Adam Thierer's Blog, page 96

Spencer Weber Waller on Facebook and antitrust

On the podcast this week, Spencer Weber Waller, Professor and Director at the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, discusses his new paper entitled, Antitrust and Social Networking. The discussion centers on the likelihood of Facebook being charged by the government as having a monopoly over the social networking market. Waller first explains antitrust law, which, among other things, prohibits monopolization to protect competition. Waller then discusses the difficulty of defining the market for social networks. He claims that Facebook is dominant in the market, but he also says there are multiple markets for Facebook’s participation, like consumer use and advertising. Waller goes on to explain how a court would analyze an antitrust violation. According to Waller, there is a two-step process involved where courts ask whether there is market power, and whether a company is doing anything with that power to interfere with competition. Waller ends the discussion by analyzing the likelihood of Facebook ever being charged with antitrust violations. Waller also briefly gives his thoughts on the recent antitrust suit filed by the DOJ against Apple.

Related Links

Antitrust and Social Networking, By Waller“Will Facebook’s Instagram Deal Face Antitrust Scrutiny?”, CNBC“The procompetitive story that could undermine the DOJ’s e-books antitrust case against Apple”, Technology Liberation Front

To keep the conversation around this episode in one place, we’d like to ask you to comment at the webpage for this episode on Surprisingly Free. Also, why not subscribe to the podcast on iTunes?

Landline rules won’t work for telecoms, or for Susan Shaw

Cecilia Kang of the Washington Post reports that

the telecom industry is forcing policymakers to re-examine what has long been a basic guarantee of government – that every American home should have access to a phone, along with other utilities such as water or electricity.

Industry executives and state lawmakers who support this effort want to expand the definition of the phone utility beyond the century-old icon of the American home to include Web-based devices or mobile phones.

The quid pro quo for a monopoly franchise was an obligation to provide timely service upon reasonable request to anyone, subject to regulated rates, terms and conditions.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated the monopoly franchise, but the obligation to serve remains in the statute books of most states.  Telecom providers, aka carriers-of-last-resort (COLR), are stuck with the quid without the quo.

This has become a problem as more and more consumers are “cutting the cord” in favor of wireless or VoIP services.  AT&T, for example, has lost nearly half of its consumer switched access lines since the end of 2006.  However, most of the loops, switches, cables and other infrastructure which comprise the telephone network must be maintained if telecom providers have to furnish telephone service to anyone who wants it within days.

The network consists of approximately 45 million tons of copper, not to mention thousands of supercomputers (optimized for switching calls, not routing packets), plus cavernous central offices with nearly vacant employee parking lots in most of the nation’s towns, suburbs and urban districts, and so on.  The cost of this massive capital base is recovered according to insanely long depreciation schedules and other gimmicks established by politicians serving on “expert” public utility commissions intent on keeping rates for basic local telephone service far below cost.

In other words, there are high fixed costs in the telecom business which do not vary in direct proportion to the number of consumers who choose to pay for telephone service in any given month or year.  When millions of consumers cut the cord, there are far fewer customers to share these substantial fixed costs.

The legacy telephone network, which is extremely reliable but horribly inefficient, cannot be sustained indefinitely.  Voice services will be delivered over broadband platforms along with data and video.  Once networks are optimized for video, incidentally, voice may become a free app.  “The challenge for the country,” according to the National Broadband Plan at page 59, “is to ensure that as [Internet Protocol]-based services replace circuit-switched services, there is a smooth transition for Americans who use traditional phone service and for the businesses that provide it.”

States with legacy COLR requirements will have no choice but to act. Where consumers have a choice between voice service providers, no provider should be saddled with a monopoly-era COLR obligation.

If it is necessary to require an incumbent to provide service, the incumbent should be free to choose the technology(ies) it will use to serve its customers.  It might be cheaper, for example, to serve consumers in some remote areas by satellite than by other means.

What about Susan Shaw cited in the Washington Post, the 53-year-old grandmother who is not interested in paying for cellular service, which would probably be costlier than the $12 a month she pays for her plain old phone?

Ms. Shaw’s landline phone service is heavily subsidized, costing far in excess of the $12 a month she pays.  Telecom providers no longer have captive ratepayers.  They are struggling to compete and cannot continue to act as private-sector tax collectors.

If $12 a month voice service for Ms. Shaw is a national priority, Congress should commit general tax revenues for that purpose.  In that case, Congress might want to consider that the economics of fixed-line telephone service doesn’t compute anymore and there may be a range of more efficient alternatives.

Event Notice: 2nd Annual GMU Conference on Competition, Search & Social Media

The fine folks at George Mason University School of Law’s Henry G. Manne Program in Law & Economics Studies have put together another stellar agenda and lineup of speakers for their Second Annual Conference on Competition, Search & Social Media. The event will be held at GMU’s School of Law on Wednesday, May 16th from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. Panel topics are listed as follows:

PANEL 1: Antitrust and Platform Competition in Search and Social Media (This panel will discuss issues involving market definition, network effects, and dynamic considerations when analyzing search and social media platform competition.)

PANEL 2: Search, Duties to Deal, and Essential Facilities (This panel will explore the extent to which search engines should be viewed as utilities, and whether they may have a legal duty to assist their rivals under the essential facilities doctrine as it survives after Trinko and Linkline.)

PANEL 3: The Interface Between Privacy and Competitive Analysis in Search and Social Media (This panel will explore the extent to which privacy should be germane to antitrust analysis of online search and social networks, including whether privacy can be viewed as a dimension of quality and the extent to which privacy regulation may affect competition.)

PANEL 4: Are There Workable Remedies for “Search Engine Bias”? (This panel will discuss economic, legal (including First Amendment), and practical issues surrounding potential remedies to allegedly “biased” search engine results.)

I’m honored to have been asked to moderate the second panel since it focuses on an issue I’ve been given a lot of thought to lately. (See my recent working paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.“)

Seriously, you’d be hard-pressed to find a better set of speakers on these topics. Check them all out here, where you can also RSVP if you’re interested.

Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset

In this new Money Morning article, “The Antitrust Curse: What Apple Can Learn From Microsoft, IBM,”  David Zeiler wonders whether the antitrust lawsuit filed against Apple and several book publishers by the U.S. Department of Justice last week could open the door to a broader case against Apple or, at a minimum, simply become a major distraction to the firm and it’s ability to innovate going forward. He uses IBM and Microsoft as case studies in this regard and notes that, “the problem with being in the DOJ’s gunsight is that it distracts management, makes the company hesitant to innovate, and blemishes the company’s public image.  While antitrust woes may not have been entirely responsible for Microsoft and IBM ceding their dominant positions in tech, they were clearly a major factor,” he says. “And worse for Apple, the e-book case could be just the beginning.”

Quite right. I raised the same concern in my recent Forbes column,”Regulatory, Antitrust and Disruptive Risks Threaten Apple’s Empire,” which Zeiler was kind enough to quote in his essay. In that piece, I argued:

Even if Apple beats back [the eBooks] investigation, broader questions are being raised about the company’s power that could invite a much broader investigation. The danger for Apple is that antitrust becomes an omnipresent threat that must be factored into all ongoing business decisions. Antitrust is a particular danger to Apple because the firm is highly vertically integrated and that integration is the source of many of their innovations.  As earlier tech titans like IBM and Microsoft learned, when antitrust hangs like the Sword of Damocles, every decision about how to evolve and innovate becomes a calculated gamble.

Regarding the earlier impact that antitrust Sword of Damocles had on Microsoft, Zeiler unearthed this terrific 2005 quote from Mark Kroese, a general manager of information services at the Microsoft Network, who described the impact of the MS antitrust case on innovation at the firm as follows: “Working at Microsoft today vs. five years ago is different,” Kroese said. “If anyone thinks the antitrust case hasn’t slowed us down, you’re wrong. If I want to meet with a products manager for Windows, there needs to be three lawyers in the room. We have to be so careful, we err on the side of caution. We are on such a fine line of conduct.” Regarding how antitrust chilled IBM, Zeiler cites veteran tech journalist Steve Wildstrom of Tech.pinions who noted,  “Twelve years of litigation were an enormous distraction in a time of rapid technological and business change. IBM management became cautious and over-lawyered, constantly looking over its shoulder-a condition that persisted for years after the case ended. The antitrust case was almost certainly a major cause of the serious decline of IBM in the late 1980s and early 90s,” Wildstrom said.

Of course, it is impossible to scientifically determine to what degree antitrust harassment contributed to either IBM or Microsoft’s inability to innovate and adapt to the rapidly changing market conditions. And let’s be clear: both IBM and MS have found ways to rebound and innovate in other ways. But one wonders what was lost in the process as the threat of antitrust constantly loomed and potentially chilled innovative efforts that could have kept both firms on the cutting-edge.

It’s not just Apple that faces similar threats today. Google is obviously another company increasingly mentioned as an antitrust target. Commenting of the dangers of a potential case against Google, Bernstein Research senior analyst Carlos Kirjner argues that “even if regulatory proceedings come to naught, the process has the potential, in the most extreme circumstances, to consume so much of the company’s energy that it can lead to important strategic missteps: many believe that Microsoft missed the boat on the Internet, and IBM on the importance of the personal computer, in large part because their management teams were focused on defending against the DoJ’s antitrust efforts.”

The better approach to disciplining tech firms and markets is to rely less on intervention and more on Schumpeter’s “perennial gales of creative destruction,” which are blowing harder than ever in our modern high-tech economy. In markets built largely upon binary code and governed by Moore’s Law, the pace and nature of change has become hyper-Schumpeterian: unrelenting and utterly unpredictable. Innovative risk-takers are constantly shaking things up and displacing yesterday’s lumbering, lethargic giants. Just ask some of the players that have been largely left in the dust, including AOL, AltaVista, MySpace, Palm, and others. Of course, there’s my favorite recent case study: Research In Motion’s BlackBerry smartphone.  As I noted in my recent column, “Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” BlackBerry was virtually synonymous with “smartphones” and was considered one of the tech titans that seemed destined to dominate for many years to come. But now the BlackBerry’s days appear numbered and its parent company Research In Motion Ltd. is struggling for its very survival.

Too many tech industry pundits today ignore these dynamic realities and instead rely a myopic analytical approach to the information economy that is fundamentally static in character. Many static equilibrium scholars in both the legal and economic profession tend to adopt a snapshot view of markets and innovation. Such critics often express an overly nostalgic view of the technological past while adopting an excessively gloomy view of the present and the chances for future progress.

But, a la Schumpeter, modern tech markets are highly dynamic. There is no static end-state, “perfect competition,” or “market equilibrium” in today’s information technology marketplace. Change and innovation are chaotic, non-linear, and paradigm-shattering. Schumpeter said it best long ago when he noted how, “in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [perfect] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization… competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other,” he argued, because the “ever-present threat” of dynamic, disruptive change “disciplines before it attacks.”

By contrast, the static equilibrium mindset is myopically fixated on short-term market share and price competition while ignoring “competition for innovation,” which is what matters most in the more dynamic Schumpeterian model. “Schumpeterian competition is primarily about active, risk-taking decision makers who seek to change their parameters,” note economists Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin. “It is about continually destroying the old economic structure from within and replacing it with a new one.” Thus, while static or “perfect competition” models assume away innovation and are preoccupied with equilibrium, dynamic models revolve around disequilibrium and assume that the only constant is change. What is most important to economic progress, therefore, is the ongoing process of constant experimentation and spontaneous discovery that allows new business models and organizational structures to emerge in response to market signals.

The other danger of the static equilibrium mindset is that the same new innovators and innovations that obtain success and scale quite rapidly as a result of this process are sometimes thought to possess problematic market power. Accusations of “monopoly” quickly follow. As Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase noted, “if an economist finds something—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of understandable practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent,” he argued.  Of course, non-economists are just as likely—perhaps more likely—to make that same error. This is why a short-term fixation on market share and market power is so problematic.

Moreover, as Schumpeter also taught us, it is essential that uneven entrepreneurial gains be tolerated so that innovation can occur and be continuously incentivized. Economies need innovators to take risks because progress is born from it. Penalizing the risk-takers by trying to “level the playing field” through rash regulation or antitrust interventions will simply sap the entrepreneurial spirit from the marketplace, limit technological innovation, and diminish the possibility of progress and prosperity over the long-haul.

If you’d like a better understanding of this dynamic conception of competition and an explanation of why the static equilibrium mindset — especially in the antitrust field — is so horribly misguided, then I strongly recommend you begin your investigation with the following readings:

Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin, “A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories,” in Jerry Ellig (ed.), Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, “Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,” 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2009).
Geoffrey A. Manne &  Joshua D. Wright, “Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust,” George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-54, February 16, 2010.
Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?” (August 2009).
Thomas Hazlett, David Teece, Leonard Waverman, “Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems,” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, (November 21, 2011), No. 11-50.
Bruce Owen, “Antitrust and Vertical Integration in ‘New Economy’ Industries,” Technology Policy Institute (November 2010).
Daniel F. Spulber, “Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(4), 915 (2008).
Richard Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy,” 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 927 (2001).

Also make sure to check out these classic works from Austrian School economists:

Israel Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (University of Chicago Press, 1985).
F.A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. & Mario J. Rizzo, “Competition and Discovery, in The Economics of Time and Ignorance (London: Routledge, 1985, 1996).






 

 

 

 

Data Transparency Coalition Debuts Today

Meet the Data Transparency Coalition.

The Washington Post‘s Capitol Business blog reports this morning:

A small but growing collection of companies has formed a coalition that will push the federal government to establish a standard system by which agencies categorize their data. …


“Our members understand that if the government identified its data elements in consistent ways, there would be vast new opportunities for the tools that they are building,” Executive Director Hudson Hollister said.

Early supporters include Microsoft and data analysis and management firms Level One Technologies, Teradata, and BrightScope. I’m on their Board of Advisors. One of their early priorities will be to pass H.R. 2146, the DATA Act.

(Here’s a nit I can’t help but pick: The Post says the coalition “aims to standardize ‘big data.’” No. It’s just data.)

Follow the coalition‘s founder and executive director on Twitter @hudsonhollister, and you can Like their Facebook page, as well, to get updates that way.

The procompetitive story that could undermine the DOJ's e-books antitrust case against Apple

Did Apple conspire with e-book publishers to raise e-book prices?  That's what DOJ argues in a lawsuit filed yesterday. But does that violate the antitrust laws?  Not necessarily—and even if it does, perhaps it shouldn't.

Antitrust's sole goal is maximizing consumer welfare.  While that generally means antitrust regulators should focus on lower prices, the situation is more complicated when we're talking about markets for new products, where technologies for distribution and consumption are evolving rapidly along with business models.  In short, the so-called Agency pricing model Apple and publishers adopted may mean (and may not mean) higher e-book prices in the short run, but it also means more variability in pricing, and it might well have facilitated Apple's entry into the market, increasing e-book retail competition and promoting innovation among e-book readers, while increasing funding for e-book content creators.

The procompetitive story goes something like the following.  (As always with antitrust, the question isn't so much which model is better, but that no one really knows what the right model is—least of all antitrust regulators—and that, the more unclear the consumer welfare effects of a practice are, as in rapidly evolving markets, the more we should err on the side of restraint).

Apple versus Amazon

Apple–decidedly a hardware company–entered the e-book market as a device maker eager to attract consumers to its expensive iPad tablets by offering appealing media content.  In this it is the very opposite of Amazon, a general retailer that naturally moved into retailing digital content, and began selling hardware (Kindle readers) only as a way of getting consumers to embrace e-books.

The Kindle is essentially a one-trick pony (the latest Kindle notwithstanding), and its focus is on e-books.  By contrast, Apple's platform (the iPad and, to a lesser degree, the iPhone) is a multi-use platform, offering Internet browsing, word processing, music, apps, and other products, of which books probably accounted–and still account–for a relatively small percentage of revenue.  Importantly, unlike Amazon, Apple has many options for promoting adoption of its platform—not least, the "sex appeal" of its famously glam products.  Without denigrating Amazon's offerings, Amazon, by contrast, competes largely on the basis of its content, and its devices sell only as long as the content is attractive and attractively priced.

In essence, Apple's iPad is a platform; Amazon's Kindle is a book merchant wrapped up in a cool device.

What this means is that Apple, unlike Amazon, is far less interested in controlling content prices for books and other content; it hardly needs to control that lever to effectively market its platform, and it can easily rely on content providers' self interest to ensure that enough content flows through its devices.

In other words, Apple is content to act as a typical platform would, acting as a conduit for others' content, which the content owner controls.  Amazon surely has "platform" status in its sights, but reliant as it is on e-books, and nascent as that market is, it is not quite ready to act like a "pure" platform.  (For more on this, see my blog post from 2010).

The Agency Model

As it happens, publishers seem to prefer the Agency Model, as well, preferring to keep control over their content in this medium rather than selling it (as in the brick-and-mortar model) to a retailer like Amazon to price, market, promote and re-sell at will.  For the publishers, the Agency Model is essentially a form of resale price maintenance — ensuring that retailers who sell their products do not inefficiently discount prices.  (For a clear exposition of the procompetitive merits of RPM, see this article by Benjamin Klein).

(As a side note, I suspect that they may well be wrong to feel this way.  The inclination seems to stem from a fear of e-books' threat to their traditional business model — a fear of technological evolution that can have catastrophic consequences (cf. Kodak, about which I wrote a few weeks ago).  But then content providers moving into digital media have been consistently woeful at understanding digital markets).

So the publishers strike a deal with Apple that gives the publishers control over pricing and Apple a cut (30%) of the profits.  Contrary to the DOJ's claim in its complaint, this model happens to look exactly like Apple's arrangement for apps and music, as well, right down to the same percentage Apple takes from sales.  This makes things easier for Apple, gives publishers more control over pricing, and offers Apple content and a good return sufficient to induce it to market and sell its platform.

It is worth noting here that there is no reason to think that the wholesale model wouldn't also have generated enough content and enough return for Apple, so I don't think the ultimate motivation here for Apple was higher prices (which could well have actually led to lower total return given fewer sales), but rather that it wasn't interested in paying for control.  So in exchange for a (possibly) larger slice of the pie, as well as consistency with its existing content provider back-end and the avoidance of having to monitor and make pricing decisions,  Apple happily relinquished decision-making over pricing and other aspects of sales.

The Most Favored Nation Clauses

Having given up this price control, Apple has one remaining problem: no guarantee of being able to offer attractive content at an attractive price if it is forced to try to sell e-books at a high price while its competitors can undercut it.  And so, as is common in this sort of distribution agreement, Apple obtains "Most Favored Nation" (MFN) clauses from publishers to ensure that if they are permitting other platforms to sell their books at a lower price, Apple will at least be able to do so, as well.  The contracts at issue in the case specify maximum resale prices for content and ensure Apple that if a publisher permits, say, Amazon to sell the same content at a lower price, it will likewise offer the content via Apple's iBooks store for the same price.

The DOJ is fighting a war against MFNs, which is a story for another day, and it seems clear from the terms of the settlement with the three setting publishers that indeed MFNs are a big part of the target here.  But there is nothing inherently problematic about MFNs, and there is plenty of scholarship explaining why they are beneficial.  Here, and important among these, they facilitate entry by offering some protection for an entrant's up-front investment in challenging an incumbent, and prevent subsequent entrants from undercutting this price.  In this sense MFNs are essentially an important way of inducing retailers like Apple to sign on to an RPM (no control) model by offering some protection against publishers striking a deal with a competitor that leaves Apple forced to price its e-books out of the market.

There is nothing, that I know of, in the MFNs or elsewhere in the agreements that requires the publishers to impose higher resale prices elsewhere, or prevents the publishers from selling throughApple at a lower price, if necessary.  That said, it may well have been everyone's hope that, as the DOJ alleges, the MFNs would operate like price floors instead of price ceilings, ensuring higher prices for publishers.  But hoping for higher prices is not an antitrust offense, and, as I've discussed, it's not even clear that, viewed more broadly in terms of the evolution of the e-book and e-reader markets, higher prices in the short run would be bad for consumers.

The Legal Standard

To the extent that book publishers don't necessarily know what's really in their best interest, the DOJ is even more constrained in judging the benefits (or costs) for consumers at large from this scheme.  As I've suggested, there is a pretty clear procompetitive story here, and a court may indeed agree that this should not be judged under a per se liability standard (as would apply in the case of naked price-fixing).

Most important, here there is no allegation that the publishers and Apple (or the publishers among themselves) agreed on price.  Rather, the allegation is that they agreed to adopt a particular business model (one that, I would point out, probably resulted in greater variation in price, rather than less, compared to Amazon's traditional $9.99-for-all pricing scheme).  If the DOJ can convince a court that this nevertheless amounts to a naked price-fixing agreement among publishers, with Apple operating as the hub, then they are probably sunk.  But while antitrust law is suspicious of collective action among rivals in coordinating on prices, this change in business model does not alone coordinate on prices.  Each individual publisher can set its own price, and it's not clear that the DOJ's evidence points to any agreement with respect to actual pricing level.

It does seem pretty clear that there is coordination here on the shift in business models.  But sometimes antitrust law condones such collective action to take account of various efficiencies (think standard setting or joint ventures or collective rights groups like BMI).  Here, there is a more than plausible case that coordinated action to move to a plausibly-more-efficient business model was necessary and pro-competitive.  If Apple can convince a court of that, then the DOJ has a rule of reason case on its hands and is facing a very uphill battle.

[Cross posted at Forbes.com]

Smartphones & Schumpeter

Two weeks ago, I penned a column for Forbes about the astonishing rise and fall of BlackBerry ("Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?"), which somehow became the most widely-read and retweeted thing I've ever written in my life. I argued that BlackBerry's story — indeed, the story of the entire U.S. smartphone sector — is the living embodiment of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Joseph Schumpeter's "perennial gales of creative destruction" are blowing harder than ever in today's tech economy and laying waste to those who don't innovate fast enough, I argued, and nowhere is that more true than in the smartphone sector. I noted how, just five years ago, "BlackBerry" was virtually synonymous with "smartphones" and was considered one of the tech titans that seemed destined to dominate for many years to come. But now the BlackBerry's days appear numbered and its parent company Research In Motion Ltd. is struggling for its very survival.

But there's another company that I ignored in that essay that was also perched atop the mobile handset hill for a long time: Nokia. Here's the horrifying opening lines from a Wall Street Journal story today about the company ("Nokia Crisis Deepens, Shares Plunge"):

Nokia Corp., long the biggest name in the cellphone business, is scrambling to stay relevant in the smartphone age. On Wednesday the company warned things will get worse before they get better, saying that competitors are rapidly eating into its sales in emerging markets such as China and India. Nokia also said its newest phone in the U.S. had a software glitch that is preventing some users from connecting to the Internet, marring its attempt to fight into the world's most important smartphone market. The company's American depositary shares slid 16% to a 15-year low of $4.24 in New York. Its market capitalization now stands at $16 billion, down from $90 billion five years ago.

It gets worse from there. The article continues on to document Nokia's gradual slide and notes that, "like BlackBerry maker Research In Motion Ltd., Nokia is trying to re-establish its relevance in a market dominated by Apple Inc.'s iPhone and Google-powered devices. Both Nokia and RIM are working on new devices they hope will make a splash, even as Apple and Android work on improvements of their own."

To put into context how remarkable this rapid reversal of fortunes is, you need to try remember what life was like just five years ago:

The iPhone and Android had not yet landed.
Most of the best-selling phones of 2007 were made by Nokia and Motorola.
Feature phones still dominated the market; smartphones were still a luxury (and a clunky luxury at that).
There were no app stores and what "apps" did exist were mostly proprietary and device or carrier-specific.
There was no 4G service.
And regulatory advocates like Tim Wu and the New America Foundation were running around saying that the FCC needed to pursue massive regulation of the cellular industry for a variety of silly reasons.

In those now-seemingly Mobile Dark Ages, those competing for power included Nokia, Motorola, LG, Sony, BlackBerry, Palm, and Microsoft, among others. Some pundits thought the idea of entry by anyone else — especially Apple and Google — was simply silly. Here are some of the more entertaining predictions I unearthed when researching my Forbes piece two weeks ago:

In December 2006, Palm CEO Ed Colligan summarily dismissed the idea that a traditional personal computing company could compete in the smartphone business. "We've learned and struggled for a few years here figuring out how to make a decent phone," he said. "PC guys are not going to just figure this out. They're not going to just walk in."
In January 2007, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer laughed off the prospect of an expensive smartphone without a keyboard having a chance in the marketplace as follows: "Five hundred dollars? Fully subsidized? With a plan? I said that's the most expensive phone in the world and it doesn't appeal to business customers because it doesn't have a keyboard, which makes it not a very good e-mail machine."
In March 2007, computing industry pundit John C. Dvorak argued that "Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone" since "There is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive." Dvorak believed the mobile handset business was already locked up by the era's major players. "This is not an emerging business. In fact it's gone so far that it's in the process of consolidation with probably two players dominating everything, Nokia Corp. and Motorola Inc."

Of course, we now know how this story turned out. Today, less than five years after these predictions were made, Nokia's profits and market share have plummeted and a struggling Motorola was purchased by Google last summer. Meanwhile, Palm appears dead and Microsoft is struggling to win back all the market share it has lost to Apple and Google in this arena. Of course, Microsoft has partnered with Nokia to try to make a go of it together. Five years ago, the Antitrust Gods would have likely thrown down the hammer and stopped such a deal. Today, many analysts wonder if MS has made yet another strategic blunder by partnering with Nokia. Their new Lumia 900 is a very impressive device, but it's already been plagued by design flaws. Moreover, as today's Journal article notes, "It's still far from clear whether Nokia's effort will be enough to convince many customers that its smartphones are a good alternative to the iPhone and Android devices. Part of the reason: iPhone and Android offer a much greater array of 'apps' built by third-party developers."

Meanwhile, wireless carriers (Sprint, T-Mobile, Verizon, AT&T, etc.) are suffering from whiplash as they wonder how Apple and Google flew right by them to become the focus of all the headlines and the darlings of Wall Street analysts. This is all part of the ongoing "Gravitational Shift" we are witnessing in the mobile ecosystem, as economist Tom Hazlett argues in a Barron's oped this week. "The telecommunications industry's center of gravity has shifted," Hazlett noted. "The edge is squeezing the core." Hazlett continues on:

Competition among the physical networks spins profits out to the virtual networks. Apple's value (from iPhones and iPads) to the wireless industry was estimated in early February at $248 billion—about 92% of the enterprise value of the entire U.S. mobile-network sector. Apple owns not a single base station or wireless license; it builds no networks. And yet it has emerged, in four short years, as "dominant in the mobile market"—an unqualified assessment offered by Walter Isaacson in his superb Steve Jobs biography.

I cannot find a more dynamic, Schumpeterian market on Planet Earth than today's mobile marketplace. Everything and everyone has been upended in just 5 years. Not even Schumpeter could have imagined creative destruction on this scale.

Nokia after the iPhone

A Free Market Defense of Retransmission Consent

Unshackling a market from obsolete, protectionist regulations can be a very challenging undertaking, especially when the lifeblood of a regulated industry is at stake. The latest push for regulatory reform to encounter the murky waters of modernization is the "Next Generation Television Marketplace Act." The ambitious and comprehensive bill, introduced by Rep. Steve Scalise and Sen. Jim DeMint in their respective chambers of Congress, aims to free up the broadcast television market. The federal government's hands have been all over this market since its inception, overseen primarily by the FCC, pursuant to the Communications Act.

The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act ("DeMint/Scalise") is a bold and laudable bill that would, on the whole, substantially free up America's television marketplace. But one aspect of the bill—its abolition of the retransmission consent regime—has sparked a vigorous debate among free marketers. This essay will explain what this debate is all about and why policymakers should think twice before getting rid of retransmission consent.

Toward a Free Market in Television

The DeMint/Scalise bill takes an axe to many of the myriad rules that stand in the way of a free market in television programming. As Co-Liberator Adam Thierer recently explained on these pages, the bill's many provisions would among other things get rid of the compulsory licensing provisions in the Copyright Act that empower government to set the rates cable and satellite ("pay-TV") providers must pay to retransmit distant broadcast signals. It would eliminate the "network non-duplication" rule, which generally bars pay-TV providers from carrying out-of-market signals that offer the same programs as local broadcasters. The bill would also end the "must-carry" rule that forces pay-TV providers to retransmit certain local broadcast signals without receiving any compensation.

These are just a few of the many provisions of the DeMint/Scalise bill that would substantially reform the Communications and Copyright Acts to foster a free video marketplace and bring television regulation into the 21st century. (For a more in-depth assessment of the positive aspects of the DeMint/Scalise proposal, see Adam's informative Forbes.com essay, Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming; Randy May's superb Free State Foundation Perspectives essay, Broadcast Retransmission Negotiations and Free Markets;" and Bruce Owen's FSF essay, The FCC and the Unfree Market for TV Program Rights.)

What DeMint/Scalise Means For Retransmission Consent

While most of the DeMint/Scalise bill's provisions are unequivocally pro-market and pro-consumer, some free marketers have criticized the bill because it would repeal the current statute that provides for "retransmission consent." Retransmission consent, which Congress enacted by overriding President George H.W. Bush's veto of the 1992 Cable Act, affords broadcasters an attenuated property right that entitles them to bar local pay-TV providers from retransmitting their signals without broadcasters' permission—thus forcing negotiation over whether broadcasters should be paid for their content. Some broadcasters don't elect to exercise this right, and instead  demand that local pay-TV operators carry their signals pursuant to the "must-carry" rule.  (Many unaffiliated broadcasters that transmit low-value programming elect to exercise must-carry because they recognize pay-TV operators are unlikely to pay retransmission fees.)

The current retransmission consent regime, which Congress created in 1992, is plagued with complex regulations that undermine free market negotiations. As Adam and Randy have explained, many of the rules discussed above—including network non-duplication, syndication exclusivity, and must-carry—tilt the playing field in broadcasters' favor, enabling them to earn hefty retransmission fees from cable and satellite providers that almost certainly exceed the fees they'd earn in a free market. This wealth transfer translates into higher monthly bills for pay-TV  subscribers, and may enable some broadcasters to reap profits (economic rents) they would not otherwise enjoy.

The DeMint/Scalise bill would eliminate numerous existing rules that distort retransmission negotiations between broadcasters and pay-TV operators. In doing so, however, the bill would also eliminate the retransmission consent regime in its entirety. This has concerned some conservatives, such as the American Conservative Union (ACU), which recently sent a letter to Congress opposing the bill's retransmission consent provisions.

But two venerable free market tech policy icons disagree with the ACU: Adam Thierer, writing on these pages, and Randy May, writing on The Free State Foundation blog. Adam argues that "ACU has mistakenly equated the retransmission consent regulatory process with an actual free market contracting process." Randy argues that if the DeMint/Scalise bill were adopted, "[b]roadcasters would . . . continue to be paid for carriage of their signals – unless they choose to withhold the carriage rights because they don't like the amount of compensation offered."

I wholeheartedly agree with Adam and Randy that ACU's characterization of the current regime as a "functioning market" is inaccurate. Nonetheless, ACU is right to worry that the retransmission consent provisions of the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act may undermine private bargaining. In particular, the bill appears to strip broadcasters of the authority to withhold carriage rights from pay-TV providers. Page 2 of the bill (PDF of bill text) states that:

Section 325 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 325) is amended . . . by striking subsections (b) and (e)

In striking these two subsections, the bill would restore 47 U.S.C. § 325 to its state prior to the enactment of the 1992 Cable Act—the law which established retransmission consent as it exists today.

On one hand, this would eliminate many onerous provisions, including the must-carry rule and the "good faith" negotiation requirement. But striking these subsections would also eliminate the legal authority that underlies broadcasters' ability to withhold carriage rights from pay-TV operators. Under pre-1992 law, as the Senate Commerce Committee's legislative on the Cable Act explained, "cable systems need not obtain consent from broadcast stations for retransmission of their signals, based on the reference in section 325 of retransmission by broadcasting stations." S. Rep. No. 102–92, at 35 (1991). In other words, if 325(b) goes away, so does retransmission consent as we know it.

Retransmission consent is not without its critics. Some argue that broadcasters don't deserve the right to exclude local pay-TV operators from retransmitting their signals, as subscribers can already freely watch over-the-air broadcast signals by simply putting up an antenna. Pay-TV providers simply retransmit broadcast signals without alteration and with advertisements intact, the argument goes, so why should broadcasters be able to demand compensation from pay-TV providers?

While this argument has rhetorical appeal, it ignores the economic realities of the modern television market. Today, unlike in the 1970s, a tiny percentage of viewers watch broadcast television over-the-air. The tiny minority of households with antennas pay no subscription fees, unlike the majority of viewers who pay a fee for a cable or satellite subscription. Broadcasters that demand retransmission fees from pay-TV operators are simply charging viewers who are willing to pay more than viewers who aren't. This practice, known as price discrimination, ultimately benefits low-income families who rely on over-the-air signals by allowing them to view programming subsidized by pay-TV subscribers.

Copyright Versus Retransmission Consent

So what about content owners? Their legal rights, unlike those of broadcasters and pay-TV providers, arise primarily out of the Copyright Act, not the Communications Act.

While the DeMint/Scalise bill would eliminate the Communications Act's retransmission consent provisions, it makes only minor changes to the Copyright Act—which, of course, prohibits most unauthorized public performances of copyrighted works, including television broadcasts.  So copyright owners would retain the right to bar pay-TV  providers from retransmitting their television shows without permission. (Indeed, in one sense, content owners would enjoy greater copyright protection under the bill, as it eliminates several limitations on copyright liability currently provided to secondary transmissions by cable and satellite providers.)

If the bill is enacted, therefore, pay-TV operators wishing to retransmit broadcast signals may no longer need to get permission from the broadcaster – but they'd still need permission from program owners to retransmit signals that contain copyrighted content. While broadcasters themselves own the rights to some of the programs they typically air—including local news shows and, in some cases, exclusive syndication rights for their area—the vast majority of broadcast television content is owned by third parties such as broadcast networks, production companies, syndicators, sports leagues, and the like. (Although the Copyright Act confers protection on compilations of copyrighted works in certain cases, whether broadcasters' programming choices may themselves be copyrightable is unclear. See 2 Patry on Copyright § 3:64.)

Before 1976, cable providers were free under federal law to retransmit local and distant broadcast signals without permission from the broadcaster or the rights holder. In 1976, Congress overhauled the Copyright Act to define public retransmissions of broadcast signals as "public performances" (which if containing copyrighted material generally require permission from the rights holder).

At the same time, however, Congress also created a compulsory license permitting cable providers to retransmit certain distant broadcast signals so long as they paid royalties to the Copyright Office (which in turn doles out payments to rights holders as it sees fit). The law also permitted cable providers to retransmit broadcast signals locally without paying any royalties to rights holders.

The DeMint/Scalise bill would leave intact the 1976 Copyright Act's definition of "public performance," while repealing not only the compulsory licensing system that currently governs retransmissions of distant signals but also the provision exempting pay-TV providers' retransmissions of local signals from copyright liability. If the bill were enacted, owners of broadcast programs would gain the ability to freely negotiate rates with pay-TV providers, instead of relying on the rates set by the Copyright Office.

Consensual Retransmission—Or Unjust Enrichment?

How would the dynamics of the video marketplace shift if DeMint/Scalise were the law? For one thing, broadcasters would hold far fewer cards, losing the regulations that benefit them, such as syndication exclusivity, network non-duplication, and most importantly, retransmission consent. Pay-TV operators, many of which currently pay substantial retransmission fees to broadcasters, might seek out less costly sources of popular network television shows—perhaps by dealing directly with major networks. But would the networks play ball? Or would they rather leave today's market structure intact and continue dealing exclusively with broadcasters? It's hard to say.

Imagine that some large pay-TV providers succeed in inking deals with networks and other rights holders to publicly perform the same programs that broadcasters carry. On one hand, this disintermediation of broadcasters might benefit consumers, especially if it translates into lower fees (and, hence, more content choices and/or lower television bills). Indeed, a major selling point of the DeMint/Scalise bill is that it would enable an array of creative economic arrangements between pay-TV providers and content owners that are verboten under current law.

But disintermediating broadcasters in this manner may have a dark side.

Imagine cable provider CableCo reaches a licensing deal with commercial network NetworkCo to display the network's primetime content to CableCo's subscribers nationwide. CableCo, recognizing that its subscribers are accustomed to watching primetime network content originally transmitted by their local broadcaster, decides to continue retransmitting the local signals that independent NetworkCo affiliate stations broadcast in each market.

Although CableCo's paid subscribers derive some value from these local signals, CableCo doesn't compensate the local broadcasters whose signal it retransmits, since the Communications Act no longer enables broadcasters to demand retransmission fees. (To avoid copyright infringement liability, CableCo might replace all timeslots that contain local news shows—which are created and owned by each affiliate station—with syndicated programming.)

Is this scenario—which could conceivably occur if DeMint/Scalise were the law—an acceptable free market outcome? Absolutely, argues Professor Bruce Owen, a veteran telecommunications policy guru, who wrote the following in a recent Free State Foundation Perspectives essay:

Unlike program producers and networks, TV stations do nothing to "earn" this right, and the benefits to them are not rewards for innovation or production of valuable services. The economic value of a retransmission right comes solely from the ability of its owner to extract cash (or carriage) from cable systems and other multi-channel video program distributors (MVPDs). In fact, now that nearly everyone gets all TV signals by cable or satellite or Internet, broadcast stations are largely useless relics of a bygone technology, and the spectrum that is still reserved for their use has far better and more valuable uses.

But if Professor Owen is correct in arguing that broadcasters "do nothing to 'earn'" the right to exclude others from retransmitting their signal, why is abolishing retransmission consent necessary? If broadcasters do nothing to enhance the value of the content they carry, the proper public policy response is to repeal the regulations (e.g., network non-duplication, syndication exclusivity, must-carry) that empower broadcasters to take a cut of exchanges that would otherwise occur directly between pay-TV providers and content owners. Without such rules in place, retransmission consent would be a dead letter (albeit technically intact) because pay-TV providers would simply obtain programming directly from the source.

What if Professor Owen is mistaken? Consider that many broadcasters work to differentiate their broadcasts from those carried by distant stations affiliated with the same network. For instance, some broadcasters overlay localized messages warning of impending perilous weather during primetime programming. Broadcasters sometimes display tickers (or "crawlers") underneath network and syndicated shows, displaying such information as local sports scores, school closings, and election results. Some broadcasters select and display local ads during commercial breaks (in addition to national ads selected by networks). Although these alterations may in some cases enjoy copyright protection, facts cannot be copyrighted, nor can works lacking "originality" or "creativity."

Unfortunately, we don't know how much economic value (if any) these "signal enhancements" add to the underlying programming. Fortunately, the market can answer that question—assuming, of course, well-defined property rights exist and regulations do not mandate exclusive dealing or otherwise obstruct voluntary marketplace negotiations.

If retransmission consent is abolished, however, broadcasters' ability to exclude others from free riding on their efforts will be severely diminished. Is this a problem? To the extent that broadcast signals possess some incremental value beyond that embodied in the programming they carry, the DeMint/Scalise bill tilts the scales in favor of pay-TV providers, and may enable them to reap economic rewards that would otherwise accrue to broadcasters.

This form of free riding offends the longstanding common law equitable principle of unjust enrichment, which holds that "[a] person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution." If pay-TV providers are free to monetize the efforts of broadcasters without permission or compensation, broadcasters may under-invest in signal enhancements. (For more on this issue, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Social Costs of Property Rights in Broadcast (and Cable) Signals, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1303 (2007)).

If, as Randy May argues, consumers are best served by "[p]rivate bargaining, in which the parties know their own interests, and can contract freely," then Sen. DeMint and Rep. Scalise should consider reforming the retransmission consent law, instead of gutting it in its entirety.

To do so, instead of repealing 47 U.S.C. § 325(b), DeMint and Scalise could rewrite that subsection to get rid of the must-carry and the good faith negotiation requirements while leaving retransmission consent intact. They could also strip the FCC of its existing authority to meddle with retransmission negotiations and instead create a private right of action for broadcasters to obtain recourse in federal court for unauthorized retransmissions. That way, if a pay-TV provider were to retransmit a broadcaster's signal without permission, the aggrieved broadcaster could recover any profits the pay-TV provider earned as a result of the unauthorized retransmission.

The Long Run

As policymakers work to liberalize the airwaves to ensure market participants put spectrum to its most highly valued uses, there may come a day when television broadcasting as we know it ceases to exist. Meanwhile, however, policymakers would be loath to lose sight of the basic principles that underlie free markets—voluntary exchange, property rights, and regulatory neutrality—in governing the television marketplace. Whatever one thinks about broadcasters' public policy advocacy in general, two wrongs don't make a right; the merits of protecting attenuated property rights in broadcast signals should stand on their own.

Broadcasters have long argued their efforts serve consumers and generate value for society. If they're right, they deserve to reap the rewards of the value they create. Retransmission consent provides the means by which they may do so.

It's high time for Congress to liberalize the television marketplace to bring it into the 21st century. Sen. DeMint and Rep. Scalise's bill would, if enacted, mark a major step toward a freer video market. However, their bill could be improved by leaving retransmission consent intact.

Apple, eBooks, Antitrust, Consolidation & Copyright

So, the Department of Justice has formally filed suit against Apple and several major book publishers claiming collusion over eBook pricing. Let's say Apple and the publishers are guilty as charged and in violation of our nation's antitrust laws. Here's my opinion on that: So what? What Apple and the publishers are doing here is trying to find a way to sustain creative works in an era when copyright law is slowly dying. As I noted here in a post yesterday, I take no joy in reporting the fact that property rights for intellectual creations no longer function effectively. I wish they did still work, but they are failing rather miserably in an age of highly decentralized digital dissemination. Moreover, I am not prepared to see government go to absurd enforcement extremes in an attempt to make intellectual property rights work. But, that being said, something needs to sustain and cross-subsidize cultural creations in an age of mass piracy. I have increasingly come to believe that consolidation of content and conduit (or devices) is a big part of the answer. Alternatively, some sort of informal collusion among cultural creators and information distributors may be the answer.

Apple and the publishers have figured that out and come up with a plan that keeps intellectual works flowing while making sure that the creators behind them get paid. At a time when copyright critics always say "just find a better business model" Apple and the publishers did just that. But now Department of Justice officials say that business model should be forbidden. That's crazy.  If we're going to let copyright die, we should at least grant more pricing and deal-making flexibility to the creative community to structure business arrangements that might give them a lifeline.

But won't such deals give publishers and other creative artists and industries more pricing power that will help them keep prices up artificially? Yes, of course! That is the whole point! God forbid we actually have to pay something to cultural creators. Ain't that a scandal. But here's a news flash: That's what copyright law was all about, too. It was about helping creators put some fences around their "property" to help them maintain some degree of pricing power for goods with zero marginal cost. The scheme worked brilliantly for many years. It spawned a vibrant marketplace of ideas and helped America become the leading exporter of expressive works on the planet. But now the effectiveness of traditional copyright is fading rapidly. Industry consolidation, cross-promotions, pricing deals, and so on, will increasingly be the "better business model" some will turn to.  So, are we going to allow it? Or will critics just keep mouthing "go find a better business model" and have the government step in every time they don't like the one industry chooses?  I say let experimentation continue.

Adam Lashinsky on how Apple works

On the podcast this week, Adam Lashinsky, author and editor-at-large for Fortune, discusses his new book, Inside Apple: How America's Most Admired–and Secretive–Company Really Works. Lashinsky begins by discussing Apple's obsession with secrecy to the point that employees do not discuss what they are working on with other employees. According to Lashinsky, secrecy is tied to focus and achievement, so Apple employees obtain a depth and expertise on one area, rather than being exposed to different areas of the company. He then discusses how secrecy impacts employee morale and how employees view accomplishment and achievement as a tradeoff for happiness and morale. Lashinsky then explains how other corporations can emulate Apple's secretive style and reap the benefits.

Related Links

"Inside Apple: How America's Most Admired–and Secretive–Company Really Works", by Lashinsky"The Consequences of Apple's Walled Garden", Time Techland"Adam Lashinsky on peeling back Apple's skin", Washington Post

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