Ezra Roizen's Blog, page 3

MBP Book Discussion #3: Chapter 2 - Strategy and resources

If you haven’t already - get the second edition of the MBP here.

The first few chapters of the MBP are intended to lay the foundation for a way of thinking. Chapter 1 speaks to the notion that startups must be bought, and are exceedingly hard to sell. We expanded on this thinking in the MBP.co post on Chapter 1: The cure for the sale process infection. Chapter 2 lays down an equally important part of this foundation, that acquisition is one of many ways for startups to access the resources they need for growth.

Startups often have a hard time harmonizing the notion of independent growth with potential M&A opportunities. How can you answer “yes” when asked if you are open to being acquired while also still projecting confidence to your investors and team about your prospects as an independent company?

Quite easily actually. In fact, it’s just one word: Impact.

Your mission is to have the biggest possible impact on the world. To meaningfully advance your field of interest. Yes, you want to create a positive economic return, but the mission is the impact. To achieve your mission, you may go on to raise more growth capital; you might establish commercial partnerships such that you can leverage existing channels and resources; and if it makes sense, you might even fully combine with a larger player through an acquisition. The point is that you can unify every conversation by emphasizing impact. In the name of impact every possible growth strategy is on the table, all the time.

Well, then how do we consider different paths for making this impact?

Product, distribution, and monetization

The MBP’s product, distribution, and monetization framework is designed to help you consider the interplay between the vectors of startup strategic thinking. There’s probably another book in the product, distribution, and monetization triad - and it only received a bit more than a page’s worth of attention in the MBP! So let’s expand on it a bit, and then tie it back to the notion of impact.

Competition is often the shaping force in business strategy frameworks. For example three of Porter’s Five Forces relate to competition (direct competition, new entrants, substitutes). However, I’d argue that in most cases, when it comes to launching new ventures, competition doesn’t make the podium.

When you’re pioneering into a new market your top priority is to rapidly establish the dominant position. That doesn’t always mean getting into the market “first,” but it does mean getting into the market “best.” There are many, many cases of fast-followers passing up early-leaders. The fast-follower having mixed just the right blend of product, distribution, and monetization to enable them to jump way out in front. In these races it’s more about leapfrogging than it is about incremental competitive moves. The eventual winner just blew the doors off the others through compelling product capabilities, effective distribution, and clever monetization. Establishing the dominant position in a new category is more about pressing forward into the emerging market than it is about pressing sideways against competitors. 

In the language of sports I would say launching new ventures is less like football, soccer, or even tennis - where every action is met with an immediate reaction, which then influences your next action. Instead, launching new ventures is a bit more like golf, where it’s you against the course and the winner is the one who designs and executes the most efficient way through the obstacles. Competition is out there, but it isn’t throwing your golf ball back in your face after every shot. You control much of your own destiny. 

How best to navigate the obstacles?

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Hot Take #2: First Round Capital on Startup M&A

If you haven’t already - get the second edition of the MBP here.

There’s a lot of gold in First Round Capital’s article on startup M&A. But there’re also a couple lumps of coal. We’re going to mine both. Before we dig in, one thing to note is that the article is written as an interview rather than a first person publication. As such I wonder if there’s a potential loss of fidelity between how the interviewee, Daniel Debow, might have worded things had he been writing the piece directly. We may never know! Either way it’s a popular piece and gives us a great deal to discuss.

The title

We have to straightaway deal with the elephant in the room, the title: How to Sell Your Startup: The Complete Guide to Running an M&A Process as a Founder. As we discussed in the last post on MBP.co, subtitled The cure for the sale process infection, the framing of the startup M&A conversation in the context of a “sale process” is as common as it is unfortunate. It isn’t to say there aren’t times when you’ll need or want to run something close to a sale process - but that’s way down the line (if ever). The first move when you're working in the Magic Box Paradigm is to develop an ongoing flow of conversations with Potential Strategic Partners (“PSPs”). Some of those conversations may develop into commercial partnerships, some into strategic investment, and some into M&A. The “process” isn’t one of selling your startup, it’s one of creating opportunities for your startup to be acquired. What’s interesting is that much of the body of the article is very MBP’ish in its recommendations - it almost feels like the title was “overlaid” on the article so as to make it jump out to the potential reader.

The lead

The lead into the piece is also a bit of a downer. The context as it’s set out is of a startup that “isn’t on fire,” one that “could find a landing pad,”and “is pursuing an acquisition as an exit strategy.” Let’s unpack this a little. First, as we discuss in Chapter 2 of the MBP book, acquisition is one of an array of potential growth strategies for your startup. It’s one of the ways you could access the resources you need to maximize your impact. In a Jobsian view, it’s a way to enlarge the dent you’re going to make in the universe. As such, if you’re following the MBP M&A isn’t something you consider once you’re out of gas, instead it’s part of your strategic thinking as soon as you fill up the tank! 

A core part of the MBP is the posture that startup acquisitions aren’t “exits” but are instead “entrances.” As it says in Chapter 2: “I want to suggest a mindset: Startup acquisitions should be seen primarily as one of the ways to access new resources—which is to say, as one of the alternatives alongside raising capital and forming commercial partnerships. For startups, an acquisition represents an “entrance” into much-needed new resources rather than an “exit” from the resources already accumulated.”

So to extract the real gold from this piece (which we’re about to do!) I’d like to propose that we reconsider the title and the initial framework. I’d flip the title to something like “A set of strategies for developing M&A opportunities for your startup” and in parallel flip the frame to “steps you as the founder should be taking from day one.” 

Break free of the sale process mindset!

Let’s get to the gold, and there’s lots of it

Right out of the gate the article makes a statement with which I couldn't agree more: “Navigating acquisitions is one of the more underexplored topics in company building.” Bingo! I can’t explain why the startup M&A topic is so underexplored, but it is, and that’s why MBP.co is taking the time to explore it. 

Debow goes on to make a fabulous abstraction, one that really sets up an MBP-way-of-thinking. He says “there’s no such thing as a company…there are people who work together as a group…you’re going to sell your company to a group of people who happen to work together.” By taking this step back you get out of what MBP speak would call Popsicle selling and you’re getting into the realm of building Partner Big Ideas (“PBIs”). You’re not thinking about selling your thing, you’re thinking about solving their problem. Debow goes on to extend this thinking when he says “One of the most important things for founders to understand is that you are selling something to an executive, who has a problem. And as the startup CEO — you are that solution.” Again, said in MBP speak - to be acquired you’re going to need to be a central figure in something that’s very important to the acquirer. As Debow says, founders need to “adjust their mirrors” for how they see startup M&A. It’s not like raising money or gaining customers - it’s its own arena and you have to understand the game if you’re going to play it well.

Relationship building is the process

As I discussed in the Hot Take on the article from TechCrunch, it’s all in the relationship building. Debow’s opening point that “You should always be thinking about building relationships with executives at large companies.” Is right down the MBP fairway. He even goes on to say something I say to my clients and prospective clients all the time: “Founders might find themselves in a tough spot if that phone call {the one to be acquired} is the first time they are making contact with an executive at a larger company.” 

Debow’s point that building “networking muscle and establishing rapport with the strongest relationships in your circle is a habit to start practicing regularly even in the earliest days of company-building” is right in line with the MBP. And it’s not only a-practice - it takes-practice. It’s not just the networking muscle, it’s learning how to speak to PSPs in their language and at their altitude. 

And then the piece strikes gold. You want to develop relationships with colleagues, not see the key leaders at PSPs as distant strangers. As Debow says, you want the M&A conversation to start with “a routine phone call to a peer.” And I’m going to collapse a few points made in the article into one follow one point along these lines: It would be better to have your first outreach to a PSP be a call to seek a piece of advice than have your first interaction be an all-or-nothing “we’re for sale, do you want to buy us?” outreach. Could not agree more.

These are all things the startup should be doing from day 1! There’s nothing in what Debow is saying that’s exclusively part of a sale process, or something to consider when you’re looking for a soft landing. The steps Debow is articulating lay the same groundwork for a ten million dollar acquisition or one that’s going to be a billion - and if you lay Debow’s groundwork you have a way better shot at being the latter. As Debow says: “these are business development relationships, partnership relationships and yes, maybe they are acquisition relationships.” The relationship building is the process, take an open-ended approach to the conversations.

It’s about advancing product strategy

As it says in the MBP book, there are three keys that all need to turn to launch a startup acquisition: product strategy sponsorship, corporate development engagement, and executive visioning. Debow speaks largely to the first two (product and corp dev) at the start of the article and then really expands on the third (executives) later on. In particular Debow has a great deal to add to the startup M&A conversation about engaging PSP technical teams and the product-centricity of startup M&A. I really enjoyed this point: “At Shopify, we don’t even call it M&A, the team is called ‘product acceleration.’” That’s right on the money.

Being acquired vs being for sale

The article has a backbeat of all these steps being the setup for sale maneuver. This is probably the biggest divergence from the MBP. In the MBP all these steps are the setup for an acquisition offer - with the PSP coming to you, not you going to them. What the MBP would say is missing from Debow’s progression is the development of the Partner Big Idea (“PBI”). He hits all around the PBI (you solve their problem, etc.), but doesn’t get to it directly. The engine of a startup acquisition is the buyer’s big idea, a big idea that you power. Your job is to help them bring that idea into existence. The PBI is going to be so big and so urgent that the PSP is going to make the first move to acquire you. 

It’s personal

The human factor in startup M&A is woven throughout the article. As it says in the MBP book: M&A is deeply personal. Debow’s perspective on the numerous people-dimensions of startup M&A are great reading and important for founders to internalize. You need to be confident, but you also need to be someone with whom the PSP team can see themselves working - and above all - arrogance is a deal killer. 

Both the MBP book and this article advise using an “interview” approach to M&A conversations - but we mean it in slightly different ways. Debow means it a bit more literally and uses the frame of a job interview. The MBP’s use of the interview concept is a bit more broad and is really about teasing out areas for follow up and eventually the building blocks of the PBI. But in either and both cases the core concept is that you’re trying to bring an open mind to the conversation - with an emphasis on learning and discovery. 

Debow also points to the importance of sponsorship and the quality of the engagement you’re getting with the PSPs executive team. As we say in the MBP (in this case in reference to trips to visit the PSP): If the CEO takes you to dinner the first evening, you’re probably already pretty well positioned. On the other hand, if after a couple trips you haven’t met anyone above a lieutenant, your deal probably doesn’t have the executive sponsorship it needs. M&A deals are big, risky, and visible - you’ll never get one over the line if the key executives at the PSP don’t see it as both transformational and critical. Debow shares lots of wisdom along these lines.

Executive sponsorship is a leading indicator of a strong PBI and as the article says “always treat the company that’s most interested in buying your startup as the most viable option, even if it’s not your favorite.” Said in MBP speak - you’re only going to get a deal done with a PSP that has a strong PBI - and if senior executives are heavily engaged, it’s very likely a big idea is in the works.

Be prepared and be honest

Both the article and the MBP align on the importance of being prepared, well organized, and responsive. Having your ducks in a row means you can not only move the deal faster, but you’ll send the signal that you’re a well run operation - which may very well get you better deal terms. I also really appreciate this point: “If there is something you are worried about, air that out early. You’re not going to fool them into buying you.” As it says in the MBP - it’s better to deal with the tough topics early in the conversation when things are still on the upswing, then to hold them for later when they run the risk of pulling you down.

Valuation, offers, and optionality

Oh boy. The article and the MBP diverge bigly when it comes to valuation, creating offers and competition vs optionality. This is where the sale process mindset instead of a PBI-powered acquisition comes home to roost. 

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MBP Book Discussion #2: Chapter 1 - The Popsicle and the magic box

If you haven’t already - get the second edition of the MBP here.

Most discussions of startup M&A start with some variation on the concept of “how to sell your company.” It’s the wrong frame for your thinking. Chapter 1 of the MBP book breaks down when something can be sold and when it must be bought. It’s very hard to sell startups, especially for an attractive price. If you want an outperforming valuation, you’re going to have to be bought.

This doesn’t mean there aren’t times when you may want, or need, to press the issue with Potential Strategic Partners (“PSPs”), so you may end up somewhere close to a sales process. But a sales process is most certainly not the place to start. Your first move should be to create the environment for being acquired. In fact the “selling” mentality is virulent and it will infect critical aspects of your thinking and strategy.

You give yourself a false sense of certainty

When you take up the belief that at some point you can “sell” your startup you infuse your thinking with a false sense of certainty. The frame of reference you’ll probably use is your experience raising money. That there are a set of potential buyers out there and when the time comes that you want, or need, to sell the company you’ll set out a process to approach a number of these buyers. Because you’re working on super cool stuff, it will be the case that some number of these buyers will make an offer to acquire you. Then you’ll parlay these potential buyers into an auction, get the best price, and close the deal.

In reality, things rarely work this way. Startup acquisitions are driven by a Partner Big Idea (“PBI”) into which your startup fits. They aren’t buying you for who you are, they’re buying you for what you can help them accomplish. PBIs take a lot of time to develop. As such they’re highly unpredictable. Startup acquisitions are anything but linear progressions.

As such the byproducts of the sale process mindset are very damaging.

You see the selling motion as a discrete process

Timing is the first thing to be infected by the “sale process mindset.” You start to see the sale process as a future activity and one that’s discrete from your normal course of business. In fact you start to see PSPs as entities to be approached if-and-when you want to be acquired, and not otherwise. So you hold off on building these key relationships – as you’ll get to it when you’re ready to run your sale process – and that’s still somewhere off in the future.

You don’t want to be seen as for sale

So if talking to PSPs only happens when you’re in a sale process, then that means if you’re talking to PSPs you’re obviously for sale. But you don’t want to be seen as being for sale. What would potential investors think? What if your competitors find out you might be for sale? Heaven forbid your team gets an inkling that you’re on the block! You don’t want there to be market chatter about your situation and prospects. So, you shy away from PSP conversations as you’re not quite ready to be for sale - and that’s what talking to PSPs would signal. Further, when you are ready, you’re going to move fast and get in front of these potentially damaging dynamics.

You don’t build PBIs

The Partner Big Idea is the magic in the box, it’s the engine of the deal, it’s what powers an acquisition. However, in a sale process you’re going to run a tight exercise to present what you are to the market, and to find buyers who are interested in you, as you are defined in-and-of-yourself, today. Speed is going to be key. But if you’re moving at that speed there isn’t going to be enough time to develop deep and powerful PBIs with PSPs. It’s going to have to be about you, not them.

How to cure this infection

First you have to break free of the sale process mindset, it’s a virus and it’s infecting your strategy.

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Hot Take #1: TechCrunch on Startup M&A

If you haven’t yet - get the second edition of the MBP here.

There are a number of popular articles on startup M&A. In our Hot Takes section we’re going to apply the Magic Box Paradigm framework to some of them and see where we align, and where we diverge.

One piece that does very well in the startup M&A search rankings is on TechCrunch: A timeline for startup M&A processes: Key steps and factors to consider by Vishal Lugani GP and co-founder at Acrew Capital. A good portion of this piece is behind a paywall, so you’ll have to pony up to read it in its entirety - but hey - we’re in the paywall business as well, so we get it!

Timing

Lugani does a good job expressing how slow this business is. I’d say it’s actually slower than he suggests! Developing actionable relationships with Potential Strategic Partners (“PSPs” in MBP speak) takes time, a lot of time! In fact one of the four core principles of the MBP is: Startup acquisitions take time. Most startups wait far too long before developing meaningful relationships with PSPs. 

Many founders think startup M&A works like startup fundraising. That there’s an efficient market of buyers and what you need to do is get in front of them, and some number of them will like you, and the ones that do will make offers to acquire you. But, sadly, that’s not how it works. 

The PSP acquisition market is highly inefficient. PSPs would rather not acquire startups. They only do so when they have absolutely no other way to get where they want to go. It’s a buy-side driven business and you have to position yourself to be acquired by a highly-motivated PSP vs. run a process to be sold to an unmotivated one.

Getting to know PSPs

Lugani makes the point that too few founders prioritize developing relationships with PSPs. I couldn't agree more with this. In fact, I’d make this point first. The piece is framed by the notion of a “process” which is a helpful way to organize the concepts, but in reality startup M&A very rarely conforms to anything close to a linear progression. Where Lugani says “Get to know your acquirers before the process” - I’d say “Getting to know your acquirers is the process.”

This isn’t to say there aren’t times when a startup has no choice but to press the issue with PSPs. The MBP book has an accompanying Spellbook called Running a process the MBP way but a “process” isn’t the ideal way to go. Ideally the startup is, in the regular course of its business, developing an increasing number of deep relationships with PSPs - and some number of those relationships will evolve into actionable acquisition opportunities. 

It’s not about when the startup wants to sell, it’s about when PSPs want to buy.

Big Ideas

Lugani makes a really important point when he says “Acquirers have a broader set of plans at play.” This is the crux of the matter. Everything hinges on what those “broader set of plans at play” exactly are. Said differently, what is the Partners’ Big Idea (in MBP speak “PBI”)? The PBI is the power source of the acquisition. It’s the big idea the partner is pursuing, an idea that features your startup as a critical component in its fulfillment. It’s the “why” of the deal and you need to be intimately familiar with it - in fact you need to help build it.

Lugani expands on this point with some great additional context when he says:

To this end, it’s critical to understand why an acquirer wants to buy your company. Is your company getting bought for its product, business or team? … For example, are there other options on the market that the acquirer could pursue, including simply building what they want themselves?

In MBP speak these would be the Methodology and Execution layers of the PBI (with the “broader set of plans at play” being the Opportunity layer). Where does your startup fit in the PSP’s plan to fulfill the PBI? What other options (besides acquiring your startup) does the PSP have available to them? 

Now we’re talking about scarcity, and as we know from the MBP, startup valuation = opportunity/scarcity. What other options does the PSP have available to them? If you are the only one then your scarcity denominator goes to 1 and you can claim a large portion of the opportunity numerator. However, if you are one of many possible ways they could advance the PBI then your scarcity denominator goes up and your value plummets. As Lugani says in relation to the buyer’s view of your utility and scarcity: “Do you understand your relative position in the negotiation?”  That’s right on.

PBIs, deadlines, competition, and offers

There’s a bit of a miracle-happens-here aspect to this piece. We need to fill in the miracle. Spoiler alert: it’s the PBI. Lugani’s approach kind of jumps from essentially: 1) get to know PSPs; to 2) receive offers. But there’s a critical step in the gap between those two. The progression should actually be: 1) get to know PSPs; 2) develop PBIs; 3) receive offers. Step 2 being the most important step. The startup team needs to work with each PSP to help them develop an actionable PBI. A PBI into which the startup fits.

Lugani hints at forcing function strategies like the use of deadlines. These are to be avoided. Closed-ended processes with deadlines for participation should only be used as a last resort. If you’re trying to develop urgency do so by developing so much organization momentum in the PSP around the PBI that they just can’t see any way forward other than buying your startup.

There’s also a bit of hinting around competition. Competition isn’t the ideal driver of price in startup M&A. Optionality is great and you want to have as many strong PBIs with as many high-value PSPs as you can. However, your optimal value will come from the outlier among them (the PSP who just needs you more than the others), not from the competition between them. In addition, competitive dynamics actually work to reduce competition! As soon as a genuinely interested PSP knows there are other interested PSPs they are going to do everything they can to lock you up in an exclusive period. Don’t decloak your options - develop each in parallel and pick from the best of them.

Offers derive from the last layer of the PBI: Economics. How is the PSP’s economic model enhanced by the acquisition of your startup? The price they will be willing to pay is essentially the present value of your contribution to their strategy. You actually don’t want to get an offer if that hasn’t been framed out - as you’d probably leaving a lot of value on the table.

The miracle we’re filling in is the magic in the box. It’s the fully formed PBI that compels the PSP to make a strong offer. Line those PBIs up, use the confidence you have from developing lots of options to push each to their max, and pick from the best among them.

Turning the three M&A keys

Lugani nails it when he articulates the three key stakeholders in a startup acquisition:

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MBP Book Discussion #1: Prologue

If you haven’t yet - get the second edition of the MBP here.

One of the things we’re going to do as we get rolling with MBP.co is discuss each of the chapters in the Magic Box Paradigm book. There’s more to the story!

The Prologue to the MBP book is about the all too familiar scenario where a startup receives some preliminary acquisition interest and proceeds to make what they think are all the right moves. Moves that actually turn out to be all the wrong ones.

Many, many deals are tanked by seller missteps. Let’s break this failed deal down and see how the MBP would have given it a much better shot.

The instinct once you get some acquisition interest:

Immediately and aggressively reach out to other potential buyers to let them know you have an offer in the works and that they should act fast - you do this because you believe there are many big players who would love to own your startup

Let the original buyer know you have interested parties - you do this because you believe the best way to increase price is through competition

Send the potential buyer uninspiring information about yourself - you do this because you feel like being responsive is the best way to keep the conversation going

Press the buyer to formalize their offer in writing, through an intermediary agreement like a term sheet - you do this because you believe that written offers are more serious than verbal ones

The MBP says your instincts are wrong, and here’s why:

Other buyers probably know very little about you. Big companies don’t buy startups just because someone else might be interested in them. They buy startups because they have a really big idea and they need the startup to advance it - and ideas that big don’t form overnight

Competition isn’t the driver of outperforming valuation, finding the outlier is. The outlier is the potential strategic partner (PSP) who needs you more than all the rest. So the question at hand would be: “do we think the buyer at the table is the outlier, or do we think there are much better potential partners out there?” And then by extension: “how long would it take to develop a big idea with them?”

Once you let a buyer know there are other interested parties you change their entire approach. You’ve flipped into deal mode, and by extension you’ve flipped them into deal mode also. And once a buyer is in M&A deal mode they are going to hit you with an exclusive provision and lock you up.  So, if you want to try to engage other parties you need to slow-roll the buyer at the table, not supercharge them - engaging new PSPs takes time - sometimes a lot of time!

Sending over a bunch of deep dive data on your startup is a trap. You want to be building the big idea - not drilling down into your financials as an independent and small company - sending internal info out of context and with no parallel thesis develop process in play is almost always going to take the conversation in the wrong direction

PBI development will almost certainly involve a much smaller group of people than the full cross-organizational due diligence Alpha set out on with BigCo - and thereby limits damage to organizational morale if the deal does fall apart

And for heaven's sake don’t get anything in writing right out of the gate - once things go on to paper they become really hard to change - you’re just at the start - keep developing the thesis - a term sheet isn’t binding anyway - if they want to do the deal they will - if they don’t they won’t - a term sheet doesn’t change a thing

So here’s what startup Alpha should have done…

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Magic Box Paradigm 2nd Edition is Live

The second edition of the MBP is out. It’s a giant upgrade.

It expands on two major questions from first edition readers:

1) How do I build an acquisition thesis with a potential strategic partner?

2) How do I position myself to get a great *first* offer? 

There are also additional insights around thought leadership, deal terms, and a new supplement on startup-to-startup transactions.

I’d say the first edition was a should-read for startup teams. I’m upgrading this second edition to a must-read!

As a launch promotion – and for a limited time – I’m making the Kindle app version free.

You can get the Kindle version here:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0CG86NT6F

Pass along to your friends and get them to join the MBP.co substack - which is now going to kick into gear.

MBP.co Your M&A Questions

As we build up to the launch of the second edition and of MBP.co - send along the topics you’d like to see discussed and your top startup partnership and M&A questions!

Last Chance to get First Edition of MBP

With the launch of the second edition of the MBP I’m going to retire the first edition - so grab your copy before it’s too late!

https://www.amazon.com/Magic-Box-Paradigm-Framework-Acquisitions/dp/0692778047

MBP.co - More Magic

A few areas of content to look forward to from MBP.co:

Expansion of topics from the Magic Box Paradigm book

Previews of future spellbooks (deep dives into related topics)

Commentary on posts made by industry luminaries regarding startup M&A (who is on track - who isn’t!)

Interviews with key players at Potential Strategic Partners (PSPs)

Interviews with great examples of Magic Box Paradigm acquisitions

Stay tuned - going to be a lot of fun!

What to expect from the second edition of the MBP

Well, it’s a big upgrade. It’s about 50% longer and covers several entirely new topics (vs just expanding on existing ones).

The biggest two changes are the addition of a chapter on building partner big ideas (PBIs) and a chapter on getting the first offer to be the right offer, or at least close to it.

MBP.co - Startup M&A Insights is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

I’ve also created spellbooks - these are supplemental books that link to the MBP, but cover deeper dive topics. I moved the chapters developing the potential strategic partner (PSP) presentation to now be a spellbook. I also moved the section on running a date-certain process to be a spellbook. I added a third spellbook on startup-to-startup acquisitions as these types of deals of their own nuannces and idiosyncracies. These first three spellbooks come with the second edition. Future spellbooks will be published as companions.

The body of the MBP book is now how to execute the pure form of the MBP framework—with the spellbooks being where we deviate or dive deeper into related topics.

And of course - MBP.co is where we’re going to keep expanding on the MBP framework!

MBP.co - Startup M&A Insights is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.