Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 244

Blog comment of the day: You wanna look like a professional in the Army?

From Blackfoot:
"You know what promotes a professional appearance? Not being fat.
Running shoes that work best for an individual -- minimalist or otherwise -- can
help with that."

Meanwhile, Thomas Rid has a nice follow-up on the
Five Fingers controversy here.

From the no-brainer department: French government is arming the Libyan rebels

This
should have been step one. Basic rule here: Indirect action is better than
direct. Before you commit your own military forces, help the locals help
themselves. This also helps with extracting yourself: You win when the locals
can defend themselves.

Btw, this apparently
is one reason the rebels have been doing better in western Libya lately.

Damn Taliban blow up my memories

My junior prom was at the Kabul Intercontinental, which
was still pretty new back then in the funky times. It was the first real
Western hotel in Kabul, and on prom night 1971 it sort of symbolized to me and
others how far Afghanistan had come. Benazir Bhutto once told me she went there
to party down when her dad was running Pakistan.

When I went back in 2002 and bought a pile of history books
at the hotel, plus some ISI propaganda tracts, it was a far drearier place,
dirty and worn out, and it denoted to me just how much Afghans had suffered in
the previous 25 years.

More recently, my favorite film about contemporary
Afghanistan, Afghan
Star, concluded with a lively, even joyous, scene in the hotel's
ballroom. (Btw, I see that Afghan Star is
now available on Netflix.
This is one of the best, and most enjoyable, introductions to post-Taliban
Afghanistan you could have. Make it a double bill with Osama,
which has nothing to do with old bin Laden and lots to do with what life was
like under the Taliban.)

So yesterday's
attacks
on the hotel hit unusually close to home for me.

Quote of the day: Wavell on the days back when the infantry was dissed bigtime

The ascendance of
infantry in the ranks of Army general officers was recently discussed on this
blog by Lt.
Gen. Barno. Nowadays, everyone seems to want to be a groundpounder. This quotation,
written by Field Marshall Archibald Wavell in April 1945, reminded me that infantry
has not always been so favored:

Let us be clear about three facts. First, all
battles and all wars are won in the end by the infantryman. Secondly, the
infantryman always bears the brunt. His casualties are heavier, he suffers
greater extremes of discomfort and fatigue than the other arms. Thirdly, the
art of the infantryman is less stereotyped and far harder to acquire in modern
war than that of any other arm. The role of the average artilleryman, for
instance, is largely routine; the setting of a fuse, the loading of a gun, even
the laying of it are processes which, once learnt, are mechanical. The
infantryman has to use initiative and intelligence in almost every step he
moves, every action he takes on the battle-field. We ought therefore to put our
men of best intelligence and endurance into the Infantry.

Yet the Infantry in peace or war receives the
lowest rates of pay, the drabbest uniforms, sometimes even the least promising
of recruits; most important of all, it ranks lowest in the public estimation
and prestige.

Looks vs. results: Get your Army hands off my snazzy Five Finger running shoes!

On the face of it, this issue
of what to wear whilst running isn't a big deal. But our Army captain is correct
in asserting that one of the warning signs of deterioration in the military
during peacetime is an emphasis on appearance over effectiveness.

By A Rifle Company
Commander

Best Defense culture
of the Army correspondent

The
Army has officially banned the wearing of Five
Finger running shoes. Many garrison commanders have already done so, but
the following order has made it official Army-wide: 

ALARACT 241/2011 REQUEST FOR EXCEPTION TO
POLICY TO PUBLISH ALARACT MODIFYING WEAR OF IMPROVED PHYSICAL FITNESS UNIFORM
(IPFU), DTG 231424Z JUN 11. This message modifies the existing wear policy for
the (IPFU). There are a variety of minimalist running shoes available for
purchase and wear. Effective immediately, only those shoes that accommodate all
five toes in one compartment are authorized for wear. Those shoes that feature
five separate, individual compartments for the toes, detract from a
professional military image and are prohibited for wear with the IPFU or when conducting
physical training in military formation. (See the message at this link.)

What
particularly gets me is the line, "detract from a professional military
image."  I don't understand how the
image of someone that takes their running serious is detracting from a
professional military image. Professionals sometimes wear items/clothing that
may look "weird" but serves a professional purpose. Anyway, I have
had some Five Fingers for over a year, and I love them. They reduce shin splints,
work your calves better, toughen your feet, and reduced my five mile run
average by five minutes in three months. 

Is
this a matter of national security? In isolation, probably not. But, I would
say that an Army that is more concerned with looks versus results IS a matter a
national security.

A Marine officer inquires: Hey, what's the story with accountability in the Army?

Here's a
new study of Army
leadership. I haven't read it
yet because in my book project (a history of American generalship since 1939) I
currently am working on the late 1980s, so I put this report on the pile of
stuff to read when I finally get to the 21st century, probably sometime this
fall.

That's by way of
saying we have a commentary right here that questions Army leadership. Read on,
Garth:

By "A Recent
Marine Rifle Company Commander"

Best Defense department of helpful Marine commentary on the
Army

After reading Black
Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death
by Jim Frederick I was upset by the lack of accountability for the senior
enlisted and officers in the chain of command of that platoon and company,
believing they were responsible for the environment that led to the crimes
committed.



Today I read the
article below about the alleged unlawful killings in Afghanistan by members
of the 5th Brigade, 2 ID in late 2009 and early 2010. The allegations were
already public knowledge by the summer of 2010 when the below article states
Capt. Roman Ligsay was promoted. Other press accounts state he was removed as
platoon leader during the deployment for his poor leadership of the platoon. He
admitted to violating orders by posing for a photo with a dead Afghan. [[BREAK]]



I understand granting immunity from prosecution to gain testimony against
others, but what does it say to every enlisted member of the U.S. military that
an officer can still be promoted after apparently failing as a leader,
knowingly violating regulations, sacrificing his integrity for immunity, and
creating or failing to prevent an environment that led to murder?



Given the leadership discussions on your FP blog over the past few months, I
thought you might wish to add this item to the debate.



I am a Marine infantry officer who served in Iraq as a Lieutenant and in
Afghanistan as a company commander. I am not trying to single out the Army. All
services and organizations have their share of problems, but I am having a
great deal of difficulty understanding the actions taken in this case.



The Haditha case offers a contrasting example of accountability. The battalion
commander was forced to fight to retire with his rank. Four additional officers
from the battalion were passed over for promotion which ended their active duty
careers. The RCT CO, Division Chief of Staff, and Division CG were also
censured.

By Adam Ashton

McClatchy Newspapers

Published: June 24, 2011



Some of the first images in a set of notorious photographs showing soldiers posing
with dead Afghans were taken with a sense pride that the Army was fighting and
killing its enemy, a Stryker officer testified Thursday.



Capt. Roman Ligsay told an Army investigator at Joint Base Lewis-McChord that
he posed for one of the pictures in November 2009 even though he knew soldiers
were ordered not to take photos of casualties for personal use. He said he felt
a "sense of accomplishment" when he saw an Afghan who was killed by
an American helicopter.



To him, the image showed "we were fighting the enemy. We weren't just out
there on patrols every day and not seeing the success of those patrols.

 

Annals of Obama & national security (II): What are the politico-diplomatic consequences of the drone warfare era?

Did anyone notice
the United States did a drone strike the other day in Somalia?
I didn't think so. Add that to other places where we are bombing: Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Yemen.

Back in the old
days, air strikes were considered an act of war. But the Obama Administration
sez no -- and here I am beginning to change my mind. Maybe they are onto
something. The drone
strikes being conducted in those three countries are not being done to challenge
those states, but to supplement the power of those states, to act when they
cannot or will not. More importantly, these are precise strikes against certain
individuals, making them more like police work than like classic military
action. Police work involves small arms used precisely. Drones aren't pistols,
but firing one Hellfire at a Land Rover is more like a police action than it is
like a large-scale military offensive with artillery barrages, armored columns,
and infantry assaults. (Yes, I
am shifting my position a bit from what I wrote recently about Libya.)  

We all understand
that drone aircraft have changed warfare, but I suspect they also are changing
diplomacy and foreign relations. Drones, like cruise missiles before them, have
made it much easier to use force internationally. But doing this does not mean
we are at war.

There is a good
dissertation to be done on the political and diplomatic implications of this
new military technology. I know there have been a couple of books in recent
years on this subject -- can anyone highly recommend one?

Gen. Wass de Czege on the customer for professional military education

This comment
by retired Army Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege
(for my money the most influential brigadier in the U.S. military in many
decades) may speak to our discussion over last weekend of the Air War College
and similar institutions. (I think here by "professional" he means
"professional military," but I am not sure. He may be speaking more broadly to
all five of the classic professions -- military, law, clergy, medicine and
academia):

The difference between a civilian graduate school and a professional one
is that in the civilian model, the customer is the student, and in the
professional model, the customer is the profession.

(p. 6)

Annals of Obama & national security: Nailing a whistleblower while torturers go free, and what happens when Lute goes?

I never would have expected that the Obama Administration's Justice
Department would prosecute a
National Security Agency whistleblower but decline to investigate
cases in which people died while being interrogated by U.S. officials. The
case against the NSA official fell
apart like a cheap suit, by the way. Viewing things as I do through the
prism of national security, I think that of the entire administration, Eric
Holder and his Justice Department have been this administration's least
valuable player.  

I still consider myself an Obama supporter, but mainly for non-national
security reasons. In that arena, my worries grow. I hear Lt. Gen.
Douglas Lute is leaving the White House soon. You may not have heard of
him, but his departure may prove significant, because from what I hear, he is
one of the few generals who has felt not only heard but understood by this
White House. And he was a carryover from the previous administration, which may
indicate that this team has not on its own found anyone in the military with
which to have candid exchanges. This crop of White House officials may or may
not be politically astute (I am not a good judge of that) but in the area I
know, I fear they are in the D range in their handling of policy deliberations
with the military. That's LBJ territory. So far this hasn't caused any major
problems, but it could: In a sustained crisis, their failure to build
relationships of trust and understanding with today's four star officers will
hurt us all, but especially those out at the sharp end of the spear. And it may
be later than you think: By August 1965, the American phase of the Vietnam War
was just months old, but Johnson had made the two negative decisions that would
lose the war and break the Army -- to not pursue the enemy into his
cross-border sanctuaries, and to not activate 100,000 reservists or extend the
enlistments of active-duty forces.

What especially worries me is that I fear the Libyan intervention may be
the wave of the future: A small, messy operation in which the United States is
a minority partner, providing unique capabilities such as ISR and refueling,
but not leading the action or dominating multilateral discussions of the way
forward. Yet so far I have to meet a single person in the military who thinks
intervening in Libya was the right thing to do. Again, this is a recipe for
trouble down the road.

Here's one short-term test: Will Lute be replaced at the White House by
another general? If so, who will it be?   

Annals of Obama & national security: Nailing a whistleblower while torturers go free, and what happens when Lute leaves?

I never would have expected that the Obama Administration's Justice
Department would prosecute a
National Security Agency whistleblower but decline to investigate
cases in which people died while being interrogated by U.S. officials. The
case against the NSA official fell
apart like a cheap suit, by the way. Viewing things as I do through the
prism of national security, I think that of the entire administration, Eric
Holder and his Justice Department have been this administration's least
valuable player.  

I still consider myself an Obama supporter, but mainly for non-national
security reasons. In that arena, my worries grow. I hear Lt. Gen.
Douglas Lute is leaving the White House soon. You may not have heard of
him, but his departure may prove significant, because from what I hear, he is
one of the few generals who has felt not only heard but understood by this
White House. And he was a carryover from the previous administration, which may
indicate that this team has not on its own found anyone in the military with
which to have candid exchanges. This crop of White House officials may or may
not be politically astute (I am not a good judge of that) but in the area I
know, I fear they are in the D range in their handling of policy deliberations
with the military. That's LBJ territory. So far this hasn't caused any major
problems, but it could: In a sustained crisis, their failure to build
relationships of trust and understanding with today's four star officers will
hurt us all, but especially those out at the sharp end of the spear. And it may
be later than you think: By August 1965, the American phase of the Vietnam War
was just months old, but Johnson had made the two negative decisions that would
lose the war and break the Army -- to not pursue the enemy into his
cross-border sanctuaries, and to not activate 100,000 reservists or extend the
enlistments of active-duty forces.

What especially worries me is that I fear the Libyan intervention may be
the wave of the future: A small, messy operation in which the United States is
a minority partner, providing unique capabilities such as ISR and refueling,
but not leading the action or dominating multilateral discussions of the way
forward. Yet so far I have to meet a single person in the military who thinks
intervening in Libya was the right thing to do. Again, this is a recipe for
trouble down the road.

Here's one short-term test: Will Lute be replaced at the White House by
another general? If so, who will it be?