Thomas E. Ricks's Blog, page 135

‘Military Review’ steps up

I've been critical on
occasion of the Army's Military Review,
so I want to point out that the new issue has several provocative articles. The
best, I think, is one on critical thinking by Col. Thomas
Williams. He
argues that Army PME "needs work." He thinks the Army needs to focus "less on
knowledge and content and more on the ability to question and argue." He also
calls on the Army to develop what he calls heretics -- "leaders capable of
challenging convention to create imaginative solutions regardless of the
operational environment." Like Roseanne Cash, Colonel Williams knows that the beginning of
wisdom is not to walk into a situation thinking you know the answers, but
figuring out the right questions.

I eagerly dug into another article, "Meritocracy in the Profession of
Arms," and wanted to like
it, but put it down disappointed. The author clearly has something on his mind
-- basically, re-emphasizing competence. I am all for that. But the article
seems to be kind of a rant about the "muddy boots" mindset. He uses the phrase
six times in the article, but never defines it, which would be the first step
in explaining why he finds it so pernicious. (And to quibble, I don't think the
author was well-served by his proofreader: You'd think the Army's premier
magazine could spell General Westmoreland's name correctly on page 20. Also, to be even
pickier, at the bottom of page 49, the current month is given as "Janaury.")

Education as strategy in Afghanistan

By Chris Taylor

Best Defense guest columnist

After eleven years of combat that ultimately will culminate with a troop
withdrawal in 2014, Afghanistan is neither settled nor solved. Long-term
success in the region demands more nuanced approaches and gives cause to
reimagine not a legacy, but a new engagement with smart investment in other
levers of influence.

Eminent Harvard professor Joe Nye, who coined the phrase "soft power,"
recently said, "soft power is the ability to get outcomes through
attraction rather than through force or payment, and education has always been
an important resource to achieve that."

Education has already proven to be a powerful attraction in Kabul. Enrollment
at the American University of Afghanistan rose from 56 students in 2006 to
1,800 in 2012, and continues to grow. Founded in 2004 by Afghan business and
civic leaders, and modeled after the successful American Universities of Beirut
and Cairo, the AUAF is a non-sectarian, co-educational institution with
undergraduate, graduate, and professional development curricula.

In May 2011, the AUAF graduated its first class of 32; nine women and 23
men with two Fulbright Scholarships awarded. In 2012, 52 graduated with six
more Fulbright Scholars named.

The university attracts Pashtuns, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Nuristanis,
Turkmen, Aimaks, and many others. In doing so, it creates an intercultural
environment where young Afghan minds interact, leveraging many tribal
narratives into one sense of Afghan unity and progress.

But by far, the fastest growing demographic at AUAF is women. With an
average enrollment of 25 percent in undergraduate and professional development
curricula (11 percent in the newly minted MBA curriculum), Afghan women are
defying archaic norms and risking their lives to educate themselves so they can
lead in their communities, in business, and in the national government. These
are the same women who have been disfigured by acid attacks and mutilation,
raped by relatives, married against their will, and received death threats from
the Taliban -- yet they still come to the AUAF because they believe they can
change their future, and that of their nation.

AUAF graduate Wasima Muhammadi said, "I want to be a deputy in the
Ministry of Finance, because currently I do not see enough women participation
in the government. I think that a mixture of both male and female leaders in
this country would have a positive impact on the progress of
Afghanistan." 

In a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, General John
Allen, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, testified
that, "Throughout history, insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign
forces, instead, they have been ultimately beaten by indigenous forces."

The case, then, is made: an educated citizenry can redefine its
country's narrative, drive change from within, and break free from tyranny.

Sound familiar?

While education is a strong soft power tool, it affects national
security, too. Afghanistan's low literacy rate poses significant challenges to
strategic training programs for its army, police forces, and government
agencies, potentially impairing its ability to fully take responsibility for
its own security in 2014.

Initially funded by a grant from USAID with support from first lady
Laura Bush, AUAF has grown substantially beyond that support. The university
has an aggressive campaign to raise $80 million over five years -- a fraction
of the $108 billion budgeted for operations in Afghanistan in 2012.

It seems education is quite the deal these days.

Contractors have made substantial profits in Afghanistan. The Federal
Procurement Data System lists over $50 billion in contracts for companies who
have supported combat and stabilization operations. Imputing an estimated
profit of 10 percent leaves $5 billion -- a small amount of which CEOs should
invest in the education of some of the tens of thousands of Afghans they
employ. As the CEO of my former company, I instituted an AUAF scholarship
program for top performing Afghan employees, or children of Afghan employees
killed while serving the company and the military. Today, six bright students,
three of whom are women, are studying accounting and finance, public
administration, and information technology on these funds.

The wealthy Afghan diaspora should be first in line to support the
AUAF's mission. Many have benefited from Western education, and sharing their
experiences and financial assistance would give others still trapped by war and
extremism a view to a better future.

As the United States now weighs its strategic options, investing in the
American University of Afghanistan makes sense. The extremist narrative lures
disenchanted youth every day, but that's because there is not a stronger,
positive message for them to embrace. Without funding for education, young
Afghans will flee the country in search of other opportunities; most never to
return -- or worse, stay home and simply endure whatever may come. That need
not be so.

A commitment to the American University of Afghanistan brings with it a
new generation of Afghan leaders who will catapult forward fresh ideas that
counter extremism, reject corruption, and embrace equality for women, all while
creating necessary long-term regional relationships and giving voice to young
Afghans who are the future of their country and dedicated to a moderate and
free society.

We should make that commitment today.

Chris Taylor is a member of the Board of Trustees at the American
University of Afghanistan and the Chairman and CEO of Novitas Group. He is a
former enlisted infantryman and Force Recon Marine. A member of the Council on
Foreign Relations and the Atlantic Council, he holds an MBA from the College of
William & Mary and an MPA in political economy and international security
from the Harvard Kennedy School, where he co-authored, "Transforming the
National Security Culture" for the Defense Leadership Project at
Harvard's Center for Public Leadership. 

What people are missing on Hagel

The significance of
the nomination of Chuck Hagel to be defense secretary is not
that he is the first Vietnam vet to be tapped, but rather that he is the first combat-veteran enlisted
man ever to be
picked. (Like Forrest Gump, he served in the 9th Infantry Division.)

I think that is nice.
But I don't think it particularly will help him with the job. I worry more
about the lack of diversity in the backgrounds of the
members of the Obama cabinet. Too many former members of Congress, too few
people who know much about the real world.

It also is kind of
weird that the three of the last four SecDefs picked by a Democratic president
have been Republicans, at least in name (Hagel, Robert Gates and William
Cohen). Where's that Democratic bench?

I remain a fan of
President Obama, but I think he and his team have a certain tone deafness on
national security. The military may just look like a political problem to
certain offices at the White House, but it really needs to be considered as
something more than that.

Emile Simpson’s ‘War From the Ground Up’: A book that should be better known

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Over the Christmas
break I read several books, but the one that will stay with me most, I think,
is Emile Simpson's War
From the Ground Up. His core theme is an examination
of "the use of armed force that directly seeks political, as opposed to specifically
military, outcomes," (p. 1). Kind of like Clausewitz's most famous dictum
turned upside down. In Afghanistan, he writes, "the ‘war' is better understood
as a direct extension of political activity."

First point: This guy
knows how to write. Although the book is a rather dense academic study (the
section on the British in Borneo mainly bored me to tears), occasionally he
just lets loose an observation or aphorism that is striking. It is not always
enjoyable reading, but just when you are about to MEGO, he hits you with a great line.

Second point: I was
amazed this was written by a former lieutenant. It is an effort to put the war
in Afghanistan into a Clauswitzian context. He succeeds. "The possibility that
one can ‘win militarily' but lose a war is indeed perverse logic; it totally
unhinges strategic theory, as it disconnects the use of force from political
purpose," (p. 138).

Third point: I
suspect we'll be hearing from this guy again. So you might as well get in on
the ground floor and read it.

I plan in the coming
days to delve deeper into the book in a series of posts. It is almost several
books in one, so I will break out sections.

Oddly, this is the
second book I have read recently with the title War From the Ground Up. The other one, last winter, was about the U.S. Army's 90th
Division in
World War II.

Military memories: I realize now that when I was a captain, I was a toxic leader

By Lt. Col. "A.N.
O'Nymous," U.S. Army

Best Defense guest
columnist

When I was a junior military intelligence captain and S2 for a
combat arms battalion, I was a "toxic leader." There were no good reasons for
this, but the fact that my immediate boss was toxic, that I was having personal
issues, and that I was leaning strongly toward leaving the military all had
something to do with it. During this period, which lasted close to two years,
selfishness guided my every action. I was not only selfish but lazy, desiring a
sense of accomplishment without wanting to do the extra work it takes to build
an effective, trained team. I cared neither about teaching nor mentoring my
subordinates, and I did not listen to them. I also drove them hard. The result
was an S2 Shop that seemed to check all the right boxes but was hardly a team.

My shop's apparent accomplishments were strong. We exceeded the standard in
every security inspection conducted by higher-ups, not only passing but
incurring zero reports of deficiencies. We were also highly successful during
our two deployments to a maneuver training center. During our first deployment,
my templates for enemy disposition and my descriptions of enemy action were so
accurate that I was under suspicion for cheating for most of this exercise. (I
didn't cheat; I had just done my homework well.) Near the end of this exercise,
the brigade commander even sent the brigade S2 to me for training, which was no
doubt a humiliating experience for that major. During my second deployment, my
staff work helped my battalion defeat the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) in more
battles than we lost -- the only time that year that a friendly unit
accomplished this feat.

But, I was the guy in my shop doing all the briefings and drawing all the
templates. My troops' jobs were to simply battletrack and take care of my
logistical needs as our command post hopped from one place to another. Of
course, they were unhappy doing such menial chores. My bright lieutenant, NCOs,
and soldiers knew they should have been doing much more than this. All also
knew that the way we were doing business was dysfunctional. What if, for
example, something happened to me? In the long term, this would have been a
good thing. In the short term, though, it would have been a mess.

Everyone was unhappy, and, unsurprisingly, a large rift developed
between me and both my assistant S2 and senior intelligence sergeant.
Eventually, this rift fueled further unprofessionalism from my assistant S2 and
me. Things got personal.

Since my shop had met or exceeded every goal given us and I got along well with
my battalion commander, I more than half-expected a top block rating for my
final efficiency report. Our army being what it is, I probably would have
received this rating in many units. Thankfully, I did not. My battalion
commander, who was not himself a great leader, strangely exercised wisdom in my
case. I'll never forget, for my final counseling, his sitting me down and
telling me: "You have been responsible for much of my success. When I list
my battalion's accomplishments for my boss, I do so knowing that you were
instrumental in many of them. But, you didn't get along with my majors, you
didn't get along with your soldiers, and I blame you for that. I'm going to
give you a report card that is squarely center of mass, and that's the best
that I can do."

This warning was indeed the best thing he could have done for me, because this
warning -- along with an underlying sense of shame that I could not shake -- initiated
some serious introspection on my part.

Compounding this good fortune, in my next two jobs (I became a
staff officer and company commander in Iraq), I was blessed with the best set
of leaders with whom I have had the pleasure of serving. Watching them in
action made a hugely positive impression on me. Reading a book that my next
commander gave me, Major General Perry Smith's Rules
and Tools for Leaders, made a similar impression. Experiencing the positive climate
change that took place in the Task Force 1st Armored Division
headquarters when Brigadier General Martin Dempsey replaced Major General
Ricardo Sanchez (the epitome of a toxic leader) also made an impression. Things
began to click and fall in place, and I returned to a better path, continually
learning as I went.

The article "Narcissism and Toxic Leaders" in the current
issue of Military Review sheds some
light on my failings then. Narcissism, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Joe Doty,
Ph.D. and Master Sergeant Jeff Fenlason argue, is the essential condition for
toxic leadership (though not all narcissists are toxic leaders). Narcissists
have "an in?ated sense of self-importance and an extreme preoccupation
with themselves." Toxic leaders, who are not necessarily screamers, are
those narcissists whose selfish, destructive behaviors create unhealthy
organizations and demoralized troops. The authors persuasively contend that our
military should develop "methods to enhance its [narcissism's] positive
attributes and raise awareness of its negative ones."

What I like best about this article is the authors' observation about
self-deception, how toxic leaders (giddy with their seeming string of
professional successes, I imagine) often do not even know that they are toxic.
That was certainly true in my case. Toxic leaders' driving junior leaders from
the military, their creating subordinates who are themselves toxic, their
units' members failing to act ethically in the absence of immediate
supervision, their units lapsing into utter ineffectiveness when they depart
the unit and the motivation to work (fear) is removed -- all of these results
have nothing to do with their leadership, these leaders tell themselves. They
are great leaders, they think. After all, their report cards say so.

The authors conclude that our military needs to place "more
emphasis on mentoring, self-awareness, self- regulation, and emotional
intelligence." But, how do we do this, and is this enough?

Based on my experience, what our institution must do first to
counter this persistent problem is to improve how we evaluate leaders. As a
junior captain, I was lucky to get the report card I actually deserved. We need
to take more of the luck out of this process. A good place to start would be
with incorporating 360-degree feedback from leaders' subordinates,
peers, and raters into their
efficiency reports. It is also important for our
military to figure out how to better assess a unit's health and to make this
assessment a key element (if not THE key element) of efficiency reports. In
other words, obvious indicators of mission accomplishment need to be better
balanced with indicators of overall unit health and morale. These latter
indicators might include, for example, command climate survey results, soldier
retention rates, and the time the unit dedicates to the professional
development of its officers and soldiers.

Getting leader efficiency reports right would require of our
military a great deal of serious thought, study, and energy. However, the
long-term results would be unquestionably worth it.

Just as important, though, is helping to prevent toxic leadership in the first
place by improving education in our service schools. I should have been
thinking about "organizational culture" and "organizational leadership" before
I was a major at the Army's Command and General Staff College. True, I received
my commission from Officer Candidate School, where there is probably time for
only a day or two of such discussion. However, robust discussions, videos, and authoritative
and compelling testimonies regarding "what right looks like" in
healthy organizations and "what wrong looks like" in unhealthy organizations
would probably have made a huge difference for me if I had received this
instruction at basic course, advanced course, and the now-defunct Combined
Arms and Services
Staff School.

Similarly, teaching cadets who are attending military schools and
ROTC programs to recognize the signs of healthy and unhealthy units might make
a huge difference for these officers, and such classes should be consistently
taught at NCO schools, too. Such a block of instruction -- regularly and
consistently applied in service schools throughout a leader's career -- would
at least get leaders thinking about putting their units' long-term health and
their troops' professional development before short-term mission accomplishment.
It is especially important that junior leaders receive this instruction while
their character is still malleable. Our pushing junior leaders to units without
this education, when they are prone to automatically emulate apparently successful
leaders (who, in real terms, may not be successful at all), is harming these
young leaders, their future units, and their future troops -- in a few cases,
perhaps, irreparably.

The
views offered here are the author's own and do not necessarily represent
those of the U.S. military .

Marine captain responds to JOs getting out

By Capt. Lindsay L. Rodman, USMC

Best Defense office of company-grade issues

I have been thinking a
lot lately about whether to leave the Marine Corps at the five-year mark. In response to "We're Getting Out of
the Marines"
-- I hope I can contextualize what many company grade officers (or "junior
officers") are facing. 

The problem with
anecdotal observation is that we all only have our own
experiences to draw from. If the lieutenant who wrote "We're Getting
Out of the Marines" is coming face-to-face with incompetence, in a short
four or five year career, how does he get a sense of whether that problem is
systemic?  Or how thoroughly it pervades?  One's experience is 100 percent
of their exposure, regardless of whether it represents the bottom
X percent.

I am career designated
and my commitment is up. I am taking note of every bad leader and every good
leader I come across. Everyone is an input into the final decision. I know that other top company grades/JOs are doing the same thing (if they have
not already decided to get out).

Anecdotally again, and
I understand that this is flawed analysis, it really feels like my most
qualified and competent peers are getting out. I look at the lists of who
is still in (at five years), and the glaring holes are the most intelligent and
self-possessed of my cohort. That is not true for everyone, but the
percentage of those who are still in is dwarfed by the number of those that
have left -- and that number continues to rise.

I don't know what I'm
going to do. I don't really want to be anything other than a Marine, so
for the time being, unless something crazy happens, I'll stay. But I also
fear what the future brings, when our current ranks feel like they are being
gutted.

I was recently
forwarded the following link by Phil Carter: http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg94185.html. It is an
eerily-similar string of discussion regarding essentially the same cast of
characters, including the disillusioned company grade and his decision to get
out. Phil's and other sentiments I have read from ten years ago are
humbling and have really made an impression on me. We all think our own
experiences are novel, and that no one could possibly understand what we
currently face. Obviously, not true for me and my peers. I have no
doubt that the current company grade/JO perspective is similar, if not directly
analogous, to what company grades/JOs have faced for decades. In some
ways, though, that is more cause for concern - why have we been complacent for
decades? And why are we resigned to that complacency now, when we may
have a window of opportunity (more societal interest in preserving competency
in the military than in the ‘90s, fewer distractions than in the ‘00s) for change? We have known forever that this bureaucracy needs better meritocratic policies,
and better quality management at the field grade level (and I read a good book
lately on similar concerns with respect to generalship).

I hope these concerns
don't fall on deaf ears because they resonate -- that seems
problematic. Rather, I'd hope that they would provoke a desire for
change. There is a lot of misfiring when it comes to incentive programs,
graduate school, bonuses, promotion systems, etc., that could be used in a
targeted fashion to improve retention rates at the top.

Capt. Rodman is a judge
advocate currently stationed at Headquarters, Marine Corps.  She has been
in the Marine Corps for nearly five years, serving in Okinawa, Afghanistan, and
the Pentagon.  She is a graduate of Duke University (AB '03), Harvard Law
School (JD '07) and the Kennedy School of Government (MPP '07). The views presented here are her
own and do not represent those of the Marine Corps or the Department of
Defense.

Marine captain: It may seem like business as usual to you, but it feels to me like our junior officer ranks ‘are being gutted’

By Capt. Lindsay L. Rodman, USMC

Best Defense office of company-grade issues

I have been thinking a
lot lately about whether to leave the Marine Corps at the five-year mark. In response to "We're Getting Out of
the Marines"
-- I hope I can contextualize what many company grade officers (or "junior
officers") are facing. 

The problem with
anecdotal observation is that we all only have our own
experiences to draw from. If the lieutenant who wrote "We're Getting
Out of the Marines" is coming face-to-face with incompetence, in a short
four or five year career, how does he get a sense of whether that problem is
systemic?  Or how thoroughly it pervades?  One's experience is 100 percent
of their exposure, regardless of whether it represents the bottom
X percent.

I am career designated
and my commitment is up. I am taking note of every bad leader and every good
leader I come across. Everyone is an input into the final decision. I know that other top company grades/JOs are doing the same thing (if they have
not already decided to get out).

Anecdotally again, and
I understand that this is flawed analysis, it really feels like my most
qualified and competent peers are getting out. I look at the lists of who
is still in (at five years), and the glaring holes are the most intelligent and
self-possessed of my cohort. That is not true for everyone, but the
percentage of those who are still in is dwarfed by the number of those that
have left -- and that number continues to rise.

I don't know what I'm
going to do. I don't really want to be anything other than a Marine, so
for the time being, unless something crazy happens, I'll stay. But I also
fear what the future brings, when our current ranks feel like they are being
gutted.

I was recently
forwarded the following link by Phil Carter: http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg94185.html. It is an
eerily-similar string of discussion regarding essentially the same cast of
characters, including the disillusioned company grade and his decision to get
out. Phil's and other sentiments I have read from ten years ago are
humbling and have really made an impression on me. We all think our own
experiences are novel, and that no one could possibly understand what we
currently face. Obviously, not true for me and my peers. I have no
doubt that the current company grade/JO perspective is similar, if not directly
analogous, to what company grades/JOs have faced for decades. In some
ways, though, that is more cause for concern - why have we been complacent for
decades? And why are we resigned to that complacency now, when we may
have a window of opportunity (more societal interest in preserving competency
in the military than in the ‘90s, fewer distractions than in the ‘00s) for change? We have known forever that this bureaucracy needs better meritocratic policies,
and better quality management at the field grade level (and I read a good book
lately on similar concerns with respect to generalship).

I hope these concerns
don't fall on deaf ears. They resonate -- and that seems
problematic. Rather, I'd hope that they would provoke a desire for
change. There is a lot of misfiring when it comes to incentive programs,
graduate school, bonuses, promotion systems, etc., that could be used in a
targeted fashion to improve retention rates at the top.

Capt. Rodman is a judge
advocate currently stationed at Headquarters, Marine Corps.  She has been
in the Marine Corps for nearly five years, serving in Okinawa, Afghanistan, and
the Pentagon.  She is a graduate of Duke University (AB '03), Harvard Law
School (JD '07) and the Kennedy School of Government (MPP '07). The views presented here are her
own and do not represent those of the Marine Corps or the Department of
Defense.

Army officer: I think I know why those departing Marine LTs wrote anonymously

By Lt. Roxanne Bras, US Army

Best Defense office of JO issues

Speaking
authoritatively for a cohort is difficult and dangerous, but what's been said
in the two Marine JO's blog posts resonates with much of
what my peers say daily. That's not to
say that their ideas are correct; perhaps junior officers always feel
marginalized and hostile to the senior officer promotion system. But I'd
argue that the spirit of the posts is accurate, both as perceived by JOs and as
demonstrated by the military's HR system.

But
first, to the anonymity and its ensuing controversy, I'll bet that the Marines
didn't use their real names for precisely the same reason that I hesitated to
write this.  Instead of engaging with an idea on its own merits, many
quickly look to the author to discredit him. Detractors love any evidence of
inexperience as an excuse to ignore the substance. The chorus of critics cry,
"He only served like 6 months. Never saw real combat." Or "he's
not infantry/isn't tabbed." Or "he's such a self-promoter and only
wrote that for attention." The ideas are forgotten and what remains is
slander. So why attach your name to something if it will only detract from the
argument? Until the military community becomes more idea and less
individual/ORB/ribbons focused, people will hesitate to participate in open
forums.  

As to
the ideas, identifying the top 20 percent of JOs isn't easy. There are late
bloomers, people who are academically talented but are poor leaders, etc. But
just because talent identification is hard, doesn't mean the Army shouldn't
make incremental steps toward improving it

Just
one example: The first experience JO's have with Army promotions systems is
with the Order of Merit List, used to determine branch and first assignment.
The OML weights PT, academics, and military proficiency. It also sends a huge
message: academics is about checking the block. While GPA is weighted as
something like 40% of the OML, there are no adjustments for rigor of
institution or major. A 2.0 at MIT is the same as a 2.0 at any other school.
That only makes sense if the army thinks there is zero correlation between the
standing of the institution, or the relevance of the major to a specific
branch, and a JOs performance. And if that's the case, why care about GPA at
all? Just make the Army an institution that promotes PT and other metrics of
proficiency.

Improvements
don't have to be complicated. Many institutions and businesses identify,
incentivize, and promote talent. How to tailor these existing solutions to the
unique nature of the military? That would
be a conversation worth having.

And
even small improvements in the military's HR system would be significant to JOs
because they're symbolic. Instead of the mantra, "a degree's a
degree," something countless officers have told me, the Army could have the
mantra, "we are a profession and so value education." That doesn't
mean that we are a profession that gives extraordinary weight to eggheads, just
that we acknowledge that education, self-improvement, and rigor are real things
and might eventually impact the way an officer conducts a war.

Seeing
incompetents and careerists advance is frustrating, but is something I imagine
I'd see even if I left the military. But the inevitabilities of bureaucracies
shouldn't excuse the specificities of the military's talent retention
problems. 

(For
what it is worth: I am not getting out, am not infantry, do not claim to be a
bad ass or an expert in anything, and am always interested in learning how to
better think about these issues.) 

Roxanne
Bras is a 1LT in the U.S. Army, serving at Fort Bragg, NC. She is a graduate of
Harvard College and Oxford University. The views expressed here are her
own and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Army, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. government.  

13 keys to keeping your faith in the Marine Corps, beginning with learning how to reconcile the ideal with the real

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By Lt. Col. Victor Bunch, USMC

Best Defense guest respondent

I'd like to address the series
of posts
by junior
Marine Officers with a
rejoinder that may put their concerns into some perspective.  My own experience is probably not uncommon
and may be instructive. With an eye on
the practical benefits of career military service, I nonetheless joined the
Marine Corps for mostly idealistic reasons that are well-known to any
Marine: I wanted to join a storied
brotherhood that exemplified the best in warrior virtues.

True to the recruiting poster's promise ... the
Corps wasn't a "rose garden". I had
pre-conceived notions about what the USMC would be like, and my initial
experiences didn't align precisely with those expectations. As I grew older in the Corps, I saw its faults. The bureaucracy was maddening and the Marines
were not ten-foot tall Spartans. I
encountered some questionable leadership and policies/practices that didn't
quite make sense.

Fortunately, my initial commanding officers
were refreshingly honest and open-minded in their career counseling. The mentorship and advice I received as a
young officer provided me with the knowledge that allowed me to evaluate and
reconcile my experiences in the context of the "real" world vs. my
"ideal". More important than the
immediate impact of that counsel was its persistent value. I still continue
recycle and rebroadcast much of that advice to my junior officers. Furthermore,
as I gained more experience, I began to more clearly see and internalize
collective conventional institutional wisdom circulating through our best
officers--time-tested wisdom informed by talented people and inculcated in the
Corp's values. Finding that wisdom allowed me to rediscover the true spirit
that animates the Corps and realize anew why it and its Marines remain special
in an unvarnished world.

The
following is a distilled list of some basic advice garnered from my experiences
and my mentors intended for junior officers struggling with the contradictions
in their Marine Corps experience.

1.
First -- and most importantly -- understand that you only "know what you know"
about the Marine Corps from a limited exposure. Avoid making sweeping judgments without attaining a broader and deeper
view. The hard truth is that your
entry-level expectations were probably somewhat unrealistic (unless you had
previous enlisted experience). Your
initial skepticism is natural and healthy. We all experienced it. It is not
unlike the evolving estimation of our parents as we grow. As youngsters, we tend lionize them, then as
teens we begin to see (and seek out) their faults, and as adults be begin to
understand them and their life choices better.
In the end, they are still special -- even though they're not perfect. Take some time to better understand the Corps
better before you judge it unworthy.

2.
Get that broader view from other senior officers. Cast your net widely. Seek mentorship and advice within and from
outside your chain of command. A
diversity of experience and advice will accelerate your assimilation, better
inform your first big decision (whether to stay or separate) and help determine
the most appropriate vector for your career choices.

3.
Tread carefully if you challenge "old" ideas and practices. Sometimes, there are sound institutional
reasons for them that aren't readily apparent. On the other hand, sometimes there aren't and they should be
challenged! Think, read, create,
innovate and speak truth to power ... but don't be rash or over-emotional. When in doubt, seek advice/opinion from a
safe mentor outside your chain of command and/or write for publication! You will find that the Corps' leadership
values tactful, considerate and loyal dissent.

4.
Don't be deterred if you observe bad leadership. (See #1 and #2) If you still hold military service as a
virtue, believe in Marine Corps values and truly care about serving your
enlisted men and women, then you owe it to yourself and them to persist. After all, if all the "good people" separate
from your service, who will lead our next generation? You can only make a difference from
within. If you love it, make it
better. It's still your Marine Corps.

5.
A career in the Corps is not for everyone. It will demand much of you and your family in both peace and war. If your heart isn't in it, then you should
probably leave. Regularly evaluate your
options. Some of you may have readymade
careers waiting on the outside, but many of you will have equally unrealistic
expectations about life is in the "Civ Div", too. The grass isn't always greener. Many of my company-grade peers that left the
Corps in the roaring 90s were unpleasantly surprised at what they encountered
in the civilian workplace. A good number
of them attempted to come back. The real
value of a Marine Corps career is the opportunity to work with people who share
similar values and develop life-long friendships bonded by shared experience
and sacrifice. There's a sense of
community within the Corps that's hard to replicate.

In order to balance the ledger, I'll offer the
following tidbits for current and future Senior Officers:

1. Understand that your junior officers'
reality is their perception of their immediate surroundings. Put yourself in
their shoes. If all you knew of your service is what you've seen in the last
few years, what would consider the "norm"?

2. Toxic leadership in your organization will
have an inordinate impact on junior officers. Though you may be able to compartmentalize the inimical behavior of
other (peer or superior) leaders as an anomaly, the junior officer may believe
it is condoned.

3. Provide the junior officer the benefit of
your personal and professional experience. Explain your motives for joining -- but more importantly -- explain why
you've stayed. If you care about the
health and future of your service, you should continually make effort to
recruit to retain the best officers. Furthermore, encourage your officers to seek mentorship/advice from
other senior officers who may have different experiences or insight into a
different career path or occupational specialty.

4. Don't be afraid to be candid about the
drawbacks to service. All our services
have their quirks and weaknesses. Arm
your subordinates with the knowledge that allows them to recognize and
understand the dysfunctions and how to either circumvent or navigate them.

5. Fight the urge to be defensive when junior
officers question the value of their service or career options. As you employ tips #3 and #4, encourage them
to frequently evaluate all their options. After all, a career in the armed forces isn't
suitable for everyone. But we shouldn't
want our best and brightest to unnecessarily burn bridges, either. The grass isn't always greener ... but you assist
them in clearly evaluating both sides before letting them jump.

6. Encourage initiative and bound it loosely
within the limits of safety and decorum. Let your junior officers innovate. This is only effective if you've given good guidance and provide constructive
feedback!

7. Be open to new ideas. When a standard practice or procedure is
questioned, don't reply with automated (negative) response. Listen. Even if the suggestion or complaint is unsound or unfounded. Conversely, if you cannot defend the efficacy of the aforementioned
practice/procedure, perhaps you should listen more closely

8. Employ Socratic PME -- whether it's a battle
study, a tactical problem or discussion about a leadership issue. Give your junior officers voice to express
new ideas and opinions with your direction and guidance. Teach them, and don't be afraid to learn from
them. You might just inspire the next
Pete Ellis, Alfred Thayer Mahan, John Boyd or John Nagl!

LtCol Victor J.
Bunch is the current CMC
Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. The views presented here are his own and do not represent those of the
Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.

We’re getting out of the Marines because we wanted to be part of an elite force

By "yet another Marine LT"

Best Defense department of the JO exodus

Why are
we getting out? It's about the low standards.

We
joined because we wanted to be part of an elite organization dedicated to doing
amazing things in defense of our nation. We wanted to make a contribution to
something great, to be able to look back at a decisive chapter in American
history and say "yeah, I was part of that." We joined the Corps because if we
were going in to the fight, we wanted to serve with the best. We wanted the
kind of job that would make our friends who took soulless, high-paying
corporate jobs feel pangs of jealousy because we went to work every day with a
purpose.

It
causes a deep, bitter pain to acknowledge that I don't think this is the
organization in which I currently serve. The reason we're getting out is
because the Marine Corps imposes a high degree of stress, yet accepts Mission
Failure so long as all the boxes on the list are checked.

I'm
talking about the Field Grade Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan who didn't
know who Mullah Omar was. I'm talking about a senior Staff NCO in the
intelligence community who could not produce a legible paragraph. I'm talking
about a Battalion Commander who took pride in the fact that he had done zero
research on Afghanistan, because it allowed him to approach his deployment with
"an open mind." I'm talking about contractors, some of whom were literally paid
ten-fold the salary of my junior Marines, who were incapable of performing
basic tasks and functionally illiterate. The problem is not so much that these
individuals pop up every now and then, as every organization has its bad eggs,
but rather that we see them passed on through the system, promoted and
rewarded. If we are truly the elite
organization we claim to be, how do we justify the fact that we allow these
individuals to retain positions of immense influence, much less promote through
the ranks? How do we justify this endemic tolerance for mediocrity or
outright incompetence?

If you
really want to know what an institution values, don't look at its mottos or
mission statements. Look at how it spends its resources, especially its human
capital. Economists call this "Revealed Preference."  When I was in the midst of a time-critical
project aimed at mapping insurgent networks in Helmand, I was told to put the
project on hiatus so I could organize a visit from General Allen. The implicit
message was that a smooth itinerary and content General were more important
than catching an insurgent cell before they left for Pakistan. How else was I
supposed to interpret this? In my opinion, it's not so much that the Marine
Corps doesn't value ideas, but that -- when the chips are down and careers are
at stake -- it values appearance and conformity more than winning. The implicit
message -- what the Marine Corps reveals by its actions -- is that it's okay to
fail to provide any added value, so long as the PowerPoint slides are free of
typos, no serialized gear is lost, and everyone attends the Sexual Harassment
Prevention training

The
biggest issue is that few are willing to acknowledge Mission Failure because
doing so is considered "unprofessional," especially for a lieutenant. As an
Army Special Forces veteran I worked with was fond of saying, "you get what you
incentivize." As it currently stands, there is an overwhelming incentive for
officers at all levels to simply keep their units looking sharp, turn in rosy,
optimistic assessments, keep off the XO's radar and, above all else, keep from
rocking the boat. No matter what becomes of your battlespace, eventually the
deployment will end and you can go home. Why risk casualties, a tongue lashing
or missed PT time when the reward might not come for years down the road? Why
point out that the emperor has no clothes when everyone one involved is going
to get their Navy Comms and Bronze Stars if we just let him keep on walking
down the road.

We
should be better than this. I have found several of the comments and reviews of
your latest book baffling. We can quibble about the merits of Marshall's
management techniques or the specific metrics by which we should measure
officer performance. But can't we unanimously agree that sub-par commanders
should be weeded out, especially in an organization that calls itself "the
finest fighting force on the face of the earth?" The practice of actively
relieving (and eventually separating) leaders for under-performance is no
panacea, but shouldn't it at least be a starting point?

I don't
want to be misunderstood. The most
extraordinary and talented people I've ever met are still serving in the Corps.
I live in a wonderful area, I'm well-paid and generally like the people I work
with. Given the chance, I would happily deploy again. But looking down the road
at what the billet of a Field Grade officer entails, I have to wonder whether
the sacrifices will be worth it. Maybe they will. I've seen some Field Grade
officers who love their jobs and feel like they're serving a purpose. But I'm
not sure I'm willing to take the gamble.

I was told at The Basic School that the most
important role as a leader is to say, when everyone is tired and ready to
declare victory and just go home, "guys, this isn't good enough, we have to do
better." I simply don't see enough leaders willing to say, regarding the things
that really matter, "guys, the last
eleven years weren't good enough, the nation needs us to do better."