Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 59

Ukraine: Call me a crazy optimist, but I think that in the long run, Putin and his kleptocratic pals will be the losers here

I spent a good part
of the weekend reading various punditry on the Ukrainian situation. The Russian
takeover of Crimea is awful, but I do believe that Putin's Russia will be the long-term loser in this situation. If the
Europeans needed a reminder of why they need NATO, they just got it. And I think they do need such a notice every couple
of decades or so that the purpose of NATO is to keep the Americans in, the Russians
out, and the Germans down.

As one smart officer
I know put it yesterday, "Putin remains what he
always was -- an opportunistic, self-promoting, KGB lieutenant colonel who
believes that he is some sort of great statesman. He rules Russia by co-opting
as much of the population as he can into his preferred game of corruption,
graft, cons, and bribes and by intimidating the rest to keep quiet. His
brazenness is belied by his vulnerability -- and by the vulnerability of
oligarchs gathered around him. The sad truth is that he and his clique are
destroying Russia more surely and rapidly than any action that the US and our
allies (or, for that matter, China, Muslim separatists, Ukrainian nationalists,
etc.) ever could."

Bottom line: No,
this is not 1914. Nor is it 1938. Lots of panicky customers out there selling
the West much too short. This just may be the last gasp of a sick, Ottoman-like
empire. Let's not get too flighty.

On how to respond to
Vlad the Invader, I am, with Garry Kasparov, a "banks not tanks" guy. The way
to inflict genuine costs on Putin and his buddies is with a financial squeeze.
This situation is a challenge to the European Union to step up and do the right
thing: Stick it to the Russian kleptocracy. We can help by providing
information and by shining a bright light on what Russia is doing.

This is also a real
opportunity for the WikiLeaks/Snowdenistas to leak material damaging to the
Russian oligarchy, like who has all the money and how they get it out and where
it is now. What a wonderful way to bring together the leftist information types
and the rightist hawks.

Cohen: Why ex-Defense Secretary Gates was wrong to publish that memoir now

Some little grasshoppers will remember that I am a fan
of the memoirs of Robert Gates. But my friend
Eliot Cohen argues powerfully in the Weekly
Standard that Gates was wrong to publish them now:

The publication of this memoir now is a breach of
faith and a violation of propriety that is hard to understand. If Gates
believes that Obama is a disastrous president, surely he should have published
this book in 2012, when it might have influenced the presidential election. If
he is merely (and appropriately) contributing to our understanding of history,
he should have waited until Obama leaves office. If he thinks he can change the
president's modus operandi and worldview by publishing it now, he is deluding himself.

Tom again: This is a strong
argument, but I am not sure if the last sentence is correct. I think Gates
could have an influence on Obama's behavior, especially his tendency to favor
the advice of political hacks over foreign policy experts.

NB: Unfortunately, money-losing
unprofit magazine does not provide link.

Not making this up: Marine sex assault lawyer faces charge of bad butt touching

The Marine Corps
can't catch a break these days. One of their top lawyers dealing with sex
assault issues now faces a charge of inappropriate butt touching. How do they select these guys?

The Future of Warfare (12): It's coming to a neighborhood near you -- the homeland

By Major Daniel Sukman


Best Defense future of war entry

A lot has been written on the future of warfare and the inevitable
rise of unmanned and autonomous robots and other systems on the battlefield. This
will prove to be correct, as we have already witnessed the first wave with the
advent of drone warfare over the last decade. What will be different in the
future is the location of warfare, specifically for America. Taking in the
second-, third-, and fourth-order effects of drones and other lethal autonomous
systems, future warfare will increasingly occur in the homeland.

During the Vietnam War and the recent conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, America's adversaries have learned that the most effective way of
attacking the U.S. strategic center of gravity (the support of the American
people), has been through attrition warfare. The more soldiers, airmen, sailors,
and Marines that appear on television or come home in a body bag, the lower
support for action overseas becomes. Drone warfare, and the introduction of
unmanned autonomous systems on the battlefield, be they supply trucks or tanks,
will remove the danger to American servicemembers on the battlefield. Adversaries
will look for asymmetric ways to attack American servicemembers, and the most
effective way to do it will be in the United States.

America's adversaries, although they will continue to look for
devastating terrorist-type attacks as we saw on 9/11 or even at the Boston
Marathon, will look for "legitimate targets" outside air bases in
Nevada from which drones are being operated. They will seek to target
headquarters of contracting companies such as Booz Allen or Blackwater (or
whatever they are called now). The attacks will not occur on the bases, but
rather when targets of opportunity present themselves. A drone operator
stopping at the local 7-11 after a shift is one example of many.

The targeting of individuals away from the battlefield is not new
to warfare, in fact it has been demonstrated in the past few years with the assassination
of nuclear scientists in Iran. There is no reason to think that our enemies
won't adopt these types of tactics to target individuals in the homeland. This
will be different from what we have seen from al Qaeda, in that nations that
the United States engages in hostilities with will look to conduct these
asymmetric attacks. They will not be limited to non-state actors.

The U.S. military must prepare for the warfare of the future, and
can do so in a number of ways. First is to ensure that soldiers overseas still
are at risk on the battlefield. We must ensure that our warriors in uniform are
viewed as warriors in the eyes of our enemy. Second, we should look at the
force protection measures we offer those in uniform within the homeland. Historically
a law enforcement-type mission, those that are conducting combat operations
from within the continental United States need to have the situational
awareness that in the future they may become legitimate targets, not only in
the eyes of our enemies, but in the eyes of the broader international
community. If today a member of the Taliban were to ambush a drone operator on
a Nevada highway, could he make a case in court that he is a legitimate actor
on the battlefield and should be considered a POW with all the rights and
protections that come with that status?

The U.S. military must form partnerships and work with law
enforcement agencies within the United States in the area of protection. This is
not a future in which the United States abandons the principle of Posse
Comitatus, rather it is a future where law enforcement has a larger and more
proactive role in America's conflicts.

War in the homeland is a scary thought. Outside of major terrorist
attacks, for the most part the homeland has been secure since the War of 1812. Although
we continue to fight the War on Drugs, the War on Poverty, the War on the
Middle Class, and the War on Christmas in the homeland, the American Way of War
is to play away games against other nations. If we are not careful in the way
we pursue unmanned and autonomous systems, that piece of the American Way of
War may change forever.

Major
Daniel Sukman, U.S. Army, is a strategist at the Army Capabilities Integration
Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Eustis, Virginia. He
holds a B.A. from Norwich University and an M.A. from Webster University. During
his career, MAJ Sukman served with the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault) and United States European Command. His combat
experience includes three tours in Iraq. This article represents the
author's views and not necessarily the views of the U.S. Army or Department of
Defense. And yes, this is his second entry in
the contest.

If Iraq was in Ukraine, Thailand, or Venezuela, we'd be paying attention

But no one here cares
that dozens of people are getting killed there on an almost daily basis. We've moved on.

Rebecca's War Dog of the Week: Postcard from the past, a war-dog wedding

By Rebecca Frankel


Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

In 1976, Air Force handlers Charlotte Sandwick and Keith
Hyland were married at the chapel at Yokota Air Force Base in Japan. It was a
war-dog wedding through and through -- their nuptial party was made up of
fellow handlers of the 475th AB Wing Security Police and in attendance, of
course, were all their dogs.

Though it's just a snapshot, this photo (featured on a
series of dog-handler Facebook pages this week), and its headline -- "Dogs
go to marriage" -- were irresistible. Both the bride and groom were Air
Force handlers in the 1970s, airmen first class. We talk a lot here about how
the military dogs tight-knit community rallies in times of need and remembrance,
but we'd be remiss not to showcase the happy occasions too.

Hat tip: Military Working Dogs FB group, The U.S. War
Dogs Association

FoW (11): Enhancing human performance

By Daniel P. Sukman


Best Defense Future
of War entrant

One of the primary elements of military research and
development is how to enhance human performance in combat, from better
equipment, weapons with longer reach, lighter loads to carry, better
physiological preparation, to all-encompassing physical enhancements. Today,
with advancements in science and technology, the U.S. military is at a crossroads
in determining how far to go in considering how to attain soldiers, airmen,
Marines, and sailors who can physically outperform our potential adversaries. To
borrow from the Olympic motto, the future of war will demand "faster, stronger,
and higher."

The limits of enhanced human performance needs to be where
the enhancements negatively effect a person the day after they leave the U.S.
Military. Although the military is a profession, unlike doctors and lawyers,
serving as a soldier does not encompass the entirety of adulthood. Most servicemembers
will leave service in their early twenties, and even those who put in 20-30
years of service will still depart with half a lifetime remaining on earth. The
complexity of the issue revolves around the argument that although certain
human enhancements may negatively affect your life after the service, it may
extend your life so you reach that point. Looking at the different ways we can
influence the human body to survive and win on future battlefields is the next
step in the evolution of the American way of war.

To meet the demands of the future battlefield, the means of
altering the human body and mind that we as a society should find acceptable
needs to be examined. To highlight the complexities, I offer the following
"lists of things" that enhance human performance, be it in the office, cockpit
or sports field. Think about what is considered "legal" what is "ethical" and
why.

Coffee, soda,
Snickers bars, amphetamines, Ritalin




Cold medicine, Human
Growth Hormone (HGH), performance enhancing drugs (PEDs), anabolic steroids,
pain killers




Vaccinations, Tommy
John surgery, Lasik eye surgery, Blood Doping/EPO, training at high altitude

As you look at each list, you can see a variety of methods,
be it ingestion of caffeine, or a surgery that physically alters your god-given
natural abilities. Some methods on the list are banned by the Olympics (cold
medication) and professional sports (deer antler spray) but remain legal for
the general populace, others are encouraged (Tommy John surgery), while others are
illegal to obtain on your own. Some of the items, such as coffee and soda, are
even banned by some religions due to the caffeine within those drinks.

An unspoken truth is that soldiers, like athletes, do not
have to be convinced to take performance enhancing drugs. Legions of staff
officers start their day with pots of coffee followed by the nicotine rush
contained in dip and other smokeless tobacco products. Similarly, the use of
drugs such as Ambien to promote sleep in stressful situations or when travelling
long distances is widely used in the armed forces. Pilots have a long history
of taking "no doze"-type pills and even amphetamines when required to fly long
distances. A "Red Team" member worth his salt would do well to find an
asymmetric way to limit coffee to staffs and energy drinks and dip to young
soldiers.

Sleep plans, or as those in the military call it "fatigue
management," is a vital part of any combat mission planning. In the 2012 Marine
Corps S&T Strategic Plan, planning for sleep is as vital as "planning for
food, fuel, ammunition or other essential logistical supplies." There may be a
risk of addiction that must be balanced, however, with the pharmaceutical
agents that exist to enhance the effectiveness of sleep during combat. If those
drugs enhance the decisions of leaders, or allow soldiers to operate at higher
altitudes, and if that, in turn, will save U.S. lives in battle, those methods
should be pursued.

In the sport of cycling, taking Erythropoietin (EPO)to raise
red blood cell counts, thus improving oxygen delivery to the muscles, is
officially banned (as Lance Armstrong is well aware of) but it is quite legal
to train at high altitude or sleep in a hyperbaric tent, which achieves exactly
the same result physiologically. Should the U.S. military, in preparation for
combat in places such as Afghanistan take EPO, or limit itself to train in
areas of high altitude? Why not allow soldiers in combat to take EPO if it will
enhance their performance and increase the odds of completing missions and coming
home alive?

Aside from biological enhancements, actual physical changes
to servicemembers can be envisioned in the future. Today we are able to replace
lost limbs on our wounded warriors, but can we add to or change (permanently)
physical characteristics of our servicemembers to provide them with one-on-one
overmatch against potential adversaries? If we can change the skin composition
to be tougher and more resistant to bullets and shrapnel, should we do so? Of
course, as Patrick Lin noted in his article "Could
Human Enhancement Turn Soldiers into Weapons that Violate International Law? Yes" in
the January 2013 issue of The
Atlantic, doing so might embolden our adversaries to engage in harsher
tactics and procedures when fighting U.S. forces. Sleep deprivation may not
torture you if you physically don't require sleep.

Enhancements in human performance, be it physical or mental,
can occur long before it becomes a necessity due to a catastrophic injury
incurred in training or in combat. If technology would allow for soldiers to
have surgery to increase their running pace, or for a plate to be inserted into
the knees or back that makes a parachute landing fall easier, or carrying a 70
pound rucksack not all that difficult, why not perform that surgery "left of
the boom," so to speak.

Mental enhancements can be a necessity in the fast-paced
ever-changing complex world of combat. This complex world demands rapid
decision-making more often than not with imperfect information and
intelligence. Should the use of certain drugs to focus the attention of
decision makers (e.g. Ritalin) and better prepare forces for combat be
encouraged? I am not advocating making military leaders walking drug stores,
but if more focused mental preparation and planning of combat can save lives,
why not offer the best enhancements modern science can provide?

The question becomes, should servicemembers be required to
risk their long-term health in pursuit of short-term physical and mental
enhancements. Professional athletes are largely prohibited from doing this, hence
the ban on PEDs and anabolic steroids. However, soldiers, Marines, airmen, and
sailors are expected as part of their service to put both their health and
lives at risk. As Clausewitz wrote,

war is violence." The future of warfare will require stronger, faster soldiers
who have more endurance; however we must be careful not create a new generation
of East German Olympic swimmers.

As the science and technology of warfare continues to
proliferate around the world, the assumption should be made that adversaries of
the United States and our allies and partners will not limit themselves with
ethical considerations in how they enhance the performance of their
footsoldiers. U.S. soldiers will not go into combat high on khat, but should
acknowledge that certain adversaries in Africa may be as we saw in Task Force
Ranger in 1993. Performance enhancing drugs, stimulants, and other narcotics
will certainly be used by our adversaries, and we should develop training and
strategy that accounts for this. We must also prepare for adversaries who have
access to advanced technologies who may use nanotechnology, or even
pharmaceuticals such as Adderall to increase their cognitive performance.

Risk of each human enhancement must be a paramount factor in
considering what we can do with servicemembers. For example, steroids can cause
terrible health problems, like liver and kidney failure, while the risks of eye
surgery are much lower both in terms of probabilities and effects. By this
standard, we accept greater risk in the now, in that performance will be
reduced in warfare; however the risk is greater of catastrophic injury or death
when involved in combat operations.

What side of the risk coin
should we as a military profession find easier to accept?

Major Daniel Sukman, U.S. Army, is a strategist at the Army
Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at
Fort Eustis, Virginia. He holds a B.A. from Norwich University and an M.A. from
Webster University. During his career, MAJ Sukman served with the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) and United States European Command. His combat
experience includes three combat tours in Iraq. This
article represents the author's views and not necessarily the views of the U.S.
Army or Department of Defense.

Tom note: Got your own views of the future of war? Consider submitting an essay . The contest remains open for at least another few weeks. Try to keep it
short -- no more than 750 words, if possible. And please, no footnotes or
recycled war college papers.

Kicking the Guard out of attack helos is part of a set of good moves for the Army

By Maj. Crispin Burke,
U.S. Army


Best Defense guest
columnist

Make
no mistake: Army Aviation will feel the effects of sequestration and be forced
to cut back, along with the rest of the Army. However, if the Army concentrates
on putting trained and qualified people
in the right organizations, armed
with the right equipment, Army
Aviation can weather today's budget cuts, and move forward into the 21st century.

A
bold new proposal would do just that -- completely revamping the Army's
aviation brigades in both the active and reserve components by divesting some
aircraft, reallocating others, and by integrating Unmanned Aerial Systems
(colloquially called "drones") with manned aircraft.

According to the proposal, recently reviewed by
the secretary of defense, the Army would retire its entire fleet of single-engine
helicopters, including 368 OH-58D scout helicopters, 228 elderly OH-58A/Cs, and
182 TH-67 trainers -- a grand total of 778 aircraft. To compensate for the
losses, the Army would radically re-shuffle its remaining dual-engine aircraft
-- replacing the active-duty OH-58 losses with AH-64 Apache helicopters drawn
from the National Guard and Reserve, and by moving many of the newly-acquired
LUH-72 Lakotas to the training role.

The
plan, of course, is not without its detractors. According to Politico, fifty state governors voiced their dismay over the loss of the
Guard's Apache helicopters in a letter to President Obama. Indeed, each
aircraft lost represents not just a machine, but an aircrew, a team of
maintainers, and plenty of jobs, livelihoods, and families affected.

Moreover,
the loss of the OH-58D is certainly a bitter one. But budget cuts are coming,
and Army Aviation is left with few alternatives, following the failure of both
expensive replacements (Comanche in 2003), and off-the-shelf options (Armed Recon Aircraft in 2008 and Armed Aerial Scout in 2013). It's
important to note, though, that reconnaissance involves more than just aircraft
-- it's trained and qualified people, and fortunately, OH-58 pilots are among
the most experienced in the Army. The OH-58 community has an incredible warrior
ethos, and despite the loss of a beloved airframe, their expertise will matter most. We shouldn't fear aircraft transitions
-- after all, were we a less capable force when we transitioned from Hueys to
Black Hawks, or from Cobras to Apaches?

Of
course, once Army Aviation gives people the right training to do the job, it's
time to focus on the organizations --
perhaps the most audacious step in the way forward. The Army National Guard
would face some difficult challenges, particularly as its Apache pilots
transition to a new aircraft (the UH-60 Black Hawk), and with it, a new
mission.

Fortunately,
Black Hawks are far more useful for homeland defense and providing defense
support for civil authorities (Title 32). The Guard would be receiving 111 of
them to offset the loss of the Apaches. Moreover, the Guard would still be able
to provide Title 10 to overseas fights through its remaining fleet of Black
Hawks and CH-47 Chinooks. In fact, proportionally speaking, the Army National
Guard would suffer less than the
active component, in terms of total aircraft loss (just 17 percent of the Guard
force, compared with to nearly 30 percent of the active component).

With
regards to the active component, the Army has also taken the unprecedented step
of pairing unmanned aircraft with manned aircraft. Each newly-formed Attack
Reconnaissance Squadron would consist of three troops of eight AH-64 Apaches
apiece. Each troop, in turn, would be augmented with a platoon of four Shadow
drones, many of which would be culled from deactivated BCTs. Each aviation
brigade, additionally, would receive a company of 12 armed Grey Eagle UAS, a true
medium-altitude, long endurance (MALE) airframe. It's an
acknowledgement that unmanned aviation is here to stay -- manned and unmanned
crewmembers will train, deploy, and fight alongside one another on a permanent
basis. In fact, the Army is arguably far ahead of the other services in this
regard.

Once
we have the right people, placed in the right organizations, the equipment falls into place. If all goes
as planned, the rotary-wing community will be an entirely dual-engine force. Students
will begin their aviation career in the LUH-72 Lakota, recently acquired by the
Army, with a proven track record in medical evacuation and law enforcement.

Old-timers
may lament the Lakota's glass cockpit, dual engines, and GPS, but the fact of
the matter is every single combat aircraft in the conventional U.S. Army's
inventory has these features. We need to seriously rethink what we should
expect from students in flight school. Whereas, 10 years ago, the use of GPS
would have been verboten, today, it's
a necessity, as GPS approaches dominate the instrument routes. Moreover, while
students may no longer perform autorotations all the way to the ground, they'll
have to learn to identify engine malfunctions in a multi-engine aircraft, a
skill which takes a considerable amount of time to learn as students progress
to new airframes.

All
told, reducing and simplifying the Army Aviation rotary-wing fleet -- from
seven airframes to four -- will save the community billions of dollars over the
years, and we'd be a much more modern and powerful force for it.

The
choice is clear -- proven people,
strong organizations, the right equipment.

Major Crispin Burke is
a serving U.S. Army officer. Direct all angry comments towards his Twitter
account, @CrispinBurke.

The Future of War (no. 10): Let's figure out how not to get into one with China

By Sean Kelleher


Best Defense future of war entry

Several recent commentaries on
the emerging Air-Sea Battle doctrine have emphasized the escalatory risks of
launching massive conventional attacks against an adversary's home territory
when the adversary has a range of retaliatory means at its disposal, including
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles (see the Diplomat, USNWC). These risks deserve close consideration,
but they are not uniquely characteristic of Air-Sea Battle, rather they are
endemic to any strategy aimed at achieving decisive victory.

The American military puts on its
best performances when it goes for the jugular: Grant's multi-pronged invasion
of the Confederacy, Winfield Scott's march to Mexico City, and the initial phases
of the 2003 invasion of Iraq are all model operations. This record is
consistent with the historical experiences of other armies; Alexander marched
into the heart of the Persian Empire, Genghis Khan had no patience for borders,
and Napoleon won most of his victories in other peoples' countries. The attack
component of Air-Sea Battle fits nicely into this pattern; massive cyber,
electronic, air, and missile strikes paralyze an opponent's capacity to
coordinate its forces, followed by attacks on now isolated targets. It aims for
decisive victory in multiple domains of warfare and, assuming appropriate
intellectual and material investments, the Pentagon has a good chance of
converting the nascent idea into an operational reality (useful
documents: DOD-JOAC, CSBA 1, CSBA 2, Danger Room).

One may reasonably ask whether
the probability of total war with China is high enough to justify a massive investment
in the war-fighting tools that would be needed to win it. However, if we assume
that the investment is justified, Air-Sea Battle is a sound idea. Yes,
there are escalatory risks, but as long as the military infrastructure in
China's coastal provinces is central to the PLA's operations, Washington will
have to be prepared to destroy it. There is no polite way to bomb another
country, and, in my decidedly non-expert opinion, much of the criticism of
Air-Sea Battle is not about the doctrine itself, but about the wisdom of
fighting China. 

The most salient criticism of the
doctrine is not its expansive scope, but its limited purview. Basing our
fortunes on an aggressive naval/air/cyber strategy assumes that a U.S.-China
conflict will not involve land battles in Asia, or attacks in the Eastern
Pacific. But what if we have to help Russia protect Siberia's resources from a
Chinese invasion, or if we need to evict PLA soldiers from Taiwan and Okinawa? Also,
what if Chinese submarines launch cruise missiles against the West Coast, while
ballistic missiles reign down on Pearl Harbor? Faced with a conflict akin to
the World Wars, Air-Sea Battle would have to be combined with other operational
concepts to create an effective strategy.

At bottom, if current economic
and military trends persist for several decades, and Washington and Beijing go
to war in the grand style, there will be a dramatic risk of escalation. But the
origin of the risk will be the conflict itself, not the strategies used to
fight it (for economic projections, and U.S.-Soviet Union comparisons, see
these posts: 1, 2).

This author, adverse to expending
vast intellectual and material resources on a perpetual arms race, let alone
living through World War III, favors radical diplomatic initiatives to develop
a deeply cooperative relationship between America and China. I have proposed
some ideas on this matter in earlier posts (here and here), but on further reflection I suspect that to break out of the security
dilemma, the United States will need to make some big, unilateral concessions
to assure China that it is not interested in military conflict. 

For example, it could permanently withdraw several carrier battle groups from
the region, perhaps retiring one or two of them. Such actions would cause howls
of protest at home and among our allies in the region, and they would leave our
allies vulnerable for a period of time. Indeed, for these maneuvers to be
credible, Washington might have to stomach a fair amount of aggressive Chinese
bullying in the region; it should only reverse course if China seriously
threatens the political integrity of other countries. In other words, part of
this strategy involves an admission by America that China is the leading power
in the Asia-Pacific, and that other states in the region need to adapt to that
reality. Hopefully, after a few years, Beijing would begin to trust that Washington's
priorities have changed and to believe that it can devote more energy to
collaborating with America, and less to military preparations.

Another possibility is that other
Asian states would form a balancing coalition against China; this development
would not improve matters, since such a coalition could pose a major threat to
Chinese security. Perhaps an even worse eventuality would be if these states
aligned themselves with Beijing, instead of making the military investments
required for a credible balancing strategy. In light of these
possibilities, an integral part of the U.S. strategy would be getting its
allies to accept a fair amount of political indignity for a few years, in the
hope of creating a better regional order in the long term.

Risks and challenges abound, but
if I am correct that such concessions will be necessary to put the U.S.-China
relationship on a new, more cooperative footing, then much better to make them
now, while Washington has a major power advantage over Beijing, than in a
couple of decades, when the capability gap may have significantly narrowed.

In many ways, this strategy runs
counter to the liberal internationalist project, which is founded on the
global, stabilizing presence of America's armed forces. But if we want China to
be a full member of a liberal order, rather than an outsider like the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, we and our allies will have to risk a substantial
measure of security now in the hope of building a lasting and productive peace.

Sean Kelleher
is an attorney in Washington D.C. who has an M.A. in international politics. He
works on document review projects, blogs at A Vegan View of World Politics , and is writing a book on U.S. foreign policy.

Is it a great World War II website, or a great way to waste a month? Perhaps both

All 79 volumes of the official Army history of World War II are now available through one big fat link.
I could waste weeks on this site.

Yes, I confess: I
fear we focus too much on World War II in general. I once vowed to stop reading
about World War II and the Civil War until I knew more about other wars,
especially in other countries.

But how can you
resist this stuff? You can't go wrong reading the specialized volumes here for
valuable background on virtually any aspect of how a big military operates in
wartime. There is, for example, an entire volume on U.S. military operations in
the Middle East, and four times that many on military medicine in World War II.
How many books have you read about military medicine in combat conditions?

And the New York Times certainly could have used
this link the other day. And in an editorial today. Especially Chapter VI.

Bonus: Here is Adm.
Chester Nimitz's operational diary for World War II, now online.