Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 246

Website of the day: 'I love Bagram'

A great list of
reasons to love the dusty airbase north of Kabul. This sort of thing used to be
graffiti on latrine walls, but now it is on line, which makes it easier to
read, and far less odorous.

Some of my faves:

23.
XXXL Air Force PT shirts

62.
The never ending upper respitory infection.

466.
Sticking it to the man by taking more than 2 drinks from the DFAC.

65.
The contractors with their beards who think they are part of the Special Ops
community.

302.
Soldiers that weigh 250 pounds and complain about fat contractors.

524.
My co-worker who insists I yell 'Fatality' when I kill mice that infiltrate our
tent.

78.
Finding out the number one place people go to secretly have sex is the
dumpster.

231.
Contractors who complain how rough their lives are on
"ilovebagram.com."

554.
The look on field grade officers faces when you great them with a crisp salute
and the daily greeting of "Sniper check!"

36.
This website

132.
Because ilovebagram.com is blocked on
work computers.

424.
So you say the Russians abandoned this base. I wonder why?

(HT to the guys in partying down in Chagcharan)

Obama on Afghanistan: A sneak preview

By Matthew Irvine

Best Defense archives bureau chief

Want to know what the president is going to say tonight on Afghanistan? Here's a hint: Check out what he said four years ago.

In one of the first foreign policy speeches of his presidential campaign, delivered at Washington's Woodrow Wilson Center on August 1, 2007, then-candidate Obama outlined his views on Afghanistan and Pakistan and foreshadowed his administration's policy.

"It is time to turn the page," Obama said. "When I am president, we will wage the war that has to be won, with a comprehensive strategy with five elements: getting out of Iraq and on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing the capabilities and partnerships we need to take out the terrorists and the world's most deadly weapons; engaging the world to dry up support for terror and extremism; restoring our values; and securing a more resilient homeland."

On troop numbers: "As president, I would deploy at least two additional brigades to Afghanistan to re-enforce our counter-terrorism operations and support NATO's efforts against the Taliban." Once in office and faced with the realities of a rapidly deteriorating war effort and resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the president deployed not 10,000 additional troops, but more than 60,000. Nonetheless, the policy goal was there.

On the end-game: "We must not, however, repeat the mistakes of Iraq. The solution in Afghanistan is not just military -- it is political and economic." The appointment of the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as special envoy to the region, the accompanying "civilian surge," and massive increase in development funding to the region all are signs of this being a main point of effort in the Obama strategy.

Back in 2007, the candidate showed the same resolve in accomplishing these goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although not perfectly executed, the outlines of the Obama strategy were all there. These lines of argument are evident in the president's policy and likely will be in his speech tonight. 

Then-candidate Obama's concluding statement on the war four years ago is a useful reference for today:

Above all, I will send a clear message: we will not repeat the mistake of the past, when we turned our back on Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal. As 9/11 showed us, the security of Afghanistan and America is shared. And today, that security is most threatened by the al Qaeda and Taliban sanctuary in the tribal regions of northwest Pakistan.

Al Qaeda terrorists train, travel, and maintain global communications in this safe haven. The Taliban pursues a hit and run strategy, striking in Afghanistan, then skulking across the border to safety.

This is the wild frontier of our globalized world. There are wind-swept deserts and cave-dotted mountains. There are tribes that see borders as nothing more than lines on a map, and governments as forces that come and go. There are blood ties deeper than alliances of convenience, and pockets of extremism that follow religion to violence. It's a tough place.

But that is no excuse. There must be no safe-haven for terrorists who threaten America. We cannot fail to act because action is hard.

Dr. Abu Muqawama, the Duke of Wellington and the messiness of war

The other day my CNAS colleague Dr. Abu Muqawama commented about Libya, "I really think the administration has been terribly sloppy in its own management of this conflict." This reminded me of something I have been thinking about lately: Because of its inherent messiness and difficulty, all wars are always terribly hard to manage. This is so consistently true that I imagine that no war looks well-run from inside it. I suspect that any war feels "terribly sloppy" at the time. This is the originating impulse of all those jokes about anyone remaining calm not understanding the situation.   

Same goes true for organizations observing these things. I first began to think about this when I was an editor at the Wall Street Journal during the 1991 Gulf War, and was surprised at how pissed off everyone was most of the time the war was underway. After it was over I took a week off just to go hiking and calm down. I also think of the Duke of Wellington's comment that "nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won."

My sense that war is the sloppiest of enterprises has been reinforced by the deep dive I've been doing over the last three years through 20th century American military history. This isn't just a matter of the Vietnam War, in which I have been immersed for 14 months -- I feel like my tour was extended, in part because I got mired in My Lai for six weeks last winter. I am emerging only now. 

Even in wars we won, it is amazing how often everyone is upset with each other, feeling ill-used, misunderstood, even betrayed. I think of MacArthur once humiliating Eichelberger to tears. This goes double for working with allies. It is the genius of Marshall and Eisenhower that they understood this and made getting along with allies their top imperative of the war. Ike once remarked to an officer, I'm not sending you home because you called him a son-of-a-bitch, I'm sending you home because you called him a British son-of-a-bitch.

Osprey engines are logging less than 200 hours of wing time in Afghanistan

And then they must be shipped home for overhaul, reports Bill Sweetman, the king of military aviation journalists.

There is a good PhD dissertation to be written on the whole V-22 Osprey mess -- how many billions of dollars have been spent over the decades to produce a fast but very expensive long-range troop transport helicopter. One of the biggest untold stories in the military, I think, is the sorry state of Marine aviation -- ancient CH-53 helos, hangar queen V-22s, and multi-role expensive fighter jets -- when what the Corps should be flying is Black Hawks and A-10s, or even long-legged prop-driven aircraft.

Meanwhile, news of a Marine aviator being sent off to federal prison is right here.

And another thing: Military strategic education is far worse than Tom thinks

This must be my week to be judged too positive in my assessments.

Jim Schneider is one of the grand old men of American strategic education, one of the early faculty members of the Army's School for Advanced Military Studies, which pulled Army professional education out of a tactical slough.

Schneider also is the author of a terrific book on the strategy of Lawrence of Arabia that will come out later this year. 

Here he alleges that the teaching of strategy in the military is even worse than I think:

By James Schneider

Best Defense department of advanced military studies

Your graphic, I think, captures two issues:

First, the fact that much of strategy is "tacticized," whereby strategy becomes expressed as smaller arrows on increasingly bigger maps. There are few genuine strategic thinkers in or out of the military -- Jim Dubik remains an exception. The inverted nature of professional military advancement militates against a higher understanding of strategy, where the default mode of thinking is tactical and technological and where we see more concerns about headgear than heuristics, etc.

Second, much of strategy as it is taught today has the numbing sound of dogmatic incantations voiced loudly by the anointed high priests of doctrine. Doctrinization in teaching strategy naturally leads to a fossilization in thinking about strategy. These issues can be attributed to a number of inextricable factors. 

First, the failure to teach military theory adequately as a fundamental component in officer education ensures that strategy is intellectually inaccessible. Strategy is a higher level of abstraction that must be grasped conceptually through theory. Theory allows us to visualize what we cannot see. Theories are like maps that allow us to visualize the terrain that we cannot see. We cannot "see" abstracted strategy, we can only visualize it theoretically. Since we can still see tactical actions quite readily, this becomes the natural default mode as we struggle with strategic abstraction.

Second, where theory is taught, it is expressed in the brilliant but sadly outmoded concepts of Clausewitz. Concepts are like the basic symbols on a map; without proper symbology the map is useless; without a reliable conceptual frame, theories are meaningless. The higher elevations of strategy are absent from Clausewitz's pre-industrial map of tactical valleys and low-lands. 

Third, the teaching of strategy is taught primarily by civilian academics using essentially the same eighteenth century methods of instruction designed for clerics. The university system, especially as it relates to the humanities, has totally overlooked the clinical method of instruction that revolutionized medicine in the nineteenth century with the invention of the teaching hospital. 

Fourth, the very idea of strategy is little understood. Strategy is the art of creating a generating logic that rationalizes violent or competitive behavior. Strategy is about creating the rules of the game, not about playing the game. Lines and arrows, Xs and Os are the tactical expression of strategy, mediated through operational art. Think of James Naismith and his invention of basketball. His set of rules -- the generating logic -- rationalized the competitive behavior of players to create a viable sport -- a strategy. The coaches (the "operational artists") mediate the play by enforcing -- coaching -- the rules played by the players -- tacticians. Strategy creates the rules for the games nations play. The strategist seeks to impose new logic -- new rules -- in a competitive, often violent environment, while disrupting the logic of his opponent. Lincoln, the first really modern strategist, changed the "game" of the American Civil War by introducing the "rule" of Emancipation.

James Schneider taught strategy and military theory at the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies from 1984 to 2008, and is the author of a forthcoming book on the strategic thinking of Lawrence of Arabia.

A thriller about a duplicitous ISI and a feisty CIA wrestling in the post-911 era

I recently finished David Ignatius' new novel, Bloodmoney, which is set mainly in Pakistan, the U.S., and London. I think anyone who reads this blog would enjoy it.

I think fiction must use a different part of the brain. I wouldn't read an academic analysis of CIA-ISI relations til past midnight, but after a long day of travel, I stayed up hours to finish reading this book.

As it happens, the other day I ran into an American diplomat who is an expert in the Middle East and strongly recommended Ignatius' previous novel, The Increment, about Iran.

So what should foreign policy wonks read on the beach this summer? I'd say the complete works of Ignatius, which amount to a grand tour of the Middle East -- start with Agents of Innocence (Lebanon, and worth the price of admission just for the stomach-churning chapter in the middle about being an Israeli agent in Syria) and work your way with him through the region. 

Here are some other takes on beach reading for wonks.

Iraq 2011: Jet skiing the Triangle of Death, listening to Bee Gee songs--and pondering what comes next

On a morning when
news comes of more
bombings in south-central Iraq, here is an overview from Lady Emma Sky, who
knows as much about Iraqi politics as a foreigner can. Her comments on Turkey
balancing Iran
in Iraq especially interested me, as did the speculation about whether an
overthrow of the jerks running Syria might lead to further fragmentation in
Iraq. And keep in mind that Iran
remains mighty
interesting.

By Emma Sky

Best Defense roving
Middle East correspondent

The taxi driver to
Beirut airport tells me that yom
al-qiyama (the day of judgment) is approaching. There will be a big
explosion soon -- a very big explosion. The revolutions sweeping the Arab World
are not good. Islamic parties will come to power everywhere. There will be no
more Christians left in the Middle East. Believe me, believe me, he insists. In
anticipation, he will make the Hajj to Mecca this year, inshallah. I tell him that I am traveling to Iraq as a tourist. The
look he gives me in the rear view mirror says it all: He thinks I am crazy.

I am heading back to
Iraq nine months after I left my job as Political Advisor to the Commanding
General of U.S. Forces Iraq. Earlier this year, a Sheikh emailed me from his
iPad, "Miss Emma we miss you. You must come visit us as a guest. You will
stay with me. And you will have no power!" I am excited and nervous. The
plane is about a third full. I am the only foreigner. I look around at my
fellow passengers. I wonder who they are and whether they bear a grudge for something
we might have done.

The flight is one
and a half hours long. I read and doze. As we approach Iraq, I look out of the
window. The sky is full of sand and visibility is poor. But I can make out the
Euphrates below. Land of the two rivers, I am coming back. [[BREAK]]

I do not have an
Iraqi visa. Visas issued in Iraqi Embassies abroad are not recognized by
Baghdad airport. I have a letter from an Iraqi General in the Ministry of
Interior, complete with a signature and stamp. In the airport, I present my
passport and letter, fill out a form, pay $80, and receive a visa within 15
minutes. I collect my bag. I am through. I want to reach down and touch the
ground, this land that has soaked up so much blood over the years -- ours and
theirs.

I spot the Fixer. We
grin at each other as we shake hands. Soon we are in his car speeding down the
airport road -- that we called Route Irish -- towards the Green Zone. I can't
see any Americans. Not on the roads, not on the checkpoints. Iraq looks normal
- for Iraq. What is new? What has changed? The situation is not good, he tells
me. The government is bad. Too many assassinations. We laugh and chat like old
friends. The Fixer, who used to 'smuggle' me out of the Green Zone is now "smuggling"
me back in. Leave it to me, he says, smiling and patting his chest with his
hand.

Before long, I am
sitting with my Iraqi hosts in their home, catching up with their news. I take
a dip in their pool. It is 46 degrees (Centigrade). The brown of the
sand-filled sky is broken by flashes of grey, white and yellow lightening.
Later in the evening, the rolls of thunder are replaced by the thuds of mortars
targeting the U.S. Embassy.

*

Sitting in the back
of the car wearing abaya and hijab, I drive south towards Karbala
with two young Iraqi army guys, who are both from Baghdad and Shia. In the
national elections last year one voted for Maliki to be Prime Minister, the
other voted for Allawi as he wanted a secular man to lead Iraq. They both agree
that life was better under Saddam, that there was more security before, people
could travel anywhere safely, gas was cheaper, salaries went further, there was
no "Sunni-Shia." They tell me that people are very upset with public
services, especially electricity, but are too scared to demonstrate. No one
likes living under occupation, but people are also worried that the situation
might deteriorate if the Americans leave. They both stress that Jaish al-Mahdi
is not the right way.

We drive for an hour
southwards. We pass numerous checkpoints. No one checks my papers. I am the
invisible woman in Islamic dress. It is late so the roads are not busy.
Finally, we turn off the main road, down a track, through an orchard, and
arrive at a house on the banks of the Euphrates where I meet up with my Iraqi
friend, and he introduces me to his companions, male and female. Tables are
arranged and big trays of food emerge from the house. Fatoush salad. Maqluba --
chicken and rice. We stuff our faces. I sit in a swing chair, chatting with my
friend, who talks about his experiences of working with the U.S. military. They
have big hearts he tells me, but they are naïve. They don't know how to do
contracting. They spent lots of money, but so much was wasted. They did not
know who was good and who was bad. Many projects were not implemented well.
Others were not sustainable. The Brits last century left us with railways,
roads and bridges. What have the Americans left us? My friend tells me about
his companions, what they do and how he knows them. When I ask them where they
are from, I discover that one woman is a Kurd who was born and bred in Baghdad,
two are Sunnis, and the others are Shia, and all have relatives of different
sects. We are Iraqis, they tell me.

It is midnight. I
lie back on the swing chair, wrap myself up in a blanket and fall asleep on the
banks of the river. My peace is rudely interrupted at 2 a.m. by a massive
explosion which shakes the ground. For a moment, I wonder if we are being
attacked. Then I speculate that perhaps there are still some Americans on a
nearby base. I don't move and quickly fall back to sleep.

I awake at 5 a.m.
when the sun rises, and see a fisherman pass in a small boat. I doze back to
sleep until I awake again from the heat of the sun. The caretaker has also
slept outside. He brings me tea. He tells me he has been guarding me through
the night, making sure I am safe, and keeping the dogs -- which look like
wolves -- away from me. I thank him. He chats about the river. The Americans
had bases here. Our people attacked them. Gangs. The Americans did not know who
was good and who bad. One time, he was up a palm tree picking dates when
Americans shot at him. He giggles as he recounts how he fell out of the tree.
Another time, he approached an U.S. checkpoint and they demanded he take off
his top, then his pants, then his underwear. They made him walk stark naked.
Another time, he thought gangs were breaking into the plantation so he opened
fire. In fact, it was American soldiers and he wounded one. The Americans
arrested him and sent him to Bucca prison near Basra. The caretaker tells me
about his life today. At home he only has a few hours of electricity a day. The
electricity comes on for one hour and then goes off for four hours. During the
hour that it is on, he makes his room as cold as possible. It is very difficult
for people. They sleep out on the roofs. He talks about the "time of the
British," and the "time of Saddam." He has already consigned the
American period to history.

I climb up on the
jet ski and speed up the Euphrates. The dust of the previous day has cleared
and the sky is brilliant blue. I wave to people on the banks and they wave
back. I pass the Iskandriyya power station which once served as a U.S. base.
Further up to the left is Jurf as-Sakr. The Americans used to called this area
the "Triangle of Death" due to the levels of violence. I remember landing by
helicopter on numerous occasions on visits to the troops, receiving briefings
of insurgents moving down the river. Now it is me on the river, and the U.S.
bases have gone. I jump off the jet ski into the water and swim back down the
river, floating with the current.

Out the back of the
house, surrounded by sheep and chickens, the Caretaker is busy barbequing a
fish that the fisherman brought us. My friend gutted it earlier, washing it in
the river and then opening it up in half to put under the grill. One of the
women places the 'masgoof' on a tray,
and brings it out to the table on the river bank. We stand around, eating the
fish with our fingers, and dipping freshly baked bread into the salads. It is
delicious.

*

I am invited to an
Armenian family for lunch. They live in part of Baghdad which used to be a
Jewish area. Before the founding of the State of Israel, over 130,000 Jews
lived in Iraq. In fact, the 1917 census put the Jewish population of Baghdad at
40 percent. The Armenian family bought the house in 1954. On the walls are hung
rifles, hand-guns, tapestries. Against a long wall, shelves are crammed with
books. My friend lives here with his wife and son, and his parents. His mother,
an elegant well-dressed woman, tells me of how the Armenians escaped to Iraq as
refugees from the genocide in Turkey. Many Armenians were taken in by Arab
tribes. The Arabs were so kind and generous to us, bringing up orphans as their
own children. We will always remember how good they were to us. We will never
forgive Turkey. The number of Armenians in Iraq has halved since 2003, and is
now down to around 10,000. She believes this is the end of Christians in Iraq.
She laments that so many are leaving for the United States. What will they find
there? Life may be easier, but here in Iraq is where we have our families, our
history, our culture. She sighs that everyone had such high hopes after the
fall of the regime. No one expected it to turn out how it has. But even in her
most depressed moments, she never wishes Saddam back. My friend's wife has
cooked a feast of Armenian foods, and I sample every plate. When I leave, she
gives me a doggy bag that will feed the Arab family that I am staying with for
days.

As I drive with my
Armenian friend back across town, we hear news of a complex attack on the
provincial council in Diyala which has left 8 killed and over 20 wounded; and
of the assassination of an Iraqi General in Baghdad.

*

I catch up with some
Turkish friends and feast on food prepared by their Turkish cook. They tell me
that Iraqis are blaming Turkey for their water shortage and are demanding that
Turkey lets more water flow into Iraq's rivers. But relations between Turkey
and Iraq -- particularly with the Kurdistan region -- are good, largely due to
the vision of the Turkish Ambassador and the investment of the Turkish private
sector. Turkish companies are operating from north to south of Iraq and have
developed a good reputation for getting things done. It is largely Turkish
companies that have beautified the Green Zone, renovating the Republican
Palace, laying down roads and building a guest house for the Arab Summit that
never happened. Today in Iraq, Turkey is seen as the main competitor to and
balancer of Iranian influence.

*

I take a tour of
Baghdad with a senior Iraqi official. He is an old friend from whom I have
learned so much about this country over the years. We visit old haunts. I can
clearly observe the changes that have taken place in the last nine months. The
local economy has improved. The private sector is certainly taking off. More
shops are open. New cars are on the roads. People are busy going about their
everyday affairs. Many concrete T-walls have gone. Security forces are less
visible.

As we drive along I
ask him what are his main concerns. He responds: the direction of the political
process, corruption, and assassinations. We discuss the different paths Iraq
might head along and indicators of each:

Dictatorship. Will Prime Minister Maliki and the Dawa
party be able to sink their tentacles deep enough to exert control over the
organs of state and the unofficial shadow state -- the old culture of Iraq
re-exerting itself, but with different beneficiaries? Maliki now serves as the
Minister of Defense, Interior, and National Security. There is no longer a
selection committee for promotions within the military. So those seeking
promotion, pensions, and protection cosy up to political leaders as they have
no confidence that the system itself will recognize their merits or provide for
them. Maliki has placed his people as deputies and advisers through all the
ministries. But power is too diffused in Iraq these days making it hard for
anyone to assume total control. And this goes against the Arab Spring trend
influencing the region.

Oligarchy: Will the political elites maintain the current political paralysis
but create an oligarchy, as in Russia? Iraq's political elites live in big
houses, receive good salaries and pensions, can afford private generators for
their electricity consumption, and are well guarded. They have their noses in
the trough and access to large contracts. But are the elites competent enough
to capture the State? Will the level of corruption and absence of the rule of
law make this path unlikely.

Haves versus have-nots: Will armed groups fight the State for a
share of the country's oil resources, as in Nigeria? Rumors abound that
militias are raising their heads once more, and the power of the Sadrists in
the south continues to increase through coercion and intimidation.

Democracy: The Parliament is growing in capacity, with members drafting laws and
debating issues. Meetings of Cabinet and sessions of Parliament -- albeit
edited -- are shown on TV. The media is flourishing, although there are attempts
to control journalists. But the sectarian construct of the political system and
corruption hinder the movement in this path. Perhaps in a decade or so, once
the current political class have been replaced, there will be more hope.

Civil war: Will Iraq plunge once more into sectarian conflict? While this is
always a risk, Iraq's political leaders, institutions and security forces are
stronger than they were in 2005 and all wish to avoid this direction.

We conclude that
Iraq might follow a mixture of these paths. It seems unlikely that Iraq will
avoid the 'resource curse', the paradox whereby a country with oil wealth has
less economic growth and worse development outcomes than a country with less
natural resources.

*

I watch the Iraqi
national tennis team practice. They are excellent players. What impresses me
most is how they interact with each other, offering words of congratulations or
commiserations on particular shots. I speak to them during the interval. They
are from different parts of Baghdad, are of different sects, were inspired by
their fathers to play, and are proud to represent Iraq on the international
stage.

*

I sit with a good
friend, a female member of Parliament, in a café in Baghdad. We reminisce about
2007 and how we worked together closely to help bring down the violence that
ravaged the country. It seems such a long time ago. We discuss the problems
facing the country today. How much longer will the patience of Iraqis continue,
I ask her? She tells me that the people are tired. They want electricity and
jobs. They want to eat and sleep. They want normal lives. There is injustice.
The country is rich, but the people do not see the benefits. The Iraqi people
have been so oppressed for years that we are like sheep. Iraq today is so far
away from the vision that people had after the fall of Saddam. I describe to
her my trips to Egypt and Tunisia and how people feel empowered because they
removed their regimes themselves, with little bloodshed, are debating their
constitutions, and new politicians are coming to the fore. She tells me that in
Iraq people do not feel that same sense of empowerment. They did not remove
Saddam themselves, many of the politicians who were put in power were Islamist
exiles returning from abroad, there was little public debate over the
constitution, and elections did not bring about change but kept the same
dysfunctional arrangement in place.

New narratives are
being created about life before the fall of the regime and life under
occupation. People have started to claim there was no 'Sunni-Shia' before 2003.
Many blame the Americans for introducing sectarian/ethnic quotas in the way the
Governing Council was established, and for excluding key segments of the
population. But it was the exiled Iraqi elites who advised them along this
path. And while political parties claim to not want quotas, they all fight to
maintain them. And during elections, Iraqis mostly voted along sectarian and
ethnic lines. And while Iraqis criticize corruption, they pay the bribes. The
gap between the political elites and the Iraqi people seems to be growing even
wider. Safe in the Green Zone, I hear some elites talk about "Shia power,"
while others now discuss creating a Sunni federal region. The elites have not
developed consensus on the nature of the state, nor moved towards building a
more just society, focusing too often on revenge and accumulating power rather
than on national reconciliation. And so the political elites squabble among
themselves over the spoils of the country's wealth. Each group watches the TV
channel that aligns with their bloc. The government channel portrays the
Cabinet discussing progress in their ministries over the 100-day period,
development projects across the country, beautiful scenery, happy members of
the public out shopping. In sharp contrast, Sharqiyya TV constantly criticizes
the government for lack of progress, highlights electricity shortages across
the country and how many hours a day are received from the national grid, and
shows brutality of the state security forces. While the politics are so
polarized, there will inevitably be levels of violence aimed at achieving
political outcomes, the institutions of state will remain weak, and economic
development will be hampered by the absence of the rule of law.

*

I luncheon at the
home of another female MP who is active in promoting human rights in Iraq. I
ask her what is the way to make politicians hear the voices of the Iraqi
people? She says it is very difficult. Iraqis still do not have their basic
needs. Electricity is the most important thing for them. It is hard for them to
access the internet, to create networks on facebook, when they have so little
access to electricity. The society needs to become less militarized. Space
needs to be made for the voices of youth and women, and minorities. This is
very hard in Iraq. The Americans did not invest enough in promoting democracy,
she laments. People are too scared to demonstrate -- scared of the government
and of the terrorists.

On Friday,
people gather in Tahrir Square to demonstrate. I watch for a bit on TV. I am
initially confused as the demonstrations look nothing like what I have seen
elsewhere in the region. Sheikhs are shown demanding the death penalty for
terrorists. I discover that these are the 'pro-government' supporters bused in
from Karbala and other provinces and security guards from inside the Green Zone
who have been told to go out and demonstrate in support of Maliki. They carry
placards with a red X through a photo of Allawi. The smaller number of 'pro-democracy'
supporters are a mixed bunch of youth, communists and others, inspired by the
Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia to seek more freedoms. Government officials
accuse them of being Baathists and terrorists. I later hear from Western
journalists on the scene that some 'pro-democracy' demonstrators were beaten up
by plain clothed men with batons -- while the security forces stood by watching
-- and two including a woman were stabbed.

In response
to the demonstration, the Iraqiyya leader Allawi delivers a harsh speech
criticizing Maliki and the Dawa party. Allawi is regarded as the main loser
from government formation, unable to capitalize on his election victory.
Earlier in the month, there were rumors that he would agree to head the
National Council on Higher Policies (although disagreements remain over the
title of the post, and whether it would receive approval of the COR) and that
agreement was close to appointing the security ministers. But discussions have
broken off again, and relations have deteriorated even further. With the two
main blocs of State of Law and Iraqiyya unable to reach agreement and with
their leaders apparently irreconcilable, the Kurds and Sadrists play the
kingmakers.

Into this toxic mix
comes the issue of whether the U.S. forces should remain in Iraq post 2011. The
Sadrists are adamant that all U.S. forces should leave by the end of the year.
They continue to attack U.S. troops so that they can claim that they have
driven them out. They threaten to protest against the government if services do
not improve by August, and to revert back to violence if U.S. forces remain
beyond the end of the year. The rest of the political elites in private say
they wish that some U.S. forces remain to help the air force protect the air space,
the navy to protect the oil platforms, and to assist with training of the army
and provision of intelligence. However, only the Kurds seem willing to lead the
debate in public. Maliki's Dawa party has put out a statement in which Dawa
"reiterated its firm stands toward the withdrawal of all the U.S. forces
from the Iraqi land, waters, and airspace on the set time, which is the end of
this year." To gain Iranian and Sadrist support for a second term as
Prime Minister, Maliki had to promise them that there would be no extension of
U.S. forces after 2011. Maliki is probably hoping that the Parliament will vote
to approve some US military presence remaining in Iraq post 2011, so that he
will have to go along with their decision. In this way, he will continue to
balance both the United States and Iran. Events in Syria are also troubling the
elites in Iraq. If the Allawite regime falls and is replaced by a Sunni one,
then Iraq will become even more important to Iran and its buffer against the
Sunni world. This may also serve to push the trend in Iraq towards Kurdish,
Sunni, and Shia regions, all heavily influenced by different neighboring
countries.

*

I go over to the
complex we called 'Freedom Towers', where U.S. soldiers once used to enjoy a
few days of respite away from the battlefield during their long tours. Today,
it is the headquarters of Dr Saleh Mutlak. I say to him: it is amazing to see
you here. The last time I saw you was 18 months ago in the Rashid hotel just
before you fled the country. He laughs as he puffs on his cigarette. He makes me
tell the story to his guests -- all of whom of course know it. One of the most
popular Sunni leaders in the country and joint-head of Iraqiyya, Mutlak was
barred by the de-Baathification committee from running in the national elections.
Through a deal worked in the government formation negotiations at the end of
last year, Mutlak is now the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. The head
of the de-Baathification committee is dead, assassinated last month. How
can anyone predict how things may turn out in Iraq?

*

Sitting in a
restaurant in Karada, downtown Baghdad, eating pizza and drinking wine with
journalist friends, I listen to an Iraqi sing Bee Gee songs. The singer moves
me to tears. He sings with such passion, making the songs his own. I invite him
over to join us at our table. He sits down with us and as he talks the
talented, confident Singer, transforms into a fragile, damaged man. What
horrors have those eyes seen, I wonder? What is the trauma he is struggling
with? He tells us that he went to the United States for a short period in the
seventies when he was a young boy, accompanying his father who had been wounded
fighting on the Syria/Israel border and needed plastic surgery. In 2003, he had
come forward to work with the U.S. military, but quit after three months when
he had been blown up by an IED. I remember the wonderful Iraqis who had come
forward to work with the Coalition back in 2003, dreaming of building a new
democratic society -- many were killed by insurgents for collaborating with the
Occupying Authorities and many others fled the country. "I dip," the singer
tells me, bringing out his pouch of tobacco. "Disgusting habit to pick up from
American soldiers!" I scold him. He laughs. Things are slowly getting better in
Iraq, he assures me. Iraqis just want to live. It is going to take a long time
-- a very long time.

Pakistani general arrested

First the Turks,
now the Paks.
One more will make a journalistic trend!

The CIA vs. Professor Juan Cole

I don't think
Congress should investigate this.
Nor do I think the main Justice Department should. Because why? Because I don't
trust either entity to handle the job: Congress was part of the problem, and
whatever it does will be politicized, while the Obama Administration has made
it very clear it does not want to turn over this rock.

Rather, I hope that
the federal grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, that I've been hearing rumors
about for a few years, which supposedly is looking into CIA torture issues,
expands its scope to look at CIA domestic abuses.

Amy Winehouse alert: When the Serb defense minister criticizes your show

...Then you know you've got trouble.

On the other hand, it is a good sign that the Balkans are so
peaceful that the Serb
defense minister has time to complain about an Amy Winehouse concert.
Maybe we should send her on a tour of Syria, Iran, and Pakistan. 

(HT to MK)