules of morality, and explain all other non-material non-phenomenal realities—and I have further heard this article of faith defended as if it were a conclusion of a scientific experiment.


A schoolboy could see the paradox involved. One cannot prove empiricism by means of empirical test. The idea that empirical ideas have truth-value is itself a metaphysical idea, not an empirical idea. Truth-value cannot be measured in veritons, little particles of truth that have mass, vector, duration and extension. Empirical ideas, like any other ideas, exist as ideas, imbued with meaning to the mind that contemplates them; otherwise nuomenal, having no physical properties.


To weasel out of this obvious paradox, I have heard the proposition that the coherence of the whole body of learning, empiricism and its axioms and conclusions, is proof of its pragmatic utility, which is, in turn, a warrant for its truth. This merely substitutes big words and gassy ideas for short words and simple ideas. We are now calling “coherence” the yardstick of truth-value. A coherent system is true and an incoherent on is not.


But so what?  The idea that coherent empirical bodies of ideas have truth-value is itself a metaphysical idea, not an empirical idea. Coherence is not more open to scientific measurement than veracity. We cannot measure the spin-values of the gluons that cohere ideas one to the other. We cannot say ’empiricism is true because it works, not because of an metaphysical theory’ unless we say ‘truth is what works’ which is itself a metaphysical proposition, namely: “the truth-value of an idea is positively correlated with the realities of the universe around us when and only when actions based on that idea result in expected outcomes according to the laws of cause and effect”. That is a theory of epistemology and ontology.


I have once heard the partisans of the ‘coherence’ theory of empiricism bring up “Bayesian probability” as an alternate type of reasoning to salvage this mess. This is merely a more elevated form of the same basic mistake. The Reverend Thomas Bayes correctly defined that the assessment of the probability of an event is and should be affected by the record of successful predictions: if you see someone flip a coin fifty times, and it comes up heads each time, the longer he goes on flipping heads only, the less weight you give to the assumption that the chance of it coming up tails is fifty-fifty.  After a certain point, you should believe the coin is weighted.


Unfortunately, once again, this is merely a method of analysis which applies to empirical observations that can be reduced to a measurement, i.e. scientific empiricism. No Bayesian analysis will tell us what the chances are that Bayesian analysis itself is true, probable, or false, since the categories “true”, “probably true” and “false” are categories of epistemology, not of empiricism.


To sum up: empiricism has categories for statements of “disproved” and “not disproved” and also for “parsimonious” and “not parsimonious.” By means of a faculty other than empirical thought, a scientist invents an account, myth, or model to predict the behavior of matter. If his model contains no more entities than needed, it is “parsimonious.”  If the model does not accurately predict the attempted behavior, it is “disproved”. If not, it is “not disproved.” Karl Popper adds the refinement that if there is no possible predicted behavior exists which can register a “disproved” statement, then the model is not science at all. This is empiricism.


Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Science holds as an axiom, neither to be proved nor disproven in science, the following statement of the empirical axiom: “a parsimonious non-disproved model is true, provisionally.” This is a metaphysical statement, not open to disproof by any empirical means. This is epistemology.


Unrelated to all this is secularism, a political posture. Secularism promotes indifference to religion, or, at least, that neutrality toward religion is the proper stance for civic and political affairs. It runs in harness with Materialism, which states that nothing outside or above the material world exists, or, if it does exist, no statements about it are open to proof or disproof, or, if they are open to proof, the proofs are of no particular objective value or subjective interest. The first is a political opinion, the second a philosophical statement of ontology: neither one can either be proved or disproved by empirical investigation. They are unrelated to science, even though they pretend to bask in the reputation science radiates.


Because the claims of what constitutes science are often conflated with secularism, which is a philosophical stance about a metaphysical postulate outside the realm of science, let us take a moment to define the bounds of science:


Eratosthenes proved scientifically that the Earth was round, and had a circumference of 250 000 stadia. He compared the shadows cast by two upright yardsticks in Syrene and Alexandria, at the hour when the southern stick cast no shadow. The distance between the two cities, and the degree of inclination of the northern yardstick (as measured by its shadow) had the same ratio to each other that 360 degrees has to the circumference of the Earth. To dispute his findings, you need to question the accuracy of his instruments, his assumptions (he treats incoming solar rays as parallel; he treats the earth as a perfect sphere), or the distances measured.


This is an empirical conclusion: If you doubt him, you can do the experiment yourself, and open your eyes and see for yourself. No evidence since the days of Eratosthenes has done other than refine his conclusion with greater accuracy.


Likewise Euclid proves that vertical angles are equal. Assume the line AB crosses line CD at point E. By definition, the straight line composed of angles AEC and CEB equal two right angles. Likewise for angles CEB and BED. Subtract the common angle BED. By common notion, two things equal to a third thing are equal to each other, the remaining vertical angles are equal. To dispute this proof, one needs either reject the definition or dispute the common notion.


This is a rational conclusion: If you doubt him, close your eyes and think it through for yourself. You can come to no other answer.


Science consists of empirical and rational conclusions: physics and mathematics.


Moses and Confucius and Christ, and every other sage and thinker in antiquity have voiced the moral axiom of the Golden Rule: Do as you would be Done by.


This is a wise conclusion. If you doubt it, try living your life with a moral and mental rule that the laws that apply to others apply to others only and not to you. Live in a land where everyone adopts the rule that they live with rules that apply only to others, never to themselves. Puzzle over the logic of how a dispute would be solved between two moral actors who both agree the rules only applies to the other: or how any dispute could be solved at all, in the absence of a universal rule equally applied. You will soon become confused and foolish.


The inability to see wisdom as a valid category of thought—for it is neither arbitrary, nor unreasonable, but neither is it empiricism nor rationalism—has led modern philosophy into blatant folly and paradox.


Consider this: if the only two categories of reason are empirical reasoning and rational reasoning, how do we answer a solipsist? The solipsist says that, on an empirical ground, he is not and can never be aware of the souls, minds, personalities, or moral nature of other human beings. They look like thinking beings, but they might be robots, or manikins, or the solipsist might be asleep or trapped in the Matrix without a Red Pill. On rationalistic ground there is no logical reason to prefer the one theory over the other: no self-contradiction is involved in the solipsist believing he is the sole creature known to possess a mind. The belief that other people have minds is merely opinion. On empirical grounds, the proof is both parsimonious and predicative. Indeed, by the principle of parsimony the solipsist correctly refuses to postulate the existence of unneeded entities, i.e. other souls.


But what the solipsist says is so obviously foolish that no man of common sense would give it one second further thought. If the solipsist is surrounded by nothing but robots or manikins, who taught him the concept “solipsism”? To whom does he preach his doctrine and why? For it is foolish to go around telling a manikin it is a manikin. If it is a manikin, the knowledge can never reach him. There is no him to reach. And what point is there in telling a real human being with a soul like yours that logic demands he treat you as if you are a manikin?


The problem is that wisdom, unlike logic, cannot be analyzed to simple principles. For example, it might be wise for a man, or a polity, to believe that Man is made in the image of God, and that therefore human life is sacred. If nothing else, spreading this belief might serve a man’s self-interest, as it might decrease the chances that his life will be held to be of no particular worth when balanced against other exigencies.


It might difficult for me to convince his neighbors that my natural rights are sacred, if I cannot convince them my life is sacred. If my neighbor is religious, and believes me to be the image of God, my argument is fairly simple. If my neighbor is secular, the argument is more complex, and must eventually be grounded in some principle my neighbor treats as inalienable. In other words, my secular neighbor must have something which is the secular equivalent of sacred, i.e. something too awe-inspiring to be touched. Once I convince him human life is sacred, the ability to defend from arbitrary death my own life, the life of my unborn child, the life of my autistic child, the life of my helpless elderly mother, the life of my comatose wife, are all markedly increased. Neither axiomatic logic nor empirical observation has any bearing on these issues: it is a question for common sense and wisdom.


In closing, let me introduce a thought by Pope Benedict XVI. “If modern reason cannot concern itself with the question of God, then it cannot argue that a God who commands jihad is better or worse than a God who commands us not to use violence to impose our religious views on others. To the modern atheist, both Gods are equally figments of the imagination, in which case it would be ludicrous to discuss their relative merits. The proponent of modern reason, therefore, could not possibly think of participating in a dialogue on whether Christianity or Islam is the more reasonable religion, since, for him, the very notion of a “reasonable religion” is a contradiction in terms.”


If the secularist says he might rather live with Christian neighbors as Islamic ones, just on the grounds that his self-interest is served by a religion that condemns conversion by the sword over one that commands it, then he is again making a statement not of axiomatic logic or empiricism but of common sense and natural wisdom.


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Unfortunately, modern philosophy and modern secularism leave no room in their view of the world to support wisdom and common sense as being anything other than an ideological superstructure, a cultural construct, an opinion, a prejudice, a lie.


When the modern lawmakers tell a new father that neither law nor morality allows him any recourse to save the unborn child in his wife’s womb from her arbitrary decision to kill it, a child he is obligated by natural law to raise and protect, he is left with nothing he can say back. How can he claim human life is sacred, when nothing is sacred?


Every visible thing depends on an invisible root, as empiricism depends on metaphysics, as logic depends on common sense, as legal rights depend on truths we hold to be self-evident. Every rational principle depends on a deeper sacred principle not open to reason to discuss. Even the deep magic from the dawn of time depends on a deeper magic from before the dawn of time.


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Published on May 07, 2015 10:50

May 6, 2015

Is Non-Nihilist Atheism Possible?

A reader with the servile, dovish yet doglike name of Malcolm the Cynic writes and says:




I am not saying Stoicism is nihilism, but rather that it will lead to the same place whether it wants to or not.


Nihilism is just more honest about it.


(Not that I think stoics are actually lying, just wrong).


Basically, what I think is that any coherent atheist philosophy will ultimately have to deny that there is meaning in the universe.




My response:


I understood what you said. As someone who had coherent atheist philosophy for over four decades of his life, I would appreciate being allowed to examine your argument to back that assertion.


I am frankly fascinated by the assertion, since I have heard theologians I respect make the statement, but none, so far, to my satisfaction, have proved his case or even given his argument. If you are in a position to do so, I invite you to.


To start: “(1) Atheism implies a belief that the universe is entirely natural with no supernatural part to it, set in motion by blind and indifferent natural forces. (2) Nihilism is the belief that there is no final truth, no ground of being, no objective morality, no difference between virtue and vice, nothing worth doing.”


I submit that there is no way to deduce statement (2) from statement (1). The one does not logically imply the other.


I moreover submit it is as easy to deduce the existence of an objective moral code, even absent the supernatural, as it is to deduce the existence of logic itself.


The argument in both cases is the same. In order to deduce whether or not logic is useful, one must use logic. Hence, it is inescapable, part of the human condition outside of which no human can step, not even for the brief moment it takes to ask a hypothetical question. Likewise, in order to deduce whether or not morality is objective, one must face the question with the honesty, humility, and perfect integrity of a philosopher, that is, one must adhere to at least these moral imperatives. Again, it is inescapable.


Nothing in the above argument presupposes the existence of a god or gods. Hence I submit that it is possible to deduce the existence of rules of logic and rule of morality that govern all men, all life. And if rules of morality exist, virtue and vice exist, are meaningful terms, and apply to real objects and events.


A meaningful life is one lived according to virtue. Hence, if virtue exists, life can be meaningful, even for an atheist.


I welcome a rebuttal from your or from anyone who cares to pick up the gauntlet.


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Published on May 06, 2015 21:15

The Notorious Meat Robot Letters – Expanded!

In my last column in this space, I invited Malcolm the Cynic, and any other reader who cared to contribute, to debate the fascinating issue of whether atheism logically necessitates to nihilism. The challenge was either to prove or disprove that a non-nihilist atheist was a logical contradiction in terms.


To my immense surprise, not one, but many contributor began debating an unrelated issue, (and one I personally find deadly dull) namely, whether reductionist materialism, also called panphysicalism, necessitates nihilism.


I will not take the time to answer any such arguments now.


The topic, for me, was years ago sapped of all joy, and the philosophical curiosity of my buoyant yet naive youth beaten slowly yet cruelly out of my aching brain by an endlessly repeated blows of sheer hooey and dreary nonsense while I very slowly and very painfully discovered that panphysicalism is not really a legitimate and thoughtful position held by legitimate and thoughtful people, but a messy ashcan of random slogans, lame excuses, utter blither, and general crackpottery held by neurotics who cannot follow a simple syllogism of three steps.


I admit the possibility that perhaps somewhere a sane panphysicalist exists, a man who can give a rational argument defending the position, but I have yet to meet him, or read his words.


Until I meet such a chimera, I place panphysicalism, as a metaphysical theory, in the same category Marxism occupies for economic theory: that is, a mere insolent denial of the very discipline allegedly being investigated.


Those interested in a detailed, absurdly detailed, examination of my thoughts and reasoning on the matter are invited to examine as much of the record as they can stomach.


Below is the list.


I post the list to show that the topic has been sufficiently discussed to the point where I see no need to revisit the question until, if ever,  a new argument is introduced. Or I should say, a line of argument.


If someone wishes to prove that atheism in and of itself necessitates panphysicalism, he is welcome to produce the proof and show the steps of his reasoning.


Until then, I reject any identification of atheist, which is an honorable, if mistaken, philosophical posture, with panphysicalism, which is self-refuting Alice-Through-the-Looking-Glass nonsense, akin to a man saying he can prove his own non-existence, right after he proves that proofs never work and that words have no meaning.


I am not asking anyone to help me refute panphysicalism. I have done so over fifty times.


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Published on May 06, 2015 21:13

May 5, 2015

Mad Mike’s Latest

Michael Z. Williamson’s new book, A Long Time Until Now is now available. Today a bunch of us are helping spread the word.


A Long Time Until Now (Temporal Displacement)
by Michael Z Williamson
ALongTimeUntilNow

And there is a contest: http://baen.com/contests-may2015.asp


And sample chapters: http://www.baenebooks.com/chapters/9781476780337/9781476780337.htm


A closeup of the cover art below the cut

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Published on May 05, 2015 12:02

Come to the Dark Side, Joss! We have Cookies!

Here is one more data point in the ongoing argument that Social Justice Warriors and Political Correcting Officers and Thought Police and (as I call them) Morlocks are not really creatures of the Left.


They are not Leftists, not Liberals, but are in fact the opposite. They use Leftwing terminology and vocabulary, but they stand for the very opposite ideals.



Leftists are antiracists and antibigots, who want a color blind society where all are judged on their merit and character.
Morlocks are pure pro-racist bigots, who hate straight white males because of their outward characteristics of skin color and genitalia, and merit and character be damned.

Scott W brings this tidbit to our attention:


http://whatswrongwiththeworld.net/2015/05/shrieking_harpies_of_tolerance.html which leads to this entry: https://storify.com/Astojap/wehdon-twitter-hate (bad language warning).


The shrieking harpies of toleration have successfully driven Joss Whedon off Twitter after their Two Minute Hate for some imagined slight against goodthink. Yes, this is the same Joss Whedon who pioneered the unobtrusive and winning pro-femininst and pro-lesbian messages into BUFFY and ANGEL and FIREFLY, all of which were not just well written entertainment, but superbly written, FIREFLY most of all.


He is being excoriated for the latest AVENGERS movie, the wildly popular latest entry in the most wildly popular film franchise in human history.


The Avengers, if my fellow geeks will kindly recollect, has been solidly on the side of anti-prejudice and anti-bigotry since their inception in the 1960s, back when this message actually had some meaning.


The Avengers has always been like the bridge crew of STAR TREK: American supersoldier Captain America alongside the Soviet superspy Black Widow together with wealthy Tony Stark and poverty-stricken Luke Cage, the Caucasian Wasp (no pun intended) and the Korean Mantis, the awesome Black Panther, Monarch of Wakanda, and the not so awesome (but still a favorite of mine) Nightthrasher, a hightech streetfighter with a skateboard. Not to mention Norse gods and Greek demigods, a guy who controls ants, and the ultimate minority, the mutants.


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Published on May 05, 2015 08:21

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