Eric Schliesser's Blog, page 3

On Stebbing, Spinoza, and the Cognitive Demands of Political Freedom, Part 2

[I am phasing out D&I at typepad. This post was first published at: digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work consider becoming a paid subscriber at ]

For Stebbing (recall) clarity is a property of cognition and intelligence. Clarity is necessary condition for success at thinking and action guided by it, or what she calls "effective thinking." (5) In particular, clarity is the absence of distortions in thought and perception caused by bias and ignorance one is not aware of. That is, undistorted or unbiased thought is what's being aimed at in describing something as ���clear.���

But her suggestion is that known biases and awareness of ignorance are not an obstacle to successful thought presumably because they can knowingly be controlled for. Clarity is, in fact, for Stebbing an acquired skill that can be controlled and that makes "rational argument and��� reasonable consideration" possible. A feature of the skill is logically sound argument. Unsurprisingly, awareness and discovery of possible fallacies play a prominent role in Stebbing's (1938) Thinking to Some Purpose.

As I noted, there is a whiff of Spinozism in her treatment of clarity. We know she was familiar with Spinoza���s system, which she discusses, in passing in her (1932) ���The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics.��� She deliberately evokes the last sentence of Spinoza's Ethics in the last sentence of the "epilogue" of her book:

My point of view with regard to this topic can be summed up in the statement: He alone is capable of being tolerant whose conclusions have been thought out and are recognized to be inconsistent with the beliefs of other persons. To be tolerant is not to be indifferent, and is incompatible with ignorance. My conclusions have been reasonably attained in so far as I have been able to discount my prejudices, to allow for the distorting effects of your prejudices, to collect the relevant evidence and to weigh that evidence in accordance with logical principles. The extent to which I can achieve these aims is the measure of my freedom of mind. To be thus free is as difficult as it is rare.-- Susan Stebbing Thinking to Some Purpose, p. 256.

Clarity, then, is a means toward freedom of mind, but also its measure. (Clarity clearly comes in degrees for Stebbing.) To avoid confusion, in that quoted paragraph, 'logical principles,' include deductive and inductive logic. 

Now 'freedom' is not introduced until the epilogue. I will quote the key paragraph to give a flavor of Stebbing's use of it: 

I believe also that similar strictures could be truly made with regard to polls held recently in Germany and in Austria. Elections in this country are not in this sense unfree. We are proud to consider ourselves a democracy; we claim to have freedom of election, freedom of speech (including freedom of the Press) limited only by the laws of libel, sedition and blasphemy, and freedom in religion. No doubt there are certain qualifications to be made; it is probable that most people would admit that without economic freedom there cannot be political freedom, and that lacking economic security no man can be regarded as economically free. But, even if these admissions be granted, it will be contended that, by and large, we in this country do have institutions that may properly be described as democratic. It is not to my purpose to dispute these contentions. Nor shall I attempt to determine what characteristics are essential to democracy. It is enough if it be granted that it lies in our national temper to dislike obvious governmental restrictions. We like to feel ourselves to be free. In short, we value civil liberties. (249)

Here 'freedom' means something like the 'means conducive toward democratic life,' including economic, political, and civil means. So, one might think that by a 'free mind,' Stebbing also means 'the mental state conducive, at least in part, toward a democratic life.' I think this is what she does mean (as I will show in the next paragraph.) But, somewhat confusingly, Stebbing goes on to write, "I deliberately omit, however, any discussion of such political obstacles to freedom as we may encounter. I am not concerned with politics. My topic is freedom of mind. Unless I can think freely I cannot think effectively." (250) And so one might think that in so far as a 'free mind' has nothing to do with politics -- and democratic life is of political significance -- that by a 'free mind' Stebbing means something essentially private. 

But that would not be right conclusion, because she immediate goes on to write, "Here ���I��� stands for any person. If I want to make up my mind upon any problem of political action, I must be able to deliberate freely. If it were in fact true that we were all politically and economically free, still it would not follow that we were possessed of the freedom of mind without which, in my opinion, no democratic institutions can be satisfactorily maintained." (250) So, by 'politics'  on the same page, Stebbing means not 'pertaining to political life,' but rather 'subject to existing political controversy' (in the sense of which "political measure" (254) to support.) For, by a 'free mind' Stebbing clearly means a key, effective ingredient that makes public deliberation possible and so is conducive to democratic institutions, that is, political life in the institutional sense (but not in the humdrum sense of a 'subject of political controversy').

So, clarity is a skill conducive to the kinds of agency involved in public deliberation of a sort that maintains democratic institutions or democratic way of life. And by 'democracy' Stebbing means a participatory one that is exercised in voting but also (as her examples in the book make clear) in the formation of public opinion of the sort familiar from British parliamentary democracy. As she puts it 'democratic government' is more than just "the consent of the governed," -- this she thinks is actual in British political life -- but rather it means that "the voice of the people prevails." (254) The latter she denies exists because the British populace lacks freedom of mind.

Now, as Stebbing notes, her book has emphasized obstacles to such freedom: "the difficulty of freeing our minds from blinkers, the difficulty of resisting propaganda and of being content to be persuaded where we should have striven to be convinced, the difficulties of an audience dominated by an unscrupulous speaker and the difficulties of a speaker who has to address an audience that is lazy and uncritical ��� in short, the difficulties created by our stupidity and by those who take advantage of that stupidity." (250) But in the epilogue she focuses on "the difficulty of obtaining information ��� the difficulty of knowing how to discover reliable testimony." And by this she means, in particular, the way the press shapes access to information.

In light of the concentrated ownership of the press, and its interests in withholding or shaping such information, and in light of many examples of partial or biased reporting that Stebbing discusses, Stebbing concludes:

I am forced to say this; if my belief in the reliability of the testimony is false, then I am not free to decide. If such information as I have is not to be trusted, then I lack freedom of decision. For this reason, those who control the Press have power to control our minds with regard to our thinking about ���all public transactions���. A controlled Press is an obstacle to democracy, an obstacle that is the more dangerous in proportion as we are unaware of our lack of freedom. (253)

The implication being that the British seem to think that they have free minds, but in reality -- because they do not reflect on the conditions that shape their access to the information salient to public life and do not seem perturbed by their controlled press -- they are not. They "acquiesce" in rule by a narrow elite, "the ruling class," whose decisions "control us." (254) Empirically, Stebbing echoes, thus, the sociological thesis (associated with Pareto, Mosca, and Michels) that one can have elite rule even in a functioning parliamentary democracies. Unlike the Italian elite school, she deplores this situation. 

Now, it is natural to read Thinking to Some Purpose, and come away thinking that to think clearly and to become free requires a lot of very time-consuming individual effort at self-betterment. And one can certainly cite passages to that effect: "I do seek to convince the reader that it is of great practical importance that we ordinary men and women should think clearly, that there are many obstacles to thinking clearly, and that some of these obstacles can be overcome provided that we wish to overcome them and are willing to make an effort to do so." (29) She closes the book with the admonition that "I...would maintain that it is desirable that we should develop in ourselves a habit of sceptical inquiry." (255) These are passages where Stebbing, thus, anticipates Arendt's conception of democratic life.

But as the book unfolds and reaches its crescendo in the epilogue, it is obvious that Stebbing also thinks that there are many structural obstacles to removing all such impediments to clear thinking. Even if one grants that Stebbing's rhetoric is designed as a kind of call to action (say to break up the ruling class monopoly on ownership of the popular press), somewhat disappointingly, she does not offer a program of how those obstacles can be removed while not undermining the possibility of a democratic life in the deliberative and self-governing sense she advocates. (She does not offer any program!)

It is also not entirely clear on Stebbing's account what to make of a people that does not seem to wish to be free in Stebbing's sense, as she implies of the English: "The vast majority of English people want to be governed peaceably, and want to be free to pursue their own unpolitical interests." (254) This echoes Lippmann's (1922) diagnosis of the (American) democratic public in Public Opinion. It is worth noting that even if one agrees with Stebbing's diagnoses, the English are not irrational. For it is, in fact, very hard work to be free in the sense she advocates, and as the concluding paragraph quoted above suggests, she is explicitly aware of this. (In fact, I like that she notes how difficult achieving tolerance is.) In addition, given the obstacles to such freedom she diagnoses, it also seems rather fruitless and (ought implies can) not required or unnecessary to be free in the political or democratic sense advocated by Stebbing. To be sure, for many unpolitical pursuits such freedom, clear thought, will be necessary for effective action and within reach.

Given the many economic and educational preconditions required and the demands on our time and attention that a life of thinking clearly requires on Stebbing's account, it is a bit surprising that she does not explore the psychological, collective, or institutional means we might have to organize our lives in complex epistemic and political environments. For example, while I have no interest in defending the English or its ruling class (then or now), but if it's true that its "ruling class, [is] educated for political purposes, trained from birth to undertake the responsibilities of ruling" (254) then this does represent (one might say echoing Schumpeter) a possible, even rational response to the structural impediments to creating a mass society of free minds in the political sense Stebbing diagnoses (even if it is also a contributing cause to maintaining such political tutelage). 

In fact, Stebbing clearly thinks that attachment to a political party is a contributing source of bias and so of not thinking clearly. (This is especially clear in chapter 8, see p.  98 on party attachment.) Throughout Thinking to Some Purpose, she often uses politicians of opposing parties as examples to illustrate biased thinking. And by varying these examples she tries to be even-handed and entice her readers to discern the structural obstacle(s) to clear thinking she diagnoses.

It does not seem to occur to Stebbing, however, that part of the epistemic or cognitive function of parties may well be to provide useful signals in complex social and political environments for cognitively overburdened or agents without sufficient interest in political life. (One may well think that one of liberal democracy���s fruits is that such a lack of interest in active political life need not be irrational.) So, because Stebbing treats clarity as a property of individual minds who must almost possess the virtues of a stoic Spinozistic sage, she misses how in the division of (cognitive and economic) labor, we might well have strategies or heuristics that allow individuals to remain in partial darkness while being part of collectives that can act with sufficient enough effectiveness.*

This first appeared at: <On Stebbing, Spinoza, and the Cognitive Demands of Political Freedom, Part 2 (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

*One may well see the exact contemporary, Lippmann's (1938) The Good Society, as developing this strategy, and laying the groundwork for a research and political program for handling the problems diagnosed by Stebbing.

On Clarity, Philosophical Preaching (and a hint of culture war issues)

When the story of Wiley's sacking of Goodin and subsequent resignations of board members first dribbled out, I suspect I was not the only one who went to the JPP home-page to figure out who is on the board (it���s not a kind of thing one keeps track of even when one works in the sub-field). I then noticed that the most recent issue of JPP contains a paper (by Mary Leng) with a sub-title, "On sex, gender, and the UK's Gender Recognition Act." So initially, I wondered whether this unfolding story was merely a continuation of the culture-war one that had consumed the philo-blogsphere a week before. (On the web-page of JPP Goodin is still listed alongside the editorial board and associate editors many of whom have resigned.) When it became clear that it was not (it involved publisher���s profit, editorial independence, journal slots, and prestige production, etc.), I felt surprisingly guilty relief to be spared another round of those culture war set of issues.

One dimension along which culture war issues regularly play out in contemporary professional philosophy is to what degree, if any, concerns over so-called inductive risk may constrain philosophical publication or activity. Even ardent consequentialists (who may well allow all kinds of restrictions on all kinds of speech in medical advertising or financial reporting) will not always grant the significance of such inductive risk either because they think philosophical speech is ipse facto harmless or because they think that the search for philosophical truth trumps possible downside risks of the enterprise (so, again, they presuppose such speech is kind of harmless).

While I am interested in this harm-free conception of philosophical speech below, I don't mean to suggest that everyone who rejects the role of inductive risk in professional philosophy today has to be a consequentialist. Some will do so on grounds of very expansive notions of academic freedom. Such people may well favor regulation of dangerous speech off-campus (say, of child pornography), but professorial research should be left unfettered. (When such arguments are not consequentialist in character they often end up having to appeal to the conscience of the expert and its special role in public reason formation.)

What's fascinating to me is that the very idea of the harmlessness of philosophical speech is relatively recent phenomenon historically or sub specie aeternitatis. For various Abrahamic religions much philosophical speech risked provoking/articulating heresies or sectarianism and was relatively strictly policed (by theology, by jurisprudence, or by magistrate, etc.). Even in pagan societies philosophical speech could be dangerous (and exile not uncommon���this is also notable among Chinese sages). Even Cicero has one of his characters speculate that "Epicurus does not believe in any gods, and that the statements which he made affirming the immortal gods were made to avert popular odium."

I used to think that the very idea that philosophical speech was harmless was a kind of effect of the partial victory of the Enlightenment in certain countries, one of the (foreseeable) side-effects of the rise of mutual toleration. But I increasingly doubt that toleration has been much practiced in the lands of Enlightenment (or an engine of liberalism) and, where it has, it's been the effect of seeing such speech as harmless or, which amounts to the same thing, ridiculous. And put like that we're on the familiar terrain of a certain kind of sober friend of analytic philosophy.

These melancholic reflections where prompted by reading H.H. Price's (1945) "The Inaugural Address: Clarity Is Not Enough." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. (I was alerted to it by ��d��m Tuboly after yesterday's post on clarity.) The lecture defends the idea that clarification just is analysis. The lecture's style evokes the great age of the philosophers known by their initials with scant explicit references to other philosophers that are evoked.

Price (1899 ��� 1984) wrote a fine book on Hume, and had some impact on philosophical discussion of perception. At one point he held The Wykeham Professorship in Logic at Oxford. O quam cito transit gloria mundi: (looking at you, Jason Stanley), he is mostly forgotten, even obscure now. I was pleased to learn from the Wikipedia entry that he had considerable interest in parapsychology and the afterlife. This made him less eccentric then than he might seem now. (As regular readers know I am reading Stebbing's (1939) Thinking to Some Purpose, and she is rather open-minded about the possibility of parapsychology. Sidgwick's contemporary stature has not suffered at all from his very considerable interest in such phenomena.)

I am by no means the first to consider the possibility that philosophy as practiced professionally by analytic philosophers might be thought trivial and, thus, harmless. We find an echo of it in Isaiah Berlin's famous inaugural lecture in which, as I noted before (recall), he mocks the "innocent and idyllic state" that ordinarily language philosophy would present to a Martian visitor. In context, it's not a compliment. (Of course, this feature of the lecture is ignored by people trying to use it as a starting point for their analysis of the concept(s) of freedom.) More polemical versions of this diagnosis can be found in Gellner's criticisms of ordinary language philosophy's trivializing tendency in which "everything remains as it." (Words and Things).

Anyway, Price's lecture concludes, in fact, with a plea for a certain kind of systematizing speculative metaphysics that devises "a conceptual scheme which brings out certain systematic relationships between the matters of fact we know already-including those queer and puzzling ones about which we know only a little." (p. 29) And Price advocates (acknowledging this might be thought ���shocking���) for more tolerance for obscure utterances that point the way to important issues, but are obscure in virtue of the lack of an existing adequate terminology. Much of the lecture, however, explicitly tackles the charge that philosophy conceived as analysis is trivial and concerns itself with trivialities. It resists the temptation to answer (with a nod to a Hippocratic principle), 'and it is better that way.' But it does grant the charge.

Like all the great lectures of the age of initials, it is (despite a slightly different jargon from ours) very lucid, and I will quote the passage in which Price resists the temptation to allow philosophy a role in (what we might call) 'betterment.'  

[A]lthough knowledge makes no difference to what is known, it may still make a very great difference to the knower. Likewise when one acquires a clear knowledge of something which one has previously known in a vague or confused manner, this it is true, makes no difference to the thing known. The principles of right action are what they are, whether we are muddled about them or clear about them. But if the "clarifying" moral philosopher enables us to get a clear knowledge of these principles, that may make a very great difference to us, though it makes no difference whatever to them. And the difference which it makes to us can hardly fail to affect our conduct. Certainly it will affect our judgments about other people's actions. We shall judge them more fairly and more charitably if we have learned to discriminate clearly between motive and intention, between rightness and conscientiouness, if we have learned to ask ourselves whether a man's duty depends on the facts as they are, or only on the facts as he believes them to be. And if we judge other people more fairly, our emotions towards them will be more appropriate, and our behaviour towards them more just. Similar results will follow if we sit down in a cool hour to judge our own actions, past or proposed (and everyone has cool hours sometimes). If we have a clear grasp of the distinctions I have mentioned, and a well-constructed terminology for formulating them, our emotions of self-approval and self-disapproval will be more appropriate to their object. These emotions cannot fail to affect our future conduct, and that conduct will in consequence be more likely to be right.

It is true, I think, that such an increase of clarity will not make us more conscientious. It will only make us more likely to do the things which are objectively right, and then only if we already have a desire to do what is right. If we have no conscience to begin with, and no desire to do what is right, the clarifying philosopher cannot give us these things. If " better " means " more likely to judge fairly and to act rightly," he can make us better men, provided always that we have some modicum of goodness to start with. But if " better" means " more conscientious," then he cannot make us better; and still less can he provide us with a conscience if we have none. (pp. 10-11)

 

What's really neat about the passage is that philosophy itself is treated as intrinsically inert and, any motivational pull it might have, as dependent on our desires, conscience, judgement, that is, our personality. With this kind of conception of philosophy, inductive risk never arises. In so far as the fruits of philosophical analysis are implicated in harms to others, we shouldn't hold these fruits accountable, but the people involved. (It���s not philosophical bullets that kill, but the person deploying them.) While ordinary language philosophy and pure conceptual analysis have become less popular, this meta-philosophical conception of philosophical praxis has won the day. And so for many the argument from inductive risk cannot get off the ground because it fails to understand properly the nature of philosophy.

In the passage quoted, Price is evoking a famous, controversial passage from Butler's Eleventh Sermon (one that generated continued reflection not just in the eighteenth century): "Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."* In the reception of Butler, much of the controversy surrounds to what degree Butler slides into a species of Hobbism/egocentrism here, not to what degree morality is motivating. But of course, it does raise the worry that without the right psychological pull, virtue might fall short. One can do much worse than to read Darwall���s The British moralists and the internal'ought': 1640-1740 to learn how that worry plays out.

I mention this because it is quite clear that Price himself assumes a picture of moral psychology that is very different from Butler's. Whatever the exact details of Price's views, it's clear that his has a family resemblance to the Humean one familiar of twentieth century discussions of practical reasoning/reasons. In it, the right reasons by themselves lack sufficient motivational pull. (A recent reading of Elijah Millgram's (2015) The great endarkenment: Philosophy for an age of hyperspecialization has made me more attentive to the ways in which conceptions of analysis and moral psychology interact and shape each other in the analytic tradition.)

At this point one may well be tempted to argue that if one gives up the Humean -- billiard ball -- account of (practical) agency or the self, the inertness of philosophy's fruits cannot be assumed. I think that's right. And if a cool-hour, meta-philosophical discussion were possible in the midst of a culture-war controversy (which it is not), it would be possible to distinguish among those who disagreed over the nature of moral psychology and/or the nature of philosophy from those that disagreed about the substantive underlying moral and political issues. In reality, of course, the substantive moral and political disagreements will shape renewals or doubling down on meta-philosophical commitments.

I could stop here. But Price recognizes that there is an open question: "can any philosopher, however anti-analytical, make us more conscientious?" His response to this question is instructive: "One would suppose that this [making us more conscientious] is the function not of philosophers but of preachers, though certainly every preacher would be the better for a training in Moral Philosophy. Perhaps however the real point of the attacks on the clarificatory moral philosophers lies here." Now Price acknowledges that from Socrates onward in the past philosophers did take on the role of moralists. (The young Hume, perhaps, being the famous exception.) And he notes that it would good if there were a (normative) discipline of Eudaemonics; and he acknowledges that psychology as practiced will not meet this need. But he resists the call for moralism by philosophy:

I do not think however that Moral Philosophers can really be blamed for not being preachers ; unless the word "preacher" is a misleading name for an expert in Eudaemonics, as possibly it is sometimes. By all means let them preach if they feel a call to do so; but we cannot fairly impose it upon them as part of their job. Their job is to tell us what goodness is, not to make us good. I admit however that "preaching" in a wide sense of that term, is a very important social function. If our existing preachers are not listened to, owing to the widespread decay of religious belief among educated people, perhaps there is need of a special order of purely ethical preachers, like some of the Stoics of the Roman Imperial period, or the Confucian teachers of China. And I agree that such persons should have a philosophical training, though they should not necessarily be professional philosophers. (p. 14)

What's interesting about the passage is not that Price does not foresee the revival of normative ethical and political theory. But rather that he does think there is an occupational niche for philosophical informed preaching.

But in so doing, Price tacitly assumes a kind of principle of specialization -- he had just quoted the Republic so this is not wholly speculative -- that rules out the double-function of preaching, which he allows some significant social utility, for professional philosophers. My meta-philosophical observation on this is this: that the moment one foregoes the inertness or triviality of the fruits of philosophy, one cannot keep preaching or moralism out of the profession ��� and keep concerns over inductive risk at bay ��� and so, if there is a culture war, culture war disagreements within the profession are inevitable. Once triviality is lost, politics enter.

 

*Adam Smith loved the phrase 'cool hours' and uses it repeatedly in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

 

 

On Susan Stebbing and Clarity (with some nods to Carnap, Quine, and Ernest nagel), Part I

[I will phase out D&I at typepad. This post was first published at: digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work consider becoming a paid subscriber at ]

When, back at NewAPPS, I first blogged about Susan Stebbing (1885 ��� 1943), a key figure in early analytic philosophy, there was almost no scholarship on her. Since then a fine entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy and a number of important scholarly papers and books have appeared. I take no credit for this joyous state of affairs!

My present interest in her work is to explore to what degree she helps us make sense of the nature of 'clarity' or 'clearness' so valued by analytic philosophers then and today. To do so, in this post I focus on Thinking to Some Purpose (1939), which was written for a wide audience (it was commissioned by pelican). This may bias our treatment of her views on clarity. But we have to start somewhere (and the book gives us some of her most detailed views on the matter).

The official topic of the book is announced in the prologue:

I am convinced of the urgent need for a democratic people to think clearly without the distortions due to unconscious bias and unrecognized ignorance. Our failures in thinking are in part due to faults which we could to some extent overcome were we to see clearly how these faults arise. It is the aim of this book to make a small effort in this direction.--Preface to the 1939 edition, pp. xxix-xxx*

It's worth noting that 'clear' and its cognates are used repeatedly through the book. Clarity here is a property of thought and perception. In what follows, I use 'cognition' as shorthand for both. Clarity seems to be a necessary condition for success at thinking (and action guided by it). In particular, clarity is the absence of distortions in thought and perception caused by bias and ignorance one is not aware of. Undoubtedly undistorted thought is what's being aimed at in describing something as ���clear.��� But the suggestion is that known biases and and awareness of ignorance are not an obstacle to successful thought presumably because they can knowingly be controlled for. Crucially, clear cognition is a key ingredient for intelligence on Stebbing's view. (22)

It is an important question in political philosophy to what degree it really is necessary for a democratic people to have undistorted thoughts and even control for known biases. But I leave that aside here. (Well, I return indirectly to it at the end of the post.)

Presumably, Stebbing's interest in unconscious bias is prompted by the significance of political propaganda, demagoguery, and advertising (she groups these together as "rhetorical persuasion") and presumably also reflects the growing stature of Freudianism in the age. It is an interesting sociological-historical fact that interest in such bias was revived in recent decades in the context of concerns over racial discriminatory practices. However, for Stebbing an important example of such unconscious bias are (not the desires of our infant inner child, but rather) the "concealed contradictions" we acquire as members of a group. (p. 22) In fact, racial biases are one of the kinds she discusses.

Be that as it may, Stebbing's notion of clarity is not the only one that one can find in the analytic tradition. For Carnap (recall) clarity is an (aesthetic) property or by-product of formal systems, of constructed languages. Clarity in the hands of Carnap means to capture a kind of demand for transparency in one's inferential practices, one's commitments, and the use of terms (it very much hopes to prevent equivocation and polysemous use).  Carnapian clarity is really a second-order property of an otherwise esoteric, expert practice.

By contrast, Quine had a tendency, as Greg Frost-Arnold has shown, (i) to associate clarity with more general forms of intelligibility. In later years, Quine might argue that (ii) his program (developed in Word & Object) of the philosopher regimenting scientific language to exhibit its ontological commitments, may also be aiming at a species of clarity (about the 'ontology' of science), alongside systematicity.  He also (iii) came to think of clarity as a more general theoretical virtue of a system. 

What's important for present purposes is that neither Carnap's nor Quine's notions of clarity is aimed at or -- given that science is highly specialized -- apt for a democratic people. (I don���t mean to deny that Carnap was very interested in facilitating improved democratic life.) And while there are undoubtedly some family resemblances and overlaps between their notion of clarity and Stebbing's it's useful to keep them distinct (more on that below).

Interestingly enough, also in 1938, (recall) Ernest Nagel was concerned with the role of clarity in democratic life. For Nagel clarification is the development of canons of intelligibility and validity apt for (esoteric) special sciences, but also the making transparent of the methods and practices of science that generate warranted claims to ordinary people in part by showing how and the way terms/concepts hang together and function in a system of knowledge and forms of ordinary practice. In particular, the cultivation of clarity is a contribution to a democratic ethos that prevents mere reliance and dependence on authoritative experts and also ensures that calls to action are proportioned to the evidence on their behalf. (See here for a scholarly version of this claim.)

Again, while I don't want to exaggerate the differences between Nagel and Stebbing ���they share in fact a pragmatist sensibility, and agree on the significance of proportioning belief to evidence and the important focus of the way we do things with reasonings --, it's important to see the contrasting notions of clarity at work here. In Nagel, clarity is something we do to specialist language and practices that, amongst other functions, can shape and diagnose features in ordinary life, whereas for Stebbing clarity can be immanent in and part and parcel of ordinary life. Not to put too fine a point on it, Nagel, Carnap, and Quine all share in the idea that there is some salient contrast between formal and specialist, regimented languages, on one hand, and ordinary speech, on the other. (How that contrast is characterized is famously a matter of substantive disagreement among them.) In this divide clarity is not to be found primarily on the side of ordinary talk. Stebbing is the outlier in thinking that clarity is not so restricted, but available, in principle, to us all. This is the first thing I wanted to establish today.

The second is that while Stebbing treats clarity as a property of thought and perception that is, in principle, widely diffused among ordinary people (she thinks we all have "some capacity to follow an argument" (21) and in a footnote hopes its not unduly optimistic (26)), she also treats it as a skill that can be acquired for one can be "trained to think clearly." (p. 4) Such training makes "rational argument and��� reasonable consideration" possible. Stebbing's role in articulating a deliberative conception of democracy is worth highlighting.

Now what such training involves and who controls access to it are quite important, but I postpone discussion of her views to another time. What matters here is that the skill itself can, once acquired with "effort" (29), also be something that we control. (She emphasizes that have to wish to think clearly.) And, third, that a feature of the skill is logically sound argument (which should not be conflated with syllogistic reasoning).

In future posts, I want to make more precise and also explore some of the difficulties with Stebbing's conception of clarity. But it is worth noting two final features of it in this digression. Stebbing takes

for granted that to be clear-headed is worth while for its own sake. Without this assumption I should not have wanted to write this book. It is, however, enough if you will admit that muddled thinking ends in bungled doing, so that to think clearly is useful for the sake of achieving even our most practical aims. Unless you admit at least as much as this, there will be no point, so far as you are concerned, in what I have to say. Our points of view would be too different for discussion to be possible. (34)

The first feature is that clarity is not just treated as an instrumental value to democratic deliberative life. Stebbing values it as a private and presumably highly intellectual virtue or end in itself. (There are shades of Spinoza here whose work she knew well.) Fair enough, and not wholly surprising.

But it is a bit peculiar that she thinks her imagined interlocuter or reader must share in the commitment that "to think clearly is useful for the sake of achieving even our most practical aims." Admittedly, it seems odd for anyone to deny this in the most general sense. But it is not wholly unreasonable for such an interlocuter to also claim that clarity of cognition may often (perhaps always) be unnecessary to achieve our most practical aims (because relying on tradition, faith, instinct, testimony, or expertise/authority of others). And perhaps (admittedly there are shades of Hume and Nietzsche here) its our biases (or overconfidence) that help us acquire  our most fundamental, practical aims (which are always constrained by time and other resources scarcities). The real problem here is not the purported role of clarity in achieving our aims, but in Stebbing's insistence that muddled thinking must end in muddled doing. This has not been established. (It's hard to see how it could be established given how much has been achieved in conditions of ignorance and superstition.)

Now, what's odd is that in order to have discussion at all, Stebbing assumes assent on this very point of contention. And the reason it is odd is that in a democratic society we can't assume or stipulate agreement over such questions or ways of life including those that, to put it exaggeratedly, resist the clarion call of Enlightenment. My point here is not that one cannot help others see how useful clarity might be (and Stebbing is wonderful on this score), but rather that it must the potential effect of such discussion not its common ground.

This first appeared at: <On Susan Stebbing and Clarity (with some nods to Carnap, Quine, and Ernest Nagel), Part I (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

 

 

*All my quotes/page-numbers are from the 2022 Routledge reprint with an introduction by Peter West and a foreword by Nigel Warburton.

On Clarke's Criticism of Austrialian Settler Colonialism and his account of intelligence

[I will phase out D&I at typepad. This post was first published at:  digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at ]

This digression is devoted to an extended aside in A Fall of Moondust; a slender 1961 novel by Arthur C. Clarke (1917 ��� 2008). It's easy to forget how famous Clarke once was not just as a science fiction author, but in wider discussions of science policy and search for extraterrestrial life. Anyway, the main action of the book is the rescue mission of a group of passengers on a sightseeing tour on the Moon, who are trapped under a kind of lunar dustbowl caused by a lunar Earthquake. While it plays some role in the development of the genre of 'hard science fiction' (or scientific science fiction), the novel is primarily a study, from multiple angles, of group dynamics and leadership under great stress and time constraints. What's neat is that there is no unique hero in the story, but that many kinds of contributions are valued. But because Clarke's characterizations are flimsy (and marred by gendered stereotypes) it's best read as an adventure story with occasionally comic touches. What follows does not contain any spoilers. 

The novel, which is set in the future, is oriented around a kind of settler-colonial mission to the Moon, and the possibility of developing a tourism industry on it. Clarke leaves the exact political details underspecified, and even the institutional contents of global peace is left unclear (especially compared to his slightly earlier Childhood's End). There is some evidence that the United Nations is politically influential and that some of the balance of power in it has shifted to Africa--we'll see evidence of what one might call 'post-colonial subaltern solidarity' that Clarke expects. (It's the great age of decolonization in which he was writing.) And while there is some evidence that the Soviet Union is culturally significant, the novel offers plenty of suggestions that ordinary market capitalism is not extinguished yet. I leave it at that (some of the evidence is quoted below).

Interestingly enough (given Clarke's own non-fictional views), the possibility of encountering extra-terrestrial life is actually minimized and ridiculed throughout the novel. It���s compared to religion in ways unflattering to both UFOs and religion.

In fact, one natural take-away from the novel is that if technological barriers to space-colonization can be overcome (and it is not obvious it's worth the money and risks), it's much preferable over settler-colonization on Earth. And the reason I say this is because there is a set-piece about 2/3rds of the novel, when -- during the dramatic action of the novel things have reached a real nadir -- there is an extended conversation between Pat (the captain of the space-bus buried under lunar dust), who we just learn is Lunar born, and McKenzie (who is one of his terrestrial touristy passengers trapped alongside him). I'll quote the passage in full:

 

"...Incidentally, how did you get a name like McKenzie?"

Having had little contact with the racial tensions that were not yet wholly extinct on Earth, Pat could make such remarks without embarrassment���indeed, without even realizing that they might cause embarrassment.

"My grandfather had it bestowed on him by a missionary when he was baptized. I'm very doubtful if it has any���ah��� genetic significance. To the best of my knowledge, I'm a full-blooded abo."

"Abo?"

"Aboriginal. We were the people occupying Australia before the whites came along. The subsequent events were somewhat depressing."

Pat's knowledge of terrestrial history was vague; like most residents of the Moon, he tended to assume that nothing of great importance had ever happened before 8 November 1967, when the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution had been so spectacularly celebrated.

"I suppose there was war?"

"You could hardly call it that. We had spears and boomerangs; they had guns. Not to mention T.B. and V.D., which were much more effective. It took us about a hundred and fifty years to get over the impact. It's only in the last century��� since about nineteen forty���that our numbers started going up again. Now there are about a hundred thousand of us��� almost as many as when your ancestors came."

McKenzie delivered this information with an ironic detachment that took any personal sting out of it, but Pat thought that he had better disclaim responsibility for the misdeeds of his terrestrial predecessors.

"Don't blame me for what happened on Earth," he said. "I've never been there, and I never will���I couldn't face that gravity. But I've looked at Australia plenty of times through the telescope. I have some sentimental feeling for the place��� my parents took off from Woomera."

"And my ancestors named it; a woomera's a booster stage for spears."

Are any of your people," asked Pat, choosing his words with care, "still living in primitive conditions? I've heard that's still true, in some parts of Asia."

"The old tribal life's gone. It went very quickly, when the African nations in the U.N. started bullying Australia. Often quite unfairly, I might add���for I'm an Australian first, and an aboriginal second. But I must admit that my white countrymen were often pretty stupid; they must have been, to think that we were stupid! Why, 'way into the last century some of them still thought we were Stone Age savages. Our technology was Stone Age, all right���but we weren't."

There seemed nothing incongruous to Pat about this discussion, beneath the surface of the Moon, of a way of life so distant both in space and time. He and McKenzie would have to entertain each other, keep an eye on their twenty unconscious companions, and fight off sleep, for at least five more hours. This was as good a way as any of doing it.

"If your people weren't in the Stone Age, Doc���and just for the sake of argument, I'll grant that you aren't���how did the whites get that idea?"

"Sheer stupidity, with the help of a preconceived bias. It's an easy assumption that if a man can't count, write, or speak good English, he must be unintelligent. I can give you a perfect example from my own family. My grandfather���the first McKenzie���lived to see the year two thousand, but he never learned to count beyond ten. And his description of a total eclipse of the Moon was 'Kerosene lamp bilong Jesus Christ he bugger-up finish altogether.'

"Now, I can write down the differential equations of the Moon's orbital motion, but I don't claim to be brighter than Grandfather. If we'd been switched in time, he might have been the better physicist. Our opportunities were different-that's all. Grandfather never had occasion to learn to count; and I never had to raise a family in the desert���which was a highly skilled, full-time job"

Perhaps," said Pat thoughtfully, "we could do with some of your grandfather's skills here. For that's what we're trying to do now���survive in a desert."

"I suppose you could put it that way, though I don't think that boomerang and fire stick would be much use to us. Maybe we could use some magic���but I'm afraid I don't know any, and I doubt if the tribal gods could make it from Arnhem Land."

"Do you ever feel sorry," asked Pat, "about the breakup of your people's way of life?"

"How could I? I scarcely knew it. I was born in Brisbane, and had learned to run an electronic computer before I ever saw a corroboree���"

"A what?"

"Tribal religious dance���and half the participants in that were taking degrees in cultural anthropology. I've no romantic illusions about the simple life and the noble savage. My ancestors were fine people, and I'm not ashamed of them, but geography had trapped them in a dead end. After the struggle for sheer existence, they had no energy left for a civilization. In the long run, it was a good thing that the white settlers arrived, despite their charming habit of selling us poisoned flour when they wanted our land."

"They did that? "

"They certainly did. But why are you surprised? That was a good hundred years before Belsen."

Pat thought this over for a few minutes. Then he looked at his watch and said, with a distinct expression of relief: "Time I reported to Base again. Let's have a quick look at the passengers first."���Chapter 19.

We don't learn what role Belsen (presumably a reference to Bergen-Belsen) has in the intellectual self-understanding of the future. But the implication seems to be that it is a non-trivial part of the cultural common ground of the educated of the future. Clarke here invites the reader to reflect on the commonalities (and some of the differences) between the genocidal treatment of the Jews by the Nazis and the settler-colonialism of the Anglo-Australians toward the aboriginals. 

More explicitly, McKenzie's argument (which is not contradicted anywhere else in the novel) is critical of racist views of intelligence in two ways (one obvious and one more subtle): first, he rejects racial nativism as explanatory when it comes to intelligence, and he plainly comes down on the side of education, opportunity, and culture as key drivers of intellectual development.

Second, he explicitly rejects the idea that there is one kind of intelligence; intelligence is something context specific. And, in fact, in this day of machine learning, it's a useful reminder of the older, wiser idea of intelligence as a culturally embedded skill that allows one to navigate one's environment(s).

This anti-racist view is embedded in a Victorian stance (that one finds in, say, J.S. Mill) that draws on a much older conceptual contrast of civilization vs savage that is understood in energetic and cultural evolutionary/selectionist terms ("geography had trapped them in a dead end. After the struggle for sheer existence.") Now, again the 'civilized' are not necessarily smarter--the point of the passage is to alert us to their arrogant stupidity and biases that makes the more powerful miss or overlook intelligence when they encounter it (and it suits their interests to do so).

But the implication of the cultural/group Darwinian argument in the quoted set-piece is that it is fundamentally better to be technologically civilized and that ���savage��� life-styles are fundamentally not worth preserving or revitalizing (notice that 'dead end'). That is to say, the total effect of the extended aside is a kind of cultural argument for technological progress or spatial manifest destiny that tries to avoid the racialist, even genocidal versions of the past. But the racist versions are not wholly repudiated on consequentialist grounds because  "in the long run, it was a good thing that the white settlers arrived" despite the costs. Not to put too fine point on it, but this is a species of secular theodicy.

This first appeared at: <https://digressionsimpressions.substack.com/p/on-arthur-c-clarkes-criticism-white> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

 

On Borges, John Perry, Spinoza, and Identity

[I will phase out D&I at typepad. This post was first published at:  digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at ]

I once met John Perry for a few minutes in line at a hotel Starbucks at an Eastern APA when those were still the job-market. We didn't know each other, and we never met again (so far). But I knew his name because I owned his A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality; our chat was brief, but it was kind not the least because his eyes didn't wander to scan the room while we talked. I forgot what we talked about, but, as the kids say, sometimes the vibe is more important than the words and it was one of the few sweet moments during that otherwise dismal APA.

So, I'll forgive him that in his (2007) Amherst Lecture which offers a reading of ���Borges and I,��� Perry opts for "the more straightforward interpretation" in supposing that the implied author of "Borges and I" is Borges the (famous) actual author of the piece, and not some fictional counterpart or doppelg��nger of the actual author. After all, we're dealing with Borges, the author of Pierre Menard!

"Borges and I' is, in fact, about the estranged relationship between the implied author of "Borges and I" and the famous author, Borges. So, it's not impossible that the implied author of "Borges and I" is the fictional counterpart.

Perry actually acknowledges this possibility on some level later in his argument when he concedes that "in following the writer���s thoughts, we must to a certain extent pretend that the writer is not Borges." But Perry thinks we can't sustain this perspective because "the interest of the story is the thoughts that the writer has about himself" (emphasis added) and not the implied fictional counterpart.

As an aside, the less straightforward interpretation that Perry rejects is that "Borges could have written a story like this about some other author." But that's compatible with the implied author being (not just a counterpart/doppelg��nger of Borges, but) also (say) Eric Schliesser. And it's quite clear that the latter option is not really implied by the story. So, while I agree with Perry that this is less likely and should be rejected, I don't think, as I hinted in the previous two paragraphs, Perry has canvassed all the relevant options when he opts for what he takes to be the more straightforward interpretation.

Perry's interpretation of "Borges and I" actually goes off the rails, I think, shortly thereafter when he writes that "It would not only be odd, but quite impossible, for Borges to survive the writer. Even if all that is meant by ���survival��� is living on as a literary figure, if Borges lives on in that way, so will the writer."  This is not right if we reject the more straightforward interpretation.

But even on the straightforward interpretation there is a wrinkle that Perry does not confront. (I say this with some trepidation not just because I remember his kindness so fondly, but also because between the two of us, he is actually the expert on identity.) Before I get to that, for Perry, "Borges and I" is fundamentally about the expression of "a certain alienation [the actual Borges] feels about certain aspects of himself and certain achievements of his." The alienation thesis is quite plausible. But the reason for Perry's confidence here is that he is working with a theory of identity (let's call it a 'classical' one) in which "the relation that A and B have when there is just one thing that is both A and B. It is the relation that Tully has to Cicero, the evening star has to the morning star, Mark Twain has to Samuel Clemens, Bill Blythe has to Bill Clinton, and so on. Identity is the relation that each thing has to itself and no other." This is familiar enough for philosophical readers.

In order to hold on to this classical theory of identity and to handle the ways in which A and B (Borges and I or I and Borges) may seem to come apart in "Borges and I," Perry introduces the idea of "motivating cognitive complex." If you are interested in finding out what that is read Perry���s lecture. I'll stipulate here that it can do the job Perry wants it to do.

To be sure, I don't mean to deny that Perry may be playing an elaborate, Borgesian game with us, too. After all, along the way, while discussing a thought experiment of Hector-Neri Casta��eda, Perry notes that "then I see on the web that the date when John Perry published his Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality was 1978, that information goes into the same mental file where information about what is in front of me, whether I am hungry or not, and the like, is kept. I get the information ���John Perry published the dialogue in 1978��� and this leads to the thought, ���I published the dialogue in 1978.���" One may well wonder who this I really is supposed to be. 

Be that as it may, I don't think that Borges (in the straightforward interpretation) or the implied author, Borges's counterpart (in my preferred interpretation) is relying on the classical theory of identity in "Borges and I." And my reason for thinking that is two-fold: first, the story ends with an epistemic claim: "I don���t know which of the two writes this page." On Perry's reading this ought to be deeply puzzling. For, by stipulation (the straightforward interpretation), the persona who is writing the piece is Borges the famous author. So this doubt really can���t arise on Perry���s straightforward reading.

Second, Perry completely, and somewhat oddly (he is a professional philosopher, after all), skips the explicit invocation of Spinoza in "Borges and I" (which in the translations I am familiar with is shorter than a double-spaced page). 

It's pretty clear that Spinoza rejects the classical theory of identity. This is obvious in Spinoza's doctrine of eternality in which the X that becomes eternal loses all the particularity one naturally  (and also on the classical theory of identity) associates with X and becomes, in fact, in a certain sense co-extensive with the true or the truths (Y). But it���s not so that from the perspective of eternity, X=Y. (See here for an attempt to describe this.) In fact, Spinoza also rejects what Tarski calls the 'classical' conception of truth (and defends what one might call a metaphysical identity theory of truth (recall here)). Rather, like the Muslim philosophers' views of God���s knowledge (as Al-Ghazali infers, they deny that God knows individuals), from the perspective of eternity, Spinoza's individuals and individuality are ephemera (and so unknowable). My point here is not to defend Spinoza.

Now, it's possible, of course, that the implied author of "Borges and I" has a different interpretation of Spinoza than the one hinted at in the previous paragraph. Fair enough. In the story, the following is claimed: "Spinoza understood that all things want to be preserved in their being." This is an evocation of a feature of the so-called general 'Conatus doctrine' (EIIIp6). In fact, it echoes Ethics IIIp9 (and a whole series of propositions developed in parts IV/V of the Ethics): "The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and also insofar as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in being." In "Borges and I" the doctrine gets glossed as follows (in the translation of Ilan Stavans): 

the stone eternally wants to be a stone and the tiger a tiger. I shall remain in Borges, not in myself (if I am someone), but I recognize myself less in his books than in many others and in the laborious strumming of a guitar. Years ago I tried freeing myself from him and went from the mythologies of the arrabal to the games with time and the infinite, but those games are Borges��� now and I shall come up with other things. Thus my life is a flight and I lose everything and everything belongs to oblivion, or to the other.

Again, at first one may think it's pretty clear Perry is onto something when he suggests that this expresses alienation. Perhaps an alienation so extreme, that the conatus doctrine ends up in a kind of inversion: rather than tending toward eternity, it tends in the implied author toward oblivion or near-total loss of identity.

Before I close this digression, I should admit that I ended up returning to Borges' story because my friend Petra had bait-and-switched me into buying Amina Cain's fascinating essay, A Horse at Night. This essay mentions two of Borges' stories (including "Borges and I���.) I write ���bait-and-switch,��� because Petra had sent me a picture of a paragraph from Cain, which I only later realized (while reading Cain's essay) was an excerpt from Annie Ernaux's The Possession.

A major theme of A Horse at Night, is how in "writing and life" two things can be imaginatively projected on top of each other without eclipsing each other and, thereby, generating something new. That is, Cain explores the complex nature of identity. To put this as a serious joke: I find Cain's implied author in A Horse at Night nearly insufferable and banal when she is engaged in autobiography and mesmerizingly evocative and interesting when discussing other artist���s works of art. For the record: Cain treats the implied author of "Borges and I" as sad.

Neither Perry nor Cain discusses Spinoza or the skeptical conclusion of "Borges and I:" "I don���t know which of the two writes this page." It's not obvious on Perry's reading why this occurs. It's a rather extreme form of skepticism; it denies knowledge of the self-identifying features of the Cartesian ego in the very act of affirming its existence. It is especially notable ��� alerted by Cain ��� that this occurs in the writer���s life that one forgets or losses oneself in a certain sense. (Cain touches on this from the perspective of the Soto Zen tradition, not Spinozism.)

If we glance at Spinoza's theory of identity the puzzle disappears if we imagine, as we are allowed in fiction, that the sentence, "I don���t know which of the two writes this page," is written from the perspective of eternity/oblivion. For from that perspective such individualizing marks are not known/knowable. Of course, the joke is knowing that one is Borges, or the implied author, or his very vain counterpart, wouldn't matter from that perspective either, or at least it shouldn't.

This first appeared at: <On Borges, John Perry, Spinoza, and Identity - by nescio13 (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

On JPP, Wiley, Prestige Production, and Game Theoretic Modeling

[I will phase out D&I at typepad. This post was first published at:  digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at ]

As Leiterreports (and here; here) and Dailynous reported, Wiley (a commercial publisher), got rid of Robert Goodin (a prominent political philosopher) as editor of the Journal of Political Philosophy (JPP), which is (one of) the leading journals in political philosophy in good part thanks to Goodin's long stewardship.  It is no surprise that most of Goodin's fellow editors and board resigned in protest. There has been a lovely closing of ranks.

Because I am going to be rather (sternly) critical of the ranks, I want to stress that Wiley's explanation was ridiculously and scandalously vague. More important, the manner in which they fired Goodin also suggests unwarranted editorial interference that actually risks endangering academic freedom. So, resignation was the right thing to do.

But as the resigning editorial board members' comments started to appear in public, it seems that folk in the know believe that the cause of Wiley's decision is that it wanted to increase the number of published papers rather rapidly up to a tenfold more (see here; here). Immediately one started to read on social media that pursuit of profit is undermining quality. (This show up in the threads I have already linked to above, but also in discussions elsewhere.)

However, a major reason why Wiley is nudging many presses to expand journal space is that universities, libraries, and grant agencies have contracted with them to do so in the context of expanding open access. From the perspective of grant agencies and universities this makes a lot of sense: they are funding research that, if of sufficient quality, needs an outlet. (For those who work in a grant system the absence of slots often becomes visible only after acceptance when one discovers that a journal has no more slots available in a given year!) I am not a fan of these contracts because they basically show what happens when well-connected corporations take advantage of well-intentioned policy shifts: they capture the financial rents. Yet, it doesn't follow that open access or expanding journal space (and so increasing acceptance rates) is a mistake. And in what follows I focus on the latter.

For, as is well known, academic philosophy has incredibly low acceptance rates in its flagship journals (often under 5% acceptance rates).* I couldn't find a recent number for JPP, but it seems to be around 5% and I wouldn't be surprised if it were lower. A quick count suggests, JPP publishes 24 articles a year (give or take). Another leading journal, P&PA "has historically published 12-16 articles per year." And it does not get much better at a journal like CRISPP (about 20). [I make the relationship between slots and acceptance rates more precise below.] The situation is not much better in most areas of professional philosophy (but see below).

I have noted in the past that these acceptance rates only make sense, epistemically, if philosophical activity had enormous inductive risk to society. Nobody believes that as Tim Crane argued in an important essay in TLS (back in 2018; see here for ungated version). Tim helpfully suggests that the real explanation is that "publication in one of these journals may no longer be that sole decisive achievement that will get you that job or grant." That's clearly true, but not wholly right not just because I would add promotion to his list. As Anna Stilz, whose comments were highlighted by Justin Weinberg, notes, publication in these journals is a "signalling device that validates the importance of someone���s work when they go up for tenure and promotion."

However, as should be well known, compared to other disciplines, including the sciences, professional philosophy's acceptance rates is especially low (recall Justin Weinber's discussion). And other disciplines also hire and promote people. Thus, I suggest the real function of such very low acceptance rates is the felt need for prestige production in professional philosophy among the circle entrusted to run leading journals.+ Before I get to the attempt to conflate such 'prestige' or 'importance' with 'quality' that insiders often make, it is worth noting that the needs of such signaling are not evidently co-extensive with the pursuit of truth (leaving wisdom aside) or progress in the field. In fact, they clearly can come apart.

For, there are some (quite predictable and also widely discussed) side-effects of the very low acceptance rates: very fine papers need to be shopped around to many journals before they find a home. This has overburdened the supply of referees, and it has put tremendous pressure on editorial process at many journals. We are a discipline that is familiar with moratoria on submission and backlogs from acceptance to publication at quite a few journals. There is also often a huge delay between submission and verdict. And consequently overall a huge delay between research and actual publication for too many papers. Thus, as organized, prestige generation slows down whatever rate of progress one might hope for in the field. (Yes, I am a skeptic about philosophical progress, so I use 'progress'  here relative to a research frontier or relative to how competent judges in a field would describe it.)** 

The problem with this state of affair is not merely epistemic. It also generates huge additional anxiety for people who are or expect to be on the job market and who are up for promotion. (This is also true in other fields, of course.) With acceptance rates so low, they basically face a (weighted) lottery whether their papers are accepted in a time frame needed. This state of affairs probably reinforces all kinds of structural injustice, again not only relative to other disciplines. The fact that many leading journals have, sometimes for decades on end, been entrusted to a 'safe pair of hands' (a distinguished, often male, philosopher) probably increases the bottlenecks and the risks of such structural injustice, but -- like the fact that we see so little experimentation with journal form (and kinds of review) [something I strongly advocate] -- I leave that aside here.

Now, I am not claiming editors are gaming acceptance rates directly. But they do clearly view number of issue/volume slots or pages as a hard constraint (perhaps regulated by an implicit willingness to let publication not be delayed for more than a year or two after official acceptance). But notice that restricting supply of slots is not the same as selecting on quality. If one really selected on quality alone one would allow the supply of slots/pages to be flexible. So, in what follows (and above) I use 'low acceptance rates' as a proxy for limiting the number of publication slots, or selectivity.

Above I noted that prestige generation trade-offs with progress at the low rates of acceptance in professional philosophy. We don't need to model that. (It gets more complicated as acceptance rates rise significantly because there may well be an inflection point where too much ease of publication undermines progress.) But we need some modeling to help understand that prestige generation or selectivity and quality can come apart significantly.

Luckily for me (and the quality of discussion) I was sent a pre-print of a paper, "Academic journals, incentives, and the quality of peer review: a model," by K. J. S. Zollman, J. Garc��a, and T. Handfield conditionally accepted at Philosophy of Science that has a game-theoretic model exploring possible trade offs between aiming for quality and (you guessed it) for low acceptance rates, in contexts where selectivity is taken to be a measure or proxy for quality. The paper should be publicly available fairly soon. But my discussion won���t turn on technical details and it���s possible lack of robustness. (I call incentive-alert philosophy of science, ���public choice philosophy of science.���) In their model quality is an effect of peer review which is costly. And somewhat worrisome they conclude that "journals incentivized by selectivity have strong incentives to maintain worse peer review than those incentivized by their quality." I claim this nicely describes well what happens in professional philosophy. 

Now, they note that aiming for low acceptance or selectivity creates an incentive among editors to discourage "self-selection because a paper which is not submitted cannot be rejected. This results in a strange process whereby journals make peer review worse in an attempt to induce bad papers to submit, but maintain sufficiently good peer review to ensure that a large proportion of those bad papers will probably be rejected." And somebody may well object that referee quality at our leading journals is -- despite the boorish incivility and rudeness -- actually qualitatively great. Let's assume there is a lot of correct testimony to this effect.

One can explain such testimony in light of Zollman/Garcia/Handfield model, if we pay attention to the role of desk rejects (something they ignore.) Let's return to JPP; it is especially famous for two interrelated features: it offered quick (even helpful) desk-rejects (often/always by Goodin) to the vast-majority of initial submissions and then stellar review process on the papers sent out to reviewers which help improve the final publications. (I know important scholars who almost only review for JPP.) And this creates (now quoting Zollman et al) "the appearance of high standards."

One may think that JPP has, thus, hit on a fine equilibrium between balancing peer review costs and quality; and that it actually is a good way to aim for selectivity and quality at once. And people do like to point to the quality of the papers appearing in JPP. (In 2021 it's impact factor was according the journal's website 1.881--quite respectable for philosophy standards, but not especially noteworthy. Something fans of selectivity tend to ignore.) Fair enough.

But, of course, desk-reject even by an impartial and distinguished and unrushed editor is a very coarse-grained (and very cheap) peer review system. And the Zollman et al. model explains that this does reduce quality. Obviously, this presupposes that among the desk-rejects are sufficiently many papers that with (costly) peer review would have been as good as the papers that JPP did publish. That's obviously true, but that's because among the papers published in very selective peers of JPP and even slightly less selective journals there is very little difference in overall quality. But the nice thing about working with a game-theoretic model like Zollman et al.'s is you don't have to trust my judgments, it's a predictable effect of the incentives -- artificially limiting supply! -- shaping decisions. Of course, the model may not be robust so here I have used it solely to help think through the issues. But notice that when multiple journals aim to be selective it becomes much costlier to provide adequate peer review because referees get overworked (and perhaps bored by seeing the same papers multiple times).

Now, I am not against prestige in professional philosophy or higher education (although one does wonder if excessive selectivity in admissions to top colleges actually is conducive to society's needs). But from the perspective of the epistemic (and social) needs of the discipline and profession, it is a mistake to have excessive selectivity in philosophy journal publication help produce or coincide with that prestige. It slows down research and, as the model suggests, plausibly hurts quality. (It probably does so by reducing intellectual diversity and increasing risk aversion.) 

So, from my perspective, while the publishers should respect editorial independence and not use heavy-handed practices, nudging our leading journals to accept more papers is the right thing to do even if the motive -- profit -- or honoring flawed open access contracts need not be so. We need such a regime change.

Of course, the increase should be gradual and not tenfold at once. The critics of Wiley have a point! As should be clear most arguments that conflate incredible selectivity and quality in defense of the status quo seem bogus and, I say this politely (these are my friends, after all), seem generally self-serving not the discipline's interest.

Tom Hurka suggested that such selectivity allows one to "keep abreast of important new developments and contributions in the field without having to wade through dozens or hundreds of published pieces." This was very true before the age of scholar.google and philpapers. But less so now. I do think we need more outlets like (as Ingrid Robeyns suggested in context) Philosophy Compass that (especially with the disappearance of review chapters in dissertations) give opinionated surveys of recent developments, but that's orthogonal to the present discussion.

Finally, I don't want to claim that increasing, even doubling slots or reducing/halving selectivity (to say 10-20% acceptance rates) solves the profession's social problems. Undoubtedly, if journal publication in particular venues is seen as key, then we cannot prevent an arms raise among job candidates and tenure seekers to publish in such journals. And maybe the gains to the referee process will be ephemeral or temporary--only time and experience will tell. But my argument for the epistemic gains from increasing slots remain.

Academic disciplines do need high quality signals for quality in publication for institutional and epistemic reasons; excessive selectivity is a bad mechanism to produce such a signal and it perniciously confers prestige that reinforces all the bad effects of the very steep disciplinary prestige hierarchies. I hope the scholars who nobly and correctly resigned in protest also work to change this bad status quo.

This first appeared at: <On JPP, Wiley, Prestige Production, and Modeling Quality: (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

*I am going to ignore the pervasive editorial unaccountability and deviations of best scholarly practices that also show in these journals.

**Of course, the salience of significant work seeps out to well connected insiders, but that just strengthens my argument.

+Some field specific journals within philosophy that actually presuppose considerable technical expertise (in the sciences or ancient languages) have much higher acceptance rates without corresponding loss of prestige. I think this is due to the fact that the prestige is already sufficiently accorded to the expertise (and that editors in these fields can focus more on keeping the discussion going aright).

 

On The End of History and the Displacement of Logic

[I will phase out D&I at typepad. This post was first published at  digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at ]

Because we understand ourselves as forward-looking problem-solvers, and recognize with the sciences that through inevitable progress today's ruling views will seem quaint when the research frontier has shifted (as it will), analytic philosophers have no major investment in curating themselves as a tradition. It has a sponge-like character in assimilating doctrines and techniques from without, and, as seen from a distance, appears to reinvent itself continuously. Because it is such a moving target external critics often seem comically out of date to knowing insiders whereas internal critics often end up being domesticated by subsequent generations (without, alas, getting credit for it). That it is a tradition is the effect of intellectual and sociological path dependencies that express themselves in certain aesthetic (clarity, transparency, rigor, etc.) and epistemic values, and the existence of bits of post Frege-Russell-Whitehead logic as a kind of (often tacit) lingua franca long after developments within logic stopped being a source of major disciplinary excitement or much utility elsewhere. 

The move from a logic requirement to a 'formal methods' in Yale University's graduate curriculum [see here at Dailynous; here at Leitterreports] tracks and, as it will be copied, shapes a much larger set of shifts in professional philosophy. In what follows, I, first, say something about how this constitutes the discipline going forward, and, second, I close -- as the previous paragraph hints -- at what predictably will be lost. The shift to 'formal methods' is often articulated in (broadly consequentialist) terms of what is useful to PhD students in their actual research or employment possibilities. It's anodyne to suggest that this actual work is interdisciplinary (with STEM/Social Sciency disciplines) in character in some sense. 

What it (really) is are three different projects (at a certain level of abstraction): (i) the projects that I have called 'synthetic philosophy' which, while using a particular technical/formal model/theory, brings together insights, knowledge, and arguments from the special sciences with the aim to offer a coherent account of complex systems and connect these to a wider culture or other philosophical projects (or both); (ii) the projects one can subsume under 'conceptual explorative research,' which amounts to developing concepts and techniques (including formal) that either are generative of scientific or social projects or help explain/understand perceived foundational problems in them; (iii) the continuous working out of inherited-as-philosophy puzzles. Presumably all three of these projects will involve collaboration with AI as coupled (human/machine/network) systems. With new base-lines, progress is possible. To be sure, the practice of wisdom does not require academic philosophy.

These three projects are at this level of generality not always at tension with each other, and because the fruits can be felt in disciplines outside of philosophy are not always zero-sum (job-wise). But we should expect near continuous hybridization and splitting and reconfiguration among such projects until a new political hegemon reconfigures higher education in the service of new ideals. (I am hinting at the fickleness of student-demand or donors as instruments of permanently shaping the discipline.) What I am, thus, stipulating -- perhaps rashly -- is that we should not expect hegemonic intellectual schools to re-emerge except temporarily. 

At this point one may object that 'argument' is missing in the previous paragraph. Perhaps, it will remain as constitutive element of philosophy. I am pretty skeptical about this possibility once formal logic is displaced from the intrinsic DNA of our professional formation. Yes, there are statistical arguments, but the skill one acquires is not argumentative, but something distinct. (What that is may be beyond my expertise, but I am inclined to say it is a skill at spotting differences that make a difference.) To be sure, I am a pluralist about the nature of 'argument' so it may be safer to predict that what will count as a paradigmatic argument will shift.

Now, before I mention some of the predictable 'losses' that follow from the shift under way, I want to prevent the misinterpretation that I somehow mourn the end of analytic philosophy (in the sense described by Liam Kofi Bright). I see nothing wrong in the fact that the half dozen departments (and the ones that mimic them) that train the influential PhDs of the next generation do not want to defend the intellectual path that got them there. The end of the unfolding history of analytic philosophy turns out to be a historical whimper. So I am using 'loss' analogously to or in the sense of 'Kuhn-loss'--the systematic forgetting of certain results and insights.

Second, it's predictable, for example, that as logic disappears as a (tacit) lingua franca much of the history of analytic philosophy will seem like strange territory and unmotivated to future students, and will become near unreadable. All kinds of moves that seemed obvious or intelligible -- think of the uses of regimentation, or Tarski's account of truth, bound variables, etc. -- will stop being self-evident. I had a glimpse of this when I read Quine's Word and Object a decade ago with Dutch undergraduates who were simply bewildered. 

In addition, I suspect that lacking such a tacit lingua franca, the three kinds of projects I mentioned will become increasingly at least partially estranged from each other and will, thereby, reflect the underlying social pluralism of our societies. That is compatible with each sharing in structural commonalities (including some that may well turn out to be politically or socially problematic). Unfortunately, that will imply that metrics and measures that are orthogonal to (intrinsic) philosophical worth, if there is such a thing, will be increasingly used for purposes of evaluation and advancement. 

This first appeared at: <On The End of History and the Displacement of Logic (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

 

On Information and the State: from Justin Smith to George Stigler

[Over time I plan to phase out D&I at typepad. This post was first published at  digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at ]

A recent wide-ranging, erudite, and politically salient Substack post by Justin Smith defends the thesis that "we may identify a vast process currently underway whereby we are moving, in our efforts to understand reality and to harness it to our ends, from its to bits. It seems to me the real story of the past few decades, a story that easily explains the rise in popularity of the simulation argument...is of a fairly total regime change, from physics to informatics ���here I am adapting the French informatique, which names the research domain in question far more appropriately than ���computer science������ as the Prima Scientia or ultimate science of reality." (The post may be gated so you will have to trust me on its interest or take a subscription to Justin's excellent substack, Hinternet.) Presumably, by 'regime' Smith is suggesting that the wide world of learning is fundamentally ordered and (he makes an explicit nod to Hacking here) ordering and authoritative in some sense. 

In these digressions, I have been joking over the years that economics will soon be displaced by computer science. But as is usual while I have been focusing on a change in one tree, Justin is noticing the shifts in the wider forest.

Unfortunately, Smith never defines 'information' (and its non-trivial cognate,) 'units of information processing' despite it playing a key role in his overall argument. That's probably a feature and not a bug of his argument because part of his point is that in virtue of the significance and fluidity (within constraints) of symbolic representation information is not (ahh) ontically stable, eternally out there. 

Inform has Latinate roots (to give form to, to shape, educate, etc.), and, perhaps, there are echoes of the scholastic doctrine of hylomorphism lurking here. (Not so long ago, I was pleased to learn that computer scientists use 'hylomorphism' to refer to a certain recursive function which struck me as very funny and profound at once.) As I was barely conscious contemplating the possible significance of this, through the mystery of the associative process and the rapidity of modern networks (and Google), I looked up and downloaded George Stigler's (1961) "The Economics of Information." This paper has over 12000 citations, and alongside his work on economic regulation, crucial to his importance to the development of economics (for which he got a Nobel).

Somewhat amusingly, Stigler also fails to give a definition of information. He tends to use 'knowledge,' 'advertising,' subjective beliefs, and the comparison of prices by consumers as ways of understanding and describing information. Information can be 'pooled' and has a 'flow.' Most famously, information is costly (and can be bought and sold).

That information is costly is both part of the cause and part of the effect of the dispersion of prices. (In an older tradition of economics -- as David M. Levy taught me, one can think of Wicksteed -- prices were thought to be uniform in a market at a given time; although earlier, during the 18th century, Adam Smith and his contemporary, James Steuart, thought that prices dispersed, too although their analysis is not identical.) I don't mean to suggest that this exhausts the role of information in Stigler's analysis of economic life because it connects means and ends, but about that some other time more.

In Stigler's paper, I encountered a fascinating passage that is worth quoting and discussing (and this is the real point of this digression):

The maintenance of appreciable dispersion of prices arises chiefly out of the fact that knowledge becomes obsolete. The conditions of supply and demand, and therefore the distribution of asking prices, change over time. There is no method by which buyers or sellers can ascertain the new average price in the market appropriate to the new conditions except by search. Sellers cannot maintain perfect correlation of successive prices, even if they wish to do so, because of the costs of search. Buyers accordingly cannot make the amount of investment in search that perfect correlation of prices would justify. The greater the instability of supply and/or demand conditions, therefore, the greater the dispersion of prices will be.
In addition, there is a component of ignorance due to the changing identity of buyers and sellers. There is a flow of new buyers and sellers in every market, and they are at least initially uninformed on prices and by their presence make the information of experienced buyers and sellers somewhat obsolete.
The amount of dispersion will also vary with one other characteristic which is of special interest: the size (in terms of both dollars and number of traders) of the market. As the market grows in these dimensions, there will appear a set of firms which specialize in collecting and selling information. They may take the form of trade journals or specialized brokers. Since the cost of collection of information is (approximately) independent of its use (although the cost of dissemination is not), there is a strong tendency toward monopoly in the provision of information: in general, there will be a "standard" source for trade information. (Stigler 1961, 220)

Chicago economists are not exactly known for assuming that any market will tend toward a monopoly. As I noted last week, in the 1950s Stigler's work was, in fact, prominent for undermining empirically the Marxist (and Marx-inspired) thesis that markets tend naturally tend to monopoly. 

Now, later when (in part inspired by the work of the sociologist Morton and in part because of his interest in which economics Phds would be hired where) Stigler turned to the sociology of scientific knowledge, he tackled this tendency toward monopoly in knowledge production head on. And so I will return to it some other time. But in the 1961 paper he leaves the point in the quoted passage alone.

It would be tempting here to discuss the role of google or wikipedia or the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy as standard sources of information in our ecologies. (And to what degree ChatGPT can displace these or become one itself.) But I want to close with an important broader context in which i situate Stigler's passage.

In the liberal tradition ��� with which Stigler was very familiar ��� which understands, as a a core function of the state, it (the state) as a machinery of record, a collector and disseminator of accurate public data. A lot of our social practices, inside and outside the market, presuppose a social infrastructure in which the machinery of record is reliable, allowing public authorities and private actors to plan their activities. For that to happen, the public must be well-informed, and the only way citizens can possibly be well-informed on complex matters of policy is for state experts to organize and process information. Elsewhere, also in joint (forthcoming) work with Nick Cowen I have argued that Walter Lippmann's (1922) Public Opinion puts this vision forward.[1]

In fact, the germ of Lippmann���s idea is expressed in the closing paragraph of John Stuart Mill���s and Harriet Taylor���s On Liberty (1869, Ch. 5), where they claim that ���the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency��� should be allied with ���the greatest possible centralisation of information, and diffusion of it from the centre.��� In context, it is clear (recall) that they are responding to Tocqueville���s fears that in order to prevent democratic despotism through local self-government, incompetent art of government is inevitable.

So, lurking in Stigler (1961) is a causal account that both explains the origin of the state and justifies the state's continued existence as a (perhaps even natural) authoritative monopoly provider of the machinery of record. (In fact, this is how Smith explains the epistemic origin of the state: as guarantor of measures and weights and the soundness of currency. ) And that even in a bit-rich world this will remain so.

Of course, Marxists and Libertarians may object that the account hinted at here effaces the violence of the state. This is undoubtedly so, but I consider this a feature not a bug of the argument.

This first appeared at: <On Information and the State: from Justin Smith to George Stigler (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

In the age of cheap computer power and powerful data collection, private institutions and individuals are capable of organizing and disseminating complex and large amounts of data. But in general they are not capable of coordinating public policy authoritatively.

Chicago Economics, MIT, and Monopoly Capitalism

[Over time I plan to phase out this blog at typepad. This post was first published at  digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at ]

Marxism predicts that left to its own devises capitalism tends toward monopoly. Let's call this the 'monopoly capitalism thesis.' I suspect the most famous articulation of this thesis was develop in the context of debates over the nature and fate of early twentieth century imperialism. For, both (recall; and here) Hobson (not a Marxist) and Lenin noticed that (militaristic) imperialism and monopoly were mutually reinforcing. For Hobson (in his 1902 Imperialism), monopoly capitalism was the effect of rent-seeking political behavior (by corrupt, imperial, financial interests). Lenin (ca 1916) didn't deny this, but while drawing on German data, especially, thought that capitalism had an inevitable tendency toward monopoly and cartels, and that imperialism (the search for monopoly markets overseas) is an effect of this tendency.

Arguably, (recall) Schumpeter (in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942) synthesized the two positions by suggesting that in conditions of modernization, monopoly would be caused (perhaps not by an internal logic of market economies, but rather) by, the "concentration of decision-making centers of the administration and the state" who seek out social counterparts in capitalist enterprises, who in turn take advantage of rents. While Burnham (in The Managerial Revolution 1941) is not interested in exploring the dynamics of the monopoly capitalism thesis, one can find a similar conclusion in it (see also my comment about Berle & Means below).

In what follows, I don't mean to suggest that the theoretical structure of the monopoly capitalism thesis was not developed after mid-century. Arguably Joan Robinson, Paul Sweezy and Baran, and Ernest Mandel all did so in various ways, and have inspired renewed work. From the left one could mention (recall this post) Durand, C��dric Durand's (2017) Fictitious capital: How finance is appropriating our future; from the more libertarian right one could mention Eric A., Posner and E. Glen Weyl (2018) Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society, which strongly implies our age is characterized by monopoly capitalism.

As an aside, with the revival of scholarly interest in the roots of neoliberalism, it is quite natural to come away thinking that the major point of contention between Marxists and liberals within political economy centered on the socialist calculation debate. This debate is theoretically very interesting because it brings together epistemology, social theory, political economy, and (after Oskar Lange) artificial intelligence. And because Hayek got an early Nobel (in part) for his contribution to it, and Austrian economics shaped American libertarianism, there has been impressive continued interest in it even after central planning lost its luster. But even critics of Marxism can acknowledge the soviet style central planning and administrative pricing need not be the only way really existing Marxism can be tried out. This observation made me return to the fate monopoly capitalism thesis: why did it not haunt mid twentieth century economics?

Now, a key part of the answer has to be in the success of Keynes & Keynesianism and also the very idea of a mixed economy (the genealogy of which I have not studied, but I assume involves Samuelson). But in a way this pushes the problem back a level--why think a mixed economy is stable so as to block the monopoly capitalism thesis (or road to serfdom thesis)?

Part of the answer can be found in a number of empirical, inductive studies associated with 'Chicago economics,' especially Warren Nutter���s (1951) The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly in the United States, 1899���1939, which originated in his (1949) dissertation and the fifth lecture, ���Competition in the United States,��� of George Stigler's (1949) Five lectures on economics problems first delivered at LSE at the behest of Robbins. (For detailed description of the material I am about to discuss see my paper, but back then I studied it through lens of paradigm building.)

I doubt I need to re-introduce Stigler (a future Nobel), who was at Columbia, to my audience. But despite the recent political and polemical focus on the Virginia School, Nutter is understudied (even his Wikipedia page is scarce), and only Daniel Kuehn has written much on him. Nutter, who during the cold war was one of the pre-eminent scholars of the Soviet economy Stateside (together with my very teacher Franklyn Holtzman), was at Yale when his dissertation work made an impact on American public life (it was featured in Fortune magazine). He later joined and co-founded the Virginia school of public choice and ended up a significant figure in the Nixon administration. In 1969, he published an extension of the dissertation with Henry Einhorn: The Extent of Enterprise Monopoly: 1899-1958. 

Now, as my comments above suggest, the 'monopoly capitalism thesis' drifted out of Marxism into mainstream-ish opinion during the Great Depression. Nutter's official target the ���hypothesis that monopoly is automatically generated in a private-enterprise system��� was also defended by Arthur R. Burns "in his book, The Decline of Competition.��� Burns was an institutionalist economist at Columbia. (This Burns should not be confused with another economist at Columbia, Arthur F. Burns, who became more prominent as Chair of the Federal Reserve.) In his book, our Burns argues that technological developments alongside patent laws (which generate rents) made monopoly inevitable (and that anti-trust was imperfect).

Another, politically more important target (for Nutter and Stigler) is The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), co-authored by A.A. Berle and Gardiner Means. This was a major work that shaped the New Deal, corporate governance, and corporate law for  a generation. Berle and Means analytically (and legally) separated corporate ownership (which, under modern conditions, was diffused) from corporate control (which was concentrated). They thereby anticipate Schumpeter and Burnham's focus on a relatively narrow managerial-corporate class (albeit not to be identical simply with capital in a Marxist sense).

Nutter and Stigler have different empirical ways of tackling the underlying question, and they use different proxies to get a handle on the empirical problems (of operationalization concentrations within a industry and measuring its change over time, and of the whole economy). And their empirical findings don't always agree. But in a rather critical review (1953) article, "Is monopoly increasing?" Solomon Fabricant (an economist associated with NBER [see this portrait drawn by Lipsey]), who notes Nutter's and Stigler's partiality toward competition, and hostility to anti-trust policy, and implies they may be systematically biased,  concludes, nevertheless, ���Yet, whatever the outcome, by the essential validity of their conclusion must stand. All the doubts that can be raised do not destroy, rather they support, the conclusion that there is no basis for believing that the economy of the United States is largely monopolistic and has been growing more monopolistic.��� (92. Nutter himself had suggested there might have been very modest growth in monopoly, but mostly as an effect of government policy.) 

That is to say, by the early 1950s the economics profession thought the monopoly capitalism thesis was, if not empirically falsified, then at least decidedly unpromising empirically. This is especially notable because the data they covered included the impact of the Great Depression and all the New Deal activity.

In work (1951) that covered later time-series data for manufacturing through 1949, "The measurement of industrial concentration," another economist, M.A. Adelman, also decried the imperfection of the data (although he praised Nutter's measures explicitly) and diagnoses underdetermination of theory by data. (He also acknowledges that Nutter is more interested in monopoly, while he is more interested in concentration.) At the end of his survey Adelman concludes: 

"But although a given set of facts is compatible with more than one policy conclusion, this does not make it compatible with any conclusion, i.e., the facts are not simply irrelevant. Stated somewhat differently: our conclusions, if correct, should mean something for the atmosphere in which policy is formed. References to "the growth in economic concentration," or statements that "during the past I6 years [I932-48] big business has been getting bigger and little business littler," or that "the forces of concentration [are] growing stronger by the hour," or that "concentration of industry is increasing so fast that no half-measures can stop it," and many others of like tenor - these must now be dismissed as unfounded. Concentration may be a problem, but for better or worse it is not threatening to engulf the economy. The moral, therefore, is simply that there is time to stop, look, and take thought. This may detract from the color and excitement of our public life, but it may also contribute to better results."  

Adelman has, I think, attracted no scholarly attention. But he became one of pillars of the MIT economics department that Samuelson built to pre-eminence. (After his early work in anti-trust he became somewhat well known in the 1970s as a leading expert of energy economics and how to tackle the oil crisis.) And so he very much represents the middle of the road of the economics profession of the era.

I quote Adelman's passage at length because it gives a sense of how he takes the empirical results to license considerable de-politicization. (One can also find this in Fabricant's conclusion.) While economists remained highly interested in theories of monopoly and imperfect competition, and how to deal with (ant-trust) policy questions emanating from actual monopolies and economic concentration (and a whole range of potentially fascinating technical questions), the monopoly capitalism thesis was effectively dead, or at least temporarily pushed to the margins. 

As I noted in my original paper, this conclusion remained intact even if this inductive approach to the question of monopoly as pursued by Nutter and Stigler got displaced by a very different approach articulated by Harberger in ���Monopoly and Resource Allocation.��� (1954) And while this, in turn, was quite consequential for the shape of American anti-trust (not the least compared with the Ordoliberal approach), it was unconcerned with the monopoly capitalism thesis.

This first appeared at: <On the controversy in the philosophical blogosphere. (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

 

On the latest controversy in the philosophical blogosphere.

[Over time I plan to phase out this blog at typepad. This post was first published at  digressions.impressions.substack here. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber at ]

At Leiterreports (here; here; here) and DailyNous another 'philosophy controversy' is playing out. I am sure most of my readers know that it was triggered by an autobiographical essay in Quillette accusing OUP, widely regarded as the leading press in English language professional philosophy [humble-brag: that's where I publish my stuff], of irregular editorial practices with a monograph and handbook chapter on one of the central topics in the contemporary culture wars. (The author has already found new homes for both works.) As has become clear, the handling editor was Peter M., who is widely regarded as the most prestigious philosophy editor within the field. (No, I work with the other Peter, O.) The author of the autobiographical essay is a senior professor at MIT, Alex Byrne.

Nearly all the people crying 'foul' now are people that happily participate in a system that is opaque, riddled with systematic conflicts of interests, editorial unaccountability, and that usually apparently does not cause them any friction. For, when I read Byrne's essay in Quillette, I was stunned by his surprise that he received 'bizarre' referee reports that do not substantiate their claims and that are uncivil. And that, after a life-time in the profession, he sincerely claims "a reviewer is expected to give reasons for her verdict." The tone of referees has been a widely discussed problem in professional philosophy (including in a thoughtful piece unrelated to culture wars in TLS by Tim Crane not so long ago.)

I was bemused to read in Byrne (and some commentators in the blogosphere) that "publication is practically guaranteed" for a handbook article. Twice in the last decade a handbook chapter drafted by me was rejected: once with the suggestion that one of the co-editors could rewrite it with me (I pulled that article and it became chapter 1 of my monograph), and once because my work was not deemed up to par and the editors decided there was too little time for me to improve it. While that stung, for all I know the editors were right about that latter call because another version of that paper was rejected in another special issue. (I can't hate the essay because it was my successful job-talk paper.) I certainly agree with Byrne that receiving editorial word via Twitter is seriously odd; it's probably still marginally better than the time the Monist canceled a special issue with one of my accepted papers without informing me! (We eventually published the paper in Metaphilosophy, where it was published after a year and half (including a mysterious delay because of an editorial mix-up.)) Yes, I did publish a subsequent paper with the Monist. None of my experiences are newsworthy because they are so common and they do not involve the culture wars (although some of my anonymous referees single out my blogging for special ire).

More than a decade ago, I was galvanized into blogging because of a massive plagiarism scandal involving a senior scholar that I sometimes collaborated with that exposed lackadaisical refereeing and publishing practices in an adjoining field. Recently that very same field was rocked by a second major plagiarism scandal (involving a more junior scholar), and dropped the ball in its response in lots of ways. In fact, shortly after NewAPPS was founded several controversies involving Synthese unfolded (we had a 'Synthese Affair' tab): one triggered by a special issue on intelligent design involving editorial improprieties that even made it to the New York Times and one involving inappropriate pictures on a course website by one of the very editors involved in that scandal. A few years later another special issue by Synthese exploded into the news when its guest editor suggested that logical pluralism and homosexuality are linked. This produced a moratorium on special issues at Synthese.

As an aside [feel free to skip to the next paragraph], after the moratorium ended, I co-edited a special issue for Synthese. My very own contribution to that special issue did not make it through the revamped referee process.  So, I can attest that Synthese has learned its lesson. (It's chapter 13 of my 2017 OUP monograph now.)

I don't mean to leave you with the feeling that professional philosophy has a Synthese problem, or that this journal was/is especially badly managed, or that controversy always only involves then-culture-war issues.  Some of the purportedly best journals in professional philosophy, Nous and PPR went through a phase when they had to put moratoria on submissions for extended periods, in part because they had been edited by the same highly respected editor, who also edited Philosophical Issues. In that very same period, another highly respected long-time editor of Philosophical Studies resigned after 25 years because he was unhappy about how a fellow editor handled a paper critical of a paper (by Byrne) thar he had published in the same journal. (Okay that also involved culture war issues.) After the resignation, stories surfaced that this very editor did not always practice double-anonymous reviewing when it suited him. 

Even when proper refereeing procedures are followed a journal can screw up post publication. By the time the 'transracialism controversy' (which also made the New York Times) had played out, the editorial team, many of the associate editors, and many of the governing board had resigned or been nudged out from the feminist journal Hypatia. (I wrote lots of earnest, widely read blog posts about this case none of them made it into the wikipedia entry.)

The previous paragraphs hint at the proverbial tip of the ice-berg. For much of the post WWII period, analytic philosophy has been characterized by a concerted effort at journal capture and then these journals were subsequently run in a clubby fashion that disproportionally served the interests of people in the network of these journals, which have absurdly low acceptance rates, in a discipline that is characterized by incredibly steep economic and prestige hierarchies. It is, in fact, not uncommon to receive incredibly uncivil referee reports, which, if they do materialize, often are slow in coming. At many journals editors de facto farm out the decision by effectively giving a single, sometimes idiotic referee veto power.

It's not just journals. When I was still very junior a highly respected editor at one of the other leading philosophy presses forced a paper out of the volume I co-edited because one of his/her/their referees was incensed over a footnote in one of the papers (never published) that re-litigated a conference dispute (between the referee and the chapter���s author) decades earlier. The referee revealed himself to me and wisely recused himself, but the editor felt loyalty to the referee and insisted that the chapter be withdrawn. (The author refused to submit a different paper.) I thought it very odd that the editor (with no expertise in the field) took sides in a professional dispute. It didn't stop me from working with this editor again, of course. And when I look into my soul, I recall times that as an editor I was involved in decisions that may have seemed badly motivated to some of the rejected authors.

If we step back from the details of any controversy, such controversy is only to be expected: academic philosophers are humans not sages, who have few reliable measures to navigate a very scarce job environment and informational overload while norms of quality and professional conduct are constantly contestable (and, more slowly, shifting). While there are a lot of truth-guided and earnest people in the profession, whenever we get a glimpse under the hood of how confidential consequential decisions (e.g., publication, admission, appointments) are really made irregularities seem to proliferate. (That is compatible with the vast majority of decisions being defensible on intrinsic and/or procedural grounds.)

Moreover, in each controversy, a very senior figure will gravely and shamelessly intone that other scholars are afraid to speak up because they fear for their careers. It somehow never registers that the structural, cultural, intellectual, and economic conditions that generate such -- let's stipulate -- real fear (sometimes even co-produced by said senior figure) also existed in some shape or another in the lost golden age they cherish, but that then they were on the right side of history in which the people in their network could count on obliging editors, referees, and appointment committees (just ask continental philosophers, or anyone working in other margins of the field).

In our collective behavior we reveal that professional philosophy is, in part, a (modest-in-the-long-term-scheme-of-things) spoils system because during each controversy we go through the same charade sincerely felt debates and sophisticated and laughable arguments (including by world class experts on argument, the working of evidence, inductive risk, deliberative democracy, and ethics, etc.), but we never really risk changing the system and incentives -- our role in a wider political economy of credentialing and knowledge production -- that produce these kinds of controversies (and the many less noticed irregularities that they hint at) so frequently.

The predictability, frequency, and manner of these controversies makes me suspect that such controversies serve a social function. It would be nice if they represented the birth-pangs of a new, healthier intellectual age. But I doubt they are truth-functional because they are characterized by what Mill called ���vituperative���' speech; I used to think the function was still epistemic: to signal a shift in norm, practice, or attitudes. I increasingly suspect they recur because they drive people without a taste for cruelty and combat away from the discipline (and thereby reduce competition over jobs and prestige, and rid ourselves of sources of dissent) and help entrench the same type of enduring professional hierarchy, even if the tokens at the top move around a bit.

This first appeared at: <On the controversy in the philosophical blogosphere. (substack.com)> a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.