Harold Titus's Blog - Posts Tagged "c-b-king"
Civil Rights Events, Albany Movement -- Filling the Jails
Students at the local Black college, Albany State, were anxious to launch protests against segregation. They were in a rebellious mood toward the conservative campus administration and pushed the college president to address their demands about conditions on campus.
Sherrod and Reagon concluded that it was important to create a mass movement in the regional metropolis before working in the rurals where Black people made up a majority of the population. The duo from SNCC began conversations with students on Albany State’s campus but were quickly kicked out by a nervous school administration. But it was too late, Sherrod wrote, “We delivered the idea that would disrupt the system” (October 4).
Charles Sherrod ... slowly gained the confidence of the people by living with them, working in the community, and giving voice to the aspirations of the people. His work there, along with Charles Jones and Cordell Reagon, was a model of the way an "outside" group works with a community anywhere in the South. Never in a hurry, the task was to lift fear that engulfed the Albany Negroes, continue the momentum of the previous spring, and teach the people what their rights and potentialities might be. The leadership was one of encouragement from the middle, rather than a take charge one (Browning 1).
On November 1, Sherrod and Reagon went to the Greyhound terminal to witness the results of an attempt made by Albany State College students to integrate waiting room facilities.
When the SNCC pair arrived, however, they saw only a small group of Albany policemen, headed by Chief Pritchett. The pair was confused over the lack of student support. The absence of student protestors resulted from a Youth Council decision to postpone the test without informing Sherrod or Reagon. As a result, the SNCC secretaries quietly slipped out of the terminal.
Leaving the station, Sherrod and Reagon found the Albany community in a state of chaos. … The fear of openly defying the status quo of segregation motivated inaction in the community, even among supposed student supporters. Sherrod and Reagon eventually prodded nine students back to the Trailways bus station, but only with intense cajoling. Arriving at the station, the nine students attempted to seat themselves in the white waiting room. Almost immediately, Chief Pritchett ordered the students to disperse. Obeying, the students retreated back to town to confer with Sherrod and Reagon. Though extremely minor by later standards of protest, the students’ attempt to desegregate the station led to widespread black interest in protest activities, even among adults who had previously shunned the methods of the SNCC secretaries. The SNCC workers’ organizing had elicited fear and panic, but the students’ action led to black community support that was otherwise absent. In order to challenge the city from a legal standpoint, the NAACP and other Albany adults agreed to support a test arrest at the station.
Realizing the need to organize the community, the leaders of SNCC, the NAACP, and other groups met on November 17, 1961, to form what became known as the Albany Movement. The Movement selected William G. Anderson, a local doctor, to head the Movement as its president, recommended by C.B. King, a well-respected black lawyer. C.B. King may have been motivated by the fact that Anderson “was a relative newcomer and had not had the opportunity to make a lot of enemies around town” (Nelligan 7-9).
Interviewed in 1985, Dr. Anderson recalled: “A number of the civic and social organizations sort of got together and—and decided all in one night—the people in the community apparently are ready for whatever is happening. We are their leaders. And we are not ready for what the people appear to be ready for. So we decided at that time it would be better for us local leaders to give some direction to whatever is happening than for these outsiders to give that direction. So we decided … then that we representatives of the established civic and social organizations of the city of Albany should bind ourselves together. And we should become a part of what was happening, because the people apparently are ready for a change, and we their leaders have not taken the lead in this endeavor. And so after a good deal of conversation about what shall we call ourselves? And naturally we tossed around all sorts of names, but when the … words ‘Albany Movement’ were spoken it sort of took hold at that time” (Interview 3).
Up to this point, protest in Albany remained limited to actions by students trained and counseled by Sherrod and Reagon. The small scale protest that resulted at the Trailways terminal on November 1 and the ensuing student enthusiasm made many blacks feel obligated to support their own children by joining in on protest activities.
“The kids were going to do it anyway,” local parent and later activist Irene Wright stated. “They were holding their own mass meetings and making plans…we didn’t want them to have to do it alone.” While many black adults favored the legal action and negotiation promulgated by the NAACP to direct positive action, they nevertheless supported SNCC protest because of their children’s involvement in it. As a result, a committee was formed that]“petitioned the City Council to set into place some mechanism…of desegregating the City of Albany,” as well as preparing for more positive action, such as demonstrations and arrests. The support of the parents was important, but there existed a great divide between support and dedication. More reluctant members of the community now supported the Movement. The question now would be whether that support would translate into action.
…
Headed by Mayor Asa Kelley, the City Council had a notable history of ignoring any and every complaint brought before it by the black community. Prior to the Albany Movement, most of these complaints centered around maintenance of public works in African-American communities, such as unpaved streets and sidewalks. The pattern of ignoring black community issues continued, as Anderson’s initial audience with the City Council ended in him being told that the council “determined that there is no common ground for discussion, and did not deem it appropriate to have it as an agenda item.” The next day the local newspaper, the Albany Herald, answered for the white establishment even more emphatically. The paper characterized Anderson as a hothead, and decried any attempt to change the status quo in Albany, going so far as to list Anderson’s address and telephone number for any “interested” party, which would be used by whites to threaten and bother Anderson throughout his time as president of the Albany Movement (Nelligan 10, 12-13).
On November 22, just a few days before the Thanksgiving holiday, three young people from the NAACP youth council and two SNCC volunteers from Albany State were arrested in the Trailways terminal. The NAACP youth council members were released on bond immediately after their arrest. However, SNCC volunteers Bertha Gober and Blanton Hall declined bail and chose to remain in jail over the holidays to dramatize their demand for justice.
After the holiday [November 25], more than 100 Albany State students marched from campus to the courthouse where they protested the arrest of Gober and Hall. A mass meeting–the first in Albany’s history–occurred at Mt. Zion Baptist church to protest the arrests, segregation, and decades of racial discrimination. The music, especially, was powerful, mirroring the Movement that had begun to emerge. Reflecting on this moment, Bernice Johnson Reagon [Cordell Reagon’s future wife] said, “When I opened my mouth and began to sing, there was a force and power within myself I had never heard before. Somehow this music … released a kind of power and required a level of concentrated energy I did not know I had” (Albany 2).
The meeting and the march were held after the SNCC notified the Department of Justice that the city of Albany did not follow the Interstate Commerce Commission ruling which prohibited discrimination in interstate bus and railway stations (Movement 1).
With the community now energized, recently arrived SNCC field secretary Charles Jones met with Sherrod and Reagon to discuss their next move. The challenge faced now by the organizers was how best to maintain the assault upon Albany’s segregation without alienating more cautious and conservative members of the movement, who still favored petitioning the city council. Should SNCC push too hard, they feared being branded as agitators. Community support was not yet so strong as to permit the SNCC members to call for demonstrations that required mass arrests and filling the jail. On the other hand, the men did worry that if they did not push hard enough, the Movement would lose enthusiasm rapidly. Sherrod, Reagon, and Jones decided to appeal for outside support. … The SNCC workers settled on the solution of asking James Forman, executive director of SNCC, to organize a Freedom Ride to Albany in an attempt to raise and maintain community support. Forman agreed, and enlisted eight others to join him in integrating Albany’s interstate terminal. By using the Freedom Riders, Sherrod, Reagon, and Jones hoped to avoid charges of provocation, while maintaining the enthusiasm for protest in the Albany community. …
On December 10, 1961, nine Freedom Riders from Atlanta arrived at the Albany Trailways bus terminal and were met by a crowd of approximately three hundred black onlookers and a squad of Albany policemen. Chief Pritchett arrested the riders without incident, telling the press that white Albany would “not stand for these troublemakers coming into our city for the sole purpose of disturbing the peace and quiet in the city of Albany,” framing the city’s opposition in domestic rather than racial rhetoric. The arrests resulted in the desired galvanization of the black community. The following day, mass meetings filled Shiloh Baptist and Mount Zion Churches. With the continuation of support, movement leaders, specifically the SNCC secretaries, began implementing their ultimate strategy of filling the jail in order to force the city into negotiations (Nelligan 13-14).
That night we had a meeting of the Albany Movement at which time we decided that we would not let these people stay in jail alone, we would fill up the jails. That next morning, at breakfast, I [Dr. Anderson] was advising my wife and my kids that their father and husband would very likely wind up in jail before the week was out, because the Albany Movement had decided that the best way to respond to first ignoring the petition of the Albany Movement, and secondly to arresting these Freedom Riders, the… the most appropriate response would be mass demonstrations. And I said, "I'll probably wind up in jail, and I want you kids to understand why this is being done" (Interview 4).
Leaders called for volunteers to march on city hall the following morning. Privately, Sherrod recognized the importance of getting people into jail and keeping them there, and evidence suggests that he told his closest supporters of this fact. This “jail, no bail” strategy, however, was evidently not shared with the masses assembled in Shiloh and Mount Zion, or even with other members of the movement. Anderson, while fully expecting to be arrested himself, stated “we had no provisions for these people going to jail because we did not anticipate mass arrests.” While Anderson acknowledged the strategy of filling the jails, he also was not prepared for mass arrests. It is likely Anderson believed that few arrests would be necessary in order to completely swamp the jail facilities, and that the arrest of the movement leaders and a few others would compromise the Albany police department’s ability to make arrests. It is unclear how many of those preparing to march were aware that they might be arrested. The last time the black community marched to city hall, the police arrested no one, and it is possible that many assumed that the same would be true.
This is significant because for African Americans living in Albany, and in southwest Georgia in general, arrest and jail represented personal endangerment. Anderson communicated the public opinion of jailing, stating “You have to understand that going to jail was probably one of the most feared things in rural Georgia. There were many blacks who were arrested in small towns in Georgia never to be heard from again… going to jail was no small thing.” Horrible conditions in local jails were well known to many, and it is important that many who agreed to march initially may have done so without preparation for extended stays in jail, which placed strain upon people economically, families especially. … the Movement was poised to test the resolve of the community through a baptism of fire, namely by sending hundreds of supporters to prison.
The following day, over four hundred people marched to city hall in downtown Albany, protesting the arrest of the Freedom Riders. The city gave the marchers permission to circle the block twice, and when the marchers refused to stop after the allotted distance, Pritchett ordered the protestors arrested. Herding the protestors into the alley between police headquarters, Pritchett arrested 267 protestors, including Sherrod and Reagon, and many of their young supporters (Nelligan 15-16).
Dr. Anderson narrated: But on this Monday morning following the arrests on Sunday, we met at a church, and we started a march downtown, and we were going to walk around the courthouse and go back to the church. We made it around the first time and I was at the head of the line with my wife. But after we made it around the first time not getting arrested I went on to my office, but the group went around a second time to make this impression that we are united behind these people that you have unjustly arrested. But the second time around they were arrested. And some 700 were arrested before they stopped (Interview 5).
The Movement continued to hold meetings in Shiloh and Mount Zion, sending two hundred and two protestors to jail the following day. In response to these marches, Pritchett informed the press that “We can’t tolerate the NAACP or the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee or any other ‘nigger’ organization to take over this town with mass demonstrations.”
Despite almost five hundred arrests since the Freedom Ride, the Albany jail was not full. This presented a problem for the “jail, no bail” strategy of the Movement. Pritchett had not been forced to turn away those whom he had arrested and therefore would not soon be forced into concessions. Pritchett, who had been warned of the possibility of mass marches, had devised a plan to ensure that his jail would never be full. Pritchett planned to use jails in the surrounding counties to house Albany prisoners should their number threaten to swamp his facilities. As he stated, “plans had been made where we had the capability of 10,000 prisoners, and never put one in our city jail.” As Pritchett himself attested, the protestors “were to be shipped out to surrounding cities in a circle…we had fifteen miles, twenty five miles, forty five miles, on up to about seventy miles that we could ship prisoners to.” Pritchett had seen to it that Albany would not be required to pay for the prisoners to be housed in other jails, as local law enforcement had agreed to absorb the cost so as to protect the segregationist cause. Pritchett did insist that his own men police the jails themselves, however, in order to maintain control over Albany prisoners. This maneuver dealt the Movement a significant setback, as no one conceived of Pritchett’s ability to increase his jail capacity this drastically.
For many of those arrested the realization that they were going to jail not in their hometown of Albany but rather in outlying areas such as “Bad” Baker County struck terror into their hearts. Prison conditions were harsh, with jail cells packed to many times their intended capacity. One woman described her cell in the Camilla jail designed to accommodate twenty prisoners being packed with over eighty-eight women. Andrew Young, describing Albany jail conditions as “harrowing,” described jailors refusing to heat the jail in the winter, and raising the heat and closing the windows on hot days. James Forman reported that many of those jailed spent most of their time “wondering when they would get out of jail,” suggesting that the expectation of staying in jail was not one most people were aware of. Some voiced their astonishment when they werearrested. One young woman stated “I didn’t expect to go to jail for kneeling and praying at city hall.” The misery of sitting in jail cells far from home sapped the resolve of many of those who initially agreed to march and risk arrest. Along with the fact that many of those arrested did not expect to be, the mass jailing of Albany blacks presented the Movement with an enormous strategic problem. The infeasibility of filling the Albany jail meant that the basic strategy proposed by SNCC and supported by the Movement could not be successful. While admirable, the suffering of Albany residents in jail accomplished little and represented an exercise in futility. This lack of concrete result would have a profound effect on the consciousness of the Albany African-American community (Nelligan 16-18).
Works cited:
“Albany Movement formed.” SNCC Digital Gateway. Web. https://snccdigital.org/events/albany...
Browning, Joan C. “Conflicting Memories of the Albany Freedom Ride and Albany Movement: An excerpt from: Who, What, When, Where? — Success or Failure?” Veterans of the Civil Rights Movement. Web. https://www.crmvet.org/comm/00albany.htm
“Interview with Dr. William Anderson.” Eyes on the Prize Interview. November 7, 1985. Washington University Digital Gateway Texts. Web. http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb...
“The Albany Movement.” African American Civil Rights Movement. Web. http://www.african-american-civil-rig...
Nelligan, Brendan Kevin. “Lessons of Albany: Civil Rights Protest in Albany, Georgia 1961-62.” Providence College: DigitalCommons@Providence. Fall 2009. Web. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu...
“October 1961: SNCC Arrives in Albany.” SNCC Digital Gateway. Web. https://snccdigital.org/events/sncc-a...
Sherrod and Reagon concluded that it was important to create a mass movement in the regional metropolis before working in the rurals where Black people made up a majority of the population. The duo from SNCC began conversations with students on Albany State’s campus but were quickly kicked out by a nervous school administration. But it was too late, Sherrod wrote, “We delivered the idea that would disrupt the system” (October 4).
Charles Sherrod ... slowly gained the confidence of the people by living with them, working in the community, and giving voice to the aspirations of the people. His work there, along with Charles Jones and Cordell Reagon, was a model of the way an "outside" group works with a community anywhere in the South. Never in a hurry, the task was to lift fear that engulfed the Albany Negroes, continue the momentum of the previous spring, and teach the people what their rights and potentialities might be. The leadership was one of encouragement from the middle, rather than a take charge one (Browning 1).
On November 1, Sherrod and Reagon went to the Greyhound terminal to witness the results of an attempt made by Albany State College students to integrate waiting room facilities.
When the SNCC pair arrived, however, they saw only a small group of Albany policemen, headed by Chief Pritchett. The pair was confused over the lack of student support. The absence of student protestors resulted from a Youth Council decision to postpone the test without informing Sherrod or Reagon. As a result, the SNCC secretaries quietly slipped out of the terminal.
Leaving the station, Sherrod and Reagon found the Albany community in a state of chaos. … The fear of openly defying the status quo of segregation motivated inaction in the community, even among supposed student supporters. Sherrod and Reagon eventually prodded nine students back to the Trailways bus station, but only with intense cajoling. Arriving at the station, the nine students attempted to seat themselves in the white waiting room. Almost immediately, Chief Pritchett ordered the students to disperse. Obeying, the students retreated back to town to confer with Sherrod and Reagon. Though extremely minor by later standards of protest, the students’ attempt to desegregate the station led to widespread black interest in protest activities, even among adults who had previously shunned the methods of the SNCC secretaries. The SNCC workers’ organizing had elicited fear and panic, but the students’ action led to black community support that was otherwise absent. In order to challenge the city from a legal standpoint, the NAACP and other Albany adults agreed to support a test arrest at the station.
Realizing the need to organize the community, the leaders of SNCC, the NAACP, and other groups met on November 17, 1961, to form what became known as the Albany Movement. The Movement selected William G. Anderson, a local doctor, to head the Movement as its president, recommended by C.B. King, a well-respected black lawyer. C.B. King may have been motivated by the fact that Anderson “was a relative newcomer and had not had the opportunity to make a lot of enemies around town” (Nelligan 7-9).
Interviewed in 1985, Dr. Anderson recalled: “A number of the civic and social organizations sort of got together and—and decided all in one night—the people in the community apparently are ready for whatever is happening. We are their leaders. And we are not ready for what the people appear to be ready for. So we decided at that time it would be better for us local leaders to give some direction to whatever is happening than for these outsiders to give that direction. So we decided … then that we representatives of the established civic and social organizations of the city of Albany should bind ourselves together. And we should become a part of what was happening, because the people apparently are ready for a change, and we their leaders have not taken the lead in this endeavor. And so after a good deal of conversation about what shall we call ourselves? And naturally we tossed around all sorts of names, but when the … words ‘Albany Movement’ were spoken it sort of took hold at that time” (Interview 3).
Up to this point, protest in Albany remained limited to actions by students trained and counseled by Sherrod and Reagon. The small scale protest that resulted at the Trailways terminal on November 1 and the ensuing student enthusiasm made many blacks feel obligated to support their own children by joining in on protest activities.
“The kids were going to do it anyway,” local parent and later activist Irene Wright stated. “They were holding their own mass meetings and making plans…we didn’t want them to have to do it alone.” While many black adults favored the legal action and negotiation promulgated by the NAACP to direct positive action, they nevertheless supported SNCC protest because of their children’s involvement in it. As a result, a committee was formed that]“petitioned the City Council to set into place some mechanism…of desegregating the City of Albany,” as well as preparing for more positive action, such as demonstrations and arrests. The support of the parents was important, but there existed a great divide between support and dedication. More reluctant members of the community now supported the Movement. The question now would be whether that support would translate into action.
…
Headed by Mayor Asa Kelley, the City Council had a notable history of ignoring any and every complaint brought before it by the black community. Prior to the Albany Movement, most of these complaints centered around maintenance of public works in African-American communities, such as unpaved streets and sidewalks. The pattern of ignoring black community issues continued, as Anderson’s initial audience with the City Council ended in him being told that the council “determined that there is no common ground for discussion, and did not deem it appropriate to have it as an agenda item.” The next day the local newspaper, the Albany Herald, answered for the white establishment even more emphatically. The paper characterized Anderson as a hothead, and decried any attempt to change the status quo in Albany, going so far as to list Anderson’s address and telephone number for any “interested” party, which would be used by whites to threaten and bother Anderson throughout his time as president of the Albany Movement (Nelligan 10, 12-13).
On November 22, just a few days before the Thanksgiving holiday, three young people from the NAACP youth council and two SNCC volunteers from Albany State were arrested in the Trailways terminal. The NAACP youth council members were released on bond immediately after their arrest. However, SNCC volunteers Bertha Gober and Blanton Hall declined bail and chose to remain in jail over the holidays to dramatize their demand for justice.
After the holiday [November 25], more than 100 Albany State students marched from campus to the courthouse where they protested the arrest of Gober and Hall. A mass meeting–the first in Albany’s history–occurred at Mt. Zion Baptist church to protest the arrests, segregation, and decades of racial discrimination. The music, especially, was powerful, mirroring the Movement that had begun to emerge. Reflecting on this moment, Bernice Johnson Reagon [Cordell Reagon’s future wife] said, “When I opened my mouth and began to sing, there was a force and power within myself I had never heard before. Somehow this music … released a kind of power and required a level of concentrated energy I did not know I had” (Albany 2).
The meeting and the march were held after the SNCC notified the Department of Justice that the city of Albany did not follow the Interstate Commerce Commission ruling which prohibited discrimination in interstate bus and railway stations (Movement 1).
With the community now energized, recently arrived SNCC field secretary Charles Jones met with Sherrod and Reagon to discuss their next move. The challenge faced now by the organizers was how best to maintain the assault upon Albany’s segregation without alienating more cautious and conservative members of the movement, who still favored petitioning the city council. Should SNCC push too hard, they feared being branded as agitators. Community support was not yet so strong as to permit the SNCC members to call for demonstrations that required mass arrests and filling the jail. On the other hand, the men did worry that if they did not push hard enough, the Movement would lose enthusiasm rapidly. Sherrod, Reagon, and Jones decided to appeal for outside support. … The SNCC workers settled on the solution of asking James Forman, executive director of SNCC, to organize a Freedom Ride to Albany in an attempt to raise and maintain community support. Forman agreed, and enlisted eight others to join him in integrating Albany’s interstate terminal. By using the Freedom Riders, Sherrod, Reagon, and Jones hoped to avoid charges of provocation, while maintaining the enthusiasm for protest in the Albany community. …
On December 10, 1961, nine Freedom Riders from Atlanta arrived at the Albany Trailways bus terminal and were met by a crowd of approximately three hundred black onlookers and a squad of Albany policemen. Chief Pritchett arrested the riders without incident, telling the press that white Albany would “not stand for these troublemakers coming into our city for the sole purpose of disturbing the peace and quiet in the city of Albany,” framing the city’s opposition in domestic rather than racial rhetoric. The arrests resulted in the desired galvanization of the black community. The following day, mass meetings filled Shiloh Baptist and Mount Zion Churches. With the continuation of support, movement leaders, specifically the SNCC secretaries, began implementing their ultimate strategy of filling the jail in order to force the city into negotiations (Nelligan 13-14).
That night we had a meeting of the Albany Movement at which time we decided that we would not let these people stay in jail alone, we would fill up the jails. That next morning, at breakfast, I [Dr. Anderson] was advising my wife and my kids that their father and husband would very likely wind up in jail before the week was out, because the Albany Movement had decided that the best way to respond to first ignoring the petition of the Albany Movement, and secondly to arresting these Freedom Riders, the… the most appropriate response would be mass demonstrations. And I said, "I'll probably wind up in jail, and I want you kids to understand why this is being done" (Interview 4).
Leaders called for volunteers to march on city hall the following morning. Privately, Sherrod recognized the importance of getting people into jail and keeping them there, and evidence suggests that he told his closest supporters of this fact. This “jail, no bail” strategy, however, was evidently not shared with the masses assembled in Shiloh and Mount Zion, or even with other members of the movement. Anderson, while fully expecting to be arrested himself, stated “we had no provisions for these people going to jail because we did not anticipate mass arrests.” While Anderson acknowledged the strategy of filling the jails, he also was not prepared for mass arrests. It is likely Anderson believed that few arrests would be necessary in order to completely swamp the jail facilities, and that the arrest of the movement leaders and a few others would compromise the Albany police department’s ability to make arrests. It is unclear how many of those preparing to march were aware that they might be arrested. The last time the black community marched to city hall, the police arrested no one, and it is possible that many assumed that the same would be true.
This is significant because for African Americans living in Albany, and in southwest Georgia in general, arrest and jail represented personal endangerment. Anderson communicated the public opinion of jailing, stating “You have to understand that going to jail was probably one of the most feared things in rural Georgia. There were many blacks who were arrested in small towns in Georgia never to be heard from again… going to jail was no small thing.” Horrible conditions in local jails were well known to many, and it is important that many who agreed to march initially may have done so without preparation for extended stays in jail, which placed strain upon people economically, families especially. … the Movement was poised to test the resolve of the community through a baptism of fire, namely by sending hundreds of supporters to prison.
The following day, over four hundred people marched to city hall in downtown Albany, protesting the arrest of the Freedom Riders. The city gave the marchers permission to circle the block twice, and when the marchers refused to stop after the allotted distance, Pritchett ordered the protestors arrested. Herding the protestors into the alley between police headquarters, Pritchett arrested 267 protestors, including Sherrod and Reagon, and many of their young supporters (Nelligan 15-16).
Dr. Anderson narrated: But on this Monday morning following the arrests on Sunday, we met at a church, and we started a march downtown, and we were going to walk around the courthouse and go back to the church. We made it around the first time and I was at the head of the line with my wife. But after we made it around the first time not getting arrested I went on to my office, but the group went around a second time to make this impression that we are united behind these people that you have unjustly arrested. But the second time around they were arrested. And some 700 were arrested before they stopped (Interview 5).
The Movement continued to hold meetings in Shiloh and Mount Zion, sending two hundred and two protestors to jail the following day. In response to these marches, Pritchett informed the press that “We can’t tolerate the NAACP or the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee or any other ‘nigger’ organization to take over this town with mass demonstrations.”
Despite almost five hundred arrests since the Freedom Ride, the Albany jail was not full. This presented a problem for the “jail, no bail” strategy of the Movement. Pritchett had not been forced to turn away those whom he had arrested and therefore would not soon be forced into concessions. Pritchett, who had been warned of the possibility of mass marches, had devised a plan to ensure that his jail would never be full. Pritchett planned to use jails in the surrounding counties to house Albany prisoners should their number threaten to swamp his facilities. As he stated, “plans had been made where we had the capability of 10,000 prisoners, and never put one in our city jail.” As Pritchett himself attested, the protestors “were to be shipped out to surrounding cities in a circle…we had fifteen miles, twenty five miles, forty five miles, on up to about seventy miles that we could ship prisoners to.” Pritchett had seen to it that Albany would not be required to pay for the prisoners to be housed in other jails, as local law enforcement had agreed to absorb the cost so as to protect the segregationist cause. Pritchett did insist that his own men police the jails themselves, however, in order to maintain control over Albany prisoners. This maneuver dealt the Movement a significant setback, as no one conceived of Pritchett’s ability to increase his jail capacity this drastically.
For many of those arrested the realization that they were going to jail not in their hometown of Albany but rather in outlying areas such as “Bad” Baker County struck terror into their hearts. Prison conditions were harsh, with jail cells packed to many times their intended capacity. One woman described her cell in the Camilla jail designed to accommodate twenty prisoners being packed with over eighty-eight women. Andrew Young, describing Albany jail conditions as “harrowing,” described jailors refusing to heat the jail in the winter, and raising the heat and closing the windows on hot days. James Forman reported that many of those jailed spent most of their time “wondering when they would get out of jail,” suggesting that the expectation of staying in jail was not one most people were aware of. Some voiced their astonishment when they werearrested. One young woman stated “I didn’t expect to go to jail for kneeling and praying at city hall.” The misery of sitting in jail cells far from home sapped the resolve of many of those who initially agreed to march and risk arrest. Along with the fact that many of those arrested did not expect to be, the mass jailing of Albany blacks presented the Movement with an enormous strategic problem. The infeasibility of filling the Albany jail meant that the basic strategy proposed by SNCC and supported by the Movement could not be successful. While admirable, the suffering of Albany residents in jail accomplished little and represented an exercise in futility. This lack of concrete result would have a profound effect on the consciousness of the Albany African-American community (Nelligan 16-18).
Works cited:
“Albany Movement formed.” SNCC Digital Gateway. Web. https://snccdigital.org/events/albany...
Browning, Joan C. “Conflicting Memories of the Albany Freedom Ride and Albany Movement: An excerpt from: Who, What, When, Where? — Success or Failure?” Veterans of the Civil Rights Movement. Web. https://www.crmvet.org/comm/00albany.htm
“Interview with Dr. William Anderson.” Eyes on the Prize Interview. November 7, 1985. Washington University Digital Gateway Texts. Web. http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb...
“The Albany Movement.” African American Civil Rights Movement. Web. http://www.african-american-civil-rig...
Nelligan, Brendan Kevin. “Lessons of Albany: Civil Rights Protest in Albany, Georgia 1961-62.” Providence College: DigitalCommons@Providence. Fall 2009. Web. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu...
“October 1961: SNCC Arrives in Albany.” SNCC Digital Gateway. Web. https://snccdigital.org/events/sncc-a...
Civil Rights Events -- Albany Movement -- MLK Comes to Help
Dr. Anderson, President of the Albany Movement, interviewed in 1985 by Eyes on the Prize, explained why Martin Luther King, Jr. was asked to come to Albany.
When we got to the point that we had this many people in jail… When we had this many people in jail, we had a meeting of the Albany Movement that night and we all recognized that we had no experience in what we were doing. We had never been involved in mass demonstrations, mass arrests. We had no provisions for bonding. No provisions for taking care of families of people who were in jail. And recognize that this was not a select group. These were common, ordinary, everyday people, housewives, cooks, maids, laborers, children out of school. We had made no provisions for these people going to jail because we did not anticipate the mass arrests. So we concluded that night that we are into something that really we need some expert help in someone who has had the experience. And I knew Dr. King from years earlier. Ah, my wife and Dr. King had been high school schoolmates, and my wife's brother and Dr. King were classmates and very close friends at David D. Howard High School here in Atlanta. And I indicated that I felt that I knew Dr. King well enough that if I were to call him he would come down and help us. Needless to say, there was not total agreement initially with issuing this call. Because recognizing that now SNCC was on the scene and by virtue of the Freedom Riders coming through CORE was on the scene, and they did also have established organizations. They wanted to protect the integrity—integrity of those organizations. We also recognize that to the extent that they received some publicity it helped to further their cause and they would be able to raise money to continue their activities. But anyway, we were able to get unanimous decision of the Albany Movement to call in Dr. King. So that night I tracked down Dr. King. I don't remember where he was at the time. But I called him personally. And he— he merely asked of me if this is the desire of all involved. And I said, "Yes it is." And he asked that I send him a telegram to that extent. And I did. … I indicated on the telegram all the organizations that were represented now in the Albany Movement. And, he responded to that call.
… Dr. King, right, he came there with not even an overnight bag or a toothbrush. Responded to my call, And I do not anticipate that he expected to get as intimately involved with the Albany Movement as he did (interview 6).
Accompanied by his close friend Ralph Abernathy, King arrived in Albany [December 15] prepared to deliver a speech to the local population …. The news of King’s arrival packed Shiloh and Mount Zion [Churches]; even people from surrounding towns traveled to Albany to hear the famous preacher speak. King delivered his speech to an enthusiastic audience, emphasizing the strengthening of community resolve. King urged those gathered to “keep moving,” opining that they would overcome segregation “with the power of our capacity to endure.”
After Dr. King spoke, Dr. Anderson took the pulpit and informed the congregation that King would remain in Albany and would lead a march on city hall the next morning. Although not planning on marching in Albany, King claimed he was moved by the spirit he felt in the Albany population. “I cannot rest, I cannot stand idly by, while these people are suffering for us so that we can obtain a better social order.” This ran counter to SCLC executive Andrew Young’s assessment, who noted that “Martin had no intention of going to jail in Albany.”
…
On December 16, 1961, Albany policemen arrested King, Abernathy, Anderson, and 265 Albany residents without incident for parading without a permit in front of city hall. Refusing bail, King vowed to remain in jail until the city made concessions to the Movement’s requests for limited desegregation. However, three days after making this promise, King reneged, as Anderson began suffering severe anxiety attacks, perhaps brought on by his own admitted fear of jail. He absolutely refused bail by himself, and as a result, King accepted bail on December 18 (Nelligan 21-26).
Dr, Anderson recounts: Dr. King and I had met with the masses of people at an early morning rally. By the end of the week there were regular demonstrations going on practically everyday. And Dr. King, Dr. Abernathy, along with my wife led a demonstration that involved several hundreds of people. And we were arrested and dispersed throughout Southwest Georgia (Interview 7).
Interviewed March 9, 2013, for the Civil Rights History Project, Mary Jones spoke of her first arrest and incarceration.
The children [students] had marched first. … [The local newspaper said] “The grownups – they too scared to march so they pushed the children out to do that work. … My oldest daughter was locked up too, 11 years old. …. “No, that aint going to go, So we organized right there to the mass meeting. And who wanted to march? All the hands went up. … We marched … by the old jail … about 700 of us. … The thing that we had to straighten out because they said we sent Martin Luther King to come do our job. We didn’t say for him to come march.
I was in there [jail] from Monday, about 11 o’clock to Thursday when my father came and bond me out. … We was in every jail around here. I went to Baker County jail. … They had the billy club. “Get on in here. You marching.” They had warned us one time: “If you don’t stop that singing and go home, you gonna be locked up.” And we got louder then. “Aint gonna let nobody turn me around.” And so we marched around about two more times and sure enough they told us we was under arrest. And back then the jail was so small it had a little place in the back. … That’s where they put 700 of us. We was all on top of each other almost. They let us stood out there about 3 or 4 hours and it was pouring down rain out then. Then they finally let us come in and they booked us. And then sent us different places.
The Baker County [jail] would hold like about 8 or 10 and they put 25 in there. One bed, the mattress was split in the middle and on the floor, the sink was running, the water had wet the mattress. And that was where we had to stay, sit on the floor. … And pray and cry. Every night they would come out with some German shepherd dogs and they would put them all almost two to the window but they had a fence around … and they would make them dogs so mad they would be barking going on and they said, “We ought to be going in there. We ought to open the gate and let these dogs go in there and eat ‘em up. So what they do then?” … Boy, we would sing louder and pray and everything.
When they feed you food, … the peas was so hard you could hardly cut them, couldn’t eat them. Grits the same way. They take the butter and put it right in the middle of the greens and throw the bread right on top of it. …. Grits and bread and peas, black-eyed peas, like that, and we were so tired that we just … I tell you the truth it was rough and tough, but if I had to do it again I would have done that (Mary 1-2).
Dr. Anderson would relate: There was not a major newspaper in the world that was not represented in Albany. Not a major television station in the United States or a television network in the United States that was not represented in Albany. And having been there before Dr. King came and knowing of the activity that we had before Dr. King, and having seen the results of his coming there in terms of the increase in the number of media people present, I know that they came there because Dr. King was there. He was a media event. We felt as though we needed the media attention because we thought that we could not get what we were looking for by appealing to the local people. There would have to be outside pressure, and the only way we could get the outside pressure would be that the media would have to call to the attention of those outside people what was happening in Albany.
…
On Monday morning following these arrests we were carried to the courthouse in Albany, and negotiating teams were identified and charged with the responsibility of meeting with us as leaders of the movement and meeting with members of the City Council to see if we could somehow resolve our differences. And end these mass demonstrations and arrests.
The negotiators reported to us. And I was seated in the court at the time with Dr. King and Dr. Abernathy [;] a tacit agreement had been reached with the city whereby they would set into place mechanisms whereby our concerns would be answered. And certain specific changes would take place in the city. And they included things like desegregation of the bus station. Desegregation of some of the public facilities like lunch counters, the bus station, the train station and some of the other facilities. We asked that this be placed in writing, and Dr. King was quite emphatic with requesting that—that this agreement be placed in writing. But we were given the assurance through the intermediaries that these were honorable people who were making this agreement and it would be given to the press in the form of a statement. And we felt as though there was a certain amount of security in having such an agreement made public knowledge, and being given to what we considered a sympathetic press. And we accepted the agreement. There were some who were uncomfortable with it. Dr. King was uncomfortable with it. Attorney C.B. King was uncomfortable with it. But we all agreed that we—that it was in the best interests of the people of Albany to have the matter resolved and to accept the agreement, with it being publicized.
They reneged 100 percent. Oh, part of the agreement was that—that all of the people who were in jail and there were several hundred in jail at the time, would be permitted to—to post straw bonds—no money—straw bonds. And those who had placed up cash bonds, the money would be returned and these cases would never be brought to trial. They reneged on each and every one of those commitments (Interview 8-9).
King was released on bond the day after his appearance in court and left the city, not to reappear until his trial commenced in February. His departure from Albany … strengthened his claim of wishing to remain a non-factor in continued discussion between the Council and the Movement. Independent of community opinion, King’s actions seem logical, especially given the fact that he had not been aware of the true nature of the settlement. However, King and the SCLC’s lack of understanding regarding community opinion and expectations meant his actions had a much more negative effect on the Movement than either would have thought.
Albany blacks met the settlement with a mixture of anger and disappointment. Worked into a frenzy by King and other leaders, black citizens faced a settlement that failed to reward them for their days in rural Georgian jails. For those who had gone to jail and lost their jobs, the settlement was unacceptable. As Howard Zinn, reporting on Albany for the Southern Regional Council, concluded “many of those jailed for protesting viewed the settlement as ‘pitifully small payment for weeks of protest, for centuries of waiting.’” Few in the community would forget that they had lost their jobs and endured terrible conditions in jail only to be granted petty concessions. This loss of interest and morale severely compromised the Movement’s ability to increase support. Even among the leadership, there was little optimism. As an anonymous leader within the Albany Movement remarked, “It’s nothing to shout to the rafters about.” Few would forget that they had marched to prison with a man who had now bailed out and left town, leaving them in prison with no semblance of progress.
The transition to economic boycotts and selective buying campaigns in the period between King’s release in December and his trial in February demonstrate that black Albany retained interest in fighting segregation, as long as that support did not necessitate arrest. Perhaps the most successful aspect of economic protest revolved around the boycott of the city bus system. Busing was provided by a private company, and blacks comprised an overwhelming majority of those that patronized the service. The boycott hit the bus company hard, with the owners openly admitting that they needed help. They met with members of the city council who, using their influence among wealthy businessmen in town, were able to subsidize the company in order to keep it afloat, to the tune of $3,000 a day. By doing this, the Albany white community signaled that it was willing to pay the price to maintain segregation in Albany.
When Anderson and other leaders brought concerns over transportation desegregation to the City Council, Mayor Kelley brushed aside the requests, asked for ten days to consider it, and then adjourned the meeting. While personally in favor of at least considering some conciliatory reforms, Kelley found no support among other members of the City council, who uniformly opposed any altering of segregation laws, knowing that as long as they refused to yield, the Movement was virtually powerless to stop them. Despite his own personally moderate opinion, Kelley did not allow any semblance of division to reach the press or the black community, realizing that any sign of division would weaken the segregationist cause.
Continued boycotting of the bus system paid off in early February, when the bus company was forced to shut down. Black participation rates, estimated to be over ninety percent, made the boycott quite effective. But the effect of this shutdown was worse for the black community than it was for the white. Wyatt T. Walker [executive director of SCLC] stated: “the bus company went bankrupt, and the black people who made up seventy percent of its ridership were inconvenienced and the Albany Movement had no semblance of victory.” Unlike in Montgomery, Albany leaders had no plans to deal with the logistical difficulties arising from lack of transportation for the community. The protest had hurt the white community, but not to the point of forcing concessions. The wealthy members of the community who sat on the City Council and held economic power were unaffected as a whole as a result of the boycott. Again, blacks were sacrificing without any tangible result.
The boycott against white businesses also proved effective, although not as successful as the bus boycott. Some white businessmen lost over fifty percent of their business as a result of these selective buying campaigns. At city council meetings held over the next few weeks, local merchants responded to the economic pressure by urging members of the city council to accept token reforms, such as integrating the bus system, hoping that if these demands were met, the boycott would cease. Unlike the busing crisis the vocal support of the merchants for race reform represented positive pressure against the City Council. However, desegregation could not happen without a city council vote to change segregation laws, something the council refused to do. In order to bolster support for their decision, council members framed the vote as a defense of the city’s law-making ability. “This is a struggle to decide who makes the policy in this city,” said council member C.B. Pritchett. Criticism from local white merchants continued, but in the end many of the merchants accepted the losses. Pritchett recounts being told by a group of merchants that “we’re losing money, but we know what this is. And we’re going to stand back; we’re not going to put any pressure. Just go ahead.” “This” was a war over segregation and the status quo in Albany. Even though they were hurting economically, the portion of the white community most adversely affected by civil rights protest held the interests of segregation over their own economic success, revealing the solidarity the white community had in fighting segregation. Although the black community participated and supported in large numbers, far larger than had been involved in marches, economic protest would have little tangible effect upon the overall Albany Movement (Nelligan 27-31).
Works cited:
“Interview with Dr. William Anderson.” Eyes on the Prize Interview. November 7, 1985. Washington University Digital Gateway Texts. Web. http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb...
“Mary Jones Oral History Interview Conducted by Will Griffin in Albany, GA, 2013-03-09.” Civil Rights History Project. Library of Congress. Web. https://www.loc.gov/collections/civil...
Nelligan, Brendan Kevin. “Lessons of Albany: Civil Rights Protest in Albany, Georgia 1961-62.” Providence College: DigitalCommons@Providence. Fall 2009. Web. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu...
When we got to the point that we had this many people in jail… When we had this many people in jail, we had a meeting of the Albany Movement that night and we all recognized that we had no experience in what we were doing. We had never been involved in mass demonstrations, mass arrests. We had no provisions for bonding. No provisions for taking care of families of people who were in jail. And recognize that this was not a select group. These were common, ordinary, everyday people, housewives, cooks, maids, laborers, children out of school. We had made no provisions for these people going to jail because we did not anticipate the mass arrests. So we concluded that night that we are into something that really we need some expert help in someone who has had the experience. And I knew Dr. King from years earlier. Ah, my wife and Dr. King had been high school schoolmates, and my wife's brother and Dr. King were classmates and very close friends at David D. Howard High School here in Atlanta. And I indicated that I felt that I knew Dr. King well enough that if I were to call him he would come down and help us. Needless to say, there was not total agreement initially with issuing this call. Because recognizing that now SNCC was on the scene and by virtue of the Freedom Riders coming through CORE was on the scene, and they did also have established organizations. They wanted to protect the integrity—integrity of those organizations. We also recognize that to the extent that they received some publicity it helped to further their cause and they would be able to raise money to continue their activities. But anyway, we were able to get unanimous decision of the Albany Movement to call in Dr. King. So that night I tracked down Dr. King. I don't remember where he was at the time. But I called him personally. And he— he merely asked of me if this is the desire of all involved. And I said, "Yes it is." And he asked that I send him a telegram to that extent. And I did. … I indicated on the telegram all the organizations that were represented now in the Albany Movement. And, he responded to that call.
… Dr. King, right, he came there with not even an overnight bag or a toothbrush. Responded to my call, And I do not anticipate that he expected to get as intimately involved with the Albany Movement as he did (interview 6).
Accompanied by his close friend Ralph Abernathy, King arrived in Albany [December 15] prepared to deliver a speech to the local population …. The news of King’s arrival packed Shiloh and Mount Zion [Churches]; even people from surrounding towns traveled to Albany to hear the famous preacher speak. King delivered his speech to an enthusiastic audience, emphasizing the strengthening of community resolve. King urged those gathered to “keep moving,” opining that they would overcome segregation “with the power of our capacity to endure.”
After Dr. King spoke, Dr. Anderson took the pulpit and informed the congregation that King would remain in Albany and would lead a march on city hall the next morning. Although not planning on marching in Albany, King claimed he was moved by the spirit he felt in the Albany population. “I cannot rest, I cannot stand idly by, while these people are suffering for us so that we can obtain a better social order.” This ran counter to SCLC executive Andrew Young’s assessment, who noted that “Martin had no intention of going to jail in Albany.”
…
On December 16, 1961, Albany policemen arrested King, Abernathy, Anderson, and 265 Albany residents without incident for parading without a permit in front of city hall. Refusing bail, King vowed to remain in jail until the city made concessions to the Movement’s requests for limited desegregation. However, three days after making this promise, King reneged, as Anderson began suffering severe anxiety attacks, perhaps brought on by his own admitted fear of jail. He absolutely refused bail by himself, and as a result, King accepted bail on December 18 (Nelligan 21-26).
Dr, Anderson recounts: Dr. King and I had met with the masses of people at an early morning rally. By the end of the week there were regular demonstrations going on practically everyday. And Dr. King, Dr. Abernathy, along with my wife led a demonstration that involved several hundreds of people. And we were arrested and dispersed throughout Southwest Georgia (Interview 7).
Interviewed March 9, 2013, for the Civil Rights History Project, Mary Jones spoke of her first arrest and incarceration.
The children [students] had marched first. … [The local newspaper said] “The grownups – they too scared to march so they pushed the children out to do that work. … My oldest daughter was locked up too, 11 years old. …. “No, that aint going to go, So we organized right there to the mass meeting. And who wanted to march? All the hands went up. … We marched … by the old jail … about 700 of us. … The thing that we had to straighten out because they said we sent Martin Luther King to come do our job. We didn’t say for him to come march.
I was in there [jail] from Monday, about 11 o’clock to Thursday when my father came and bond me out. … We was in every jail around here. I went to Baker County jail. … They had the billy club. “Get on in here. You marching.” They had warned us one time: “If you don’t stop that singing and go home, you gonna be locked up.” And we got louder then. “Aint gonna let nobody turn me around.” And so we marched around about two more times and sure enough they told us we was under arrest. And back then the jail was so small it had a little place in the back. … That’s where they put 700 of us. We was all on top of each other almost. They let us stood out there about 3 or 4 hours and it was pouring down rain out then. Then they finally let us come in and they booked us. And then sent us different places.
The Baker County [jail] would hold like about 8 or 10 and they put 25 in there. One bed, the mattress was split in the middle and on the floor, the sink was running, the water had wet the mattress. And that was where we had to stay, sit on the floor. … And pray and cry. Every night they would come out with some German shepherd dogs and they would put them all almost two to the window but they had a fence around … and they would make them dogs so mad they would be barking going on and they said, “We ought to be going in there. We ought to open the gate and let these dogs go in there and eat ‘em up. So what they do then?” … Boy, we would sing louder and pray and everything.
When they feed you food, … the peas was so hard you could hardly cut them, couldn’t eat them. Grits the same way. They take the butter and put it right in the middle of the greens and throw the bread right on top of it. …. Grits and bread and peas, black-eyed peas, like that, and we were so tired that we just … I tell you the truth it was rough and tough, but if I had to do it again I would have done that (Mary 1-2).
Dr. Anderson would relate: There was not a major newspaper in the world that was not represented in Albany. Not a major television station in the United States or a television network in the United States that was not represented in Albany. And having been there before Dr. King came and knowing of the activity that we had before Dr. King, and having seen the results of his coming there in terms of the increase in the number of media people present, I know that they came there because Dr. King was there. He was a media event. We felt as though we needed the media attention because we thought that we could not get what we were looking for by appealing to the local people. There would have to be outside pressure, and the only way we could get the outside pressure would be that the media would have to call to the attention of those outside people what was happening in Albany.
…
On Monday morning following these arrests we were carried to the courthouse in Albany, and negotiating teams were identified and charged with the responsibility of meeting with us as leaders of the movement and meeting with members of the City Council to see if we could somehow resolve our differences. And end these mass demonstrations and arrests.
The negotiators reported to us. And I was seated in the court at the time with Dr. King and Dr. Abernathy [;] a tacit agreement had been reached with the city whereby they would set into place mechanisms whereby our concerns would be answered. And certain specific changes would take place in the city. And they included things like desegregation of the bus station. Desegregation of some of the public facilities like lunch counters, the bus station, the train station and some of the other facilities. We asked that this be placed in writing, and Dr. King was quite emphatic with requesting that—that this agreement be placed in writing. But we were given the assurance through the intermediaries that these were honorable people who were making this agreement and it would be given to the press in the form of a statement. And we felt as though there was a certain amount of security in having such an agreement made public knowledge, and being given to what we considered a sympathetic press. And we accepted the agreement. There were some who were uncomfortable with it. Dr. King was uncomfortable with it. Attorney C.B. King was uncomfortable with it. But we all agreed that we—that it was in the best interests of the people of Albany to have the matter resolved and to accept the agreement, with it being publicized.
They reneged 100 percent. Oh, part of the agreement was that—that all of the people who were in jail and there were several hundred in jail at the time, would be permitted to—to post straw bonds—no money—straw bonds. And those who had placed up cash bonds, the money would be returned and these cases would never be brought to trial. They reneged on each and every one of those commitments (Interview 8-9).
King was released on bond the day after his appearance in court and left the city, not to reappear until his trial commenced in February. His departure from Albany … strengthened his claim of wishing to remain a non-factor in continued discussion between the Council and the Movement. Independent of community opinion, King’s actions seem logical, especially given the fact that he had not been aware of the true nature of the settlement. However, King and the SCLC’s lack of understanding regarding community opinion and expectations meant his actions had a much more negative effect on the Movement than either would have thought.
Albany blacks met the settlement with a mixture of anger and disappointment. Worked into a frenzy by King and other leaders, black citizens faced a settlement that failed to reward them for their days in rural Georgian jails. For those who had gone to jail and lost their jobs, the settlement was unacceptable. As Howard Zinn, reporting on Albany for the Southern Regional Council, concluded “many of those jailed for protesting viewed the settlement as ‘pitifully small payment for weeks of protest, for centuries of waiting.’” Few in the community would forget that they had lost their jobs and endured terrible conditions in jail only to be granted petty concessions. This loss of interest and morale severely compromised the Movement’s ability to increase support. Even among the leadership, there was little optimism. As an anonymous leader within the Albany Movement remarked, “It’s nothing to shout to the rafters about.” Few would forget that they had marched to prison with a man who had now bailed out and left town, leaving them in prison with no semblance of progress.
The transition to economic boycotts and selective buying campaigns in the period between King’s release in December and his trial in February demonstrate that black Albany retained interest in fighting segregation, as long as that support did not necessitate arrest. Perhaps the most successful aspect of economic protest revolved around the boycott of the city bus system. Busing was provided by a private company, and blacks comprised an overwhelming majority of those that patronized the service. The boycott hit the bus company hard, with the owners openly admitting that they needed help. They met with members of the city council who, using their influence among wealthy businessmen in town, were able to subsidize the company in order to keep it afloat, to the tune of $3,000 a day. By doing this, the Albany white community signaled that it was willing to pay the price to maintain segregation in Albany.
When Anderson and other leaders brought concerns over transportation desegregation to the City Council, Mayor Kelley brushed aside the requests, asked for ten days to consider it, and then adjourned the meeting. While personally in favor of at least considering some conciliatory reforms, Kelley found no support among other members of the City council, who uniformly opposed any altering of segregation laws, knowing that as long as they refused to yield, the Movement was virtually powerless to stop them. Despite his own personally moderate opinion, Kelley did not allow any semblance of division to reach the press or the black community, realizing that any sign of division would weaken the segregationist cause.
Continued boycotting of the bus system paid off in early February, when the bus company was forced to shut down. Black participation rates, estimated to be over ninety percent, made the boycott quite effective. But the effect of this shutdown was worse for the black community than it was for the white. Wyatt T. Walker [executive director of SCLC] stated: “the bus company went bankrupt, and the black people who made up seventy percent of its ridership were inconvenienced and the Albany Movement had no semblance of victory.” Unlike in Montgomery, Albany leaders had no plans to deal with the logistical difficulties arising from lack of transportation for the community. The protest had hurt the white community, but not to the point of forcing concessions. The wealthy members of the community who sat on the City Council and held economic power were unaffected as a whole as a result of the boycott. Again, blacks were sacrificing without any tangible result.
The boycott against white businesses also proved effective, although not as successful as the bus boycott. Some white businessmen lost over fifty percent of their business as a result of these selective buying campaigns. At city council meetings held over the next few weeks, local merchants responded to the economic pressure by urging members of the city council to accept token reforms, such as integrating the bus system, hoping that if these demands were met, the boycott would cease. Unlike the busing crisis the vocal support of the merchants for race reform represented positive pressure against the City Council. However, desegregation could not happen without a city council vote to change segregation laws, something the council refused to do. In order to bolster support for their decision, council members framed the vote as a defense of the city’s law-making ability. “This is a struggle to decide who makes the policy in this city,” said council member C.B. Pritchett. Criticism from local white merchants continued, but in the end many of the merchants accepted the losses. Pritchett recounts being told by a group of merchants that “we’re losing money, but we know what this is. And we’re going to stand back; we’re not going to put any pressure. Just go ahead.” “This” was a war over segregation and the status quo in Albany. Even though they were hurting economically, the portion of the white community most adversely affected by civil rights protest held the interests of segregation over their own economic success, revealing the solidarity the white community had in fighting segregation. Although the black community participated and supported in large numbers, far larger than had been involved in marches, economic protest would have little tangible effect upon the overall Albany Movement (Nelligan 27-31).
Works cited:
“Interview with Dr. William Anderson.” Eyes on the Prize Interview. November 7, 1985. Washington University Digital Gateway Texts. Web. http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb...
“Mary Jones Oral History Interview Conducted by Will Griffin in Albany, GA, 2013-03-09.” Civil Rights History Project. Library of Congress. Web. https://www.loc.gov/collections/civil...
Nelligan, Brendan Kevin. “Lessons of Albany: Civil Rights Protest in Albany, Georgia 1961-62.” Providence College: DigitalCommons@Providence. Fall 2009. Web. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu...
