Peter L. Berger's Blog, page 212

Bill McKibben Calls Out Green Hypocrisy

Everyone’s favorite environmentalist Bill McKibben ranted against Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau, scolding the public for “swooning” for the leader who, in McKibben’s own words, “sure is cute” and who “appears to have recently quit a boy band.” Trudeau’s sin? Green hypocrisy. McKibben writes for the Guardian:

Trudeau says all the right things, over and over. He’s got no Scott Pruitts in his cabinet: everyone who works for him says the right things. Indeed, they specialize in getting others to say them too – it was Canadian diplomats, and the country’s environment minister Catherine McKenna, who pushed at the Paris climate talks for a tougher-than-expected goal: holding the planet’s rise in temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

But those words are meaningless if you keep digging up more carbon and selling it to people to burn, and that’s exactly what Trudeau is doing. He’s hard at work pushing for new pipelines through Canada and the US to carry yet more oil out of Alberta’s tarsands, which is one of the greatest climate disasters on the planet.

Last month, speaking at a Houston petroleum industry gathering, he got a standing ovation from the oilmen for saying “No country would find 173bn barrels of oil in the ground and just leave them there.”

McKibben savages Trudeau but stops short of the final truth: none of the world’s important leaders back the green agenda. The difference is between the sly hypocrites who pretend to be green for the cameras, and the Trump types who don’t bother. He seems more bothered by the former, but the truth is that neither type of leader is sympathetic to the green cause that McKibben embodies.

But from McKibben’s point of view, there is even worse news. The hypocrites reflect what voters want: they want to feel that something nice and green is being done, but they don’t vote for parties who are willing to make the huge changes McKibben and his colleagues claim are necessary.

This is what we mean at TAI when we say that the conventional green agenda is a Dead Man Walking and that all the green activists and all the climate diplomats won’t move the needle.

We think there is a better alternative: not to deny the dangers of climate change but to develop a new green agenda that could actually command enough political support to bring real change. That isn’t as hard as it looks; the information revolution is producing a Great Decoupling, with economic growth increasingly unrelated to resource intensive manufacturing and other greenhouse promoting activities. American emissions dropped three percent last year even as the economy grew, not because of green policymaking (then-president Obama’s Clean Power Plan never had a chance to go into effect), but rather because a flood of cheap shale gas displaced coal as our nation’s primary source of power. The United States is showing that you can grow, and do it green.

For reasons that are essentially non-rational and even religious, McKibben and the Hair Shirt Green lobby he represents will never buy this, but the anti-tech, dystopian greens aren’t the only people who care about the future of our beautiful planet.

In many ways McKibben is a more clear-sighted and honest observer than the gassy green mainstream media and Davos groupies who fall for the Trudeau hypocrites and vacuous Paris accords, but his path still leads only to futility and despair. If the green movement and the human race are to flourish, we must find a better way forward, and we need fewer hypocrites and more smart greens to lead the way.

Tillerson Comes into His Own

Reports of Rex Tillerson’s isolation and ineffectiveness have been greatly exaggerated, says  Politico :

Viewed as the walled-off leader of a demoralized department, Tillerson in the opening days of the Trump administration was cast as an inexperienced statesman undercut by the White House as the nation’s top diplomat, supplanted in that role by the president’s powerful son-in-law.

But over the past month, as Tillerson has taken a lead on the administration’s strategy with Syria, Russia and China, his status has shifted — and behind the scenes, he’s emerging as Trump’s favorite Cabinet secretary. […]

In Trump’s 83 days as president, Tillerson has had more meetings with the president than any other Cabinet secretary, according to multiple White House aides and a review of public schedules. When Tillerson isn’t traveling abroad, the two men schedule a private dinner at least once a week.

A lot of people underestimated Tillerson and wrote him off, taking his lack of press visibility as proof that he was isolated from the White House and not up to his job. That was a mistake. When somebody with Tillerson’s experience and track record goes quiet, it isn’t to sit in a funk and wait for failure to knock on the door. He was planning, working, and starting to master a complicated new job.

It is much too early to say whether he will be a successful Secretary of State: the world is a difficult place, the job is hard, and the swamps of DC are rich in predators. But so far, he’s focused on what ought to be Job Number One for every incoming Secretary of State, and especially for those without a lot of history with the Big Boss at 1600: build a relationship with and gain the confidence of the President. Forget about pacifying the press or preening on the world stage; the SoS has an audience of one, especially in the beginning.

On top of that, Tillerson seems to be working closely and effectively with his most important colleagues: the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor. This is a reassuring sign; Mattis and McMaster are among Trump’s most knowledgable and experienced aides, and all three men seem to be exerting more influence in recent days. And Tillerson deserves credit of his own for some savvy diplomatic moves that have gone under-appreciated, from his terse and menacing posture on North Korea to his underreported successes at the Moscow summit.

Maybe, just maybe, thirty years of rising through the ranks of the world’s largest oil company and ten years running it taught Rex Tillerson a few skills.

Retail in a Tailspin

The U.S. retail industry is in the midst of an internet-driven collapse that stands to affect hundreds of thousands of workers. The New York Times reports:

E-commerce players, led by the industry giant Amazon, have made it so easy and fast for people to shop online that traditional retailers, shackled by fading real estate and a culture of selling in stores, are struggling to compete. […]

This transformation is hollowing out suburban shopping malls, bankrupting longtime brands and leading to staggering job losses.

More workers in general merchandise stores have been laid off since October, about 89,000 Americans. That is more than all of the people employed in the United States coal industry, which President Trump championed during the campaign as a prime example of the workers who have been left behind in the economic recovery.

There’s no question that competition from online shopping sites has been crucial to the shuttering of brick-and-mortar stores. But it’s also worth noting that the alarming data are coming in after two years of frenzied minimum wage hikes in cities and states across the country. Retail is a labor-intensive and generally low-wage industry; the minimum wage hikes might not have contributed directly to the evaporation of retail jobs, but they certainly haven’t helped.

We are living at a time when technology and automation seem likely to continue to eat into less-skilled sources of employment for the foreseeable future. This creates an obligation for us to find ways to help the workers who are displaced. But wage floors that put even more people out of work and accelerate the process of dislocation will make the social consequences of this transformation even worse.

Pence to Pyongyang: Don’t Test Trump

Vice President Mike Pence today issued a stern warning to North Korea during his visit to Seoul: remember Syria and Afghanistan, and don’t test Trump. Reuters:

“Just in the past two weeks, the world witnessed the strength and resolve of our new president in actions taken in Syria and Afghanistan,” Pence said in a joint appearance with Hwang.

“North Korea would do well not to test his resolve or the strength of the armed forces of the United States in this region,” Pence said. […]

“All options are on the table to achieve the objectives and ensure the stability of the people of this country,” he told reporters as tinny propaganda music floated across from the North Korean side of the so-called demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Pence here seems to be confirming our own take on the Syria strike: it was never about changing the game in Syria, but rather demonstrating the new administration’s resolve and willingness to use force. Announcing the strike over dessert with Xi Jinping sent an unmistakeable message: China should get serious about restraining North Korea, and Pyongyang would be unwise to test Trump’s limits. Likewise, Trump’s use of the “Mother of All Bombs” in Afghanistan now looks like a similar instance of shock-and-awe signaling, intended in part to reinforce the administration’s more overt and menacing gestures toward North Korea.

For all of the administration’s tough signaling, however, there are signs that Trump is pursuing a more cautious approach behind the scenes. This weekend, Pentagon officials quickly disputed an NBC News report that the U.S. was preparing a pre-emptive strike, and National Security Adviser HR McMaster told ABC’s This Week that the administration was exploring “all actions we can, short of a military option, to try to resolve this peacefully.” Trump himself seems determined to gain Chinese cooperation on North Korea by offering concessions on the trade issue.

In the meantime, the Trump Administration may be leaning on techniques developed under Obama: namely, the “left-of-launch” cyber attacks designed to disable missiles as they leave the launchpad. As the New York Times notes, those techniques are consistent with a major missile test flub by the North Koreans this weekend, which happened just seconds after liftoff. And though such cyber tactics are hardly a panacea for the Korean conundrum—as we explained in March—they could be a helpful short-term tool to frustrate the Norks’ tests.

In any case, Trump’s North Korea posture is coming into clearer view: a combination of menacing threats and demonstrative shows of force, combined with a backstage effort to tighten the economic screws on Pyongyang via Beijing (with some cyber sabotage thrown in for good measure). Whether or not this proves effective in the long term, it’s clear that there are few good alternative options after decades of kicking the can down the road.

What Erdogan’s Win Means

Last night, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan narrowly won his referendum to expand his powers as President of Turkey. The BBC:

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s push for an executive presidency succeeded with just over 51% of the vote.

The win was met with both celebrations and protests across Turkey.

The CHP is refusing to accept the “Yes” victory and is demanding a recount of 60% of the votes, criticising a decision to pass unstamped ballot papers as valid unless proven otherwise.

Three of Turkey’s biggest cities – Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir – all voted “no” to the constitutional changes. [….]

With 99.97% of ballots counted, the “Yes” campaign had won 51.41% of the votes cast, while “No” had taken 48.59%.

For once, the pre-election polls were right. The final vote was close, closer even than the polls suggested, considering the strongly Yes expatriate vote. A map of the results reveals the profound divisions the referendum raised within Turkey. While Diyarbakir and the far-southeast voted No, Erdogan carried much of the Kurdish vote, winning provinces like Gaziantep and Sanliurfa outright. Notably, Turkey’s three largest cities—Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir—voted No, a far worse result than Erdogan (former mayor of Istanbul) would have hoped for given the AKP’s strong performance in the last parliamentary elections. Even more so than usual, the Anatolian hinterlands carried Erdogan across the line. While the No camp is in the process of challenging the vote, and international monitors decried the “unlevel playing field” that saw the leaders of the opposition HDP imprisoned and the No campaign marginalized, there’s little reason to think the results will be overturned.

The powers now-granted to President Erdogan are extensive. Under the new “presidential system” he will be both head of state and head of government for the first time. Other, more subtle changes make that position near-dictatorial. The office of Prime Minister will be abolished, along with most forms of parliamentary oversight. The Constitutional and Supreme Courts, while they retain some of their independence, will now be directly appointed by Erdogan and parliament. Should he resume leadership of the AKP (which may happen as early as the end of the month), Erdogan will be able to hand-pick party members for elected office. The changes also extend his term limit until 2029, though a convenient loophole would allow him to serve even longer.

While some of the changes won’t be implemented until after the next election in 2019, Erdogan effectively already exercises many of the powers under Turkey’s state of emergency, which has been in place since the July 15 coup attempt. Unsurprisingly, the state of emergency is set to be extended yet again following the referendum.

Some of Erdogan’s immediate goals are clear. Another referendum on restoring the death penalty is high on the agenda. The president of the European Commission has said that that move, which would almost certainly pass, would end Turkey’s EU accession talks. The writing has been on the wall for Turkey’s accession talks for some time— after Brexit, Turkey lost its strongest supporter in the EU and Erdogan’s victory is at least in part a product of his strategy to make the EU his enemy. The next step to watch will be Turkey’s “final offer” on visa-free travel within the EU, which will in turn decide the fate of the migrant deal that helped pause the massive refugee flows into Europe.

Within Turkey, the vote is an affirmation of the steps Erdogan has taken following the coup attempt, including a re-assertion of control of the military, political repression of the opposition, and massive purges across Turkish society.

But more importantly it’s also a symbolic end to the century-old Kemalist secular project in Turkey. Much as Ataturk wielded similar powers to end the Ottoman Caliphate and bring the Turkish Republic into being, Erdogan will now have the unfettered power to remake Turkey into a great power in the Ottomanist tradition. Whether an Islamist Turkey can remain a partner of the EU, a NATO ally, and a pillar of regional stability, however, is unknown.

China Fails to Break Its Addiction

The headline in the Wall Street Journal trumpeted the good news for Beijing today: China posted its best quarterly growth figures since 2015, defying the gloomier expectations of economic analysts. Dig even slightly below the surface, however, and the picture is less rosy, showing that China has failed to break its addiction to old-fashioned economic stimulus and real estate:

China reported growth of 6.9% in the first quarter, its fastest pace since the third quarter of 2015, fueled by credit and infrastructure spending as well as a stubbornly booming property market.

The pace was a notch up from the 6.8% expansion in the previous quarter and puts China well ahead of its annual target of about 6.5% growth. […]

But many of the drivers that have powered the recent expansion are expected to falter by the second half of 2017, economists say.

China’s central bank has gradually tightened credit using short-term lending instruments, wary of rapidly rising debt and growing speculation in asset markets. That, along with increased mortgage and purchase restrictions, are expected to weaken the property market in coming months—which accounts for 25% to 30% of China’s economy including related industries, according to DBS—with knock-on effects for construction and raw-material firms.

As ever, when faced with choice between necessary but painful reforms and letting the economy chug ahead on an unsustainable path, China’s leadership flinches. As a result, growth is picking up, but the economy’s weak spots—dependence on high credit, dubious infrastructure investments and the greatest housing bubble in the history of the human race—only get worse.

Fake Words

We hear a lot about Fake News. Fake Words have been around even longer, but are less publicly celebrated. Yet they matter at least as much as “Alternative Facts”—or maybe more, as they are often written or said unconsciously. A set of them is regularly used in and about Russia.

The experienced Australian analyst John Besemeres has described a “blindingly obvious” truth in his recent book of essays on Russia and East-Central Europe, A Difficult Neighbourhood. He wrote of Moscow’s objective being explicitly to achieve a dominant position for itself on the Eurasian continent not as a modern, securely post-imperial and enlightened power, but as a hyper nationalist neo-Soviet state. This is evidently a conclusion he has come to over time and reluctantly. The West still in his view has failed to face up to it adequately. Besemeres’s account of the central importance of Russia’s lengthy, continuing and brutal effort to reduce Ukraine to abject obedience has formed a critical but by no means isolated demonstration of his contention.

Many, perhaps most, Western analysts and many Western political leaders use a different language. This has tended over time to reduce Ukraine and other formerly Soviet states to the objects of a struggle between East and West rather than one most obviously between, on the one hand, countries like Ukraine (and Georgia) that are moving toward re-forming themselves into nation states and, on the other, a Russia dedicated to preventing any such thing. The analogy with the emergence of nation states in the 19th and 20th centuries from the decay of European and Ottoman imperial states is, seen in this light, a better illustration of the realities troubling European security than one stemming from Cold War perceptions.

I have highlighted words of ambiguous and by extension fake coloring here and in what follows. East and West, for instance, could have been singled out in this way earlier. These first three highlighted and commonly used concepts instantly conjure up the misleading image of a continental struggle between two armed camps. Tension between Russia and other states is however in the first place the result of Moscow’s policies towards it neighbors, not a pre-ordained and concerted Western policy of besieging Russia.

The Kremlin narrative is of course different. It is based on the outcome of World War II as seen and indeed increasingly insisted on by the Kremlin, and buttressed by inherited Tsarist as well as Soviet root beliefs. These include a conspiratorially minded fear of the West. Russia claims a sphere of influence. In a general sense, of course it has one. All countries do. Russia is, like other countries, also exposed to outside influence, whether beneficial or harmful. Ukraine’s civic society would, potentially at least, be a good stimulus for a Russia still held in check by a Kremlin whose rule is more akin to that of the disgraced Yanukovych than one devoted to the wider interests of its subjects. But when the Kremlin claims a sphere of influence or interest it means that its natural right and objective is to establish and defend a zone with clear and, if necessary, expanding boundaries over which it has control and from which outsiders and their ideas are excluded.

Other widely used formulations have a particular meaning when used by Russian spokesmen. Russia asserts for example that its national interest in enforcing its sphere of influence should be respected as paramount by those inside its confines and those outside it, or else… Moscow is after all the capital of a Great Power, and one ruled by a Strong Man. These claims are taken seriously, though not always explicitly, by numbers of foreign observers. Russia, we are for instance warned quite often, must not be provoked. But are Russia’s longer-term interests really best served by neo-imperialism? A wider definition of the country’s national interest than one of forcing its neighbors into subjection would serve its own citizens better. There is no such thing as being or becoming a “great power” in the abstract, and “strong men” cannot last for ever without falling prisoners to their past policies and the sycophancy of their courtiers.

The arguments that Russia must not be provoked or that its isolation is undesirable are valid for other countries as well, Western countries not least. So, too, in the same general sense are calls for engagement and dialogue. But these objectives and the accompanying wish for good relations with Moscow are empty without the Kremlin pursuing them as well. That would require Moscow to respect the interests of its intended vassals, and to accept that European and wider security objectives cannot be met without mutual accommodation within a group of like-minded nations, not on the basis that might is right. As things stand, it is the Kremlin which has isolated itself, not a malignant West. Those calling for engagement or dialogue generally mean by these terms, at least by implication, that other countries should either accept or put to one side as givens Russian breaches of what has until recently been fundamental to European security, for the sake of possible progress in other areas. Such accommodation would also apply to what have in the very recent past been described by authoritative Western persons as war crimes.

It is urged in support of the argument for accommodating ourselves to Russian adventures that we have to deal with Russia as it is. A truism, to be sure: Only a fool would argue that we must deal with a fantasy Russia. But like many truisms, the phrase has a variety of possible meanings. Russia is something now, has been something else in the past, and will be different in the future. Treating it with respect, another widespread policy recommendation, would not entail dealing with Russia as it is, unless one is to believe that passing by on the other side of its misdemeanors and ingratiating oneself with its leaders are marks of respect. True respect is something earned by virtue, not fear.

General Washington in his Farewell Address as President said, “Religion and morality are essential props. In vain does that man claim the praise of patriotism who labors to subvert or undermine these great pillars of human happiness.” We might not use quite this language today but the underlying point remains cogent. We need to be clear what the Russians—or more accurately official Russians—have in mind when they use the words they do in describing their interests. We need also to be clear to ourselves as well as to them in describing our hopes of working effectively with them. Insofar as we allow concepts informed by the habits of the past to dominate our approach we labor under the illusion that accommodating ourselves to the Russian narrative will lead to our resolving present difficulties. It will not. The struggle between Ukraine and by extension other formerly Soviet states, on the one hand, and today’s Russia, on the other, will not be resolved by Moscow’s forceful absorption of their territories. Western ideas of bargains with Russia based on sacrificing the interests of states or nations with populations intent on determining their own futures would not work either, to say nothing of such proposals shaming the values we claim to hold. Nor would they even necessarily gratify Putin’s Kremlin for long, let alone enable it to face up to the mounting problems that have arisen under his long rule.

China Snubbing OPEC Oil

China has a healthy appetite for oil (to say the least), and over the past four years its reliance on OPEC suppliers for crude imports has ballooned from 34 to 43 percent. That’s starting to change, however, as Riyadh has begun a concerted effort to diversify away from the cartel’s suppliers. The Energy Information Agency (EIA) reports:

While OPEC countries still made up most (57%) of China’s 7.6 million barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil imports in 2016, crude oil from non-OPEC countries made up 65% of the growth in China’s imports between 2012 and 2016. Leading non-OPEC suppliers included Russia (14% of total imports), Oman (9%), and Brazil (5%).

On an average annual basis, China’s crude oil imports increased by 2.2 million b/d between 2012 and 2016, and the non-OPEC countries’ share increased from 34% to 43% over the period. Market shares for China’s top three non-OPEC suppliers (Russia, Oman, and Brazil), all increased over these years. While still comparatively small as a share of China’s crude oil imports, imports from Brazil reached a record high of 0.6 million b/d in December 2016, and imports from the United Kingdom reached a high of 0.2 million b/d in February 2017.

China’s oil demand has risen quite a bit over the past few years, and has recently been hastened as a result of crude price collapse. As the EIA explains, “[much] of Chinese production growth from 2012 through 2015 was driven by more expensive drilling and production techniques, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) in older fields.” Cheaper global prices made these projects unprofitable, which has forced Beijing to look elsewhere for its oil. As a result, China has become the world’s largest crude oil importer, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects the country will be the world’s largest oil refiner sometime in the next three to five years.

With petrostates cutting oil production to try and induce a price rebound, China has begun actively looking outside of the Middle East for more stable suppliers. In February, it surpassed Canada as the top buyer of American crude. On average, it purchased 1.48 million barrels per day from West Africa in April. In January, forty percent of North Sea crude was shipped to Asia. The pattern is clear: China’s reliance on oil imports is increasing, and as Middle East producers reduce their output, its confidence in OPEC suppliers is waning.

Keep an Eye on the Blue City-Red State Showdown

The jurisdictional turf war that has gotten the most press since the Presidential election is the one between the unified Republican government in Washington and the blue states along the coasts. But red states, mostly in the South, are engaged in a struggle for authority of their own as they try to put the brakes on progressive legislation in their own rebellious blue cities. The Tennessean reports on a representative example:

Nashville and Memphis received great fanfare last fall from criminal justice advocates for passing local ordinances that gave police the power to reduce penalties for possession of small amounts of marijuana.

But now it’s over after just seven months.

Tennessee Gov. Bill Haslam on Wednesday signed into law Republican-backed legislation to repeal separate Nashville and Memphis laws that had allowed partial marijuana decriminalization in those communities, officially putting an end to the short-lived policies.

The state vs. local showdown is even more intense in Texas, where Gov. Greg Abbott recently said, “for us to be able to continue our legacy of economic freedom, it was necessary that we begin to speak up and to propose laws to limit the ability of cities to California-ize the great state of Texas,” according to Governing magazine.

As geographic polarization becomes more pronounced, with Democrats dominating metropolitan centers and the GOP becoming increasingly uncontested in the countryside, conflicts between red states and progressive cities within their borders are likely to become more frequent.

But while states like California that challenge the U.S. government in the age of Trump actually have a chance of winning some victories under America’s federalist architecture, localities are not sovereign and don’t have the same kind of legal or political recourse. That means that in the long run, big cities in red states, no matter how liberal their populations, will be prevented from moving as far to the Left as their counterparts in places like New York and Illinois.

If residents don’t like it, they always have the option of voting with their feet…

Offshore Wind Turns a Corner

Renewable energy—or at least one form of it—took a big step forward this week when Denmark’s Dong Energy, the largest offshore wind company on the planet, announced its intention to construct a pair of wind projects off the coast of Germany without any government subsidies. The FT reports:

In an advance for what has been one of the most heavily subsidised types of renewable power, Denmark’s Dong Energy said it would rely on wholesale market prices instead of extra government support for the projects in the German North Sea. […]

“The zero subsidy bid is a breakthrough for the cost competitiveness of offshore wind and it demonstrates the technology’s massive global growth potential as a cornerstone in the economically viable shift to green energy systems,” said Dong’s head of wind power, Samuel Leupold.

The cost of both solar and wind energy has been falling at a steady rate in recent years, but it’s not been something we’ve pinned our hopes on, for a few reasons. First, renewables have been on the cusp of “breaking through” for decades, always being sold as the energy source of the future but showing little progress in becoming the energy source of the present. Much of that has boiled down to cost: these energy sources struggle to compete with fossil fuels on price, and their success thus far has therefore relied on government support. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Germany, where clean energy has been propped up by subsidies called feed-in tariffs, whose costs have been passed along to consumers (German electricity prices are among the highest in Europe).

Renewables also face a number of challenges as their share of energy mixes grows. Lacking cost-effective and scalable power storage options, wind and solar cannot be consistently relied upon to supply a grid—what happens when the sun doesn’t shine and the wind doesn’t blow? That intermittency isn’t just a threat to reliability of supply, it also wreaks havoc on grids that were not constructed with this sort of variability in mind. This problem—and the stress it places on power grids—becomes more pressing the larger renewables’ share of an energy mix becomes, which limits how far wind and solar can go, even if they were capable of competing on price.

Dong’s announcement is an undeniable sign of progress for offshore wind power. If the company can successfully demonstrate that it’s possible to profitably construct and operate a wind farm without subsidies, the cost criticism of renewables will begin to weaken. That said, it should be noted that this is something of a special case. These new farms are in a particularly windy location (smart siting should always be a primary concern for new energy projects), and they’re close to existing projects, which will allow Dong to piggyback on existing infrastructure. Moreover, the projects Dong bid on won’t begin operating until 2024, which allowed the company to project lower operating costs on the expectation that the turbines that will eventually be constructed will be larger and more efficient than those currently available at present. In other words, this is a bet that offshore wind will be a moneymaker seven years from now.

This achievement also does little to address concerns about the security of supply or grid stability issues. Indeed, one of the big reasons why Dong thinks it’s able to snub subsidies is the fact that the company won’t have to pay the cost of connecting its projects to the grid—a cushy deal Germany set up for the company, and one that is a departure from industry practice. There are clearly many more wrinkles to iron out.

With all of those caveats still in mind, let’s give credit where credit is due: given the right set of conditions, offshore wind isn’t far from becoming a viable energy option. As researchers continue to make clean energy technologies cheaper and more efficient, renewables’ reliance on subsidies will wane. If and when that happens, the industry will still have a host of other hurdles to clear, but these energy sources are moving in the right direction, and that’s excellent news for future global energy security.