Mark Winborn's Blog, page 20
March 9, 2012
C.G. Jung on the Distinction Between Psyche and Soul
"I have been compelled, in my investigations into the structure of the unconscious, to make a conceptual distinction between soul and psyche. By psyche I understand the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious. By soul, on the other hand, I understand a clearly demarcated functional complex that can best be described as a 'personality'." (CW 6, par. 797)C.G. Jung (1921) Psychological Types, The Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Vol. 6, par. 797, Princeton, NJ: Bollingen - Princeton University Press
March 6, 2012
Judith Mitriani - Defensive Organizations
"Defensive organizations have been widely investigated, theorized about, and clinically illustrated, especially in the Kleinian literature, since Riviere's (1936) seminal paper on the negative therapeutic reaction. Rosenfeld (1964) described defensive organizations as structured, organized patterns of manic defenses, relied upon to ward off anxieties of a paranoid-schizoid and depressive nature. He observed that defenses such as omnipotence, grandiosity, denial, splitting, and projective identification, as well as the feeling of triumph over a diminished and denigrated object and dominance over the helpless, needy and dependent baby-self — when maintained throughout infancy and childhood without mitigation — may become a well-organized, rigid, and stable aspect of the personality.
This defensive organization, when idealized, often blocks the establishment of and substitutes for those good internalized objects which might otherwise protect and support the nascent self while continuing to foster its growth and development. Ultimately, the impressionable baby-self comes under the control of the defensive organization which employs seduction, "terror, persecution and dread" (Meltzer, 1968), or "the threat of insanity" (Money-Kyrle, 1969).
Rosenfeld (1971) further developed his ideas, titrating out from the concept of narcissism the notion of negative narcissism and its probable relationship to the negative therapeutic reaction. Both Rosenfeld (1971) and Meltzer (1968) conceptualized this character structure as a Mafia or gang: a covert and collusive network of renegade malignant objects in hierarchical organization, which provide the infantile self with a reliable source of protection from madness, psychic pain, and anxiety in return for absolute obedience, loyalty, and constant acts of tribute.
In analysis we can detect the existence of these structures as it becomes apparent that the patient cannot bear or is afraid of being dependent upon and having feelings of affection for or gratitude toward the analyst. In fact, these patients often experience negative therapeutic reactions just as the relationship with the analyst begins to deepen and productive work momentarily proceeds. Thus, when tangible gains are achieved by the analytic couple and the patient might otherwise feel some relief from his psychic pain and anxiety, it is as if the "gang leader" — in an attempt to assert its hegemony — rears its ugly head and brings it all down with doubts, somatic symptoms, guilt, and threats of death and destruction.
During these episodes, we often hear our patients complaining that the analysis is worthless or, even worse, noxious. However, what may appear as an attempt to denigrate the analyst's work and worth may well be intended as an act of appeasement toward some inner force that cannot bear the development of this fruitful alliance between analyst and analysand — since such a new alliance threatens to provide an alternate means of living and coping with and within relationships while rendering the old regime obsolete." (pp. 12-13)
Judith Mitrani (2007). Fear of Breakdown, the Compulsion to Repeat, and the Defensive Organization: in Psychoanalysis and in Patrick Suskind's The Pigeon. Fort Da, Vol. 13, pp. 7-25
This defensive organization, when idealized, often blocks the establishment of and substitutes for those good internalized objects which might otherwise protect and support the nascent self while continuing to foster its growth and development. Ultimately, the impressionable baby-self comes under the control of the defensive organization which employs seduction, "terror, persecution and dread" (Meltzer, 1968), or "the threat of insanity" (Money-Kyrle, 1969).
Rosenfeld (1971) further developed his ideas, titrating out from the concept of narcissism the notion of negative narcissism and its probable relationship to the negative therapeutic reaction. Both Rosenfeld (1971) and Meltzer (1968) conceptualized this character structure as a Mafia or gang: a covert and collusive network of renegade malignant objects in hierarchical organization, which provide the infantile self with a reliable source of protection from madness, psychic pain, and anxiety in return for absolute obedience, loyalty, and constant acts of tribute.
In analysis we can detect the existence of these structures as it becomes apparent that the patient cannot bear or is afraid of being dependent upon and having feelings of affection for or gratitude toward the analyst. In fact, these patients often experience negative therapeutic reactions just as the relationship with the analyst begins to deepen and productive work momentarily proceeds. Thus, when tangible gains are achieved by the analytic couple and the patient might otherwise feel some relief from his psychic pain and anxiety, it is as if the "gang leader" — in an attempt to assert its hegemony — rears its ugly head and brings it all down with doubts, somatic symptoms, guilt, and threats of death and destruction.
During these episodes, we often hear our patients complaining that the analysis is worthless or, even worse, noxious. However, what may appear as an attempt to denigrate the analyst's work and worth may well be intended as an act of appeasement toward some inner force that cannot bear the development of this fruitful alliance between analyst and analysand — since such a new alliance threatens to provide an alternate means of living and coping with and within relationships while rendering the old regime obsolete." (pp. 12-13)
Judith Mitrani (2007). Fear of Breakdown, the Compulsion to Repeat, and the Defensive Organization: in Psychoanalysis and in Patrick Suskind's The Pigeon. Fort Da, Vol. 13, pp. 7-25
March 2, 2012
Nathan Schwartz-Salant on the Correspondence Between Carl Jung's 'Participation Mystique' and Melanie Klein's 'Projective Identification'
"In 1946 Melanie Klein published 'Notes on some schizoid mechanisms' (19), in which she coined the term projective identification. Klein's paper employed the mother/infant object-relation and outlined a conception of parts of one person being put into and identified with another person. In the same year, 1946, Jung published the 'The psychology of the transference' (13), in which he used the arcane symbolism of alchemy to explore the same phenomenology as Klein. Klein's paper, as Donald Meltzer has noted, had an 'electrifying impact [upon] the analysts who were closely working with her' Meltzer (22, p. 20). Jung's hardly had such an impact. For most Jungians, let alone analysts of other schools of thought, his alchemical model often seems too abstract for 'here and now' clinical practice. Yet inherent in Jung's study of the transference lies an approach to the phenomenology of projective identification which richly elaborates the findings of Klein and other psychoanalysts, as well as deepening our understanding and widening the possibilities for clinical usage. Jung's work also helps delineate the limitations of employing the concept of projective identification.
Klein describes how: "The phantasied onslaughts on the mother follow two main lines: one is the predominantly oral impulse to suck dry, bite up, scoop out and rob the mother's body of its good contents … The other line of attack derives from the anal and urethral impulses and implies expelling dangerous substances (excrements) out of the self and on to the mother or, as I would rather call it, into the mother. These excrements and bad parts of the self are meant not only to injure but also to control and to take possession of the object. In so far as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self, she is not felt to be a separate individual but is felt to be the bad self ... Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed against the mother. This leads to a particular form of aggression which establishes the prototype of an aggressive object-relation. I suggest for this process the term 'projective identification' " (KLEIN 19, p. 8).
Klein further described how both good and bad parts of the self can be projected. When this is excessive, she says, the ego becomes weakened and impoverished (Ibid. p. 9), cannot assimilate internal objects, and feels ruled by them (Ibid. p. 11). In a further elaboration of these principles, James Grotstein has emphasised that projective identification is imagination (GROTSTEIN 10, p. 124). Projective identification, he writes, is a 'mental mechanism whereby the self experiences the unconscious phantasy of translocating itself, or aspects of itself, into an object for exploratory or defensive purposes' (Ibid. p. 123).
Rosemary Gordon has observed that Jung's usage of the term unconscious identity, psychic infection, participation mystique, induction, and the process he called feeling-into are synonyms for projective identification (9, p. 128). Jung's definition of feeling-into highlights its imaginal nature. It is a kind of perception process … it conveys, through the agency of feeling, an essential psychic content into the object; whereby the object is introjected. This content, by virtue of its intimate relation with the subject, assimilates the object to the subject, and so links it up with the subject that the latter senses himself … in the object. The subject … does not feel himself into the object, but the object felt into appears rather as though it were animated and expressing itself of its own accord. This peculiarity depends upon the fact that the projection transfers an unconscious content into the object, whence also the feeling-into process is termed transference in analytical psychology (JUNG, 11, p. 290, in the translation by H. G. Baynes (1923), pp. 359-60).
Jung's statement refers to positive aspects of projective identification which lead to aesthetic awareness (JUNG 11, par. 486), empathy, and a deep imaginal searching out of processes in the object. When he says, 'The subject … does not feel himself into the object,' he refers to a subject who already has an ego-self differentiation. But in other instances of projective identification the subject, or at least certain ego functions of the subject, as Klein emphasised, do project into the object, and this can lead to a state of confusion and to a weakening of consciousness that allows for emotional flooding by unconscious processes. In extreme instances a relationship dominated by projective identification can trigger psychotic episodes. As a result of the way the image of the self can hide in objects through projective identification, the subject has the unconscious phantasy of being invisible (GROTSTEIN 10, p. 130). This can become extreme, leading to a sense of a 'loss of soul' and a terror that the self can never be found.
Negative aspects of projective identification, such as confusion, identity loss or panic often appear dominant. However, projective identification also has the power, as Gordon has explained, to break down inner psychic boundaries, as well as those between a person and the object world (9, p. 145). This breakdown of structures is essential to any qualitative personality change.
Jung often stressed negative features of what Klein called projective identification. His goal in therapy, as stated in his commentary to The Secret of the Golden Flower, is the dissolution of those fusion states between subject and object, states he called participation mystique (JUNG 18, pars. 65-66). But this goal then appears questionable when Jung himself explains that once the self becomes the centre of personality, participation mystique is done away with and 'results in a personality that suffers only in the lower storeys, as it were, but in its upper storey is singularly detached from painful as well as from joyful happenings' (Ibid., par. 67). It would appear from this statement that one cannot totally do away with the process of projective identification except to banish it to the body, hardly a desirable state, and one that can lead only to mind-body splitting.
In these remarks Jung was centring upon what he called the 'compulsion and impossible responsibility' (Ibid., par. 78) that can accompany interactions dominated by participation mystique. Thus he emphasised the role of the self in breaking the compulsive tie between subject and object, the negative form of projective identification. In his study of the 'Visions of Zosimos' Jung struck a different tone and regarded participation mystique as underlying alchemical projections which 'are a special instance of the mode of thinking typified by the idea of the microcosm' (JUNG 16, par. 123). Generally, Jung was aware of the potentially creative and destructive aspects of participation mystique, and thus of the phenomenology of projective identification. He was influenced by both possibilities in his analysis of the alchemical imagery of the Rosarium Philosophorum, his Ariadne thread through the complexities of the transference (JUNG 13, par. 401)....
'The psychology of the transference', Jung's main statement on the transference, is centrally concerned with the phenomenology of projective identification. There he addressed unconscious processes that 'have an inductive effect on the unconscious of [the] doctor' (Ibid., par. 363). This theme repeats itself in variations throughout his study (Ibid., pars. 364, 365, 367). Jung described the phenomenology of projective identification as activating the unconscious and the archetypal transference..." (pp. 39-42)
Nathan Schwartz-Salant (1988). Archetypal Foundations of Projective Identification. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 33, pp. 39-64
Klein describes how: "The phantasied onslaughts on the mother follow two main lines: one is the predominantly oral impulse to suck dry, bite up, scoop out and rob the mother's body of its good contents … The other line of attack derives from the anal and urethral impulses and implies expelling dangerous substances (excrements) out of the self and on to the mother or, as I would rather call it, into the mother. These excrements and bad parts of the self are meant not only to injure but also to control and to take possession of the object. In so far as the mother comes to contain the bad parts of the self, she is not felt to be a separate individual but is felt to be the bad self ... Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed against the mother. This leads to a particular form of aggression which establishes the prototype of an aggressive object-relation. I suggest for this process the term 'projective identification' " (KLEIN 19, p. 8).
Klein further described how both good and bad parts of the self can be projected. When this is excessive, she says, the ego becomes weakened and impoverished (Ibid. p. 9), cannot assimilate internal objects, and feels ruled by them (Ibid. p. 11). In a further elaboration of these principles, James Grotstein has emphasised that projective identification is imagination (GROTSTEIN 10, p. 124). Projective identification, he writes, is a 'mental mechanism whereby the self experiences the unconscious phantasy of translocating itself, or aspects of itself, into an object for exploratory or defensive purposes' (Ibid. p. 123).
Rosemary Gordon has observed that Jung's usage of the term unconscious identity, psychic infection, participation mystique, induction, and the process he called feeling-into are synonyms for projective identification (9, p. 128). Jung's definition of feeling-into highlights its imaginal nature. It is a kind of perception process … it conveys, through the agency of feeling, an essential psychic content into the object; whereby the object is introjected. This content, by virtue of its intimate relation with the subject, assimilates the object to the subject, and so links it up with the subject that the latter senses himself … in the object. The subject … does not feel himself into the object, but the object felt into appears rather as though it were animated and expressing itself of its own accord. This peculiarity depends upon the fact that the projection transfers an unconscious content into the object, whence also the feeling-into process is termed transference in analytical psychology (JUNG, 11, p. 290, in the translation by H. G. Baynes (1923), pp. 359-60).
Jung's statement refers to positive aspects of projective identification which lead to aesthetic awareness (JUNG 11, par. 486), empathy, and a deep imaginal searching out of processes in the object. When he says, 'The subject … does not feel himself into the object,' he refers to a subject who already has an ego-self differentiation. But in other instances of projective identification the subject, or at least certain ego functions of the subject, as Klein emphasised, do project into the object, and this can lead to a state of confusion and to a weakening of consciousness that allows for emotional flooding by unconscious processes. In extreme instances a relationship dominated by projective identification can trigger psychotic episodes. As a result of the way the image of the self can hide in objects through projective identification, the subject has the unconscious phantasy of being invisible (GROTSTEIN 10, p. 130). This can become extreme, leading to a sense of a 'loss of soul' and a terror that the self can never be found.
Negative aspects of projective identification, such as confusion, identity loss or panic often appear dominant. However, projective identification also has the power, as Gordon has explained, to break down inner psychic boundaries, as well as those between a person and the object world (9, p. 145). This breakdown of structures is essential to any qualitative personality change.
Jung often stressed negative features of what Klein called projective identification. His goal in therapy, as stated in his commentary to The Secret of the Golden Flower, is the dissolution of those fusion states between subject and object, states he called participation mystique (JUNG 18, pars. 65-66). But this goal then appears questionable when Jung himself explains that once the self becomes the centre of personality, participation mystique is done away with and 'results in a personality that suffers only in the lower storeys, as it were, but in its upper storey is singularly detached from painful as well as from joyful happenings' (Ibid., par. 67). It would appear from this statement that one cannot totally do away with the process of projective identification except to banish it to the body, hardly a desirable state, and one that can lead only to mind-body splitting.
In these remarks Jung was centring upon what he called the 'compulsion and impossible responsibility' (Ibid., par. 78) that can accompany interactions dominated by participation mystique. Thus he emphasised the role of the self in breaking the compulsive tie between subject and object, the negative form of projective identification. In his study of the 'Visions of Zosimos' Jung struck a different tone and regarded participation mystique as underlying alchemical projections which 'are a special instance of the mode of thinking typified by the idea of the microcosm' (JUNG 16, par. 123). Generally, Jung was aware of the potentially creative and destructive aspects of participation mystique, and thus of the phenomenology of projective identification. He was influenced by both possibilities in his analysis of the alchemical imagery of the Rosarium Philosophorum, his Ariadne thread through the complexities of the transference (JUNG 13, par. 401)....
'The psychology of the transference', Jung's main statement on the transference, is centrally concerned with the phenomenology of projective identification. There he addressed unconscious processes that 'have an inductive effect on the unconscious of [the] doctor' (Ibid., par. 363). This theme repeats itself in variations throughout his study (Ibid., pars. 364, 365, 367). Jung described the phenomenology of projective identification as activating the unconscious and the archetypal transference..." (pp. 39-42)
Nathan Schwartz-Salant (1988). Archetypal Foundations of Projective Identification. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 33, pp. 39-64
March 1, 2012
Beutel & Huber - Can Neuroimaging Contribute to Understanding Analytic Change?
Conclusion: "If we do not limit psychoanalysis to the domain of latent or manifest meaning, but consider it a general model of mind-more specifically, a model of mental disorders and psychotherapeutic treatment-then there are unique opportunities to study psychodynamic hypotheses and change processes (Kandel, 1998, 1999). The functioning of structures strongly affected by adverse experiences early in development (e.g., the limbic system) has become accessible to neuroimaging, opening new avenues for the study of psychoanalytic hypotheses and models. Some basic psychoanalytic tenets have been substantiated by recent neuroscience findings (e.g., the developmental impact of early experiences, unconscious processing). On the other hand, we cannot bypass neurobiological findings on biological vulnerability factors for mental disorders that may increase the vulnerability to adverse experiences in childhood or later life (Hariri et al., 2002). We are also alerted to potential biological changes resulting from adverse experiences (e.g., memory functioning in PTSD). As exemplified by the recent surge in mentalizing and related constructs, studying the neurobiology of psychoanalytic concepts may help in the formulation and testing of the psychodynamic concepts of psychic function. Given the growing discontent with atheoretical, descriptive diagnoses (e.g., major depression), neurobiological findings may help to refine diagnoses according to more functional categories, having implications for the current discussion on "disease-specific treatments." Functional characteristics of subgroups of patients beyond descriptive diagnostic criteria (e.g., levels of emotional processing as proposed by Lane & Schwartz, 1987; Moriguchi et al., 2006) may have an effect on treatment response to certain types of psychotherapy (e.g., psychoanalysis, psychodynamic psychotherapy, or a combination with psychotropic medication). While psychoanalytic concepts have been frequently assimilated and modified by various disciplines (e.g., psychology, psychiatry, neurosciences, humanities), psychoanalysis has moved into an academic outsider position in many fields. Increasingly, psychoanalysts have been advocating a reconnection with academic development (Bornstein, 2005). Among the entry points, neuroscience is but one, albeit an important and promising one." (p. 14)
Manfred Beutel and Michael Huber (2008). Functional Neuroimaging—Can It Contribute to Our Understanding of Processes of Change?. Neuro-Psychoanalysis, Vol. 10, pp. 5-16
Manfred Beutel and Michael Huber (2008). Functional Neuroimaging—Can It Contribute to Our Understanding of Processes of Change?. Neuro-Psychoanalysis, Vol. 10, pp. 5-16
February 24, 2012
Martin Schmidt on Psychic Skin
"Psychoanalytic practice and theory is fundamentally concerned with boundaries and containment. This requires the establishment of semi-permeable, flexible membranes that can create space, hold and control the passage of that which goes in and out. The consulting room and its furniture, the building that it is in, the person of the analyst, the words we choose, the silence, the transference and the analytic hour itself, all provide a kind of metaphorical 'skin' for the analysis.
Freud states that 'the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body' (1927, p. 26). In her seminal paper, Esther Bick (1968) argues that in its most primitive form, the parts of the personality are held together by the skin functioning as a boundary. Just as the Psychic skin: psychotic defences, borderline process and delusions psychological functions of nourishment, reassurance and comfort are dependent upon the introjection of the warm and receptive breast, so too the mental function of containment is dependent upon the introjection of an external object capable of providing a 'skin-container' function. Without the incorporation of this containing function, the concept of a space within the self cannot arise and consequently introjection itself (i.e. the psychological construction of objects in an internal space) is impaired. Unrestrained projective identification ensues and all the confusions of identity associated with it.
Following in Bick's footsteps, Joan Symington (1985) describes how the baby lives in constant fear of its psychic skin being breached and spilling out into 'unintegrated states'. If the mother is able to contain the baby's distress, the psychic skin is strengthened. If, however, the mother fails or is absent, then the infant has to resort to its own means of holding itself together. She has observed a number of ways in which the baby attempts to do this: by focusing its attention on a source of light, sound, touch or smell; by engaging in repetitive movement and by muscular tightening/clenching. Adult equivalents of these primitive omnipotent defences include pacing the floor, continuous talking, self-stroking, watching television, plugging into headphones and compulsive exercise. The perpetuation of these survival mechanisms may lead to the development of what Bick calls a 'second muscular skin', based on robustness and muscularity, rather than identification with a containing object. If unmodified, this can become a defensive-offensive armour which we see in schizophrenia.
Didier Anzieu (op.cit.) developed these ideas and formulated the concept of a 'skin ego', a bodily pre-ego, a mental image based on the infant's experience of the skin which it uses to support the functions of the ego. He argues that as every psychical activity is anaclitically dependent upon biological/physical functions, the functions of the ego mirror the functions of the skin: a container/sac for retaining thoughts, affects and good experiences accumulated through feeding, touch and bathing in words, an interface which protects against penetration and a means of communication with the outside world.
This skin ego provides a kind of 'narcissistic envelope' to protect the psyche. Anzieu imagines that there is a primitive fantasy of a skin common to mother and baby which is followed by a flayed skin (with separation) and then the establishment of a skin of one's own. At this point, I would like to clarify my own use of the term 'psychic skin'. There is a tendency in psychoanalysis to use metaphor to describe psychological functions/capacities in terms of body parts; e.g., Symington says the 'optimal containing object' is the nipple in the mouth and Bick directly equates psychic skin to physical skin. However, as Warren Colman points out, there is a danger in exaggerating the physical source of the metaphor: 'The process of reduction back to the physical body has the effect of imbuing the physical body with meaning that it did not necessarily have before' (Colman 2005, p 653).
I am using the term 'psychic skin' as a metaphor for an abstract psychological capacity, namely, the containing and protective function of the psyche. This is informed by the infant's actual experience of its own physical skin and the actions of its parents (e.g., their touch); also by the integration of their feeling/thinking containing function (which processes and makes bearable the infant's anxieties) and other archetypal factors which I will aim to describe." (pp. 23-25)
Martin Schmidt (2012) Psychic skin: psychotic defences, borderline process and delusions. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2012, Vol. 57, pp. 21–39
Freud states that 'the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body' (1927, p. 26). In her seminal paper, Esther Bick (1968) argues that in its most primitive form, the parts of the personality are held together by the skin functioning as a boundary. Just as the Psychic skin: psychotic defences, borderline process and delusions psychological functions of nourishment, reassurance and comfort are dependent upon the introjection of the warm and receptive breast, so too the mental function of containment is dependent upon the introjection of an external object capable of providing a 'skin-container' function. Without the incorporation of this containing function, the concept of a space within the self cannot arise and consequently introjection itself (i.e. the psychological construction of objects in an internal space) is impaired. Unrestrained projective identification ensues and all the confusions of identity associated with it.
Following in Bick's footsteps, Joan Symington (1985) describes how the baby lives in constant fear of its psychic skin being breached and spilling out into 'unintegrated states'. If the mother is able to contain the baby's distress, the psychic skin is strengthened. If, however, the mother fails or is absent, then the infant has to resort to its own means of holding itself together. She has observed a number of ways in which the baby attempts to do this: by focusing its attention on a source of light, sound, touch or smell; by engaging in repetitive movement and by muscular tightening/clenching. Adult equivalents of these primitive omnipotent defences include pacing the floor, continuous talking, self-stroking, watching television, plugging into headphones and compulsive exercise. The perpetuation of these survival mechanisms may lead to the development of what Bick calls a 'second muscular skin', based on robustness and muscularity, rather than identification with a containing object. If unmodified, this can become a defensive-offensive armour which we see in schizophrenia.
Didier Anzieu (op.cit.) developed these ideas and formulated the concept of a 'skin ego', a bodily pre-ego, a mental image based on the infant's experience of the skin which it uses to support the functions of the ego. He argues that as every psychical activity is anaclitically dependent upon biological/physical functions, the functions of the ego mirror the functions of the skin: a container/sac for retaining thoughts, affects and good experiences accumulated through feeding, touch and bathing in words, an interface which protects against penetration and a means of communication with the outside world.
This skin ego provides a kind of 'narcissistic envelope' to protect the psyche. Anzieu imagines that there is a primitive fantasy of a skin common to mother and baby which is followed by a flayed skin (with separation) and then the establishment of a skin of one's own. At this point, I would like to clarify my own use of the term 'psychic skin'. There is a tendency in psychoanalysis to use metaphor to describe psychological functions/capacities in terms of body parts; e.g., Symington says the 'optimal containing object' is the nipple in the mouth and Bick directly equates psychic skin to physical skin. However, as Warren Colman points out, there is a danger in exaggerating the physical source of the metaphor: 'The process of reduction back to the physical body has the effect of imbuing the physical body with meaning that it did not necessarily have before' (Colman 2005, p 653).
I am using the term 'psychic skin' as a metaphor for an abstract psychological capacity, namely, the containing and protective function of the psyche. This is informed by the infant's actual experience of its own physical skin and the actions of its parents (e.g., their touch); also by the integration of their feeling/thinking containing function (which processes and makes bearable the infant's anxieties) and other archetypal factors which I will aim to describe." (pp. 23-25)
Martin Schmidt (2012) Psychic skin: psychotic defences, borderline process and delusions. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2012, Vol. 57, pp. 21–39
February 21, 2012
Winnicott - The Interaction of Past and Present in the Fear of Breakdown
"I can now state my main contention, and it turns out to be very simple. I contend that clinical fear of breakdown is the fear of a breakdown that has already been experienced. It is a fear of the original agony which caused the defence organization which the patient displays as an illness syndrome.
This idea may or may not prove immediately useful to the clinician. We cannot hurry up our patients. Nevertheless, we can hold up their progress because of genuinely not knowing; any little piece of our understanding may help us to keep up with a patient's needs.
There are moments, according to my experience, when a patient needs to be told that the breakdown, a fear of which destroys his or her life, has already been. It is a fact that is carried round hidden away in the unconscious. The unconscious here is not exactly the repressed unconscious of psychoneurosis, nor is it the unconscious of Freud's formulation of the part o the psyche that is very close to neurophysiological functioning. Nor is it the unconscious of Jung's which I would call: all those things that go on in underground caves, or (in other words) the world's mythology, in which there is collusion between the individual and the maternal inner psychic realities. In this special context the unconscious means that the ego integration is not able to encompass something. The ego is too immature to gather all the phenomena into the area of personal omnipotence. It must be asked here: why does the patient go on being worried by this that belongs to the past? The answer must be that the original experience of primitive agony cannot get into the past tense unless the ego can first gather it into its own present time experience and into omnipotent control now (assuming the auxiliary ego-supporting function of the mother (analyst)).
In other words, the patient must go on looking for the past detail which is not yet experienced. This search takes the form of a looking for this detail in the future.
Unless the therapist can work successfully on the basis that this detail is already a fact, the patient must go on fearing to find what is being compulsively looked for in the future.
On the other hand, if the patient is ready for some kind of acceptance of this queer kind of truth, that what is not yet experienced did nevertheless happen in the past, then the way is open for the agony to be experienced in the transference, in reaction to the analyst's failures and mistakes. These latter can be dealt with by the patient in doses that are not excessive, and the patient can account for each technical failure of the analyst as countertransference. In other words, gradually the patient gathers the original failure of the facilitating environment into the area of his or her omnipotence and the experience of omnipotence which belongs to the state of dependence (transference fact).
All this is very difficult, time-consuming and painful, but it at any rate is not futile. What is futile is the alternative, and it is this that must now be examined." (pp. 104-105)
Donald Winnicott (1974). Fear of Breakdown. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 1, pp. 103-107.
This idea may or may not prove immediately useful to the clinician. We cannot hurry up our patients. Nevertheless, we can hold up their progress because of genuinely not knowing; any little piece of our understanding may help us to keep up with a patient's needs.
There are moments, according to my experience, when a patient needs to be told that the breakdown, a fear of which destroys his or her life, has already been. It is a fact that is carried round hidden away in the unconscious. The unconscious here is not exactly the repressed unconscious of psychoneurosis, nor is it the unconscious of Freud's formulation of the part o the psyche that is very close to neurophysiological functioning. Nor is it the unconscious of Jung's which I would call: all those things that go on in underground caves, or (in other words) the world's mythology, in which there is collusion between the individual and the maternal inner psychic realities. In this special context the unconscious means that the ego integration is not able to encompass something. The ego is too immature to gather all the phenomena into the area of personal omnipotence. It must be asked here: why does the patient go on being worried by this that belongs to the past? The answer must be that the original experience of primitive agony cannot get into the past tense unless the ego can first gather it into its own present time experience and into omnipotent control now (assuming the auxiliary ego-supporting function of the mother (analyst)).
In other words, the patient must go on looking for the past detail which is not yet experienced. This search takes the form of a looking for this detail in the future.
Unless the therapist can work successfully on the basis that this detail is already a fact, the patient must go on fearing to find what is being compulsively looked for in the future.
On the other hand, if the patient is ready for some kind of acceptance of this queer kind of truth, that what is not yet experienced did nevertheless happen in the past, then the way is open for the agony to be experienced in the transference, in reaction to the analyst's failures and mistakes. These latter can be dealt with by the patient in doses that are not excessive, and the patient can account for each technical failure of the analyst as countertransference. In other words, gradually the patient gathers the original failure of the facilitating environment into the area of his or her omnipotence and the experience of omnipotence which belongs to the state of dependence (transference fact).
All this is very difficult, time-consuming and painful, but it at any rate is not futile. What is futile is the alternative, and it is this that must now be examined." (pp. 104-105)
Donald Winnicott (1974). Fear of Breakdown. International Review of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 1, pp. 103-107.
February 17, 2012
Carl Jung on the Transcendent Function
Jung's concept of the transcendent function, originally developed in 1916, is at the center of his system of Analytical Psychology. There are striking parallels between Jung's notion of the transcendent function and the concept of alpha function proposed at a later time by Wilfrend Bion (1962, Learning from Experience):
"The tendencies of the conscious and the unconscious are the two factors that together make up the transcendent function. It is called 'transcendent' because it makes the transition from one attitude to another organically possible." [The Transcendent Function, CW 8, par. 145.]
"Once the unconscious content has been given form and the meaning of the formulation is understood, the question arises as to how the ego will relate to this position, and how the ego and the unconscious are to come to terms. This is the second and more important stage of the procedure, the bringing together of opposites for the production of a third: the transcendent function. At this stage it is no longer the unconscious that takes the lead, but the ego." [The Transcendent Function, CW 8, par. 181.]
"From the activity of the unconscious there now emerges a new content, constellated by thesis and antithesis in equal measure and standing in a compensatory relation to both. It thus forms the middle ground on which the opposites can be united. If, for instance, we conceive the opposition to be sensuality versus spirituality, then the mediatory content born out of the unconscious provides a welcome means of expression for the spiritual thesis, because of its rich spiritual associations, and also for the sensual antithesis, because of its sensuous imagery. The ego, however, torn between thesis and antithesis, finds in the middle ground its own counterpart, its sole and unique means of expression, and it eagerly seizes on this in order to be delivered from its division." [Psychological Types, CW 6, par. 825.]
"If the mediatory product remains intact, it forms the raw material for a process not of dissolution but of construction, in which thesis and antithesis both play their part. In this way it becomes a new content that governs the whole attitude, putting an end to the division and forcing the energy of the opposites into a common channel. The standstill is overcome and life can flow on with renewed power towards new goals." [Psychological Types, CW6, par. 827.]"
C.G. Jung (1916/1958) The Transcendent Function, Collected Works Vol. 8, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
C.G. Jung (1921) Psychological Types, Collected Works Vol. 6, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
"The tendencies of the conscious and the unconscious are the two factors that together make up the transcendent function. It is called 'transcendent' because it makes the transition from one attitude to another organically possible." [The Transcendent Function, CW 8, par. 145.]
"Once the unconscious content has been given form and the meaning of the formulation is understood, the question arises as to how the ego will relate to this position, and how the ego and the unconscious are to come to terms. This is the second and more important stage of the procedure, the bringing together of opposites for the production of a third: the transcendent function. At this stage it is no longer the unconscious that takes the lead, but the ego." [The Transcendent Function, CW 8, par. 181.]
"From the activity of the unconscious there now emerges a new content, constellated by thesis and antithesis in equal measure and standing in a compensatory relation to both. It thus forms the middle ground on which the opposites can be united. If, for instance, we conceive the opposition to be sensuality versus spirituality, then the mediatory content born out of the unconscious provides a welcome means of expression for the spiritual thesis, because of its rich spiritual associations, and also for the sensual antithesis, because of its sensuous imagery. The ego, however, torn between thesis and antithesis, finds in the middle ground its own counterpart, its sole and unique means of expression, and it eagerly seizes on this in order to be delivered from its division." [Psychological Types, CW 6, par. 825.]
"If the mediatory product remains intact, it forms the raw material for a process not of dissolution but of construction, in which thesis and antithesis both play their part. In this way it becomes a new content that governs the whole attitude, putting an end to the division and forcing the energy of the opposites into a common channel. The standstill is overcome and life can flow on with renewed power towards new goals." [Psychological Types, CW6, par. 827.]"
C.G. Jung (1916/1958) The Transcendent Function, Collected Works Vol. 8, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
C.G. Jung (1921) Psychological Types, Collected Works Vol. 6, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
February 14, 2012
Leuzinger-Bohleber and Pfeifer - Memory as Embodied Process
Abstract: "Memory has always been a central issue in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Recent developments in the cognitive and neural sciences suggest that traditional notions of memory based on stored structures which are also often underlying psychoanalytic thinking cannot account for a number of fundamental phenomena and thus need to be revised. We suggest that memory be conceived as a) a theoretical construct explaining current behaviour by reference to events that have happened in the past. b) Memory is not to be conceived as stored structures but as a function of the whole organism, as a complex, dynamic, recategorising and interactive process, which is always 'embodied'. c) Memory always has a subjective and an objective side. The subjective side is given by the individual's history, the objective side by the neural patterns generated by the sensory motor interactions with the environment. This implies that both 'narrative' (subjective) and 'historical' (objective) truth have to be taken into account achieving stable psychic change..." (p. 3)
Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber and Rolf Pfeifer (2002). Remembering a Depressive Primary Object. Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 83:3-33
Marianne Leuzinger-Bohleber and Rolf Pfeifer (2002). Remembering a Depressive Primary Object. Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 83:3-33
February 10, 2012
Murray Jackson - Considerations in Symbolic Process with Schizoid Patients
"In recent years there has been an increasing interest among psychopathologists in the study and treatment of schizoid disorders, which are now known to be more accessible to analytical psychotherapy than was formerly realized. Clinical and theoretical studies, mostly made by psycho-analysts, have revealed types of mental mechanism specific to the schizoid level of mental organization, and thrown light on the process of the formation of symbols and their precursors. In the course of analysis of schizoid patients the process of symbol formation may sometimes be seen developing. At primitive levels symbolism is archaic and prelogical, the symbol having the same emotional value as the thing symbolized, and this stage has been called the symbolic equation. With further development this changes to symbolic representation, where the symbol represents rather than presents the thing symbolized, is a picture rather than a replica. When this change occurs in the treatment of schizoid patients, it is associated with a lessening of persecutory anxiety and an increased capacity for depression and for healthier object relations.
In the transference with such patients primitive contents are projected into the analyst and may confer a delusional quality on the process. Examples are given from clinical practice of the appearance of symbolic equations in such cases, and of their change to representations as treatment progresses.
In the context of clinical observations a condensed account of psycho-analytic theories of symbol formation is presented, and the relevance of all this to Jung's concept of the symbol is considered.
The main contention of this paper is that Jung's use of the term "symbol" corresponds to the experience of symbolic equations by a relatively mature ego, an ego with a specific attitude of receptiveness, the "symbolic attitude", towards such experience. With the immature ego at the schizoid level of mental organization, it is most unlikely that symbols can be appreciated in this way, and attempts to use symbolic experience in a conventional therapeutic way are likely to lead to defensive splitting in the ego.
The best safeguard against this happening is for the therapist to give the bodily aspects of mental life the importance they deserve, and to be aware of the need for genetically earlier levels of experience to be properly integrated before there can be much hope of potentially creative experience having a truly creative, rather than a defensive, outcome.
These ideas contain little that is new, and accord with Jung's views about the need, in certain cases, for regression to the archaic object relationship, which is represented by the biologically based symbol and which has the potential of resolving the state of splitting into opposites. However, the linking of current psycho-analytic concepts with these established ideas of analytical psychology seems, to the author, to be quite essential if progress is to be made in the treatment of, and discussion of, schizoid patients." (pp. 156-157)
Murray Jackson (1963). Symbol Formation and the Delusional Transference. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 8, pp. 145-159
In the transference with such patients primitive contents are projected into the analyst and may confer a delusional quality on the process. Examples are given from clinical practice of the appearance of symbolic equations in such cases, and of their change to representations as treatment progresses.
In the context of clinical observations a condensed account of psycho-analytic theories of symbol formation is presented, and the relevance of all this to Jung's concept of the symbol is considered.
The main contention of this paper is that Jung's use of the term "symbol" corresponds to the experience of symbolic equations by a relatively mature ego, an ego with a specific attitude of receptiveness, the "symbolic attitude", towards such experience. With the immature ego at the schizoid level of mental organization, it is most unlikely that symbols can be appreciated in this way, and attempts to use symbolic experience in a conventional therapeutic way are likely to lead to defensive splitting in the ego.
The best safeguard against this happening is for the therapist to give the bodily aspects of mental life the importance they deserve, and to be aware of the need for genetically earlier levels of experience to be properly integrated before there can be much hope of potentially creative experience having a truly creative, rather than a defensive, outcome.
These ideas contain little that is new, and accord with Jung's views about the need, in certain cases, for regression to the archaic object relationship, which is represented by the biologically based symbol and which has the potential of resolving the state of splitting into opposites. However, the linking of current psycho-analytic concepts with these established ideas of analytical psychology seems, to the author, to be quite essential if progress is to be made in the treatment of, and discussion of, schizoid patients." (pp. 156-157)
Murray Jackson (1963). Symbol Formation and the Delusional Transference. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 8, pp. 145-159
February 7, 2012
Brief Overview of the Work of Hyman Spotnitz and the School of Modern Psychoanalysis
"The term modern psychoanalysis is used to describe a body of new developments in psychoanalytic theory and technique that emphasizes the role of emotional communication in the analytic situation, especially in the analyst's interventions. Clinically, the methods and techniques of modern psychoanalysis enable psychoanalysts to treat a much wider range of disturbances than was believed possible using classical methods. In fact experience has shown that modern psychoanalysis can be an effective treatment for all the psychodynamically reversible illnesses, including psychosomatic disorders, organic disorders with a psychological component, psychoses, neuroses, and character disorders.
Scientifically, the findings of modern psychoanalysis have contributed new insights into both the dynamics of emotional illnesses (especially the more severe disturbances such as schizophrenia) and our understanding of the mechanisms through which the analytic process cures these conditions. As in classical analysis, the modern analyst's strategy is to create a transference situation by having the patient communicate verbally from the couch. Cure is then effected through analysis and resolution of the transference resistances.
Historically, modern analysis dates from the work of Spotnitz, who during the 1940s used psychoanalysis to treat severely regressed, hospitalized patients. Spotnitz, and other modern analysts since then, have found that for psychoanalysis to be effective with such disturbances, it is necessary to establish a narcissistic transference with the patient. This condition differs from object transference because it involves a re-creation of the relationship that existed with the mothering figure before the ego boundaries became defined.
Classical analysis, beginning with Freud, have held that the narcissistic disorders do not respond to psychoanalytic treatment. However, modern analysts have found that the development of a narcissistic transference makes possible the treatment of such patients.
Early work by modern analysts disclosed that the narcissistic patient's major resistances involved defenses against powerful aggressive feelings. This finding suggests another important difference between modern analysis and classical analysis: the primary focus of classical analysts is the resolution of transference resistance to the expression of libidinal feelings; modern analysts, when working with the narcissistic disorders, focus first on the aggressive drive in order to liberate the libidinal drive.
Theoretically, it is fruitful to view the symptoms of narcissistic disorders (depression, withdrawal, ego fragmentation, psychosomatic complaints, and so on) as primitive defenses against acting out murderous impulses toward an object. To prevent action the impulses are turned inward against the patient's own ego or soma." (pp. 3-4)
Editorial Board (1976). The Origins of Modern Psychoanalysis. Modern Psychoanalysis, Vol. 1, pp. 3-16
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Scientifically, the findings of modern psychoanalysis have contributed new insights into both the dynamics of emotional illnesses (especially the more severe disturbances such as schizophrenia) and our understanding of the mechanisms through which the analytic process cures these conditions. As in classical analysis, the modern analyst's strategy is to create a transference situation by having the patient communicate verbally from the couch. Cure is then effected through analysis and resolution of the transference resistances.
Historically, modern analysis dates from the work of Spotnitz, who during the 1940s used psychoanalysis to treat severely regressed, hospitalized patients. Spotnitz, and other modern analysts since then, have found that for psychoanalysis to be effective with such disturbances, it is necessary to establish a narcissistic transference with the patient. This condition differs from object transference because it involves a re-creation of the relationship that existed with the mothering figure before the ego boundaries became defined.
Classical analysis, beginning with Freud, have held that the narcissistic disorders do not respond to psychoanalytic treatment. However, modern analysts have found that the development of a narcissistic transference makes possible the treatment of such patients.
Early work by modern analysts disclosed that the narcissistic patient's major resistances involved defenses against powerful aggressive feelings. This finding suggests another important difference between modern analysis and classical analysis: the primary focus of classical analysts is the resolution of transference resistance to the expression of libidinal feelings; modern analysts, when working with the narcissistic disorders, focus first on the aggressive drive in order to liberate the libidinal drive.
Theoretically, it is fruitful to view the symptoms of narcissistic disorders (depression, withdrawal, ego fragmentation, psychosomatic complaints, and so on) as primitive defenses against acting out murderous impulses toward an object. To prevent action the impulses are turned inward against the patient's own ego or soma." (pp. 3-4)
Editorial Board (1976). The Origins of Modern Psychoanalysis. Modern Psychoanalysis, Vol. 1, pp. 3-16
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