Ralph Allan Smith
Website
Genre
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Trinity and Reality: An Introduction to the Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Christian Faith
3 editions
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published
2004
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Paradox and Truth: Rethinking Van Til on the Trinity
2 editions
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published
2003
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The Eternal Covenant: How the Trinity Reshapes Covenant Theology
3 editions
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published
2003
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Hear, My Son
2 editions
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published
2011
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The Covenantal Kingdom
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published
1996
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The Baptism of Jesus the Christ
5 editions
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published
2010
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The Covenantal Structure of the Bible: An Introduction to the Bible
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El Reino del Pacto
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“From a Trinitarian perspective, the most obvious philosophical problem of monism is its inability to arrive at a concrete particular. In monistic systems, individual things lack substantial reality and ultimate meaning. This is true not only for "things," but also for persons, who are not finally different from animals, plants, or things. In monism, only the "not-two" is the really real. Individual things are real because they are identical with the ultimate. According to Zen, the individual is identical with the One, therefore it has meaning. Assertions that individual things have meaning in themselves are not wanting, but they do not make sense in a theory that must deny words and logical reasoning as a means of expressing ultimate truth-- and, of course, the convenient fact is that since the truth of Zen is said to transcend words, these assertions do not have to make sense! The proof that Zen is monistic and the fundamental problem of its philosophy are one and the same -- Zen cannot tolerate a concrete particular.”
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“From a Trinitarian perspective, the most obvious philosophical problem of monism is its inability to arrive at a concrete particular. In monistic systems, individual things lack substantial reality and ultimate meaning. This is true not only for 'things,' but also for persons, who are not finally different from animals, plants, or things. In monism, only the 'not-two' is the really real. Individual things are real because they are identical with the ultimate. According to Zen, the individual is identical with the One, therefore it has meaning. Assertions that individual things have meaning in themselves are not wanting, but they do not make sense in a theory that must deny words and logical reasoning as a means of expressing ultimate truth-- and, of course, the convenient fact is that since the truth of Zen is said to transcend words, these assertions do not have to make sense! The proof that Zen is monistic and the fundamental problem of its philosophy are one and the same -- Zen cannot tolerate a concrete particular.”
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