Nicholas Gilby's Blog
April 6, 2013
The fatal flaw in the Arms Trade Treaty: we will never know if it has been effective
Last week in New York, the UN General Assembly voted to adopt the Arms Trade Treaty by 154 votes to 3 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/201...). The “Control Arms” NGOs and some states have claimed that this Treaty will save lives by denying human rights abusers, committers of atrocities etc. conventional weapons or weapons systems. However, the NGOs have never articulated how we will know if the Treaty is effective, and this is what I am going to look at in this blog.
Let me clear I have followed the Control Arms campaign since its launch in 2003, although I have always been sceptical about what how useful the end result would be. Although I am associated with Campaign Against Arms Trade (www.caat.org.uk), all my remarks here are my own views only.
First of all the Treaty is actually quite narrow in scope in that its object (Article 1) is to “prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion”. Although the Treaty does not define the word “illicit” in my Collins Gem English dictionary the word means “illegal, prohibited, forbidden”. In other words the UN has only agreed to try and prevent and eradicate the arms trade which is not sanctioned by Government. So, the object is not, to take one current example, to eradicate the arming of Assad by the Russians which is one of the many reasons the terrible suffering in Syria continues.
However, the other object is to improve the “regulation” of the international trade in arms and this is where, one imagines, the NGOs think that one could try and reduce or stop the level of arms sales from Russia to Syria or prevent a similar problem in the future. Various Articles in the Treaty set out the tests States should use to decide whether to agree or refuse a proposed arms export.
It is self-evident that to evaluate any public policy, you need information. And, obviously, information that is adequate to test whether the stated policy is working or not. So, for the Arms Trade Treaty, it must be a minimum requirement that the information provided by States must include information about whether the tests set out in the Treaty are applied correctly. And if not that, at least information which would enable reasonable inferences to be drawn about whether the tests were being applied correctly.
So what are States required to do in the Arms Trade Treaty?
In Article 5.4 States are required to provide a “control list” of items where an export permit or licence is needed from the Government of the exporting country. This “control list” is to be circulated to the other participating States, but it is not a requirement they are made publicly available. Provision of a control list, while of value, will not help us evaluate the effectiveness of the Treaty.
In Article 13 States must report, after the Treaty’s first year, an “initial” report of the “measures undertaken” to implement the Treaty. Thereafter States do not have to provide any further information about “measures undertaken”.
The other thing States must do is provide an annual report “concerning authorised or actual exports and imports of conventional arms” defined in Article 2(1). Again there is no requirement the reports are made publicly available.
There is no definition of what information should be provided, States are permitted to exclude “commercially sensitive or national security information” at will, and nowhere in the Treaty does the Secretariat have power to specify what must be in the reports. So, for example, were Russia reporting, they could simply say “Last year we exported 400 battle tanks, 800 armoured combat vehicles and no other conventional arms”. To be compliant they would have to provide no further information than that sentence (assuming that sentence was true). They do not have to provide as much information as that provided to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
It seems to me self-evident that the reporting provisions are so weak, no evaluation of the Arms Trade Treaty can be possible. And because of this, there is no way any State which is violating the Treaty cannot be held to account, because nowhere in the Treaty do they have to cough up the necessary information. Public reports of dubious transfers can simply be dismissed by an assertion that the Treaty has been complied with. It is self-evident that the States which are “violating” the Treaty are unlikely to provide adequate information. Further, and more worryingly, it means that it is going to be rather difficult to justify any desirable amendments to the Treaty, as there will likely be no adequate evidence at all to base any arguments on.
Luckily the Treaty does contain much better provisions on reviews and amendments than previous drafts so it is possible that over a (very long) period of time, the reporting provision could be improved. But it will be at least six years from the time the Treaty is adopted (50 States need to ratify, so possibly in a year or so?), so in the best case about seven years from now. And there is of course no guarantee any proposed useful reporting provision will be acceptable to the three-quarters of the ratifying States.
So if insufficient information is provided either to hold any States to account or to even evaluate the effectiveness of the Treaty, will someone answer this: what is the point of the Arms Trade Treaty when States will continue, as they do now, to have complete freedom of action in decisions on arms exports?
I appreciate that this is a depressing conclusion to draw after 10 years of international negotiation, with much hard work done by very many well-meaning people. But that is no excuse for failing to look the facts squarely in the face.
In my next blog on this topic I will look at other inadequacies of the Treaty text.
Let me clear I have followed the Control Arms campaign since its launch in 2003, although I have always been sceptical about what how useful the end result would be. Although I am associated with Campaign Against Arms Trade (www.caat.org.uk), all my remarks here are my own views only.
First of all the Treaty is actually quite narrow in scope in that its object (Article 1) is to “prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion”. Although the Treaty does not define the word “illicit” in my Collins Gem English dictionary the word means “illegal, prohibited, forbidden”. In other words the UN has only agreed to try and prevent and eradicate the arms trade which is not sanctioned by Government. So, the object is not, to take one current example, to eradicate the arming of Assad by the Russians which is one of the many reasons the terrible suffering in Syria continues.
However, the other object is to improve the “regulation” of the international trade in arms and this is where, one imagines, the NGOs think that one could try and reduce or stop the level of arms sales from Russia to Syria or prevent a similar problem in the future. Various Articles in the Treaty set out the tests States should use to decide whether to agree or refuse a proposed arms export.
It is self-evident that to evaluate any public policy, you need information. And, obviously, information that is adequate to test whether the stated policy is working or not. So, for the Arms Trade Treaty, it must be a minimum requirement that the information provided by States must include information about whether the tests set out in the Treaty are applied correctly. And if not that, at least information which would enable reasonable inferences to be drawn about whether the tests were being applied correctly.
So what are States required to do in the Arms Trade Treaty?
In Article 5.4 States are required to provide a “control list” of items where an export permit or licence is needed from the Government of the exporting country. This “control list” is to be circulated to the other participating States, but it is not a requirement they are made publicly available. Provision of a control list, while of value, will not help us evaluate the effectiveness of the Treaty.
In Article 13 States must report, after the Treaty’s first year, an “initial” report of the “measures undertaken” to implement the Treaty. Thereafter States do not have to provide any further information about “measures undertaken”.
The other thing States must do is provide an annual report “concerning authorised or actual exports and imports of conventional arms” defined in Article 2(1). Again there is no requirement the reports are made publicly available.
There is no definition of what information should be provided, States are permitted to exclude “commercially sensitive or national security information” at will, and nowhere in the Treaty does the Secretariat have power to specify what must be in the reports. So, for example, were Russia reporting, they could simply say “Last year we exported 400 battle tanks, 800 armoured combat vehicles and no other conventional arms”. To be compliant they would have to provide no further information than that sentence (assuming that sentence was true). They do not have to provide as much information as that provided to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
It seems to me self-evident that the reporting provisions are so weak, no evaluation of the Arms Trade Treaty can be possible. And because of this, there is no way any State which is violating the Treaty cannot be held to account, because nowhere in the Treaty do they have to cough up the necessary information. Public reports of dubious transfers can simply be dismissed by an assertion that the Treaty has been complied with. It is self-evident that the States which are “violating” the Treaty are unlikely to provide adequate information. Further, and more worryingly, it means that it is going to be rather difficult to justify any desirable amendments to the Treaty, as there will likely be no adequate evidence at all to base any arguments on.
Luckily the Treaty does contain much better provisions on reviews and amendments than previous drafts so it is possible that over a (very long) period of time, the reporting provision could be improved. But it will be at least six years from the time the Treaty is adopted (50 States need to ratify, so possibly in a year or so?), so in the best case about seven years from now. And there is of course no guarantee any proposed useful reporting provision will be acceptable to the three-quarters of the ratifying States.
So if insufficient information is provided either to hold any States to account or to even evaluate the effectiveness of the Treaty, will someone answer this: what is the point of the Arms Trade Treaty when States will continue, as they do now, to have complete freedom of action in decisions on arms exports?
I appreciate that this is a depressing conclusion to draw after 10 years of international negotiation, with much hard work done by very many well-meaning people. But that is no excuse for failing to look the facts squarely in the face.
In my next blog on this topic I will look at other inadequacies of the Treaty text.
April 4, 2013
One thought about Cameron's Trident article
Today British Prime Minister David Cameron has set out why he thinks Britain should retain its nuclear deterrent, by building a successor to the Vanguard submarines: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/polit....
His arguments are entirely unsurprising and he makes some points which are undoubtedly true:
a) "there is a real risk of new nuclear-armed states emerging".
b) "Can you be certain how that regime [North Korea], or indeed any other nuclear armed regime, will develop?"
c) "the US might not put itself at risk in order to deter an attack on the UK".
However, one point he did not address and remains to me unanswered is this. If he believes that the UK should retain nuclear weapons because one can never be certain about the future, and that other countries will retain nuclear weapons regardless of what we do, why are not all other countries trying to arm themselves with nuclear weapons now? Why don't their leaders, who like him are responsible people, lie in bed worried at night that their people are unprotected?
The answer is of course that the citizens of all countries that are not in some international hotspot like the Korean peninusla or the Indian sub-continent do not worry. They know that the chances of them ending up in a crisis that requires nuclear weapons, or the threat of their use, to resolve is so wildly improbable, if not impossible, that there is no point spending the significant sums we in the UK waste on Trident on them.
His arguments are entirely unsurprising and he makes some points which are undoubtedly true:
a) "there is a real risk of new nuclear-armed states emerging".
b) "Can you be certain how that regime [North Korea], or indeed any other nuclear armed regime, will develop?"
c) "the US might not put itself at risk in order to deter an attack on the UK".
However, one point he did not address and remains to me unanswered is this. If he believes that the UK should retain nuclear weapons because one can never be certain about the future, and that other countries will retain nuclear weapons regardless of what we do, why are not all other countries trying to arm themselves with nuclear weapons now? Why don't their leaders, who like him are responsible people, lie in bed worried at night that their people are unprotected?
The answer is of course that the citizens of all countries that are not in some international hotspot like the Korean peninusla or the Indian sub-continent do not worry. They know that the chances of them ending up in a crisis that requires nuclear weapons, or the threat of their use, to resolve is so wildly improbable, if not impossible, that there is no point spending the significant sums we in the UK waste on Trident on them.
March 18, 2013
50 years of the British Military Mission to the Saudi Arabian National Guard: a little history
Prince Charles and Camilla have recently been in Saudi Arabia as part of their nine-day tour of the Middle East. On Saturday 16th March Charles marked the fiftieth anniversary of the British Military Mission to the Saudi Arabian National Guard.
Britain’s military links with Saudi Arabia are very long-standing. The SANGCOM deal with the National Guard, now being investigated by Britain’s Serious Fraud Office, was first signed in 1978. BAE’s Al Yamamah deal has its origins in the mid-1960s. But another, little-known but highly important, part of Britain’s relations with Saudi Arabia is the British Military Mission to the National Guard. In this article I set out a little bit of the history behind it (and have included the relevant file references from the British National Archives).
In the early 1960s, the Saudi Royal Family were worried they might be overthrown in a military coup. This had been the fate of regimes in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958) and Yemen (1962).
In February 1963, Kamal Adham, the brother-in-law of Prince Feisal, the power behind the throne, asked the Foreign Office for advisers for the “White Army”. The “White Army”, also known as the National Guard, was run by Prince Abdullah, who is now the King of Saudi Arabia.
Britain had only restored relations with Saudi Arabia, severed during the Suez crisis, one month earlier. Frank Brenchley was Britain’s Chargé d’affaires in Jedda. He told London there was a “genuine military need to improve training of Abdullah’s White Army”. He said that as the “White Army is essential body-guard of the Royal Family, supplying advisers for it would be an additional commitment to the present regime”. Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home approved a mission to study the feasibility of Adham’s request.
Brigadier Jim Hope-Thomson led the mission, accompanied by Major Nigel Bromage. They arrived in Jedda on Tuesday 19th March 1963 and after visiting Riyadh left Saudi Arabia ten days later.
Back in London, Hope-Thomson wrote his report. He said
“the Saudi Arabian National Guard, sometimes known at the ‘White Army, are a paid irregular force of Bedouin, available to deal with any threat to the internal security of the Kingdom…The National Guard as such was formed in 1953 by the present King Saud when he succeeded his father to the Saudi Arabian throne”.
The National Guard, he said was, “a factor of considerable importance relative to the security and balance of power within the country”. Kamal Adham told Hope-Thomson and Bromage that “the National Guard was for internal security in support of the régime, and only for that”.
However,
“for military operations of any length or severity they would be virtually useless. They may well be capable of crushing an internal uprising in its initial stages, not involving a direct clash with the army”.
He continued
“the National Guard live a life of truly oriental cloth…no training appears to be done, and when at home, the men idle away their days gossiping and drinking coffee an utopian state free from the normal day to day tasks of Bedouin life”.
He told the Foreign Office that the two other major power centres in the country, the “urban proletariat” and the regular army, “must be regarded as susceptible to Nasserite influence and are therefore, from the Saudi family point of view, suspect and undependable”.
Hope-Thomson recommended that a maximum of four regular officers on secondment should be sent to the National Guard. He argued the aim should be “the improvement of relations with the Saudi Government and the opening of a new source of intelligence” (FO 371/168890).
In May 1963, Douglas-Home told Prime Minister Harold Macmillan “it is clear that any successor regime in Saudi Arabia would almost certainly be worse for our position in the Persian Gulf” and that it was in Britain’s interests to advise the “White Army” (PREM 11/4447).
The advisers could also collect intelligence. Diplomats told Home “the supply of advisers would fill an intelligence gap. The Americans themselves regard this as most important” (FO 371/168891). Hope-Thomson recommended that the advisers “should be instructed to pass intelligence through Her Majesty’s Embassy” in Jedda (FO 371/168890).
Macmillan approved the proposal for advisers Foreign Office Minister of State The Earl of Dundee informed the Cabinet on 23rd May 1963 that advisers had been made available to the National Guard to “reinforce the régime in Saudi Arabia against internal dissension” (CAB 128/37).
Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Timbrell was appointed the Head of the British Military Mission. His colleague was Nigel Bromage. In June 1963, Timbrell and Bromage presented their plan for the re-organisation of the National Guard (FO 371/168892). The plan “aimed “to produce a force which can safeguard the internal security of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom” (FO 371/168891).
On 7th August 1963, Timbrell returned to Saudi Arabia to take up his post, followed by Bromage on 17th September (FO 371/168892). This British Military Mission has now lasted fifty years.
In November 1966 Abdullah asked the British Military Mission to stay another 10 years. One diplomat commented that the officers “have contributed to the stability of the regime and have provided a useful source of intelligence: the two principal aims in mind when they were sent” (FO 371/185502). The Mission also helped build good relations between Britain and the Saudis. One Ministry of Defence official told Defence Secretary Denis Healey that Abdullah “is very close to the throne, occupies a position of considerable influence in the Kingdom and was believed to be principally responsible for the deposition of his eldest brother, King Saud” (WO 32/20242).
Though the British Government wanted the British Military Mission to help maintain the Saudi Royal Family in power over the years, behind the scenes they doubted the effectiveness of the National Guard.
Brigadier Roy Watson replaced Timbrell in October 1965. He wrote scathing reports to London about the National Guard and Abdullah. He said in one report
“it is unfortunate that the Emir insists on sending only ‘sons of sheiks and Emirs’ for training in England, in the belief that leadership is hereditary, and breeding will tell. The results so far have not borne out this belief”.
Watson was summoned to see Abdullah. Abdullah, Watson said, was
“not satisfied with precautions currently being taken for the protection of the King (despite the fact that a Royal Guard and a Special Branch exist for this purpose). The Emir asked what the National Guard could do to improve matters, and gave the Mission 30 minutes in which to work out a plan”.
Although a “tall order”, the Mission set up a Special Security Unit for Abdullah. A demonstration was organised so Abdullah could see its capabilities. Watson wrote
“the demonstration consisted of the passage of an imaginary VIP through an imaginary crowded street (patrolled by members of the special unit, in plain clothes) and the arrest of a would-be assassin. The Emir [Abdullah] was delighted, particularly since – having rather missed the point of the demonstration – he had spotted the evil-doer long before he was arrested. So delighted was the Emir that he ordered the demonstration to be repeated a few days later… he had invited a number of his brothers and numerous friends. When it was pointed out this would completely ruin the secrecy which had hitherto surrounded the special unit, the Emir replied that he appreciated this, but the demonstration would serve as a deterrent to anyone thinking of harming the King. The second demonstration… was an even greater success, the Emir this time having spotted the assassin long before his brothers The demonstration also included unarmed combat, and its conclusion was greeted with loud and prolonged applause by the spectators (some 500 of them)” (FCO 8/783).
In 1970 the SAS exercised with the National Guard (FCO 8/1754) and in 1971 provided training (FCO 8/2125). Nonetheless the then British Ambassador told London “the Saudi Arabian National Guard may be in danger of becoming a ‘Notional Guard’” and “the National Guard is a paper tiger, and moreover the paper is very thin” (FCO 8/1915).
But the British Government has persisted and the British Military Mission still exists with its aim intact. In 2006, the Ministry of Defence said its “purpose is to provide advice and training assistance to the [Saudi Arabian National Guard] in order to promote regional and national stability. The [British Military Mission]’s objectives are to build [Saudi Arabian National Guard] capacity for Internal Security”.
And this was still the case more recently (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/...). On 14th March 2011 the National Guard sent scores of UK-made armoured personnel carriers into Bahrain. The armoured vehicles, marketed as Tacticas, were manufactured by BAE Systems Land Systems Division in Newcastle Upon Tyne with final assembly taking place in Belgium. The Saudi Ambassador to London, Prince Mohammed Bin Nawaf Al-Saud, said the Saudis had “sent a brigade of specialised units to secure and protect critical Bahraini installations and infrastructure" and that “Saudi forces have not engaged in any security operations against Bahraini citizens” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics...). Nonetheless this no doubt freed up Bahraini security forces to carry out their campaign of violence and human rights abuses against protesters.
Britain’s military links with Saudi Arabia are very long-standing. The SANGCOM deal with the National Guard, now being investigated by Britain’s Serious Fraud Office, was first signed in 1978. BAE’s Al Yamamah deal has its origins in the mid-1960s. But another, little-known but highly important, part of Britain’s relations with Saudi Arabia is the British Military Mission to the National Guard. In this article I set out a little bit of the history behind it (and have included the relevant file references from the British National Archives).
In the early 1960s, the Saudi Royal Family were worried they might be overthrown in a military coup. This had been the fate of regimes in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958) and Yemen (1962).
In February 1963, Kamal Adham, the brother-in-law of Prince Feisal, the power behind the throne, asked the Foreign Office for advisers for the “White Army”. The “White Army”, also known as the National Guard, was run by Prince Abdullah, who is now the King of Saudi Arabia.
Britain had only restored relations with Saudi Arabia, severed during the Suez crisis, one month earlier. Frank Brenchley was Britain’s Chargé d’affaires in Jedda. He told London there was a “genuine military need to improve training of Abdullah’s White Army”. He said that as the “White Army is essential body-guard of the Royal Family, supplying advisers for it would be an additional commitment to the present regime”. Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home approved a mission to study the feasibility of Adham’s request.
Brigadier Jim Hope-Thomson led the mission, accompanied by Major Nigel Bromage. They arrived in Jedda on Tuesday 19th March 1963 and after visiting Riyadh left Saudi Arabia ten days later.
Back in London, Hope-Thomson wrote his report. He said
“the Saudi Arabian National Guard, sometimes known at the ‘White Army, are a paid irregular force of Bedouin, available to deal with any threat to the internal security of the Kingdom…The National Guard as such was formed in 1953 by the present King Saud when he succeeded his father to the Saudi Arabian throne”.
The National Guard, he said was, “a factor of considerable importance relative to the security and balance of power within the country”. Kamal Adham told Hope-Thomson and Bromage that “the National Guard was for internal security in support of the régime, and only for that”.
However,
“for military operations of any length or severity they would be virtually useless. They may well be capable of crushing an internal uprising in its initial stages, not involving a direct clash with the army”.
He continued
“the National Guard live a life of truly oriental cloth…no training appears to be done, and when at home, the men idle away their days gossiping and drinking coffee an utopian state free from the normal day to day tasks of Bedouin life”.
He told the Foreign Office that the two other major power centres in the country, the “urban proletariat” and the regular army, “must be regarded as susceptible to Nasserite influence and are therefore, from the Saudi family point of view, suspect and undependable”.
Hope-Thomson recommended that a maximum of four regular officers on secondment should be sent to the National Guard. He argued the aim should be “the improvement of relations with the Saudi Government and the opening of a new source of intelligence” (FO 371/168890).
In May 1963, Douglas-Home told Prime Minister Harold Macmillan “it is clear that any successor regime in Saudi Arabia would almost certainly be worse for our position in the Persian Gulf” and that it was in Britain’s interests to advise the “White Army” (PREM 11/4447).
The advisers could also collect intelligence. Diplomats told Home “the supply of advisers would fill an intelligence gap. The Americans themselves regard this as most important” (FO 371/168891). Hope-Thomson recommended that the advisers “should be instructed to pass intelligence through Her Majesty’s Embassy” in Jedda (FO 371/168890).
Macmillan approved the proposal for advisers Foreign Office Minister of State The Earl of Dundee informed the Cabinet on 23rd May 1963 that advisers had been made available to the National Guard to “reinforce the régime in Saudi Arabia against internal dissension” (CAB 128/37).
Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Timbrell was appointed the Head of the British Military Mission. His colleague was Nigel Bromage. In June 1963, Timbrell and Bromage presented their plan for the re-organisation of the National Guard (FO 371/168892). The plan “aimed “to produce a force which can safeguard the internal security of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom” (FO 371/168891).
On 7th August 1963, Timbrell returned to Saudi Arabia to take up his post, followed by Bromage on 17th September (FO 371/168892). This British Military Mission has now lasted fifty years.
In November 1966 Abdullah asked the British Military Mission to stay another 10 years. One diplomat commented that the officers “have contributed to the stability of the regime and have provided a useful source of intelligence: the two principal aims in mind when they were sent” (FO 371/185502). The Mission also helped build good relations between Britain and the Saudis. One Ministry of Defence official told Defence Secretary Denis Healey that Abdullah “is very close to the throne, occupies a position of considerable influence in the Kingdom and was believed to be principally responsible for the deposition of his eldest brother, King Saud” (WO 32/20242).
Though the British Government wanted the British Military Mission to help maintain the Saudi Royal Family in power over the years, behind the scenes they doubted the effectiveness of the National Guard.
Brigadier Roy Watson replaced Timbrell in October 1965. He wrote scathing reports to London about the National Guard and Abdullah. He said in one report
“it is unfortunate that the Emir insists on sending only ‘sons of sheiks and Emirs’ for training in England, in the belief that leadership is hereditary, and breeding will tell. The results so far have not borne out this belief”.
Watson was summoned to see Abdullah. Abdullah, Watson said, was
“not satisfied with precautions currently being taken for the protection of the King (despite the fact that a Royal Guard and a Special Branch exist for this purpose). The Emir asked what the National Guard could do to improve matters, and gave the Mission 30 minutes in which to work out a plan”.
Although a “tall order”, the Mission set up a Special Security Unit for Abdullah. A demonstration was organised so Abdullah could see its capabilities. Watson wrote
“the demonstration consisted of the passage of an imaginary VIP through an imaginary crowded street (patrolled by members of the special unit, in plain clothes) and the arrest of a would-be assassin. The Emir [Abdullah] was delighted, particularly since – having rather missed the point of the demonstration – he had spotted the evil-doer long before he was arrested. So delighted was the Emir that he ordered the demonstration to be repeated a few days later… he had invited a number of his brothers and numerous friends. When it was pointed out this would completely ruin the secrecy which had hitherto surrounded the special unit, the Emir replied that he appreciated this, but the demonstration would serve as a deterrent to anyone thinking of harming the King. The second demonstration… was an even greater success, the Emir this time having spotted the assassin long before his brothers The demonstration also included unarmed combat, and its conclusion was greeted with loud and prolonged applause by the spectators (some 500 of them)” (FCO 8/783).
In 1970 the SAS exercised with the National Guard (FCO 8/1754) and in 1971 provided training (FCO 8/2125). Nonetheless the then British Ambassador told London “the Saudi Arabian National Guard may be in danger of becoming a ‘Notional Guard’” and “the National Guard is a paper tiger, and moreover the paper is very thin” (FCO 8/1915).
But the British Government has persisted and the British Military Mission still exists with its aim intact. In 2006, the Ministry of Defence said its “purpose is to provide advice and training assistance to the [Saudi Arabian National Guard] in order to promote regional and national stability. The [British Military Mission]’s objectives are to build [Saudi Arabian National Guard] capacity for Internal Security”.
And this was still the case more recently (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/...). On 14th March 2011 the National Guard sent scores of UK-made armoured personnel carriers into Bahrain. The armoured vehicles, marketed as Tacticas, were manufactured by BAE Systems Land Systems Division in Newcastle Upon Tyne with final assembly taking place in Belgium. The Saudi Ambassador to London, Prince Mohammed Bin Nawaf Al-Saud, said the Saudis had “sent a brigade of specialised units to secure and protect critical Bahraini installations and infrastructure" and that “Saudi forces have not engaged in any security operations against Bahraini citizens” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics...). Nonetheless this no doubt freed up Bahraini security forces to carry out their campaign of violence and human rights abuses against protesters.
August 6, 2012
The Arms Trade Treaty - staying on the road to nowhere?
As seemed likely, the recent Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty ended without the consensus it needed to come up with an Arms Trade Treaty. So the question is what next? This question is relevant as the Arms Trade Treaty campaign is unlikely to wither away just yet. For example, a few days ago the UK Government said in an open letter (http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-...) that “the UN General Assembly in the autumn, to which the [Diplomatic] Conference President is sending his report, will be the next opportunity to address the issue amongst the whole UN membership. Our priority will be to bank the progress we’ve made and sustain momentum to agree a Treaty”.
The draft treaty on which the consensus required could not be reached is here: http://reachingcriticalwill.org/image.... According to one NGO account (http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/bl...), its opponents include the US, China, Russia, Venezuela, North Korea and Cuba.
It is not surprising that states such as North Korea oppose the Treaty, as they must fear the end of the global arms free-for-all might deny their regime what it needs to cling on to power. So, at the very least, an effective Treaty must have all the major exporters signed up and implementing it seriously. That way is probably the easiest way of dealing with opponents such as North Korea – isolate them from as many sources of supply as possible. Thus, the opposition of the US and Russia, currently the top two arms exporters in the world (http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/06) and China, which is number six, is a serious problem (I am not suggesting that these three countries are major suppliers to North Korea – simply that, given the volume of arms they export, if they are not signed up to an Arms Trade Treaty and implementing it seriously, many appalling regimes will find it much easier to get hold of weapons).
The flaws in the draft Treaty I discussed in a previous post are largely still there: http://www.goodreads.com/author_blog_.... In some respects it is worse: for example whereas previously there had to be a “substantial” risk that an export of arms would be used to commit or facilitate SERIOUS violations of international law or international humanitarian law, or to commit terrorism for it to be denied, now there must be an “overriding” risk.
It is clear (to me at least) that the Treaty is unlikely to be a success. For example the EU already has much stronger rules that the draft Treaty in its EU Common Position. But as Professor Neil Cooper says rightly (http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/att/att...), the evidence is that despite well established consultation mechanisms practice varies widely. Further, as a recent UK Parliamentary report has shown, even these much stricter criteria cannot prevent States making incautious judgements when deciding about arms exports to human rights abusing regimes (http://www.parliament.uk/business/com...). Ultimately the EU Code of Conduct, now the Common Position did not stop the UK recently arming Colonel Gaddafi, a man with a well-established track record as a terrorist and human rights abuser. So the obvious question is, given a Treaty which the major exporters can all agree on is likely to be weaker than the current draft, is it worth pursuing a Treaty at the UN?
The UK Government clearly believes it is, citing five reasons. The first is tenuous – a global first in having a regulatory structure. But if the regulatory structure is hopelessly ineffective, all it does is bring agreements such as this into disrepute. The second again is tenuous – it will be the “first” agreement governing the export of small arms and light weapons. The same comment again applies – the regulation is only worthwhile if effective at least to some extent. The third reason misrepresents the draft – it says that arms exports will be assessed on the basis of certain criteria – true – and will be refused if they pose “unacceptable risks”. This is untrue – unless you believe the only arms exports that are unacceptable are those where there is an OVERRIDING risk that the export could be used to commit or facilitate SERIOUS violations of international law or international humanitarian law, or to commit terrorism. The fourth reason is similar to the first and second – a commitment to regulate arms brokering. And the fifth reason – mandatory reporting – is in reality toothless as there are no specifics about what has to be reported and so the reports could, and probably will be in many cases, leave the reader unable to assess how effectively, if at all, the State concerned has implemented the Treaty.
One NGO commentator, present at the talks, has recently claimed (http://attmonitor.blogspot.co.uk/2012...) “the [Arms Trade Treaty] in its most attractive form might have had an impact on diverted transfers several years down the road”. If you accept the analysis above, that can only be true if the Treaty can be changed to something much stronger when already agreed and ratified. Professor Neil Cooper put it nicely “A strong [Arms Trade Treaty] may have the potential to grow and develop so that it establishes a new normative consensus capable of really influencing the practice of states…the wording of clauses on human rights and international humanitarian law may be of less significance than the powers the agreement provides to any implementation unit created to oversee a new [Arms Trade Treaty] regime”.
Here the draft Treaty is extremely problematic, because there is no enforcement mechanism, and because there is no provision for regular Conferences of State Parties. Indeed the first such Conference has to decide how regular the meetings are. If agreement cannot be reached about how often to meet, there may well not be a meeting for a very long time, as it would be in the interests of those wishing to keep the Treaty weak to refuse to agree to one. So the idea the Treaty could be made stronger over time seems highly unlikely to be realised unless the current draft text is changed quite radically.
And what is obviously the worst outcome is a really weak and ineffective Treaty which cannot be changed. Because that will be the end of the road as far as international agreement on the arms trade goes. So, to me at least, there seems little point in continuing to negotiate. Better to retire gracefully from the battlefield and fight another day (so to speak).
What other options are there? Well, for all its flaws, perhaps one would be to try and expand the EU Common Position into an international agreement between the willing. The more countries that come aboard, the better, and, perhaps, over time, with positive political change in countries such as China and Russia (well we may be waiting a while for that, but I hope it will happen), Cooper’s suggestion might become more realistic. Of course the EU Common Position is hardly perfect, and certainly many of the EU countries, like the UK, ought to take a far less permissive approach to arms exports than they currently do. So if I was the UK Government, I would be looking at the 90 countries (http://reachingcriticalwill.org/image...) who expressed the desire to bring the current Arms Trade Treaty text to the UN General Assembly First Committee to “finalize our work” to achieve “a strong and robust Treaty”, and seeing if they would be willing to sign something as “strong” as the EU Common Position. That would be better than what we have now (although not much), and does not make things worse.
Ultimately what is lacking is political will in sufficient countries, and political will can only be generated from within. This could happen. Thirty years ago, the UK was strongly against any international agreement to deal with bribery. Today, the UK is part of an international agreement with most of the significant exporting countries, and has, as a result, one of the strongest anti-bribery laws in the world. So change can happen. But it may take a long time.
There is one final lesson for me from this attempt to impose some control on the international arms trade. I agree with Dr Zuber of Global Action to Prevent War
(http://attmonitor.blogspot.co.uk/2012...) that “we should also rethink how we ‘sell’ the [Arms Trade Treaty] to the global public and avoid generating expectations that put pressure on a document that was never likely to fulfill those expectations. The [Arms Trade Treaty] in its most attractive form might have had an impact on diverted transfers several years down the road. It never was conceived as a disarmament obligation or as necessarily the ‘game changer’ for the UN system that many of its loudest proponents claimed”. I was saddened to see the constant claims during the negotiations that if the Arms Trade Treaty was in place, the Russians would not arm Assad. This was patently false. These silly claims simply discredit those who make them, and generate cynicism towards future efforts to promote change. It is far better to be honest and open about what is and is not achievable.
The draft treaty on which the consensus required could not be reached is here: http://reachingcriticalwill.org/image.... According to one NGO account (http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/bl...), its opponents include the US, China, Russia, Venezuela, North Korea and Cuba.
It is not surprising that states such as North Korea oppose the Treaty, as they must fear the end of the global arms free-for-all might deny their regime what it needs to cling on to power. So, at the very least, an effective Treaty must have all the major exporters signed up and implementing it seriously. That way is probably the easiest way of dealing with opponents such as North Korea – isolate them from as many sources of supply as possible. Thus, the opposition of the US and Russia, currently the top two arms exporters in the world (http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/06) and China, which is number six, is a serious problem (I am not suggesting that these three countries are major suppliers to North Korea – simply that, given the volume of arms they export, if they are not signed up to an Arms Trade Treaty and implementing it seriously, many appalling regimes will find it much easier to get hold of weapons).
The flaws in the draft Treaty I discussed in a previous post are largely still there: http://www.goodreads.com/author_blog_.... In some respects it is worse: for example whereas previously there had to be a “substantial” risk that an export of arms would be used to commit or facilitate SERIOUS violations of international law or international humanitarian law, or to commit terrorism for it to be denied, now there must be an “overriding” risk.
It is clear (to me at least) that the Treaty is unlikely to be a success. For example the EU already has much stronger rules that the draft Treaty in its EU Common Position. But as Professor Neil Cooper says rightly (http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/att/att...), the evidence is that despite well established consultation mechanisms practice varies widely. Further, as a recent UK Parliamentary report has shown, even these much stricter criteria cannot prevent States making incautious judgements when deciding about arms exports to human rights abusing regimes (http://www.parliament.uk/business/com...). Ultimately the EU Code of Conduct, now the Common Position did not stop the UK recently arming Colonel Gaddafi, a man with a well-established track record as a terrorist and human rights abuser. So the obvious question is, given a Treaty which the major exporters can all agree on is likely to be weaker than the current draft, is it worth pursuing a Treaty at the UN?
The UK Government clearly believes it is, citing five reasons. The first is tenuous – a global first in having a regulatory structure. But if the regulatory structure is hopelessly ineffective, all it does is bring agreements such as this into disrepute. The second again is tenuous – it will be the “first” agreement governing the export of small arms and light weapons. The same comment again applies – the regulation is only worthwhile if effective at least to some extent. The third reason misrepresents the draft – it says that arms exports will be assessed on the basis of certain criteria – true – and will be refused if they pose “unacceptable risks”. This is untrue – unless you believe the only arms exports that are unacceptable are those where there is an OVERRIDING risk that the export could be used to commit or facilitate SERIOUS violations of international law or international humanitarian law, or to commit terrorism. The fourth reason is similar to the first and second – a commitment to regulate arms brokering. And the fifth reason – mandatory reporting – is in reality toothless as there are no specifics about what has to be reported and so the reports could, and probably will be in many cases, leave the reader unable to assess how effectively, if at all, the State concerned has implemented the Treaty.
One NGO commentator, present at the talks, has recently claimed (http://attmonitor.blogspot.co.uk/2012...) “the [Arms Trade Treaty] in its most attractive form might have had an impact on diverted transfers several years down the road”. If you accept the analysis above, that can only be true if the Treaty can be changed to something much stronger when already agreed and ratified. Professor Neil Cooper put it nicely “A strong [Arms Trade Treaty] may have the potential to grow and develop so that it establishes a new normative consensus capable of really influencing the practice of states…the wording of clauses on human rights and international humanitarian law may be of less significance than the powers the agreement provides to any implementation unit created to oversee a new [Arms Trade Treaty] regime”.
Here the draft Treaty is extremely problematic, because there is no enforcement mechanism, and because there is no provision for regular Conferences of State Parties. Indeed the first such Conference has to decide how regular the meetings are. If agreement cannot be reached about how often to meet, there may well not be a meeting for a very long time, as it would be in the interests of those wishing to keep the Treaty weak to refuse to agree to one. So the idea the Treaty could be made stronger over time seems highly unlikely to be realised unless the current draft text is changed quite radically.
And what is obviously the worst outcome is a really weak and ineffective Treaty which cannot be changed. Because that will be the end of the road as far as international agreement on the arms trade goes. So, to me at least, there seems little point in continuing to negotiate. Better to retire gracefully from the battlefield and fight another day (so to speak).
What other options are there? Well, for all its flaws, perhaps one would be to try and expand the EU Common Position into an international agreement between the willing. The more countries that come aboard, the better, and, perhaps, over time, with positive political change in countries such as China and Russia (well we may be waiting a while for that, but I hope it will happen), Cooper’s suggestion might become more realistic. Of course the EU Common Position is hardly perfect, and certainly many of the EU countries, like the UK, ought to take a far less permissive approach to arms exports than they currently do. So if I was the UK Government, I would be looking at the 90 countries (http://reachingcriticalwill.org/image...) who expressed the desire to bring the current Arms Trade Treaty text to the UN General Assembly First Committee to “finalize our work” to achieve “a strong and robust Treaty”, and seeing if they would be willing to sign something as “strong” as the EU Common Position. That would be better than what we have now (although not much), and does not make things worse.
Ultimately what is lacking is political will in sufficient countries, and political will can only be generated from within. This could happen. Thirty years ago, the UK was strongly against any international agreement to deal with bribery. Today, the UK is part of an international agreement with most of the significant exporting countries, and has, as a result, one of the strongest anti-bribery laws in the world. So change can happen. But it may take a long time.
There is one final lesson for me from this attempt to impose some control on the international arms trade. I agree with Dr Zuber of Global Action to Prevent War
(http://attmonitor.blogspot.co.uk/2012...) that “we should also rethink how we ‘sell’ the [Arms Trade Treaty] to the global public and avoid generating expectations that put pressure on a document that was never likely to fulfill those expectations. The [Arms Trade Treaty] in its most attractive form might have had an impact on diverted transfers several years down the road. It never was conceived as a disarmament obligation or as necessarily the ‘game changer’ for the UN system that many of its loudest proponents claimed”. I was saddened to see the constant claims during the negotiations that if the Arms Trade Treaty was in place, the Russians would not arm Assad. This was patently false. These silly claims simply discredit those who make them, and generate cynicism towards future efforts to promote change. It is far better to be honest and open about what is and is not achievable.
July 25, 2012
The dismal state of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations
The Diplomatic Conference in New York to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty appears destined, as seen by this uninformed observer, to end without an Arms Trade Treaty.
I agree with Britain’s Foreign Office Ministers who say that there is a critical mass of states doing their utmost to thwart the negotiations. The unfortunate soul chairing the conference has now produced a draft treaty (http://www.acronym.org.uk/official-an...). Given the very limited amount of time left the questions are: is the text any good and should the UK sign it or something like it?
Firstly, from the perspective of someone who wants to end the global arms free-for-all, the text is terribly weak. Even in the preamble the signatories only have to “recall”, not “reaffirm” the UN Charter promoting peace “with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”.
The goal of the treaty (Article 1) is merely “the highest common standards” of regulation and to “prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and their diversion to illegal and unauthorised end use”. In other words, no real change. Most states already are, for very good reasons, against a black market in arms. But there is plenty of licit trade in arms which is very harmful – Putin’s supplying of Assad being the most obvious current egregious example. Stopping that is not a “goal” of the treaty. The Arms Trade Treaty will, if agreed, apply to things like battle tanks and warships, though given the goals one wonders why as it would be difficult to have an illicit trade in these items.
Moving on to Article 4 the treaty contains the same terribly weak wording I criticised in an earlier blog. Where there is a “substantial” risk that an export of arms would be used to commit or facilitate SERIOUS violations of international law or international humanitarian law, or to commit terrorism, States shall not supply. However, States must take into account “information provided by the importing State”. Those States planning to import weapons to commit hideous acts, one imagines, will perhaps not be entirely honest to their suppliers about their intentions. Their lies will have to be taken at face value by the exporter, according to the Treaty. Absolutely prohibited are exporters violating UN arms embargoes, breaking the exporter’s international agreements and facilitating genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. But this does not account for much of the arms trade and of course terms like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are terms wide open to being interpreted “flexibly”.
All of this seems a charter for States to do as they please. But I think the worst parts of the treaty are these.
Firstly, under enforcement (Article 12) this is left for States to do. Unlike, say the OECD Anti-Bribery convention, there is absolutely no peer review, or any mechanism at all to hold those breaking the Treaty to account.
Secondly even holding States to account will be impossible. In Article 11 on record-keeping States must keep records but there is no requirement to keep adequate records. States are told records “may” contain basic information such as quantity, value, type of arms transferred etc. but there is freedom to keep as little or as much information as the State pleases. One imagine those supplying pariah states, such as China and Russia, may not keep records sufficiently detailed to enable meaningful scrutiny of their actions.
Thirdly, once this Treaty is signed it will be difficult to change. In Article 21 there is to be a Conference of States Parties after one year after the ATT comes into force. Proposed amendments must be circulated beforehand and attract the support of a majority of States Parties before they can even be discussed (Article 20).
So should the UK sign it? My feeling is it should not. It seems just too weak. It will not make any difference to the real situation, and is set up in a way to avoid anyone being held into account. Better not to have a worthless Treaty that can be amended only with difficulty, and better to wait until a more promising moment, even if that is decades away.
David Miliband said in the Guardian today (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/...) that the British Government should have gone further than they did and joined the group of 74 states calling for a tougher treaty. I agree with that but what I really do not understand is why he thinks that would have made a difference.
Sadly these negotiations have I think rather exposed the NGOs whose campaigning has been such a driver in getting the Conference to happen. I understand a great deal of effort has been made, but it seems to me that events have shown up that not enough thinking has been done into how an ATT would actually work. Many have felt the same, but did not want to appear nay-sayers while there was a chance, however remote, of success.
Let me contribute some not particularly profound thoughts to the debate. Arms importers will still want their arms, for the worst reasons. So unsurprisingly nasty States where the rulers want arms to keep their populations and/or neighbours in fear of their lives (e.g. Egypt, Cuba, North Korea, Iran etc. etc. etc) are in the vanguard of the opposition to an ATT. However, this problem could potentially be circumvented if the few main exporters all acted in concert. But China and Russia will not want to play ball (Russia has clearly demonstrated this by refurbishing Assad’s attack helicopters). Ultimately in the ethics-free zone that is international relations, the ability to exercise power through force, or enable others to do so, is just too tempting a privilege to give up. And that is the reality an ATT cannot deal with, or at least not as currently envisaged and drafted. It seems to me that a focus on the domestic politics of the major exporters is where the solution lies. It further seems to me that an ATT is unrealistic until Russia and/or China move in a democratic direction, or cease to become major suppliers (highly unlikely), and the Western countries (and others such as Israel) decide to forego the very limited economic benefits of the arms trade. In other words it cannot be done at the moment, but one can imagine that in the coming decades it might if China and Russia became more democratic. In other words an ATT is wishful thinking, for the moment.
What I have found depressing are the numerous statements that an ATT, in the current circumstances, would change anything. Such statements are simply an act of faith and have no basis in reality. An example is Nicholas Watt’s reporting here: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/.... He writes “A draft of the treaty said that governments must not sell arms to countries where there is a "substantial risk of a serious violation" of human rights. Russia would have been prevented from supplying arms to Syria if the treaty had been put in place.” To anyone with the most basic understanding of world politics, or life, that is, surely, a non-sequitur.
I agree with Britain’s Foreign Office Ministers who say that there is a critical mass of states doing their utmost to thwart the negotiations. The unfortunate soul chairing the conference has now produced a draft treaty (http://www.acronym.org.uk/official-an...). Given the very limited amount of time left the questions are: is the text any good and should the UK sign it or something like it?
Firstly, from the perspective of someone who wants to end the global arms free-for-all, the text is terribly weak. Even in the preamble the signatories only have to “recall”, not “reaffirm” the UN Charter promoting peace “with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”.
The goal of the treaty (Article 1) is merely “the highest common standards” of regulation and to “prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and their diversion to illegal and unauthorised end use”. In other words, no real change. Most states already are, for very good reasons, against a black market in arms. But there is plenty of licit trade in arms which is very harmful – Putin’s supplying of Assad being the most obvious current egregious example. Stopping that is not a “goal” of the treaty. The Arms Trade Treaty will, if agreed, apply to things like battle tanks and warships, though given the goals one wonders why as it would be difficult to have an illicit trade in these items.
Moving on to Article 4 the treaty contains the same terribly weak wording I criticised in an earlier blog. Where there is a “substantial” risk that an export of arms would be used to commit or facilitate SERIOUS violations of international law or international humanitarian law, or to commit terrorism, States shall not supply. However, States must take into account “information provided by the importing State”. Those States planning to import weapons to commit hideous acts, one imagines, will perhaps not be entirely honest to their suppliers about their intentions. Their lies will have to be taken at face value by the exporter, according to the Treaty. Absolutely prohibited are exporters violating UN arms embargoes, breaking the exporter’s international agreements and facilitating genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. But this does not account for much of the arms trade and of course terms like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are terms wide open to being interpreted “flexibly”.
All of this seems a charter for States to do as they please. But I think the worst parts of the treaty are these.
Firstly, under enforcement (Article 12) this is left for States to do. Unlike, say the OECD Anti-Bribery convention, there is absolutely no peer review, or any mechanism at all to hold those breaking the Treaty to account.
Secondly even holding States to account will be impossible. In Article 11 on record-keeping States must keep records but there is no requirement to keep adequate records. States are told records “may” contain basic information such as quantity, value, type of arms transferred etc. but there is freedom to keep as little or as much information as the State pleases. One imagine those supplying pariah states, such as China and Russia, may not keep records sufficiently detailed to enable meaningful scrutiny of their actions.
Thirdly, once this Treaty is signed it will be difficult to change. In Article 21 there is to be a Conference of States Parties after one year after the ATT comes into force. Proposed amendments must be circulated beforehand and attract the support of a majority of States Parties before they can even be discussed (Article 20).
So should the UK sign it? My feeling is it should not. It seems just too weak. It will not make any difference to the real situation, and is set up in a way to avoid anyone being held into account. Better not to have a worthless Treaty that can be amended only with difficulty, and better to wait until a more promising moment, even if that is decades away.
David Miliband said in the Guardian today (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/...) that the British Government should have gone further than they did and joined the group of 74 states calling for a tougher treaty. I agree with that but what I really do not understand is why he thinks that would have made a difference.
Sadly these negotiations have I think rather exposed the NGOs whose campaigning has been such a driver in getting the Conference to happen. I understand a great deal of effort has been made, but it seems to me that events have shown up that not enough thinking has been done into how an ATT would actually work. Many have felt the same, but did not want to appear nay-sayers while there was a chance, however remote, of success.
Let me contribute some not particularly profound thoughts to the debate. Arms importers will still want their arms, for the worst reasons. So unsurprisingly nasty States where the rulers want arms to keep their populations and/or neighbours in fear of their lives (e.g. Egypt, Cuba, North Korea, Iran etc. etc. etc) are in the vanguard of the opposition to an ATT. However, this problem could potentially be circumvented if the few main exporters all acted in concert. But China and Russia will not want to play ball (Russia has clearly demonstrated this by refurbishing Assad’s attack helicopters). Ultimately in the ethics-free zone that is international relations, the ability to exercise power through force, or enable others to do so, is just too tempting a privilege to give up. And that is the reality an ATT cannot deal with, or at least not as currently envisaged and drafted. It seems to me that a focus on the domestic politics of the major exporters is where the solution lies. It further seems to me that an ATT is unrealistic until Russia and/or China move in a democratic direction, or cease to become major suppliers (highly unlikely), and the Western countries (and others such as Israel) decide to forego the very limited economic benefits of the arms trade. In other words it cannot be done at the moment, but one can imagine that in the coming decades it might if China and Russia became more democratic. In other words an ATT is wishful thinking, for the moment.
What I have found depressing are the numerous statements that an ATT, in the current circumstances, would change anything. Such statements are simply an act of faith and have no basis in reality. An example is Nicholas Watt’s reporting here: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/.... He writes “A draft of the treaty said that governments must not sell arms to countries where there is a "substantial risk of a serious violation" of human rights. Russia would have been prevented from supplying arms to Syria if the treaty had been put in place.” To anyone with the most basic understanding of world politics, or life, that is, surely, a non-sequitur.
July 9, 2012
Why the Arms Trade Treaty (as currently drafted) will not work
About a week ago on Twitter I was informed by @ArmsTreaty that “Strong #ArmsTreaty would prohibit flow of arms to Syria now”. I was sceptical and replied “how?”. I got no response.
No doubt the person who runs that particular Twitter feed is too busy playing high politics in New York to explain themselves to me. Fair enough. However a look at the recent draft treaty circulated by the chair (http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/pd...) suggests that the Arms Trade Treaty will do nothing to stop murderers like Bashar al-Assad of Syria.
Clause 6 says that State Parties, before allowing arms exports, must make an assessment as to whether there is a “substantial risk” (not any risk) that various nasty things will happen as a result of the proposed sale, such as “serious” (not any) violations of international humanitarian/human rights law. However, luckily for the murderous buyers like Assad, in clause 6.3, even if a State realises that selling arms will result in a substantial risk of a serious violation of international law “including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes”, then all they need to do is take “appropriate precautionary and preventive measures” to “mitigate” (not eliminate) “such risk”. And, luckily, under clause 7C (“enforcement”) the responsibility for monitoring and action is purely in the hands of the exporting state, who, one presumes, will find their own conduct to be impeccable.
Let us put ourselves in Vladimir Putin’s shoes. Suppose he signs this treaty and it comes into force. Bashar Al-Assad rings up and says “I need some attack helicopters refurbished”. Putin says “what for?” Assad says “well, you know, I may need them one day”. Putin agrees to refurbish them and then transfers them back to Syria. But to mitigate such “risk” he says to Assad “please promise not to kill civilians with these”. Assad says “OK”. Organisations like Human Rights Watch then notice these helicopters being used to kill civilians indiscriminately.
What happens next? What difference will the Arms Trade Treaty make, as is stands? Under the draft treaty, Putin has done nothing wrong and is required to do nothing more. If the treaty will not make a difference what is the point? Let’s suppose you think that Putin’s request for an assurance is not “appropriate”. What will the international community do about it?
No doubt the person who runs that particular Twitter feed is too busy playing high politics in New York to explain themselves to me. Fair enough. However a look at the recent draft treaty circulated by the chair (http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/pd...) suggests that the Arms Trade Treaty will do nothing to stop murderers like Bashar al-Assad of Syria.
Clause 6 says that State Parties, before allowing arms exports, must make an assessment as to whether there is a “substantial risk” (not any risk) that various nasty things will happen as a result of the proposed sale, such as “serious” (not any) violations of international humanitarian/human rights law. However, luckily for the murderous buyers like Assad, in clause 6.3, even if a State realises that selling arms will result in a substantial risk of a serious violation of international law “including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes”, then all they need to do is take “appropriate precautionary and preventive measures” to “mitigate” (not eliminate) “such risk”. And, luckily, under clause 7C (“enforcement”) the responsibility for monitoring and action is purely in the hands of the exporting state, who, one presumes, will find their own conduct to be impeccable.
Let us put ourselves in Vladimir Putin’s shoes. Suppose he signs this treaty and it comes into force. Bashar Al-Assad rings up and says “I need some attack helicopters refurbished”. Putin says “what for?” Assad says “well, you know, I may need them one day”. Putin agrees to refurbish them and then transfers them back to Syria. But to mitigate such “risk” he says to Assad “please promise not to kill civilians with these”. Assad says “OK”. Organisations like Human Rights Watch then notice these helicopters being used to kill civilians indiscriminately.
What happens next? What difference will the Arms Trade Treaty make, as is stands? Under the draft treaty, Putin has done nothing wrong and is required to do nothing more. If the treaty will not make a difference what is the point? Let’s suppose you think that Putin’s request for an assurance is not “appropriate”. What will the international community do about it?
June 27, 2012
The UK and the Arms Trade Treaty
In the build-up to the Diplomatic Conference in July which aims to negotiate a binding Arms Trade Treaty, Governments have been sending the UN their views on what it should contain. These are principally in response to suggestions by the Conference chair contained in a “non-paper”. The UK Government suggestions are at page 106-109 here http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.....
Today in Parliament UK Prime Minister David Cameron said he was in favour of an Arms Trade Treaty. But a look at the paper his Government has submitted to the UN suggests he does not support a treaty that will be effective. Granted that many Governments aim to avoid any treaty being negotiated at all, or would only accept a very watered-down one, but given compromises inevitably have to be made in international negotiations, it sends a bad signal to the doubters if it looks like you are not very serious to kick off with.
Sadly the UK states it aims to “facilitate” what it calls a “legitimate” trade in arms. What is “legitimate” one moment, like selling arms to Colonel Gaddafi, as the UK did recently, is not legitimate the next. But once arms are sold you can’t get them back. The idea of “legitimate” arms trading is a smokescreen to disguise an argument of convenience not a point of principle. International relations is a hazardous ever-changing affair and that reality should be acknowledged.
The most depressing section is paragraph “V” called “criteria and parameters”. Here the use of qualifiers makes you wonder why the UK Government will bother turning up to New York. For example states must forbid transfers where there is a “substantial” risk (not any risk or a slight risk but a substantial one) that “serious” violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law , or of peace and security would ensue. Presumably an arms sale creating a slight risk of a minor violation of human rights is fine, or one resulting in a slight risk a minor fight between two states. But, however, and, quite rightly, no such qualifier is stated for terrorism (the wording is “any terrorist acts”). So under this bizarre criterion selling arms to someone who “might” use them in a border dispute would be fine while “facilitating” a terrorist act killing two people is not. Both are wrong.
The fact the UK cannot enter the negotiations saying both should not be permitted just shows they aim for a treaty which will leave the current arms trade largely as it is. They may say, and I agree, that nothing else will be possible because plenty of states oppose. But then if that is the case better to be honest and denounce the whole rotten charade. Because let’s face it, that probably might have more impact than negotiating a piece of paper which will change nothing, but make it more difficult to call for change in the future.
Today in Parliament UK Prime Minister David Cameron said he was in favour of an Arms Trade Treaty. But a look at the paper his Government has submitted to the UN suggests he does not support a treaty that will be effective. Granted that many Governments aim to avoid any treaty being negotiated at all, or would only accept a very watered-down one, but given compromises inevitably have to be made in international negotiations, it sends a bad signal to the doubters if it looks like you are not very serious to kick off with.
Sadly the UK states it aims to “facilitate” what it calls a “legitimate” trade in arms. What is “legitimate” one moment, like selling arms to Colonel Gaddafi, as the UK did recently, is not legitimate the next. But once arms are sold you can’t get them back. The idea of “legitimate” arms trading is a smokescreen to disguise an argument of convenience not a point of principle. International relations is a hazardous ever-changing affair and that reality should be acknowledged.
The most depressing section is paragraph “V” called “criteria and parameters”. Here the use of qualifiers makes you wonder why the UK Government will bother turning up to New York. For example states must forbid transfers where there is a “substantial” risk (not any risk or a slight risk but a substantial one) that “serious” violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law , or of peace and security would ensue. Presumably an arms sale creating a slight risk of a minor violation of human rights is fine, or one resulting in a slight risk a minor fight between two states. But, however, and, quite rightly, no such qualifier is stated for terrorism (the wording is “any terrorist acts”). So under this bizarre criterion selling arms to someone who “might” use them in a border dispute would be fine while “facilitating” a terrorist act killing two people is not. Both are wrong.
The fact the UK cannot enter the negotiations saying both should not be permitted just shows they aim for a treaty which will leave the current arms trade largely as it is. They may say, and I agree, that nothing else will be possible because plenty of states oppose. But then if that is the case better to be honest and denounce the whole rotten charade. Because let’s face it, that probably might have more impact than negotiating a piece of paper which will change nothing, but make it more difficult to call for change in the future.
February 27, 2012
Hierarchy of global arms production unchanged (as usual)
On page 28 of my book The No-Nonsense Guide to the Arms Trade I referred to the "international hierarchy of arms production" where a few global companies dominate the global competition for military contracts. This is best illustrated when SIPRI or industry journal Defense News publish their new "Top 100" arms companies. Today's SIPRI publication (http://www.sipri.org/research/armamen...) has the same companies in the top 100 for 2010 as I had on page 34 of my book for 2007. Even the rankings have stayed the same except for BAE/Boeing and L-3/Finmeccanica, who have swapped places.
Despite the arrival of many new companies further down the food chain, the global arms industry is become increasingly concentrated in these companies - which account now for 56% of the global arms market, up from 44% in 2003 and 22% in 1990.
Despite the arrival of many new companies further down the food chain, the global arms industry is become increasingly concentrated in these companies - which account now for 56% of the global arms market, up from 44% in 2003 and 22% in 1990.
