Centre for Policy Development's Blog, page 32

How can Australia’s Democracy Deliver? | ROUNDTABLE | November 2017

Key documents for the roundtable:

Full agenda
Participant list
Participant profiles

Speakers: Dr Nikolas Kirby (Research Fellow and Departmental Lecturer in Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Oxford, and Director of the Building Integrity Program at the Blavatnik School of Government), Professor Glenn Withers (Research School of Economics, ANU), Tony Douglas (Director, Essential Research), Dr Heather Smith PSM (Secretary of the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science), Terry Moran AC (Chair of CPD & former Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet).

Our roundtable on 10 November asked how Australia’s democracy can deliver. It formed part of CPD’s 10th Anniversary Series, which has democratic renewal as its centrepiece. It took place a week after former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, delivered CPD’s inaugural John Menadue Oration on the topic: ‘Can Democracy Deliver?’

We were delighted to bring together a diverse group of leading thinkers. The agenda was an ambitious one for three hours and over thirty people, but the group rose to the challenge and were equally candid and creative.

Our roundtable delved further into the question of democratic renewal. Democracy and the international rules-based order face profound pressure across the globe. Australia is not immune to this pressure. There is a gap between expectations of government in the community and government’s capability to build and deliver an agenda. There is a question mark over assumptions that have underpinned public policy over the past few decades, such as the nature of growth, economic structure, the role of government, and the delivery of human services.

Broad sections of the Australian community appear to have ‘buyers’ remorse’. CPD’s motivation for holding this roundtable is our belief that successful democracies are stable but not static. We also believe the debate about democratic renewal cannot be resolved by focussing simply on ‘trust’, ‘leadership’, and ‘deliberation’. It requires a deeper discussion about Australian attitudes to democracy and to government, the connection of those ideas and preferences with more effective government, and a clearer shared purpose of what Australia’s democracy should pursue.

We had an interactive discussion about:

what democracy and the social compact means for Australians today;
what the community expects of government (informed by new CPD research on this question) and;
what reforms Australia’s democracy needs most – new ideas, structures, institutions and processes.

We were not seeking a communiqué or attempting to reach an artificial consensus. We wanted a frank exchange of views under the Chatham House Rule on the pressure facing Australia’s democracy and new ideas to ensure Australia’s democracy can be fit for purpose.

We are in the process of distilling all the remarks, including the feedback on the discussion paper and the roundtable received after the event. The paper itself will be released next month.

Next year CPD will take forward several of the recommendations that emerged from the roundtable and hope to do so with many of the people and organisations involved on 10 November. We look forward to providing updates about this work in due course.

Related links

Terry Moran AC, CPD’s Chair, addressed some of the themes of CPD’s attitudes research in a speech for IPAA Victoria on 21 November 2017. Read the speech here, along with the coverage in  The Guardian  and The Mandarin .

 

CPD would like to thank John W.H. Denton and the team at Corrs Chambers Westgarth for hosting the event, and participants who contributed to an engaged and candid discussion.

 

 

The post How can Australia’s Democracy Deliver? | ROUNDTABLE | November 2017 appeared first on Centre for Policy Development.

CPD Roundtable on Australia’s Democracy | PAST EVENT

Key documents for the roundtable:

Full agenda
Participant list
Participant profiles

Speakers: Dr Nikolas Kirby (Research Fellow and Departmental Lecturer in Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Oxford, and Director of the Building Integrity Program at the Blavatnik School of Government), Professor Glenn Withers (Research School of Economics, ANU), Tony Douglas (Director, Essential Research), Dr Heather Smith PSM (Secretary of the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science), Terry Moran AC (Chair of CPD & former Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet).

Our roundtable on 10 November asked how Australia’s democracy can deliver. It formed part of CPD’s 10th Anniversary Series, which has democratic renewal as its centrepiece. It took place a week after former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, delivered CPD’s inaugural John Menadue Oration on the topic: ‘Can Democracy Deliver?’

We were delighted to bring together a diverse group of leading thinkers. The agenda was an ambitious one for three hours and over thirty people, but the group rose to the challenge and were equally candid and creative.

Our roundtable delved further into the question of democratic renewal. Democracy and the international rules-based order face profound pressure across the globe. Australia is not immune to this pressure. There is a gap between expectations of government in the community and government’s capability to build and deliver an agenda. There is a question mark over assumptions that have underpinned public policy over the past few decades, such as the nature of growth, economic structure, the role of government, and the delivery of human services.

Broad sections of the Australian community appear to have ‘buyers’ remorse’. CPD’s motivation for holding this roundtable is our belief that successful democracies are stable but not static. We also believe the debate about democratic renewal cannot be resolved by focussing simply on ‘trust’, ‘leadership’, and ‘deliberation’. It requires a deeper discussion about Australian attitudes to democracy and to government, the connection of those ideas and preferences with more effective government, and a clearer shared purpose of what Australia’s democracy should pursue.

We had an interactive discussion about:

what democracy and the social compact means for Australians today;
what the community expects of government (informed by new CPD research on this question) and;
what reforms Australia’s democracy needs most – new ideas, structures, institutions and processes.

We were not seeking a communiqué or attempting to reach an artificial consensus. We wanted a frank exchange of views under the Chatham House Rule on the pressure facing Australia’s democracy and new ideas to ensure Australia’s democracy can be fit for purpose.

We are in the process of distilling all the remarks, including the feedback on the discussion paper and the roundtable received after the event. The paper itself will be released next month.

Next year CPD will take forward several of the recommendations that emerged from the roundtable and hope to do so with many of the people and organisations involved on 10 November. We look forward to providing updates about this work in due course.

Related links

Terry Moran AC, CPD’s Chair, addressed some of the themes of CPD’s attitudes research in a speech for IPAA Victoria on 21 November 2017. Read the speech here, along with the coverage in  The Guardian  and The Mandarin .

 

CPD would like to thank John W.H. Denton and the team at Corrs Chambers Westgarth for hosting the event, and participants who contributed to an engaged and candid discussion.

 

 

The post CPD Roundtable on Australia’s Democracy | PAST EVENT appeared first on Centre for Policy Development.

Public Forum: Building a Sustainable Economy | EVENT | 29 November 2017 | Sydney

RSVP for free here.

 

When  

29 November 2017

Wednesday

Start 5:30pm – End 7:30pm

Where

Level 40 Governor Macquarie Tower,

1 Farrer Place,

Sydney NSW

2000

MinterEllison

RSVP for free here.

We invite you to join us for a special event to celebrate our 10th anniversary – a panel discussion about how business, investors and regulators can help build a more sustainable economy and financial system featuring Geoff Summerhayes (Executive Board Member of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority); Sam Mostyn, Non-Executive Director, Steven Skala (Chair, Clean Energy Finance Corporation) and Christina Tonkin (Managing Director – Loans &Specialised Finance, ANZ).

 

 

The post Public Forum: Building a Sustainable Economy | EVENT | 29 November 2017 | Sydney appeared first on Centre for Policy Development.

Can Democracy Deliver? | John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | November 2017

CPD’s Inaugural Annual John Menadue Oration –  “Can Democracy Deliver?”

Remarks by  Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa

Melbourne, 2 November 2017

Listen to an audio recording of the full oration here.

Marty Natalegawa at John Menaude Oration about Rohingya crisis_ABC's The World Program

“Can democracy deliver?

As one who has traversed Indonesia’s now more than a decade-long transformative democratic journey – such that today it constitutes the world’s third-largest democracy – the reply to such question can only be resoundingly in the affirmative: yes!

Indeed, it has to.

Democracy must deliver.

Throughout all corners of the world, we continue to bear witness to people’s yearnings for democracy; for the right to choose and to hold to democratic account their elected representatives; for the protection and promotion of their fundamental human rights – respect for rule of law; for the betterment of their life and their future.

Here in East Asia, two-decade past reminds of some of the most transformative democratic changes:

The return to full democracy in the Republic of Korea and the People Power Revolution in the Philippines, both in the late 1980s;

The reformasi in Indonesia, in the late 1990s;

And, more recently, though still obviously fragile and replete with challenges, in Myanmar – the democratic reform that has seen its past advocates of democracy now taking the helm of government.

We are today reminded too of the historic magnitude and significance of these developments in East Asia, as we contrast the continued fragility of the promise that was once described by some as “Arab Spring” in parts of the Middle East and North Africa:

Unleashing promising reform in some countries, and yet triggering internal conflicts and convulsions in others;

Prompting broader regional and global, direct as well as proxy, geopolitical tensions;

And, most tragically, inflicting violence, carnage and sufferings on the most vulnerable in our societies – children, women and the elderlies.   Of peoples in their thousands seeking refuge across borders and continents.

However, even in situations of evident democratic transformation, we are reminded too that democracy is a process, not an event – never-ending in its nature and prone to ebbs and flows – of progress and of regress.

Hence, despite sometime trumpeted gains, here in East Asia, and beyond, a case can be made of recent signs of shifting dynamics – of democracies adrift – of a changing democratic architecture after decades of promise.

For democratic gains have been tempered by challenges old and new.

Of the latter, increasingly, we are becoming cognizant of the possible implications to democracy of the advent of new technologies – some positively transformative in nature, while others illustrative of the potential for their negative exploitations.

On the one hand, making information more available with speed and breadth of scope unprecedented before, ushering the potential for a more informed electorate;

Providing continuous avenues, beyond the periodic electoral cycles, for peoples to make known their views, and expectations of elected representatives – to hold leaders to greater account and to ensure that they remain sensitive to the public interests;

As well, through the application of technologies, supporting the holding of elections in countries whose geographic and physical features make for electorates in remote and previously inaccessible regions.

Yet, the very same technologies, or strictly speaking, their exploitations, have given rise to new types of concerns and challenges to democracy.

More abundant information has not assured a more informed and open-minded populace, as rising signs of intolerance permeate;

Of dismissals of the position of the other;

Of denial of inconvenient facts on the one hand, and of the spread of false information on the other; and

Of the rise and sharpening of particularly divisive politics – of identity politics.

Further, while technologies have opened greater opportunities for the voices of the people to be heard, in an age of big data and social media, they have also opened the doors to interferences in elections – the short term manipulation of the individual voters’ fears and prejudices – to secure electoral advantages and victories, and similar concerted manipulation of online conversations to influence public opinion.

As some societies grapple with the implications on democracy brought forth by new technologies, it is worthy to remind that in others, the challenges are decidedly more direct and fundamental:

Of the absence of peace – of the prevalence of open conflicts – suspending any hope for the exercise of democratic rights as peoples grapple with the basic task of survival;

Of the surge of populist authoritarianism – to see in democracy only as electoral means to acquire power, only to subsequently systematically dismantle and weaken the values inherent to democracy.  Of countries once on gradual path to democratic reform, now appearing to have taken pause or, indeed, to have stepped-back. For voices of dissent, or simply alternative voices, to be silenced by the threat or prospect of legal prosecution.

—

In such complex environment, the management of the nexus between the internal and external milieu – so called domestic and international affairs – has become more critical than ever before.

Among others, the promotion and protection of democratic principles in a world of sovereign nation states.

Further, the potential impact of more complex and open democratic settings on the conduct of diplomacy.

I am of the view that, ultimately, democratic reform processes are inherently internal to the countries concerned.  However, this is not to say that there is total absence of the external dimension.

The internal and external dimensions are interrelated and synergies can be attained.

Certainly, to be sustained, democracy cannot possibly be imposed from without.

There is not a magic wand – a one-size-fits-all – that can apply to all countries with their differing circumstances, past experiences and visions for their common future.

Ours is a world replete with examples of well-meaning efforts to externally and sometimes even forcefully introduce democracy to countries that have ultimately foundered, as they lack internal and national sense of ownership so critical if such processes are to be sustained.

However, this is not to say such processes take place in a total vacuum – disconnected from the external milieu.

Indeed, I have been of the view that the contemporary world is one in which the distinction between internal and external domains is increasing becoming tenuous, such that for all practical purposes they have become one: mutually affecting one another.

The term “intermestic” perhaps captures such linkage between the international and domestic domains.

Issues abound, traditionally viewed as internal, that have foreign policy or external dimensions – food security, energy security, the environment, the management of the economy, migration and the flow refugees, health, terrorism, to cite a few – all defying national solutions alone.  Thus, any attempt to promote democratically obtained mandate at the national level on such issues ultimately requires and demands cooperative partnership across nations.

Personally, such deep links between the internal and external environments have been driving motivation to promote ASEAN’s democratic architecture – to positively alter the dynamics in the region.

As Indonesia embarked on its process of democratic reform post-1998, it deliberately and purposefully injected within ASEAN a discourse on democracy, good governance and human rights, hitherto absent.  The resultant ASEAN Political Security Community pillars, in addition to the Economic and Socio-Cultural pillar, was groundbreaking for a region more used to view such issues as being the exclusive preserve of individual countries.

Though clearly not without shortcomings, the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), for the first time formally lay out certain democratic, human rights and good governance benchmarks for ASEAN to aspire to, and to judge current and future conduct on.

More than the establishment of formal ASEAN institutions and capacities, I have sought to deliberately introduce state practice within ASEAN to change its dynamics on matters relating to human rights and democracy.  At no countries’ behest or expectation, instead at its own initiative, Indonesia begun to deliberately share developments within the country – the various problems and challenges it was facing internally  – before ASEAN meetings.

The objective was clear: to alter the dynamics within ASEAN, such that it becomes more attuned to principles of democracy, human rights and good governance. Further, it reflected Indonesia’s confidence and conviction in a democratic response to the various issues it was facing.

In most instances, the reaction by the rest of the ASEAN Member States was awkward and deafening silence, as Indonesia’s efforts were not in line with traditional ASEAN practices.

However, slowly the dynamics began to change.

Other ASEAN countries, notably, at the time, Thailand, the Philippines and Myanmar, also began to share of internal developments in their respective countries.  Such sharing of information began to be viewed not as being “interference” in internal affairs of ASEAN Member States, rather as manifestation of how the ASEAN “family” of nations can demonstrate genuine concern and interest on internal matters relating to the promotion and protection of the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance that affect the region as a whole.

In introducing these as ASEAN’s common concern, I was motivated to ensure that the then nascent reform process in Indonesia does not take place in a regional vacuum.  Instead, for the Southeast Asia region to move in similar direction, albeit admittedly at different pace.

In essence, to inject democratic dynamics in Southeast Asia.

In a manner, it was such gradual development of a more nuanced application of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which allowed ASEAN, until recently, to navigate the complex process of Myanmar’s recent democratic reform – to synergize all the various often conflicting sets of demands within and outside Myanmar.

I believe it possible to urgently address the current challenge on the Rohingya issue with a similar approach.

Clearly, yet another litmus test for ASEAN.   To demonstrate relevance.  To be part of the solution.

Recent developments, however, remind of the fragility of democratization process.

Signs abound in Southeast Asia of shifting democratic momentum and dynamics.

Of democracy adrift, or even in retreat.

While such ebb and flow are not new and will no doubt continue, today they occur within the context of the much-heralded ASEAN Community.  As a result, this time, there is sharp and glaring contrast between the actual realities and conditions on the one hand, and the avowed and publicly declared commitments, on the other.

As the initiator of these collective commitments on democracy and human rights in the region, Indonesia has special responsibilities to ensure that there is no backtracking by ASEAN; Indonesia’s leadership has been, and will continue to be key.

Absent relentless and continuous efforts – of mutual encouragement and support for democratic reform – the dynamics will shift.  Positive momentum lost.

—

There is another manifestation of the nexus between democracy and foreign policy that requires careful and thoughtful management.

I am referring here to the democratization of foreign policy; a phenomenon to be much welcomed.

For diplomacy and foreign policy cannot be the exclusive preserve of a few.

As a process, it refers to the critical need to promote a sense of public participation and ownership for the effective discharge of foreign policies.   In a democracy, the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy, like other fields of government endeavour, cannot be divorced from the public at large.

As outcome, it speaks to the issue of relevance of foreign policies; to issues that matters and are of concern to the general public at large.

Certainly, the foreign policy-making environment today is arguably far more complex than hitherto been the case.

Of wide-ranging constituencies, in particular civil societies, which need to be brought on board;

Of ever-widening issues that preoccupy the public: issues that have both domestic and external dimensions;

Of rapid advances in information technology – including the role of social media and other non-traditional means of information dissemination – which have placed diplomacy and foreign policy in a transformed setting – on the one hand providing greater opportunity for policy dissemination, while on the other, placing it under an almost continuous public glare and attention.

For diplomacy, such milieu occasionally implies that the management of issues of mutual concern between countries has injected to them internal domestic dynamics to further add to already complex situation.

Besides the issue of territorial disputes, perhaps one of the most vivid recent illustrations of such complex reality has been over the management of movements of peoples across state boundaries, as refugees seeking protection from conflicts and political upheavals.   Too readily, such issues have become enveloped by domestic political dynamics in the countries of destination, transit and origin – making resolution of the issue even more elusive.  The recent surge of refugees to Europe, escaping the conflict in Syria and other parts of the Middle East, is one such illustration; rapidly becoming enveloped in European domestic politics.

Of course, I have been particularly aware of similar dynamics impacting on Indonesia’s and Australia’s common efforts on the issue of irregular movements of peoples – of refugees.

On such and other similar issues, I deem it important that policy makers demonstrate constructive leadership and partnership – to seek mutually acceptable solutions – not one that aim to score political points off the other with one eye on domestic political consideration – rather one that demonstrates the best of our humanity and respect for principles of democracy.

In particular, a type of leadership that has the courage and resilience to inform the public – to promote a more informed public – of the complexities of the issues at hand, the hard choices, requiring common undertaking and the search for common solution.  The pursuit of narrow populist agenda – however appealing – is to be discouraged.

As any neighbours, Australia and Indonesia do not always have a common view on issues affecting them.   Precisely, as neighbours, however, we do have common issues to manage and address.  The tasks for leaders past and future, have been to build on such realities and develop common interest between the two countries.  I am of the firm view that ultimately, our democracies have made our relations stronger, more resilient and robust.  Where consensus has proven elusive, we can agree to disagree.  We can disagree, without being disagreeable.

In a world where dialogue and diplomacy are seemingly in retreat, as democracies Australia and Indonesia can provide a different narrative.  Of the efficacy of diplomacy as means to address issues among nations.

—

Democracy needs constant investment of efforts; of nurturing.  In many societies, institutional and governance capacities need to be painstakingly build.

Most significantly, leaders and institutions must earn the public’s trust.

There is no room for complacency.  Countenancing attacks against universal democratic values.

This is equally the case within nations and among nations.

Absent such efforts, democracy can find itself cast adrift; at best irrelevant and distant from people’s concerns and interests, and worse still, retreating.

Ultimately, democracy can only thrive if it delivers.

As it must.

Thank you very much.”

Footnotes:

Served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (2009-2014), Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN (2007-2009) and Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s (2005-2007), as well as in various other capacities, including as Director General for ASEAN Cooperation.  Currently serving, inter alia, as UN Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Board on Mediation and UN President of the General Assembly’s Team of External Advisors.

 

Media coverage and related links

‘Can democracy deliver?’ (pdf), Marty Natalegawa

Opening remarks for John Menadue Oration, Travers McLeod

Indonesia and Australia can nurture democracy together (Marty Natalegawa, extract from oration), AFR, 3 November.

The World, ABC News (from 8:00 mins), 2 November

ABC News Breakfast, 3 November

Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister says Trump needs to show Asia that the US can be a leader in the region when he visits next week. pic.twitter.com/xbPoO3Xd1F

— News Breakfast (@BreakfastNews) November 2, 2017

The post Can Democracy Deliver? | John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | November 2017 appeared first on Centre for Policy Development.

“Can Democracy Deliver?” | John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | PAST EVENT | November 2017

CPD’s Inaugural Annual John Menadue Oration –  “Can Democracy Deliver?”

Remarks by  Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa

Melbourne, 2 November 2017

Listen to an audio recording of the full oration here.

Marty Natalegawa at John Menaude Oration about Rohingya crisis_ABC's The World Program

“Can democracy deliver?

As one who has traversed Indonesia’s now more than a decade-long transformative democratic journey – such that today it constitutes the world’s third-largest democracy – the reply to such question can only be resoundingly in the affirmative: yes!

Indeed, it has to.

Democracy must deliver.

Throughout all corners of the world, we continue to bear witness to people’s yearnings for democracy; for the right to choose and to hold to democratic account their elected representatives; for the protection and promotion of their fundamental human rights – respect for rule of law; for the betterment of their life and their future.

Here in East Asia, two-decade past reminds of some of the most transformative democratic changes:

The return to full democracy in the Republic of Korea and the People Power Revolution in the Philippines, both in the late 1980s;

The reformasi in Indonesia, in the late 1990s;

And, more recently, though still obviously fragile and replete with challenges, in Myanmar – the democratic reform that has seen its past advocates of democracy now taking the helm of government.

We are today reminded too of the historic magnitude and significance of these developments in East Asia, as we contrast the continued fragility of the promise that was once described by some as “Arab Spring” in parts of the Middle East and North Africa:

Unleashing promising reform in some countries, and yet triggering internal conflicts and convulsions in others;

Prompting broader regional and global, direct as well as proxy, geopolitical tensions;

And, most tragically, inflicting violence, carnage and sufferings on the most vulnerable in our societies – children, women and the elderlies.   Of peoples in their thousands seeking refuge across borders and continents.

However, even in situations of evident democratic transformation, we are reminded too that democracy is a process, not an event – never-ending in its nature and prone to ebbs and flows – of progress and of regress.

Hence, despite sometime trumpeted gains, here in East Asia, and beyond, a case can be made of recent signs of shifting dynamics – of democracies adrift – of a changing democratic architecture after decades of promise.

For democratic gains have been tempered by challenges old and new.

Of the latter, increasingly, we are becoming cognizant of the possible implications to democracy of the advent of new technologies – some positively transformative in nature, while others illustrative of the potential for their negative exploitations.

On the one hand, making information more available with speed and breadth of scope unprecedented before, ushering the potential for a more informed electorate;

Providing continuous avenues, beyond the periodic electoral cycles, for peoples to make known their views, and expectations of elected representatives – to hold leaders to greater account and to ensure that they remain sensitive to the public interests;

As well, through the application of technologies, supporting the holding of elections in countries whose geographic and physical features make for electorates in remote and previously inaccessible regions.

Yet, the very same technologies, or strictly speaking, their exploitations, have given rise to new types of concerns and challenges to democracy.

More abundant information has not assured a more informed and open-minded populace, as rising signs of intolerance permeate;

Of dismissals of the position of the other;

Of denial of inconvenient facts on the one hand, and of the spread of false information on the other; and

Of the rise and sharpening of particularly divisive politics – of identity politics.

Further, while technologies have opened greater opportunities for the voices of the people to be heard, in an age of big data and social media, they have also opened the doors to interferences in elections – the short term manipulation of the individual voters’ fears and prejudices – to secure electoral advantages and victories, and similar concerted manipulation of online conversations to influence public opinion.

As some societies grapple with the implications on democracy brought forth by new technologies, it is worthy to remind that in others, the challenges are decidedly more direct and fundamental:

Of the absence of peace – of the prevalence of open conflicts – suspending any hope for the exercise of democratic rights as peoples grapple with the basic task of survival;

Of the surge of populist authoritarianism – to see in democracy only as electoral means to acquire power, only to subsequently systematically dismantle and weaken the values inherent to democracy.  Of countries once on gradual path to democratic reform, now appearing to have taken pause or, indeed, to have stepped-back. For voices of dissent, or simply alternative voices, to be silenced by the threat or prospect of legal prosecution.

—

In such complex environment, the management of the nexus between the internal and external milieu – so called domestic and international affairs – has become more critical than ever before.

Among others, the promotion and protection of democratic principles in a world of sovereign nation states.

Further, the potential impact of more complex and open democratic settings on the conduct of diplomacy.

I am of the view that, ultimately, democratic reform processes are inherently internal to the countries concerned.  However, this is not to say that there is total absence of the external dimension.

The internal and external dimensions are interrelated and synergies can be attained.

Certainly, to be sustained, democracy cannot possibly be imposed from without.

There is not a magic wand – a one-size-fits-all – that can apply to all countries with their differing circumstances, past experiences and visions for their common future.

Ours is a world replete with examples of well-meaning efforts to externally and sometimes even forcefully introduce democracy to countries that have ultimately foundered, as they lack internal and national sense of ownership so critical if such processes are to be sustained.

However, this is not to say such processes take place in a total vacuum – disconnected from the external milieu.

Indeed, I have been of the view that the contemporary world is one in which the distinction between internal and external domains is increasing becoming tenuous, such that for all practical purposes they have become one: mutually affecting one another.

The term “intermestic” perhaps captures such linkage between the international and domestic domains.

Issues abound, traditionally viewed as internal, that have foreign policy or external dimensions – food security, energy security, the environment, the management of the economy, migration and the flow refugees, health, terrorism, to cite a few – all defying national solutions alone.  Thus, any attempt to promote democratically obtained mandate at the national level on such issues ultimately requires and demands cooperative partnership across nations.

Personally, such deep links between the internal and external environments have been driving motivation to promote ASEAN’s democratic architecture – to positively alter the dynamics in the region.

As Indonesia embarked on its process of democratic reform post-1998, it deliberately and purposefully injected within ASEAN a discourse on democracy, good governance and human rights, hitherto absent.  The resultant ASEAN Political Security Community pillars, in addition to the Economic and Socio-Cultural pillar, was groundbreaking for a region more used to view such issues as being the exclusive preserve of individual countries.

Though clearly not without shortcomings, the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), for the first time formally lay out certain democratic, human rights and good governance benchmarks for ASEAN to aspire to, and to judge current and future conduct on.

More than the establishment of formal ASEAN institutions and capacities, I have sought to deliberately introduce state practice within ASEAN to change its dynamics on matters relating to human rights and democracy.  At no countries’ behest or expectation, instead at its own initiative, Indonesia begun to deliberately share developments within the country – the various problems and challenges it was facing internally  – before ASEAN meetings.

The objective was clear: to alter the dynamics within ASEAN, such that it becomes more attuned to principles of democracy, human rights and good governance. Further, it reflected Indonesia’s confidence and conviction in a democratic response to the various issues it was facing.

In most instances, the reaction by the rest of the ASEAN Member States was awkward and deafening silence, as Indonesia’s efforts were not in line with traditional ASEAN practices.

However, slowly the dynamics began to change.

Other ASEAN countries, notably, at the time, Thailand, the Philippines and Myanmar, also began to share of internal developments in their respective countries.  Such sharing of information began to be viewed not as being “interference” in internal affairs of ASEAN Member States, rather as manifestation of how the ASEAN “family” of nations can demonstrate genuine concern and interest on internal matters relating to the promotion and protection of the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance that affect the region as a whole.

In introducing these as ASEAN’s common concern, I was motivated to ensure that the then nascent reform process in Indonesia does not take place in a regional vacuum.  Instead, for the Southeast Asia region to move in similar direction, albeit admittedly at different pace.

In essence, to inject democratic dynamics in Southeast Asia.

In a manner, it was such gradual development of a more nuanced application of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which allowed ASEAN, until recently, to navigate the complex process of Myanmar’s recent democratic reform – to synergize all the various often conflicting sets of demands within and outside Myanmar.

I believe it possible to urgently address the current challenge on the Rohingya issue with a similar approach.

Clearly, yet another litmus test for ASEAN.   To demonstrate relevance.  To be part of the solution.

Recent developments, however, remind of the fragility of democratization process.

Signs abound in Southeast Asia of shifting democratic momentum and dynamics.

Of democracy adrift, or even in retreat.

While such ebb and flow are not new and will no doubt continue, today they occur within the context of the much-heralded ASEAN Community.  As a result, this time, there is sharp and glaring contrast between the actual realities and conditions on the one hand, and the avowed and publicly declared commitments, on the other.

As the initiator of these collective commitments on democracy and human rights in the region, Indonesia has special responsibilities to ensure that there is no backtracking by ASEAN; Indonesia’s leadership has been, and will continue to be key.

Absent relentless and continuous efforts – of mutual encouragement and support for democratic reform – the dynamics will shift.  Positive momentum lost.

—

There is another manifestation of the nexus between democracy and foreign policy that requires careful and thoughtful management.

I am referring here to the democratization of foreign policy; a phenomenon to be much welcomed.

For diplomacy and foreign policy cannot be the exclusive preserve of a few.

As a process, it refers to the critical need to promote a sense of public participation and ownership for the effective discharge of foreign policies.   In a democracy, the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy, like other fields of government endeavour, cannot be divorced from the public at large.

As outcome, it speaks to the issue of relevance of foreign policies; to issues that matters and are of concern to the general public at large.

Certainly, the foreign policy-making environment today is arguably far more complex than hitherto been the case.

Of wide-ranging constituencies, in particular civil societies, which need to be brought on board;

Of ever-widening issues that preoccupy the public: issues that have both domestic and external dimensions;

Of rapid advances in information technology – including the role of social media and other non-traditional means of information dissemination – which have placed diplomacy and foreign policy in a transformed setting – on the one hand providing greater opportunity for policy dissemination, while on the other, placing it under an almost continuous public glare and attention.

For diplomacy, such milieu occasionally implies that the management of issues of mutual concern between countries has injected to them internal domestic dynamics to further add to already complex situation.

Besides the issue of territorial disputes, perhaps one of the most vivid recent illustrations of such complex reality has been over the management of movements of peoples across state boundaries, as refugees seeking protection from conflicts and political upheavals.   Too readily, such issues have become enveloped by domestic political dynamics in the countries of destination, transit and origin – making resolution of the issue even more elusive.  The recent surge of refugees to Europe, escaping the conflict in Syria and other parts of the Middle East, is one such illustration; rapidly becoming enveloped in European domestic politics.

Of course, I have been particularly aware of similar dynamics impacting on Indonesia’s and Australia’s common efforts on the issue of irregular movements of peoples – of refugees.

On such and other similar issues, I deem it important that policy makers demonstrate constructive leadership and partnership – to seek mutually acceptable solutions – not one that aim to score political points off the other with one eye on domestic political consideration – rather one that demonstrates the best of our humanity and respect for principles of democracy.

In particular, a type of leadership that has the courage and resilience to inform the public – to promote a more informed public – of the complexities of the issues at hand, the hard choices, requiring common undertaking and the search for common solution.  The pursuit of narrow populist agenda – however appealing – is to be discouraged.

As any neighbours, Australia and Indonesia do not always have a common view on issues affecting them.   Precisely, as neighbours, however, we do have common issues to manage and address.  The tasks for leaders past and future, have been to build on such realities and develop common interest between the two countries.  I am of the firm view that ultimately, our democracies have made our relations stronger, more resilient and robust.  Where consensus has proven elusive, we can agree to disagree.  We can disagree, without being disagreeable.

In a world where dialogue and diplomacy are seemingly in retreat, as democracies Australia and Indonesia can provide a different narrative.  Of the efficacy of diplomacy as means to address issues among nations.

—

Democracy needs constant investment of efforts; of nurturing.  In many societies, institutional and governance capacities need to be painstakingly build.

Most significantly, leaders and institutions must earn the public’s trust.

There is no room for complacency.  Countenancing attacks against universal democratic values.

This is equally the case within nations and among nations.

Absent such efforts, democracy can find itself cast adrift; at best irrelevant and distant from people’s concerns and interests, and worse still, retreating.

Ultimately, democracy can only thrive if it delivers.

As it must.

Thank you very much.”

Footnotes:

Served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (2009-2014), Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN (2007-2009) and Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s (2005-2007), as well as in various other capacities, including as Director General for ASEAN Cooperation.  Currently serving, inter alia, as UN Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Board on Mediation and UN President of the General Assembly’s Team of External Advisors.

 

Media coverage and related links

‘Can democracy deliver?’ (pdf), Marty Natalegawa

Opening remarks for John Menadue Oration, Travers McLeod

Indonesia and Australia can nurture democracy together (Marty Natalegawa, extract from oration), AFR, 3 November.

The World, ABC News (from 8:00 mins), 2 November

ABC News Breakfast, 3 November

Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister says Trump needs to show Asia that the US can be a leader in the region when he visits next week. pic.twitter.com/xbPoO3Xd1F

— News Breakfast (@BreakfastNews) November 2, 2017

The post “Can Democracy Deliver?” | John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | PAST EVENT | November 2017 appeared first on Centre for Policy Development.

“Can Democracy Deliver?” | John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | EVENT | November 2017

 

CPD’s Inaugural Annual John Menadue Oration –  “Can Democracy Deliver?”

Remarks by  Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa

Melbourne, 2 November 2017

 

“Can democracy deliver?

As one who has traversed Indonesia’s now more than a decade-long transformative democratic journey – such that today it constitutes the world’s third-largest democracy – the reply to such question can only be resoundingly in the affirmative: yes!

Indeed, it has to.

Democracy must deliver.

Throughout all corners of the world, we continue to bear witness to people’s yearnings for democracy; for the right to choose and to hold to democratic account their elected representatives; for the protection and promotion of their fundamental human rights – respect for rule of law; for the betterment of their life and their future.

Here in East Asia, two-decade past reminds of some of the most transformative democratic changes:

The return to full democracy in the Republic of Korea and the People Power Revolution in the Philippines, both in the late 1980s;

The reformasi in Indonesia, in the late 1990s;

And, more recently, though still obviously fragile and replete with challenges, in Myanmar – the democratic reform that has seen its past advocates of democracy now taking the helm of government.

We are today reminded too of the historic magnitude and significance of these developments in East Asia, as we contrast the continued fragility of the promise that was once described by some as “Arab Spring” in parts of the Middle East and North Africa:

Unleashing promising reform in some countries, and yet triggering internal conflicts and convulsions in others;

Prompting broader regional and global, direct as well as proxy, geopolitical tensions;

And, most tragically, inflicting violence, carnage and sufferings on the most vulnerable in our societies – children, women and the elderlies.   Of peoples in their thousands seeking refuge across borders and continents.

However, even in situations of evident democratic transformation, we are reminded too that democracy is a process, not an event – never-ending in its nature and prone to ebbs and flows – of progress and of regress.

Hence, despite sometime trumpeted gains, here in East Asia, and beyond, a case can be made of recent signs of shifting dynamics – of democracies adrift – of a changing democratic architecture after decades of promise.

For democratic gains have been tempered by challenges old and new.

Of the latter, increasingly, we are becoming cognizant of the possible implications to democracy of the advent of new technologies – some positively transformative in nature, while others illustrative of the potential for their negative exploitations.

On the one hand, making information more available with speed and breadth of scope unprecedented before, ushering the potential for a more informed electorate;

Providing continuous avenues, beyond the periodic electoral cycles, for peoples to make known their views, and expectations of elected representatives – to hold leaders to greater account and to ensure that they remain sensitive to the public interests;

As well, through the application of technologies, supporting the holding of elections in countries whose geographic and physical features make for electorates in remote and previously inaccessible regions.

Yet, the very same technologies, or strictly speaking, their exploitations, have given rise to new types of concerns and challenges to democracy.

More abundant information has not assured a more informed and open-minded populace, as rising signs of intolerance permeate;

Of dismissals of the position of the other;

Of denial of inconvenient facts on the one hand, and of the spread of false information on the other; and

Of the rise and sharpening of particularly divisive politics – of identity politics.

Further, while technologies have opened greater opportunities for the voices of the people to be heard, in an age of big data and social media, they have also opened the doors to interferences in elections – the short term manipulation of the individual voters’ fears and prejudices – to secure electoral advantages and victories, and similar concerted manipulation of online conversations to influence public opinion.

As some societies grapple with the implications on democracy brought forth by new technologies, it is worthy to remind that in others, the challenges are decidedly more direct and fundamental:

Of the absence of peace – of the prevalence of open conflicts – suspending any hope for the exercise of democratic rights as peoples grapple with the basic task of survival;

Of the surge of populist authoritarianism – to see in democracy only as electoral means to acquire power, only to subsequently systematically dismantle and weaken the values inherent to democracy.  Of countries once on gradual path to democratic reform, now appearing to have taken pause or, indeed, to have stepped-back. For voices of dissent, or simply alternative voices, to be silenced by the threat or prospect of legal prosecution.

—

In such complex environment, the management of the nexus between the internal and external milieu – so called domestic and international affairs – has become more critical than ever before.

Among others, the promotion and protection of democratic principles in a world of sovereign nation states.

Further, the potential impact of more complex and open democratic settings on the conduct of diplomacy.

I am of the view that, ultimately, democratic reform processes are inherently internal to the countries concerned.  However, this is not to say that there is total absence of the external dimension.

The internal and external dimensions are interrelated and synergies can be attained.

Certainly, to be sustained, democracy cannot possibly be imposed from without.

There is not a magic wand – a one-size-fits-all – that can apply to all countries with their differing circumstances, past experiences and visions for their common future.

Ours is a world replete with examples of well-meaning efforts to externally and sometimes even forcefully introduce democracy to countries that have ultimately foundered, as they lack internal and national sense of ownership so critical if such processes are to be sustained.

However, this is not to say such processes take place in a total vacuum – disconnected from the external milieu.

Indeed, I have been of the view that the contemporary world is one in which the distinction between internal and external domains is increasing becoming tenuous, such that for all practical purposes they have become one: mutually affecting one another.

The term “intermestic” perhaps captures such linkage between the international and domestic domains.

Issues abound, traditionally viewed as internal, that have foreign policy or external dimensions – food security, energy security, the environment, the management of the economy, migration and the flow refugees, health, terrorism, to cite a few – all defying national solutions alone.  Thus, any attempt to promote democratically obtained mandate at the national level on such issues ultimately requires and demands cooperative partnership across nations.

Personally, such deep links between the internal and external environments have been driving motivation to promote ASEAN’s democratic architecture – to positively alter the dynamics in the region.

As Indonesia embarked on its process of democratic reform post-1998, it deliberately and purposefully injected within ASEAN a discourse on democracy, good governance and human rights, hitherto absent.  The resultant ASEAN Political Security Community pillars, in addition to the Economic and Socio-Cultural pillar, was groundbreaking for a region more used to view such issues as being the exclusive preserve of individual countries.

Though clearly not without shortcomings, the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), for the first time formally lay out certain democratic, human rights and good governance benchmarks for ASEAN to aspire to, and to judge current and future conduct on.

More than the establishment of formal ASEAN institutions and capacities, I have sought to deliberately introduce state practice within ASEAN to change its dynamics on matters relating to human rights and democracy.  At no countries’ behest or expectation, instead at its own initiative, Indonesia begun to deliberately share developments within the country – the various problems and challenges it was facing internally  – before ASEAN meetings.

The objective was clear: to alter the dynamics within ASEAN, such that it becomes more attuned to principles of democracy, human rights and good governance. Further, it reflected Indonesia’s confidence and conviction in a democratic response to the various issues it was facing.

In most instances, the reaction by the rest of the ASEAN Member States was awkward and deafening silence, as Indonesia’s efforts were not in line with traditional ASEAN practices.

However, slowly the dynamics began to change.

Other ASEAN countries, notably, at the time, Thailand, the Philippines and Myanmar, also began to share of internal developments in their respective countries.  Such sharing of information began to be viewed not as being “interference” in internal affairs of ASEAN Member States, rather as manifestation of how the ASEAN “family” of nations can demonstrate genuine concern and interest on internal matters relating to the promotion and protection of the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance that affect the region as a whole.

In introducing these as ASEAN’s common concern, I was motivated to ensure that the then nascent reform process in Indonesia does not take place in a regional vacuum.  Instead, for the Southeast Asia region to move in similar direction, albeit admittedly at different pace.

In essence, to inject democratic dynamics in Southeast Asia.

In a manner, it was such gradual development of a more nuanced application of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which allowed ASEAN, until recently, to navigate the complex process of Myanmar’s recent democratic reform – to synergize all the various often conflicting sets of demands within and outside Myanmar.

I believe it possible to urgently address the current challenge on the Rohingya issue with a similar approach.

Clearly, yet another litmus test for ASEAN.   To demonstrate relevance.  To be part of the solution.

Recent developments, however, remind of the fragility of democratization process.

Signs abound in Southeast Asia of shifting democratic momentum and dynamics.

Of democracy adrift, or even in retreat.

While such ebb and flow are not new and will no doubt continue, today they occur within the context of the much-heralded ASEAN Community.  As a result, this time, there is sharp and glaring contrast between the actual realities and conditions on the one hand, and the avowed and publicly declared commitments, on the other.

As the initiator of these collective commitments on democracy and human rights in the region, Indonesia has special responsibilities to ensure that there is no backtracking by ASEAN; Indonesia’s leadership has been, and will continue to be key.

Absent relentless and continuous efforts – of mutual encouragement and support for democratic reform – the dynamics will shift.  Positive momentum lost.

—

There is another manifestation of the nexus between democracy and foreign policy that requires careful and thoughtful management.

I am referring here to the democratization of foreign policy; a phenomenon to be much welcomed.

For diplomacy and foreign policy cannot be the exclusive preserve of a few.

As a process, it refers to the critical need to promote a sense of public participation and ownership for the effective discharge of foreign policies.   In a democracy, the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy, like other fields of government endeavour, cannot be divorced from the public at large.

As outcome, it speaks to the issue of relevance of foreign policies; to issues that matters and are of concern to the general public at large.

Certainly, the foreign policy-making environment today is arguably far more complex than hitherto been the case.

Of wide-ranging constituencies, in particular civil societies, which need to be brought on board;

Of ever-widening issues that preoccupy the public: issues that have both domestic and external dimensions;

Of rapid advances in information technology – including the role of social media and other non-traditional means of information dissemination – which have placed diplomacy and foreign policy in a transformed setting – on the one hand providing greater opportunity for policy dissemination, while on the other, placing it under an almost continuous public glare and attention.

For diplomacy, such milieu occasionally implies that the management of issues of mutual concern between countries has injected to them internal domestic dynamics to further add to already complex situation.

Besides the issue of territorial disputes, perhaps one of the most vivid recent illustrations of such complex reality has been over the management of movements of peoples across state boundaries, as refugees seeking protection from conflicts and political upheavals.   Too readily, such issues have become enveloped by domestic political dynamics in the countries of destination, transit and origin – making resolution of the issue even more elusive.  The recent surge of refugees to Europe, escaping the conflict in Syria and other parts of the Middle East, is one such illustration; rapidly becoming enveloped in European domestic politics.

Of course, I have been particularly aware of similar dynamics impacting on Indonesia’s and Australia’s common efforts on the issue of irregular movements of peoples – of refugees.

On such and other similar issues, I deem it important that policy makers demonstrate constructive leadership and partnership – to seek mutually acceptable solutions – not one that aim to score political points off the other with one eye on domestic political consideration – rather one that demonstrates the best of our humanity and respect for principles of democracy.

In particular, a type of leadership that has the courage and resilience to inform the public – to promote a more informed public – of the complexities of the issues at hand, the hard choices, requiring common undertaking and the search for common solution.  The pursuit of narrow populist agenda – however appealing – is to be discouraged.

As any neighbours, Australia and Indonesia do not always have a common view on issues affecting them.   Precisely, as neighbours, however, we do have common issues to manage and address.  The tasks for leaders past and future, have been to build on such realities and develop common interest between the two countries.  I am of the firm view that ultimately, our democracies have made our relations stronger, more resilient and robust.  Where consensus has proven elusive, we can agree to disagree.  We can disagree, without being disagreeable.

In a world where dialogue and diplomacy are seemingly in retreat, as democracies Australia and Indonesia can provide a different narrative.  Of the efficacy of diplomacy as means to address issues among nations.

—

Democracy needs constant investment of efforts; of nurturing.  In many societies, institutional and governance capacities need to be painstakingly build.

Most significantly, leaders and institutions must earn the public’s trust.

There is no room for complacency.  Countenancing attacks against universal democratic values.

This is equally the case within nations and among nations.

Absent such efforts, democracy can find itself cast adrift; at best irrelevant and distant from people’s concerns and interests, and worse still, retreating.

Ultimately, democracy can only thrive if it delivers.

As it must.

Thank you very much.”

Footnotes:

Served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (2009-2014), Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN (2007-2009) and Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s (2005-2007), as well as in various other capacities, including as Director General for ASEAN Cooperation.  Currently serving, inter alia, as UN Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Board on Mediation and UN President of the General Assembly’s Team of External Advisors.

 

Media coverage and related links

‘Can democracy deliver?’ (pdf), Marty Natalegawa

Opening remarks for John Menadue Oration, Travers McLeod

Indonesia and Australia can nurture democracy together (Marty Natalegawa, extract from oration), AFR, 3 November.

The World, ABC News (from 8:00 mins), 2 November

ABC News Breakfast, 3 November

Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister says Trump needs to show Asia that the US can be a leader in the region when he visits next week. pic.twitter.com/xbPoO3Xd1F

— News Breakfast (@BreakfastNews) November 2, 2017

 

 

 

 

The post “Can Democracy Deliver?” | John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | EVENT | November 2017 appeared first on Centre for Policy Development.

John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | 2 November 2017 | Melbourne

CPD’s Inaugural Annual John Menadue Oration –  “Can Democracy Deliver?”

Remarks by  Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa

Melbourne, 2 November 2017

Listen to an audio recording of the full oration here.

Marty Natalegawa at John Menaude Oration about Rohingya crisis_ABC's The World Program

“Can democracy deliver?

As one who has traversed Indonesia’s now more than a decade-long transformative democratic journey – such that today it constitutes the world’s third-largest democracy – the reply to such question can only be resoundingly in the affirmative: yes!

Indeed, it has to.

Democracy must deliver.

Throughout all corners of the world, we continue to bear witness to people’s yearnings for democracy; for the right to choose and to hold to democratic account their elected representatives; for the protection and promotion of their fundamental human rights – respect for rule of law; for the betterment of their life and their future.

Here in East Asia, two-decade past reminds of some of the most transformative democratic changes:

The return to full democracy in the Republic of Korea and the People Power Revolution in the Philippines, both in the late 1980s;

The reformasi in Indonesia, in the late 1990s;

And, more recently, though still obviously fragile and replete with challenges, in Myanmar – the democratic reform that has seen its past advocates of democracy now taking the helm of government.

We are today reminded too of the historic magnitude and significance of these developments in East Asia, as we contrast the continued fragility of the promise that was once described by some as “Arab Spring” in parts of the Middle East and North Africa:

Unleashing promising reform in some countries, and yet triggering internal conflicts and convulsions in others;

Prompting broader regional and global, direct as well as proxy, geopolitical tensions;

And, most tragically, inflicting violence, carnage and sufferings on the most vulnerable in our societies – children, women and the elderlies.   Of peoples in their thousands seeking refuge across borders and continents.

However, even in situations of evident democratic transformation, we are reminded too that democracy is a process, not an event – never-ending in its nature and prone to ebbs and flows – of progress and of regress.

Hence, despite sometime trumpeted gains, here in East Asia, and beyond, a case can be made of recent signs of shifting dynamics – of democracies adrift – of a changing democratic architecture after decades of promise.

For democratic gains have been tempered by challenges old and new.

Of the latter, increasingly, we are becoming cognizant of the possible implications to democracy of the advent of new technologies – some positively transformative in nature, while others illustrative of the potential for their negative exploitations.

On the one hand, making information more available with speed and breadth of scope unprecedented before, ushering the potential for a more informed electorate;

Providing continuous avenues, beyond the periodic electoral cycles, for peoples to make known their views, and expectations of elected representatives – to hold leaders to greater account and to ensure that they remain sensitive to the public interests;

As well, through the application of technologies, supporting the holding of elections in countries whose geographic and physical features make for electorates in remote and previously inaccessible regions.

Yet, the very same technologies, or strictly speaking, their exploitations, have given rise to new types of concerns and challenges to democracy.

More abundant information has not assured a more informed and open-minded populace, as rising signs of intolerance permeate;

Of dismissals of the position of the other;

Of denial of inconvenient facts on the one hand, and of the spread of false information on the other; and

Of the rise and sharpening of particularly divisive politics – of identity politics.

Further, while technologies have opened greater opportunities for the voices of the people to be heard, in an age of big data and social media, they have also opened the doors to interferences in elections – the short term manipulation of the individual voters’ fears and prejudices – to secure electoral advantages and victories, and similar concerted manipulation of online conversations to influence public opinion.

As some societies grapple with the implications on democracy brought forth by new technologies, it is worthy to remind that in others, the challenges are decidedly more direct and fundamental:

Of the absence of peace – of the prevalence of open conflicts – suspending any hope for the exercise of democratic rights as peoples grapple with the basic task of survival;

Of the surge of populist authoritarianism – to see in democracy only as electoral means to acquire power, only to subsequently systematically dismantle and weaken the values inherent to democracy.  Of countries once on gradual path to democratic reform, now appearing to have taken pause or, indeed, to have stepped-back. For voices of dissent, or simply alternative voices, to be silenced by the threat or prospect of legal prosecution.

—

In such complex environment, the management of the nexus between the internal and external milieu – so called domestic and international affairs – has become more critical than ever before.

Among others, the promotion and protection of democratic principles in a world of sovereign nation states.

Further, the potential impact of more complex and open democratic settings on the conduct of diplomacy.

I am of the view that, ultimately, democratic reform processes are inherently internal to the countries concerned.  However, this is not to say that there is total absence of the external dimension.

The internal and external dimensions are interrelated and synergies can be attained.

Certainly, to be sustained, democracy cannot possibly be imposed from without.

There is not a magic wand – a one-size-fits-all – that can apply to all countries with their differing circumstances, past experiences and visions for their common future.

Ours is a world replete with examples of well-meaning efforts to externally and sometimes even forcefully introduce democracy to countries that have ultimately foundered, as they lack internal and national sense of ownership so critical if such processes are to be sustained.

However, this is not to say such processes take place in a total vacuum – disconnected from the external milieu.

Indeed, I have been of the view that the contemporary world is one in which the distinction between internal and external domains is increasing becoming tenuous, such that for all practical purposes they have become one: mutually affecting one another.

The term “intermestic” perhaps captures such linkage between the international and domestic domains.

Issues abound, traditionally viewed as internal, that have foreign policy or external dimensions – food security, energy security, the environment, the management of the economy, migration and the flow refugees, health, terrorism, to cite a few – all defying national solutions alone.  Thus, any attempt to promote democratically obtained mandate at the national level on such issues ultimately requires and demands cooperative partnership across nations.

Personally, such deep links between the internal and external environments have been driving motivation to promote ASEAN’s democratic architecture – to positively alter the dynamics in the region.

As Indonesia embarked on its process of democratic reform post-1998, it deliberately and purposefully injected within ASEAN a discourse on democracy, good governance and human rights, hitherto absent.  The resultant ASEAN Political Security Community pillars, in addition to the Economic and Socio-Cultural pillar, was groundbreaking for a region more used to view such issues as being the exclusive preserve of individual countries.

Though clearly not without shortcomings, the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), for the first time formally lay out certain democratic, human rights and good governance benchmarks for ASEAN to aspire to, and to judge current and future conduct on.

More than the establishment of formal ASEAN institutions and capacities, I have sought to deliberately introduce state practice within ASEAN to change its dynamics on matters relating to human rights and democracy.  At no countries’ behest or expectation, instead at its own initiative, Indonesia begun to deliberately share developments within the country – the various problems and challenges it was facing internally  – before ASEAN meetings.

The objective was clear: to alter the dynamics within ASEAN, such that it becomes more attuned to principles of democracy, human rights and good governance. Further, it reflected Indonesia’s confidence and conviction in a democratic response to the various issues it was facing.

In most instances, the reaction by the rest of the ASEAN Member States was awkward and deafening silence, as Indonesia’s efforts were not in line with traditional ASEAN practices.

However, slowly the dynamics began to change.

Other ASEAN countries, notably, at the time, Thailand, the Philippines and Myanmar, also began to share of internal developments in their respective countries.  Such sharing of information began to be viewed not as being “interference” in internal affairs of ASEAN Member States, rather as manifestation of how the ASEAN “family” of nations can demonstrate genuine concern and interest on internal matters relating to the promotion and protection of the principles of democracy, human rights and good governance that affect the region as a whole.

In introducing these as ASEAN’s common concern, I was motivated to ensure that the then nascent reform process in Indonesia does not take place in a regional vacuum.  Instead, for the Southeast Asia region to move in similar direction, albeit admittedly at different pace.

In essence, to inject democratic dynamics in Southeast Asia.

In a manner, it was such gradual development of a more nuanced application of the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which allowed ASEAN, until recently, to navigate the complex process of Myanmar’s recent democratic reform – to synergize all the various often conflicting sets of demands within and outside Myanmar.

I believe it possible to urgently address the current challenge on the Rohingya issue with a similar approach.

Clearly, yet another litmus test for ASEAN.   To demonstrate relevance.  To be part of the solution.

Recent developments, however, remind of the fragility of democratization process.

Signs abound in Southeast Asia of shifting democratic momentum and dynamics.

Of democracy adrift, or even in retreat.

While such ebb and flow are not new and will no doubt continue, today they occur within the context of the much-heralded ASEAN Community.  As a result, this time, there is sharp and glaring contrast between the actual realities and conditions on the one hand, and the avowed and publicly declared commitments, on the other.

As the initiator of these collective commitments on democracy and human rights in the region, Indonesia has special responsibilities to ensure that there is no backtracking by ASEAN; Indonesia’s leadership has been, and will continue to be key.

Absent relentless and continuous efforts – of mutual encouragement and support for democratic reform – the dynamics will shift.  Positive momentum lost.

—

There is another manifestation of the nexus between democracy and foreign policy that requires careful and thoughtful management.

I am referring here to the democratization of foreign policy; a phenomenon to be much welcomed.

For diplomacy and foreign policy cannot be the exclusive preserve of a few.

As a process, it refers to the critical need to promote a sense of public participation and ownership for the effective discharge of foreign policies.   In a democracy, the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy, like other fields of government endeavour, cannot be divorced from the public at large.

As outcome, it speaks to the issue of relevance of foreign policies; to issues that matters and are of concern to the general public at large.

Certainly, the foreign policy-making environment today is arguably far more complex than hitherto been the case.

Of wide-ranging constituencies, in particular civil societies, which need to be brought on board;

Of ever-widening issues that preoccupy the public: issues that have both domestic and external dimensions;

Of rapid advances in information technology – including the role of social media and other non-traditional means of information dissemination – which have placed diplomacy and foreign policy in a transformed setting – on the one hand providing greater opportunity for policy dissemination, while on the other, placing it under an almost continuous public glare and attention.

For diplomacy, such milieu occasionally implies that the management of issues of mutual concern between countries has injected to them internal domestic dynamics to further add to already complex situation.

Besides the issue of territorial disputes, perhaps one of the most vivid recent illustrations of such complex reality has been over the management of movements of peoples across state boundaries, as refugees seeking protection from conflicts and political upheavals.   Too readily, such issues have become enveloped by domestic political dynamics in the countries of destination, transit and origin – making resolution of the issue even more elusive.  The recent surge of refugees to Europe, escaping the conflict in Syria and other parts of the Middle East, is one such illustration; rapidly becoming enveloped in European domestic politics.

Of course, I have been particularly aware of similar dynamics impacting on Indonesia’s and Australia’s common efforts on the issue of irregular movements of peoples – of refugees.

On such and other similar issues, I deem it important that policy makers demonstrate constructive leadership and partnership – to seek mutually acceptable solutions – not one that aim to score political points off the other with one eye on domestic political consideration – rather one that demonstrates the best of our humanity and respect for principles of democracy.

In particular, a type of leadership that has the courage and resilience to inform the public – to promote a more informed public – of the complexities of the issues at hand, the hard choices, requiring common undertaking and the search for common solution.  The pursuit of narrow populist agenda – however appealing – is to be discouraged.

As any neighbours, Australia and Indonesia do not always have a common view on issues affecting them.   Precisely, as neighbours, however, we do have common issues to manage and address.  The tasks for leaders past and future, have been to build on such realities and develop common interest between the two countries.  I am of the firm view that ultimately, our democracies have made our relations stronger, more resilient and robust.  Where consensus has proven elusive, we can agree to disagree.  We can disagree, without being disagreeable.

In a world where dialogue and diplomacy are seemingly in retreat, as democracies Australia and Indonesia can provide a different narrative.  Of the efficacy of diplomacy as means to address issues among nations.

—

Democracy needs constant investment of efforts; of nurturing.  In many societies, institutional and governance capacities need to be painstakingly build.

Most significantly, leaders and institutions must earn the public’s trust.

There is no room for complacency.  Countenancing attacks against universal democratic values.

This is equally the case within nations and among nations.

Absent such efforts, democracy can find itself cast adrift; at best irrelevant and distant from people’s concerns and interests, and worse still, retreating.

Ultimately, democracy can only thrive if it delivers.

As it must.

Thank you very much.”

Footnotes:

Served as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (2009-2014), Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN (2007-2009) and Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s (2005-2007), as well as in various other capacities, including as Director General for ASEAN Cooperation.  Currently serving, inter alia, as UN Secretary General’s High Level Advisory Board on Mediation and UN President of the General Assembly’s Team of External Advisors.

 

Media coverage and related links

‘Can democracy deliver?’ (pdf), Marty Natalegawa

Opening remarks for John Menadue Oration, Travers McLeod

Indonesia and Australia can nurture democracy together (Marty Natalegawa, extract from oration), AFR, 3 November.

The World, ABC News (from 8:00 mins), 2 November

ABC News Breakfast, 3 November

Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister says Trump needs to show Asia that the US can be a leader in the region when he visits next week. pic.twitter.com/xbPoO3Xd1F

— News Breakfast (@BreakfastNews) November 2, 2017

CPD’s inaugural annual oration has been named in honour of John Menadue AO, CPD’s founding Chairperson, in recognition of John’s contribution to public policy in Australia and to CPD. John served as Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet under Prime Ministers Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser, was Australia’s Ambassador to Japan, and held senior roles in the business community. He remains a CPD fellow. 

 

For an introduction to some of the issues at the heart of CPD’s 10th-anniversary series on democratic renewal, listen to Charlie Leadbeater’s opening remarks at CPD’s forum on trust in democracy, held in June 2017:

https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Charlie-Leadbeater_Why-trust-matters.m4a

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John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | 2 November | Melbourne

If you can join this special event, please RSVP here.
 

WHEN:     Thursday, 2 November 2017, 5.30pm – 8.00 pm

WHERE:  State Library Victoria, Village Roadshow Theatrette 179 La Trobe St, Melbourne

 

Join us to welcome Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister, who will deliver CPD’s inaugural annual oration as part of our 10th-anniversary series in November.

Pak Marty has been described as “one of the most respected foreign policy and international security thinkers of his generation, both within Indonesia, in South East Asia, and in the broader Asia-Pacific region“.

We’ve asked Pak Marty to speak on the theme for our 10-anniversary series: ‘Can Democracy Deliver?‘:

How can we strengthen our democracy so that it better serves us in solving the big problems of our time, including

climate change, forced migration, inequality, the future of work, and social cohesion?

What can be done to fix, or create, the systems, practices and cultures of democratic government that can transmit sound

ideas into implementation?

What is preventing Australian democracy from delivering difficult but necessary policy reform?

Given Pak Marty’s policy, political and leadership experiences in Indonesia, the broader Asia-Pacific region and at the global level, his perspectives on the challenges facing democracy in this particular international moment will be especially timely and valuable.

We would be delighted if you could participate in this special event. RSVP here.

There will be a cocktail reception after the oration.

For an introduction to some of the issues at the heart of CPD’s 10th-anniversary series on democratic renewal, listen to Charlie Leadbeater’s opening remarks at CPD’s forum on trust in democracy, held in June 2017:

https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Charlie-Leadbeater_Why-trust-matters.m4a

 

Dr Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana Natalegawa (Dr Natalegawa) served as the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia from 2009-2014. Prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister, he served as the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations in New York from 2007–2009.

Dr Natalegawa also served as the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Kingdom and Ireland from 2005-2007, and in the years 2002–2005, he consecutively served as the Chief of Staff of the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and as the Director General for ASEAN Cooperation in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

His term as Director General for ASEAN Cooperation coincided with Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN, a period marked by intensive effort to promote the idea of an ASEAN Community which was formally endorsed by the member countries through the 2003 Bali Concord II.

He served at the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN between 1994 and 1999, including during Indonesia’s membership of the Security Council in 1996-1997.

In addition to his Doctor of Philosophy from The Australian National University, Dr Natalegawa completed a Master of Philosophy at Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge, and a Bachelor of Science (Hons) at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

CPD’s inaugural annual oration has been named in honour of John Menadue AO, CPD’s founding Chairperson, in recognition of John’s contribution to public policy in Australia and to CPD. John served as Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet under Prime Ministers Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser, was Australia’s Ambassador to Japan, and held senior roles in the business community. He remains a CPD fellow.

The post John Menadue Oration by Marty Natalegawa | 2 November | Melbourne appeared first on Centre for Policy Development.

The Centre for Policy Development supports marriage equality

The Centre for Policy Development’s Board met last night for its Annual General Meeting and confirmed the organisation’s support for marriage equality. 

CPD is an independent and non-partisan Approved Research Institute. Our values commit us, among other things, to a society that expands opportunity and social justice. Our policy development is geared towards an Australia that is equitable, aspirational and truly prosperous – and enlivened by the challenge of shaping a better future for all Australians. 

CPD believes the current law on marriage is unjust and belongs in Australia’s past, not in its future. We strongly support marriage equality so that LGBTIQ+ Australians have the same right given to others: the right to marry the person they choose. 

CPD recognises the marriage equality survey, and ongoing debate, is having negative impacts on the LGBTIQ+ community as a whole and on its individual members. As part of this community, CPD offers its continued and wholehearted support to our friends, families and colleagues and stands in solidarity with them. CPD does not take a position in elections but we oppose discrimination and prejudice in all its forms.

 

The post The Centre for Policy Development supports marriage equality appeared first on CPD.

Fifth meeting | ASIA DIALOGUE ON FORCED MIGRATION | September 2017

 

Key documents for the fourth ADFM meeting:

Full agenda and participant list
Briefing papers
Participant profiles
Press Release

The fifth meeting of the Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration (ADFM) took place on 10-12 September 2017 in Manila, the Philippines, as the humanitarian and security crisis unfolded in Myanmar and Bangladesh.

ADFM members intended to consolidate progress with the Bali Process and ASEAN on the region’s capacity to respond to mass displacement. Given the situation in Myanmar and Bangladesh, it was clear those discussions could not occur in the abstract. Information supplied to the ADFM at the time of our meeting confirmed that approximately 300,000 people had crossed the border into Bangladesh from Myanmar since conflict broke out in Rakhine State on 25 August.

There was strong consensus that the new Bali Process emergency response mechanism should be triggered in response to the situation. The ADFM wrote to the Bali Process Co-Chairs to convey this view formally. Triggering the mechanism could achieve several important objectives. First and foremost, it would ensure there is an ‘honest broker’ with existing authority and legitimacy to share information and coordinate policy responses in the region.

Here is the ADFM media release on the issue. Here also is a front-page article in the Jakarta Post on the issue.

ADFM members also urged ASEAN to work to de-escalate the situation in Myanmar and Bangladesh and to be part of a collective and coordinated response.

The ADFM continued to advance proposals to address trafficking in persons in the region. The ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP), which entered into force in March 2017, is among the most significant legal instruments that the ASEAN Summit has agreed to. The Bohol Work Plan, developed to drive the implementation of ACTIP, is the first ever ASEAN cross-sectoral work plan of its kind and is a comprehensive and innovative approach to trafficking in persons. The ADFM made recommendations to the ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), who met in Manila in the week following the ADFM, on the development of an implementation mechanism for the ACTIP and collaboration between ASEAN and the Bali Process senior officials on these issues.

We continued to enjoy strong attendance from past ADFM participants in Manila. Meeting in the Philippines during their time as ASEAN Chair and during the ASEAN 50th anniversary celebrations, allowed us to expand ADFM participation to include ASEAN senior officials. The ADFM Secretariat are very grateful for the support of Director Leocadio Trovela and his team at the Philippines Department of the Interior and Local Government.

In addition to our substantive discussions on effective responses by the Bali Process and ASEAN to forced migration issues, ADFM members endorsed further research and policy development on climate-related displacement and employment opportunities for refugees. Members also agreed the ADFM’s contribution to consultations for the global compacts on migrants and refugees.

The sixth ADFM meeting will take place in Sydney in March 2018, alongside the Australia-ASEAN Special Summit.

We will update this post in due course but wanted to ensure those following the ADFM have access to the briefing papers.

Background reading:

For the ADFM home page click here.
To find out more about the rationale behind the ADFM click here.
To read more about the first ADFM meeting in Melbourne in August 2015 click here.
To read more about the second ADFM meeting in Bangkok in January 2016 click here.
To read more about the third ADFM meeting in Kuala Lumpur in September 2016 click here.
To read more about the fourth ADFM meeting in Jakarta in March 2017 click here.

We will update this post in due course but wanted to ensure those following the ADFM have access to the briefing papers.

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