Mark Winborn's Blog, page 19

Mark Winborn - The Influence of Familiarity on Analysis

"I propose that familiarity is a particular aspect of the intersubjective field which emerges over time and begins to shape and influence the behaviours, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of the participants. I also propose that it is an influence co-created (Eber 1990) in the field; it does not originate from the individual psyche of either the analyst or patient." (p. 189)

"I have proposed that the experience of familiarity is an affective state that can be utilized as a defence (defensive familiarity) against ‘analytic contact’ (Waska 2007) or in a manner facilitative of the analytic process (facilitative familiarity). Facilitative familiarity is associated with the positive aspects of familiarity (e.g., consistency, continuity, predictability) that help establish a sense of security in analysis. In practice, we can see states of familiarity along a continuum that extends from utility and facilitation to defensiveness and obstruction; with more optimal functioning of the dyad, there will be a fluctuation of states of familiarity and otherness in the field while at the other extreme there will be a fixed tone and sense of stuckness." (pp. 194-195)

"I have outlined a distinction between experiences of ‘facilitative familiarity’ which furthers the felt sense of security and trust in analysis and what I have termed ‘defensive familiarity’ – those states of familiarity which interfere with or otherwise disrupt the analytic process. It is facilitative familiarity states that provide the base from which the members of the dyad can face the disruption and conflict that may emerge as implicit states of defensive familiarity that come alive in the dyad. Engaging with states of familiarity in the analytic field is a complicated project fraught with ambivalence. In many instances,the familiar feels warm, comfortable, predictable, or safe and an analysis can’t proceed without the presence of these elements that help to build a secure base; however, they engender feelings that can be difficult for the analyst to question or relinquish, even in the service of greater analytic depth; and the patient may also be reluctant to examine the experience of familiarity too closely, perhaps fearing to venture into riskier psychic territory. The patient may also hear our attempts at exploring the feelings of familiarity as an indication that they aren’t doing therapy correctly, feeling criticized in the process of the exploration. These are some of the shared emotional dilemmas that may be encountered as the analyst and patient attempt to mutually engage experiences of defensive familiarity. Reading the implicit communication on the face and in the body, voice and feeling tone will be important to this process as will awareness of states of match and mis-match during analytic interactions.

I am not advocating the adoption of a stance of formality as a means of avoiding a sense of familiarity, nor am I advocating any attempt to avoid the feeling of familiarity in the analytic setting. I think the danger for analytic work is not the feeling of familiarity itself but the lack of sufficient consideration for how it affects our various analytic relationships. Obviously, it is not possible or desirable to defend against or attempt to diminish the influence of the familiar on an analysis, but by considering the variety of ways it can influence an analysis, we can become more conscious of this phenomenon. My aim is to bring the feeling of familiarity, as an emergent aspect of the transference/countertransference field of many analytic relationships, to the foreground for consideration."' (p. 202)

Mark Winborn (2012) The Shadow of Familiarity: A contributor to the intersubjective field. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 57, pp.187–206

Rosemary Gordon - Transference as a Fulcrum of Analysis

The most recent volume of the Journal of Analytical Psychology contained the death announcement of Dr. Rosemary Gordon who was a prominent author/editor within the field of Analytical Psychology and an influential member of the Society of Analytical Psychology in London. She died on January 15th, 2012 at the age of 92.

"The value of transference analysis is, I think, intimately linked up with its potentiality for stimulating the development of the symbolizing process, or, as Jung has called it, of the transcendent function. This function enables the psyche to form and to relate to symbols. Symbols act as bridges between pairs of opposites and so link the conscious to the unconscious, the strange to the familiar, soma to psyche, and the fragment to the whole. Francis Bacon has regarded myths or 'fables' as 'a transparent veil occupying the "middle" region that separates what has perished from what survives'. One might say that analysis strives to help a patient develop such a middle region, so that, as in the case of my patient, what has perished (i.e., the quarrelling parents of the past) will cease to be confused with what survives (i.e., the patient himself who needs to gain access to his potential to grow and to create).

When 'transference' rather than 'true' relationship predominates then the symbolic function has most likely remained immature. For then past and present cannot yet be seen as both related and different, nor can the object perceived be recognized as other or more than the object desired or feared. In a previous paper I have suggested that the transcendent function can develop only when a person has become able to confront three major life problems: death, mourning and separation, and greed.

The very context and circumstances of analysis inevitably evoke these fundamental anxieties—which the history of the patient may have made too overwhelming and unbearable for him to contain. Through the constancy and reliability of the analyst, the rhythm of his presence and of his absence, and the perception, verbalization and interpretation of the fears, rages, loves and hates the patient experiences, the disintegrating ferociousness of these anxieties may be diminished sufficiently so that then true symbolization can develop..." (p. 114)

"To summarize:
1. The concept of transference has been accepted as valid and valuable but each generation of analysts hopes to use it with increasing skill and perceptivity in the analytic process.

2. Transference analysis can be regarded as lived-through active imagination. Its goal is the forging of links between inner and outer world through the development of the transcendent function.

3. Interesting parallels suggest themselves between the discoveries and goals of transference analysis and Martin Buber's concept of the 'I-It' and the 'I-Thou' attitudes. The 'I-It' attitude I have suggested corresponds to transference relationship, while in the 'I-Thou' attitude a whole subject encounters or relates not to an object, but to another whole subject." (p. 116)

Rosemary Gordon (1968). Transference as a Fulcrum of Analysis. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 13, pp. 109-117

Michael Eigen & Primary Aloneness

"D.W. Winnicott writes of essential aloneness made possible by unknown support. The baby is supported in an alone state by a not-quite-cognized presence. In the passages I wish to amplify, Winnicott points to an aloneness that precedes clear self-other cognition. The mother is there helping the baby but the baby may not take in the fact that another being distinct from him is keeping him in life. Among the passages in which Winnicott (1988) feels pressed to convey this paradox are the following:

'At the start is an essential aloneness. At the same time this aloneness can only take place under maximum conditions of dependence. Throughout the life of the individual there continues a fundamental unalterable inherent aloneness, along with which goes unawareness of the conditions that are essential to the state of aloneness. (p. 132)'

Whether or not Winnicott's time sequences turn out to be correct, there is, I feel, an important experience he tries to express. He uses a certain verbal latitude to touch and communicate this experience and I will take liberties too. What is at stake is a psychic reality of great import, a precious piece of our beings that we must take time to live our way into and, simply, to live.

An aloneness that is supported by another one doesn't know is there. A primary aloneness supported by an unknown boundless other. To think that aloneness has in its very core a sense of an unknown infinite other - no wonder Winnicott says so much depends on the quality of environmental being and response. The very quality of our aloneness depends on it.

I personally experience something sacred in this core. I think Winnicott did also. Our lives tap into a sense of holiness connected with a background aura of infinite unknown support. That such an implicit sense exists offers no guarantees about how we use it. When the support basic aloneness needs cracks, vanishes or is threatened, emergent self-feeling veers towards cataclysm.

Chronic self-hardening may be an important part of individuation, but a price is paid. Basic aloneness mutates and splinters, and the cataclysm one hoped to dissolve is embedded in character. We have a lot to say about character and cataclysm in ourselves and in the world. But our concern in this paper is to support a thread of peace that Winnicott calls to our attention." (pp. 63-64)

　

"Initially, I spoke of the baby's sense of unknown boundlessness, but in the preceding passages Winnicott writes that the dependence he touches does not sense its dependence. Neither sensing nor perception of dependence arises at this stage. Perhaps there is an implicit rather than an explicit sense of unknown boundlessness. At some point, I feel there is. Yet I take Winnicott to heart when he says that the point of experience he touches here does not sense dependence, even if dependence is present. To be dependent without sensing it and to be supported in being by that unsensed, unknown dependence - this is a radical statement with many ramifications. As I live my way into it, I feel freer. To be totally supported by unknown support includes an area of experience that is exquisitely, thrillingly beautiful. A piece of the peace that passeth understanding.

Winnicott's is a peace that reaches towards and from the aloneness of an incommunicado core. It supports that core by its own incommunicado being. It creates a background for the history of aloneness throughout a person's life. For aloneness, too, has biography. Threads of aloneness reach forward, some of them into a oneness of awareness. Awareness sports immense diversity but shares a common thread. The iteration of being aware, an implicit awareness of being in every speck of consciousness, is a kind of oneness, if only a oneness of something like sameness that unites human being. We love or hate our differences but one mind runs through them. One, that is, if one counts that high. All-one, all alone, all one in aloneness, brothers and sisters, shared humanity.

We grow into shared aloneness as a precious state of being, a privileged state among others, in which sharing is in the aloneness, and aloneness is in the sharing. In dipping in, some of us discover new levels and qualities of caring. For some, dipping in is more than enough." (pp. 67-68)

Michael Eigen (2008). Primary Aloneness. Psychoanalytic Perspectives, Vol. 5, pp. 63-68

Pier Claudio Devescovi on the Separation of Freud and Jung

Introduction: "The thesis I wish to uphold is that Jung, at the time of his first meeting with Freud, had already developed his own understanding of the Unconscious and of psychic functioning and had autonomously elaborated a method of his own.

His ideas and his method, with their deep-seated roots in humanistic culture, had taken shape during his years at the University of Basel (1895-1900). It was in his degree dissertation entitled 'On the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena' (Jung 1902) that they were first presented in a more organic way.

I shall try to follow the formation of Jungian ideas using his university years' documents—some already published and others still in course of publication—so as to highlight the relevant historical coordinates and cultural influences. I believe that these elements played an important part in Jung's relations with Freud and in their separation. Beyond the many facets of this undoubtedly very complex relationship, the fact remains that the two men had incredibly different cultural backgrounds and ways of thinking. Independently from one another, they both constructed hypotheses on psychic functioning and on the aetiology of neurosis and elaborated a method for analysing the Unconscious." (p. 277)

Conclusion: "I have tried to highlight the nucleus of Jung's initial ideas, tracing their origins and derivations. Jung's conceptions of mythology and religion, his historical perspective, his understanding of the Unconscious, of repression and of the aetiology of hysteria have roots in a cultural background and in a method very different from Freud's. The originality and independence of this set of ideas enable us to argue that Jung should not simply be considered as one of Freud's pupils and that the elements that I have described played an important role in the relationship, and in the eventual separation, between the two men.

During the years in which Freud and Jung worked together, the various aspects: political, transferential, professional, etc. evolved around this basic situation. Freud strongly believed that it was his destiny to be the founder of psychoanalysis, which meant he was entirely open to the prospect of having as his successor someone who would continue his work, but left no space for a plurality of fundamental ideas, nor for the possibility of a co-foundation. These were interpreted by Freud as a schismatic attitude on Jung's part and, as such, were received with bitterness and resentment. Over 80 years after that split, and in the light of the considerations which I have attempted to express, it seems to me that their relationship should be viewed, rather, as the 'Chronicle of a Separation Foretold'. " (pp. 284-285)

Pier Claudio Devescovi (2000). At the Origins of Jungian Thought: Culture and Method. Elements of a Separation'. Psychoanalysis and History, Vol. 2, pp. 277-286

James Grotstein Introduces the Concept of Projective Transidentification

"I proffer the following statements:

(a) Intersubjective projective identification constitutes not only the operation of Klein's theory of projective identification as an unconscious, omnipotent, intrapsychic phantasy (occurring only within the unconscious of the projecting subject) but also two other process: (1) conscious and/or preconscious modes of sensorimotor induction and/or evocation or prompting techniques (mental, physical, verbal, posturing or priming, 'nudging') on the part of the projecting subject, followed by (2) spontaneous empathic simulation in the receptive object of the subject's experience who is already inherently equipped (programmed) to empathize with it. So far I am discussing projective identification in metapsychological theory. From the perspective of experience, however, the projecting subject feels that he has rid himself of bad (or good) emotional contents, and now believes that the object is the self or indistinguishable from it in regard to the projected parts—and, experientially, the object may concur that it has become affected.

(b) The projecting subject and the object of projection constitute two separate self-activating systems, and the interpersonal process should consequently be renamed 'projective transidentification' to designate its unique transpersonal mode so as to contrast it with the unconscious phantasy of intrapsychic projective identification proper.

(c) A corollary of the preceding view is that one can never project into another individual per se, only into one's image (internal object representation) of them— and then attempt to manipulate that image in unconscious phantasy as if it were the external object that was being manipulated. This idea is but another way of stating that the objects we encounter in our daily lives are fraught with personal transferences from our unconscious.

(d) Consequently, projective transidentification would function by establishing an inductive resonance between the internal object images formed by the projecting subject, on one hand, and those counterpart images formed by the external object of the subject, on the other.

(e) Projective identification into the object-image is followed by an introjection by the projecting subject of the now projectively transformed image of the object, which ultimately lands in the subject's superego and ego upon introjection. If hatred were projected, the subject would experience a hateful superego and a hated ego respectively.

(f) Projection from the Kleinian/Bionian points of view is inseparable from and identical with projective identification, but they are distinguished from each other in various different ways in the mainstream American view." (pp. 1059-1060)

　
　

James Grotstein (2005). 'Projective transidentification: An extension of the concept of projective identification'. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 86, pp. 1051-1069

Marcus West on Jung's Perspectives on the Ego

Abstract: "This paper explores some aspects of the narrowness of Jung's usage of the term ego and the consequences which are understood to follow there from. Jung is understood to see the ego as a surface phenomenon and, essentially, as the focal point of consciousness, not recognizing its potential to function more broadly, deeply, and unconsciously. Furthermore, although he does recognize the ego as 'the total conscious personality' his use of the term frequently does not reflect that definition. Whilst Jung's analysis of the narrowly functioning ego is enlightening and groundbreaking, he treats this narrow functioning as if it is characteristic of the ego itself, ascribing any 'broad functioning' primarily to the Self. This narrow use of the term ego, and the corresponding use of the term Self, are understood to have significant consequences for clinical practice, including leading the analyst into an over-identification with the patient and a loss of the analyst's sense of self. It is also understood to lead to difficulties dealing with more disturbed individuals, to stuck and broken down analyses, to wear and tear on the analyst and, potentially, splits between the different schools of analytical psychology. These concerns all represent difficulties with working in the transference, and Jung's own experience of this is briefly explored."

Introduction: "The ego has something of a bad name within analytical psychology as, whilst Jung was adamant about its necessity (e.g., Jung 1916, paras. 181-188), even arguing for it as a requisite element of spiritual experience (e.g., Jung 1929, para. 506; Jung 1954c, para. 774 & Jung 1934/1954, para. 520), he also described it, variously, as 'small' and 'feeble' (Jung 1937, para. 145), 'futile and ridiculous' (Jung 1955, para. 284), and saw 'mere ego-life' as 'inadequate and unsatisfactory' (Jung 1926, para. 645), and 'petty and oversensitive' (Jung 1928, para. 275). This paper aims to demonstrate that Jung works from a very narrow and superficial model of the ego, often not even consistent with his own definition of it as the conscious personality (Jung 1951a, paras. 1 & 7), and that he wrongly takes this narrow definition as characteristic of the ego itself. The paper will further suggest that the ego can be seen to function more broadly, deeply and unconsciously than Jung supposes. This broadly functioning ego encompasses and reflects all elements of the personality, including coming to know that the 'I' is attendant upon an autonomous, unconsciously functioning core self experienced as other and 'not-I'; in other words, 'the "not-I" is also who I am'.

The second part of the paper suggests certain ramifications for the practice of analytical psychology which are understood to follow, potentially, from such a narrow definition; for example, clinical difficulties relating to an over-identification with the patient and a loss of sense of self (as my original title had it: 'There you are, but where did I go?'); difficulties dealing with more disturbed individuals; stuck, broken down, and sometimes abusive analyses, and to wear and tear on the analyst. I will also be looking at the difficulties Jung experienced with certain of his patients in this light. I will suggest, speculatively, that this under-emphasis on the ego can be seen to be responsible for some of the splits in analytical psychology, for example between those who follow Jung's practice of seeing patients less frequently and those who work more intensively with patients.

All these are serious concerns, with serious consequences for both patient and analyst. This paper was first given at the IAAP Congress in Cape Town, South Africa, in August 2007. At that Congress there was a panel discussion exploring 'Reactions to Jung', where Rod Anderson reported the results of a questionnaire he had sent out to his fellow South African health professionals. The questionnaire revealed that people saw Jung as (amongst other things) turning too quickly to the unconscious, not sufficiently recognizing the ego as a developmental achievement, and that these issues led to clinical difficulties.

These criticisms closely echo my own experience and concerns. I feel that it is vitally important to address these shadow aspects of analytical psychology, of which even those relatively unstudied in the field are aware (it may be argued, of course, that their criticisms come precisely because they have not studied Jung in depth, but I do not think this is necessarily the case).

My reason for making this critique is not only to address these shadow aspects of analytical psychology, however, but also to better utilize and value Jung's crucial insights which are at the heart of his work, for example, specifically, his critique of the (narrowly functioning) ego, his understanding of the autonomy of the unconscious, and his valuing and 'locating' of spiritual experience. I suggest that the understanding of a broadly functioning ego can offer a potential resolution of some of these difficulties." (pp. 367-368)

Marcus West (2008). The Narrow use of the Term Ego in Analytical Psychology: The 'Not-I' is Also who I am. J. Anal. Psychol., 53:367-388

Charles Strozier on the Preeminent Position of Freud and Kohut in the Development of Psychoanalysis

Conclusion: "There are two foundational (as opposed to merely important) thinkers in the history of psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud and Heinz Kohut. Between 1965 and 1981, Kohut's paradigm shift freed psychoanalytic thinking from the drive model, but retained its multifaceted perspectives and located practice firmly in an empathic context. Contemporary models and orientations, some more creative than others, from intersubjectivity, to the Relationalists, the constructivists, the post-modernists, and so on, have sought to extend aspects of Kohut's work in their own terms. Such extensions are entirely appropriate and commendable. All of these contemporary thinkers in psychoanalysis, however, are children of Kohut. While Freud created the core ideas of psychoanalysis and its first form of practice, the shift in perspective brought by Kohut energizes in new ways a very relevant tradition that begins with William James, runs through Pierre Janet, finds expression in some of late Ferenczi and aspects of Carl Jung, and re-surfaces with thinkers like Donald Winnicott. For many years such thinking that is so relevant for understanding trauma and other issues ran like a submerged underground stream beneath the huge dyke of ego psychology. Kohut released the waters."

To read the remainder of the article "Robert Stolorow's Myth of Originality" by Charles Strozier published on the International Psychoanalysis Blog at:
International Psychoanalysis

Corbett and Kugler on the Interface Between C.G. Jung and Heinz Kohut

"The question of the relationship between the concepts of the self in the work of Jung and Kohut has been debated by various Jungian analysts (for example, Jacoby, 1981; Schwartz-Salant, 1982; Redfearn, 1983; Samuels, 1985; Corbett, 1989). Jung's self-concept seems to have been largely ignored by self psychologists with one exception. Oremland (1985) equates Jung's self with the cosmos and suggests that Jungian therapy tends toward "mystical purpose." His essay presents a distorted view of Jung's self concept and Jungian therapy. Oremland believes that to compare Kohut and Jung would provide ammunition for Kohut's detractors. While Oremland is critical of interrelating Jung and Kohut, most other authors of comparative essays have focused constructively on the similarities and differences.

Jacoby (1981) for example, points out the following parallels between the two theorists. Kohut (1977) sees the self as the center of the psychological universe, in contrast to the more traditional Freudian view of the self as a content of the mental apparatus (that is, as a representation). This formulation is close to Jung's definition of the self. Kohut, again, bears a striking resemblance to Jung when he writes that man's ultimate goal might be "the realization, through his actions, of the blueprint for his life that had been laid down in his nuclear self" (p. 133). Further, when Kohut states that "our transient individuality also possesses a significance that extends beyond the borders of our life" (p. 180) and describes "cosmic narcissism" that transcends the boundaries of the individual (Kohut, 1966), he seems to be referring to the phenomenon Jung describes as the transpersonal/transcendant aspects of the self. This is further reflected in Kohut's view of the cognitive inpenetrability of the self per se. For Kohut (1977) only "its introspectively or empathically perceived psychological manifestations are open to us" (p. 311). Gordon (1980) also notes how Kohut (1977), while discussing Kafka and O'Neill, emphasizes man's search for wholeness and meaning, and thus is very close to Jung's association of the experience of the self with the discovery of meaning.

Schwartz-Salant (1982) believes that Kohut is attractive to Jungians because his approach his similar to Jung's synthetic or purposive attitude toward therapy. Because of Jung's opposition to the idea of psychic determinism, he characteristically adopts a "final" perspective in which the self is conceived of not simply as the sum or outcome of causal sequences and antecedent connections in the past, but also as prospective and purposive, apparently possessing a sense of future direction and intention. Hence, it cannot be analyzed purely historically. Jung (1971) maintained that no psychological fact about an individual can be explained in terms of causality alone. For many Jungians, the idea that the self points toward future development frees one from the tyranny of a psychology based purely on developmental vicissitudes. Kohut's (1966) description of the narcissistic transference, for example, is reminiscent of Jung's (1969c) insistence that the transference be understood not only in terms of its historical antecedents, but also in terms of its purposefulness.

A variety of theoretical differences also exist between Jung and Kohut. For example, one of the major differences between the two authors lies in their different theories of the origin of intrapsychic structure. For Kohut (1971) structuralization of the child's inner world is the result of the parental selfobject's empathic responsiveness to the child's innate needs, whose origin is not specified. Jung, on the other hand, postulates that the child is born with an a priori psychological matrix, out of which personal consciousness will emerge. This matrix is structured in characteristic ways (archetypes) that provide the potential for particular forms of experience, whose content is determined by the child's interaction with his specific environment. The image1 that Kohut uses to illustrate the creation of intrapsychic structure is that of eating and assimilating food, which is digested to become part of the person. For Kohut, if we eat hamburger, we do not become hamburger, because the substance of the empathic interaction is assimilated in a unique way. This process of digestion creates the building blocks that eventuate in the development of a self. To continue within this metaphor, for Jung the unconscious contains specifically configured "enzymes" that digest the person's psychic substances (experiences) taken in during the course of the person's life, resulting in the subjective experience of personal identity. These "enzymes" are given with the person's psychic anatomy and are not simply the product of the person's interacting with his selfobjects, although the quality of this interaction is important in modifying their effects on the growth of the person.

Other theoretical differences have been noted by various authors. Jacoby (1981), for example, points out that one major difference between the two theorists is in their focus on the "location" of self-experiences. Jung provides a wealth of intrapsychic symbolic descriptions of the self, while Kohut focuses more on the transference manifestations of the self, although it is clear that these are all intrapsychic phenomena for the person. Schwartz-Salant (1982) also highlights certain differences, noting how Kohut's references to the cosmic qualities of the self are "only metaphors of little significance," not referring to the transpersonal realm of Jung's self. Further, Schwartz-Salant believes Kohut's characterization of negative affects, such as rage, as disintegration products of the self, differs significantly from Jung's idea that the self intrinsically contains both dark and light aspects. (Kohut is, however, clear that a cohesive self may experience rage as a primary expression of itself rather than as a disintegration product.) Samuels (1985) points out that Kohut's self is created during psychic development, and this notion is antithetical to Jung's concept of the self as a priori, especially when Kohut indicates that the self forms at a point in time. Samuels compares Kohut's theory of a self that gradually coalesces from smaller units to the theory developed by Fordham (1976, 1985), a developmentally oriented Jungian who describes the baby as possessing an initially integrated self unit that unfolds or "deintegrates" because of the interaction of its innate organizing ability with environmental experiences. Fordham is clearly presenting Jung's view, as for example, when Jung (1966) writes that the "meaning and purpose (of self-realization) is the realization in all its aspects, of the personality originally hidden away in the embryonic germ-plasm, the production and unfolding of the original potential wholeness" (p. 110). Jung's and Fordham's idea of the unfolding of innate potential, like Kohut's concept of the blueprint, raises several important questions about the origin of the self: Is the self solely the result of developmental processes with no a priori structures? Is the self given a priori with the birth of the individual? Is the self the result of innate structures interacting over time with the environment? These questions will be taken up in the next section." (pp. 189-202)

Lionel Corbett and Paul Kugler (1989). Chapter 11: The Self in Jung and Kohut. Progress in Self Psychology, Vol. 5, pp. 189-208

Masterson and Rinsley on Rewarding and Withholding Object Relations

"In the case of the borderline, the object relations unit remains split into two separate part-units, each of which comprises as it were a part-self representation, a part-object representation and an affective component which links the former two together. These two part-units are derived from internalization of the two principal themes of interaction with the borderline mother: the mother responds to the child's regressive behaviour by maintaining her libidinal availability, and to the child's efforts toward separation-individuation by its withdrawal. Thus are produced, in effect, the two afore-mentioned part-units, which may be termed the withdrawing part-unit and the rewarding part-unit, each of which has its own component part-self representation, part-object representation and predominantly linking affect; the withdrawing part-unit is cathected predominantly with aggressive energy, the rewarding part unit with libidinal energy, and both remain separated from each other, as it were, through the mechanism of the splitting defence. It will be recalled that this situation comes about through fixation at Kernberg's Stage 3, with ensuing failure of integration of 'good' (positive; libidinal) and 'bad' (negative; aggressive) self and object representations into whole (positive + negative) self representations and object representations, which would otherwise be expected to have occurred during Stage 4....

As already noted, the splitting defence keeps separate the rewarding and the withdrawing object relations part-units, including their associated affects. Although both the rewarding and the withdrawing maternal part-objects are pathological, the borderline experiences the rewarding part-unit as increasingly ego-syntonic, as it relieves the feelings of abandonment associated with the withdrawing part-unit, with the result that the individual 'feels good'. The affective state associated with the rewarding part-unit is that of gratification at being fed, hence 'loved'. The ensuing denial of reality is, in the last analysis, but a small price to pay for this affective state.

An alliance is now seen to develop between the child's rewarding maternal part-image (rewarding part-unit) and his pathological (pleasure) ego, the primary purpose of which is to promote the 'good' feeling and to defend against the feeling of abandonment associated with the withdrawing part-unit. This ultimately powerful alliance as it were further promotes the denial of separateness and potentiates the child's acting out of his reunion fantasies. The alliance has an important secondary function the discharge of aggression, which is both associated with and directed toward the withdrawing part-unit by means of symptoms, inhibitions, and various kinds of destructive acts. The aggression, which gains access to motility through the agency of the pathological (pleasure) ego, remains unneutralized, hence unavailable for the further development of endopsychic structure (Rinsley, 1968).

The withdrawing part-unit (part-self representation, part-object representation and feelings of abandonment) becomes activated by actual experiences of separation (or of loss), as a result of the individual's efforts toward psychosocial growth, and by moves toward separation-individuation within the therapeutic process, all of which inter se alia symbolize earlier life experiences which provoked the mother's withdrawal of supplies.

The alliance between the rewarding part-unit and the pathological (pleasure) ego is in turn activated by the resurgence of the withdrawing part-unit. The purpose of this operation, as it were, is defensive, i.e. to restore the wish for reunion, thereby to relieve the feeling of abandonment. The rewarding part-unit thus becomes the borderline's principal defence against the painful affective state associated with the withdrawing part-unit. In terms of reality, however, both part-units are pathological; it is as if the patient has but two alternatives, i.e. either to feel bad and abandoned (withdrawing part-unit) or to feel good (rewarding part-unit), at the cost of denial of reality and self-destructive acting out.

It is necessary now to consider the impact which this intrapsychic structure exerts upon therapeutic transference and resistance. In brief, the transference which the borderline develops results from the operation of the split object relations unit—the rewarding part-unit and the withdrawing part-unit—each of which the patient proceeds alternatively to project onto the therapist. During those periods in which the patient projects the withdrawing part-unit (with its part-object representation of the withdrawing mother) on to the therapist, he perceives therapy as necessarily leading to feelings of abandonment, denies the reality of therapeutic benefit and activates the rewarding part-unit as a resistance. When projecting the rewarding part-unit (with its reunion fantasy) on to the therapist, the patient 'feels good' but, under the sway of the pathological (pleasure) ego, is usually found to be acting in a self-destructive manner....

The working through of the encapsulated rage and depression associated with the withdrawing part-unit in turn frees its component part-self and part-object representations from their intensely negative, aggressively valent affects. As a result, the new object relations unit (constructive self + 'good' therapist + 'good' affect) linked with the reality ego becomes integrated into an overall 'good' self representation, while the split object relations unit linked with the pathological (pleasure) ego becomes integrated into an overall 'bad' self representation; both are now accessible to the patient's conscious awareness as are their counterparts within the person of the therapist. At this point, the patient has begun in earnest the work of differentiating good and bad self representations from good and bad object representations as prefatory to the next step, in which good and bad self representations coalesce, as do good and bad object representations. The stage is now set for the inception of whole-object relations, which marks the patient's entrance into Stage 4 (Kernberg, 1972).

The de-linking, as it were, of 'raw' instinctual energies from the rewarding and withdrawing part-units renders these energies increasingly available to the synthetic function associated with the patient's expanding reality ego, hence available for progressive neutralization. With this, and concomitant with the progressive coalescence of good-bad self and object representations, splitting becomes replaced by normal repression, with progressive effacement, as it were, of the personified or 'unmetabolized' images associated with the disappearing split object relations unit (Kernberg, 1966). The patient is now able to complete the work of mourning for these 'lost' images, which characterizes his final work of separation from the mother." (pp. 168-172)

James Masterson and Donald Rinsley (1975). The Borderline Syndrome: The Role of the Mother in the Genesis and Psychic Structure of the Borderline Personality. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 56, pp. 163-177

　

The First Anniversary of the Psychoanalytic Muse

Today is the first anniversary of the Psychoanalytic Muse.  This blogsite was launched on March 10, 2011.  During the past year this site has been viewed 6238 times by readers from 77 countries around the world. It averages approximately 520 views per month and reached its highest readership just last month, February 2012, when readers accessed it 893 times.  It is extremely gratifying to see that the Psychoanalytic Muse has reached such a wide and diverse audience.  I see the success of this site as confirmation that the ideas associated with the various schools of Psychoanalysis and Analytical Psychology are vibrant, alive, and influential 112 years after Sigmund Freud initially published The Interpretation of Dreams.  My thanks and appreciation to all of the readers that have taken the time to read these posts during the course of the year.