C.A.A. Savastano's Blog, page 2

The Death and Times of a Gangster pt. 2

Sam Giancana AKA Anthony de Bendo

Salvatore Momo “Mooney” Giancana was born during the spring of nineteen hundred and eight within the Little Italy section of Chicago. He spent his formative years in street gangs and was responsible for several crimes, including murder, by reaching the age of twenty. Sam gained the position of driver in the ranks of Al Capone’s gang and with the passing of the nineteen thirties would officially joined the Chicago mafia. Officials note amongst nineteen forty-nine he became the right hand of former Capone Gang leader Anthony “Big Tuna” Joseph Accardo. Giancana over the years would conceal his identity to undertake crimes by using a prodigious amount of aliases which required Federal Bureau of Investigation officials to link his nearly one hundred false names. Momo’s rising influence also garnered him a percentage of the profits made by several gambling rackets and liquor businesses within the suburbs of Chicago. It also brought him to the attention of the United States Department of Justice and its subordinate groups.

Chicago Crime Boss AnThony j. Accardo

Sam’s true name appeared a year later on the list of prominent underworld figures Attorney General James McGrath distributed to Justice Department agencies. With his increased power came greater public attention and United States Senate Crime Investigating Committee sought to question him following his appearance on the aforementioned list of important mafioso. Ten days following the press announcement of his possible questioning by officials Giancana was suspected of conspiring with other criminals, including hit man Charles “Typewriter” Nicoletti, to murder a local police lieutenant in his own home. Salvatore’s brazen actions reveal his utter contempt for the law and these earlier years are marked with repeated violence without concern for legal consequences. Yet the gangsters of the Windy City had little reason fear local police due to the significant bureaucratic corruption the mafia had established over the decades.

A member of the Chicago press told FBI officials amid nineteen fifty-two dozens of underworld records that should have been in the files of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) had vanished. The Bureau was able to locate nearly all of the missing documents with its own holdings and notably the CPD had originally provided them. Such internal corruption allowed Giancana to gain power with each unrecorded murder, extortion, kidnapping, and bank robbery he undertook. Mooney’s reputation of being a dangerous and respected man was cemented by an extensive trail of bodies as he spent many years enforcing the mafia’s will. The next year Paul DeLucia aka Paul Ricca, a former bodyguard to Al Capone, would ascend to lead the Chicago Outfit with his “enforcer” Sam Giancana. Momo would again demonstrate his cunning by using third party assassins via intermediaries to serve the mafia’s interests and conceal its hand from some crimes. He would escape being served a grand jury subpoena with the passing of nineteen fifty-five following a tip from a spy the outfit had in official circles. Sam would rapidly expand his criminal empire to assume control of unions, race tracks, lounges, and several legitimate businesses as that decade wore on. Officials following this period would brand him the “arch killer” and boss of the Chicago underworld.i

By the close of the nineteen fifties a United States Senate committee was investigating criminal enterprises and they subpoenaed Giancana for testimony. He replied to most questions by invoking his 5th Amendment rights and “only laughed when asked how he ranked in the crime hierarchy”. He conferred with gangland fixer Johnny Roselli about increasing their criminal interests within Las Vegas hotels and casinos in the course of nineteen sixty. The Central Intelligence Agency would approach both Salvatore and Roselli in that period to discuss using the mafia to assassinate Fidel Castro but no plot of substance emerged. Instead the wily Giancana used the illegal contacts as blackmail and forced Kennedy administration officials to dismiss unrelated legal charges against him. A year later Sam would meet with additional criminal notables to acquire shares in at least three Las Vegas casinos using Johnny Roselli and others as intermediaries.

Enforcer Dominic “Butchie” Blasi

Amidst the summer of nineteen sixty-three Momo was attempting to replace the alderman of Chicago’s First Ward, a person he ousted, with his relative to cement political control of that area. Yet his chosen political appointee John D’Arco was already a member of the Illinois state legislation and the media exposing this situation would prevent Giancana’s plotting.ii Simultaneously, Giancana was still the subject of extensive Bureau surveillance that monitored his daily activities and officials installed surveillance equipment in at least one establishment he frequented. A notable figure serving Mooney in the years before he rose to power was Dominic “Butchie” Blasi. This mob enforcer was Giancana’s bodyguard during the nineteen sixties and the FBI thoroughly interviewed him on multiple occasions in the same decade. One meeting was undertaken in the course of nineteen sixty-four where Blasi confirmed that Giancana believed that federal officials were keeping him under constant surveillance. Dominic told Bureau officials he did not accompany Sam on a recent Hawaiian trip due to not making “that kind of money”.iii At this point Giancana was sharing control of the Chicago Mafia with Anthony “Tony” Joseph Accardo, his former mentor, until Salvatore was arrested and jailed. The next year he was giving orders from Cook County jail to his trusted protege and hit squad leader Charles Nicoletti.

SAM Battaglia led the Underworld After Giancana

As nineteen sixty-six passed Blasi was released from jail and contacted for another official interview. Bureau special agent questions ranged from the location of Sam Giancana to relationships the mafia boss had with some his family members. He noted that Sam would spend lavishly upon various women but he was “frugal” with blood relations and Momo’s brother was selling “hot” watches to survive. While Blasi told officials he would not discuss the criminal business of his associates he “agreed to arrangements for further contacts”.iv In the same period competing factions were struggling for control of Chicago’s mob and Sam Battaglia replaced Giancana within the criminal infrastructure. Following his release from prison Giancana fled the US and spent time in multiple Latin American countries to avoid further prosecution. It required nearly a decade for American officials to finally locate and extradite him from Mexico City amid nineteen seventy-four. Following Sam’s relocation to the US he again resided in Chicago and was still recovering from prior surgery abroad. Additionally, he was subpoenaed for testimony before the US Senate about his connection to the CIA’s plotting against Castro but Salvatore died before that could happen.

Dominic Blasi has been repeatedly deemed Giancana’s assassin over the years by varying sources and official documents would support that determination. Yet these claims rarely offer the precise details, that Blasi’s FBI connections explain official failures to apprehend him, and the provenance of the murder weapon. Bearing new facts and undertaking a fresh review of the crime presents a clearer picture of the ambush within Momo’s own basement. Motive, means, and opportunity are the legal requirements used to discern a suspect’s viability and methods used in a crime. In this matter the motive is likely to silence the old boss and prevent any chance he might divulge related mafia secrets. Additionally, Giancana was attempting to regain some of his lost power and this endangered the holdings of Tony Accardo. The Chicago outfit had a strong motive to remove Momo from the equation before he could testify or regain his lost influence and exact revenge.

As for the means, the weapon used to kill Giancana was one of a pair that was purchased by an unknown criminal in Florida years prior. The FBI would trace the murder weapon and learned “the pistol was sold to Tamiami Gun Shop...August 9, 1965...however, has no documentation reflecting this acquisition.”v The Bureau learned the gun shop was a “dummy” business that had been used to hide illegal weapons deals with criminals, Cuban exiles, and CIA related figures. The other pistol bought with the Giancana murder weapon according to officials was used in the unsolved murder of criminal August Maniaci a few months after Momo’s death. The driver was hit squad leader Charles Nicoletti and a witness identified his companion Paul Schiro as the assassin.vi Thus, both weapons were previously acquired by the Mafia and distributed to people within its ranks for specific murders.

An opportunity to dispatch Salvatore Giancana would present itself the evening of June 19, 1975. Joe DiPersio served as the Giancana’s home’s caretaker and had went for a brief stroll with the old mafioso the night of his death. Dominic Blasi was subsequently observed by DiPersio looking around the house for scotch to drink less than thirty minutes before the attack on Mooney. DiPersio would provide Blasi a glass full of ice and “cleaned up the mess” from a dripping pipe than Sam noticed in the basement ceiling. The caretaker inquired if anything else was required and Momo replied if DiPersio was needed he would call. DiPersio closed the basement’s sliding door to provide them privacy and ventured back upstairs to watch television with his wife at roughly “11:20 p.m.”.vii He would subsequently note the air conditioner was on and this paired with the volume of the television proved quite loud. About thirty minutes later he rose to check on Sam and noticed that Blasi’s vehicle was no longer parked in the driveway.

Within the scant period Giancana and Blasi were unobserved the elder criminal decided to prepare and cook a meal. This consumes precious time which supports unknown people did not have foreknowledge of Giancana’s temporary isolation from protection. In those last moments only a single person was in the basement with Momo, the person for years he trusted to protect his life. Officials note the murder weapon utilized a silencer and this would further cement the assassin realized others were nearby and they required a discreet method of killing Giancana. It was only during this brief window a killer might strike with the rest of the household beyond reach and without the ability to hear what transpired downstairs. Since Dominic Blasi was a recent visitor he did not worry about his fingerprints being all over the crime scene and he quietly leaves the house unobserved.

Joe the caretaker opened the sliding door to the basement and called down the stairs to learn if Mooney needed anything before he went to bed. Hearing no response Joe went to the basement to inspect multiple rooms and this led him to find Giancana slain upon the floor. The gangster lay with a pool of blood under his head and the gas stove nearby was still lit with a burning pan of food. DiPersio turned off the stove, “took the pan off the burner”, and “burned his hand” seeking to prevent a fire. Yet the absence of smoke filling these areas indicates the food was cooked shortly before Joe reentered the basement. The lack of any signs of a struggle demonstrates the improbability of an unknown killer and based on his body’s position Momo did not anticipate the shot. The assassin operated quickly and knew the basement exit allowed them to leave unseen by others.

DiPersio believed the killer “knew Giancana spent the majority of his time in the basement...when he found the body...the door separating the dining room and kitchen area was almost fully closed. This door was never closed...and was recessed into the wall.” These details would only be known to a person familiar with the home’s layout and random killers lacked such information. The caretakers received a threatening call following Sam’s death and were told remain quiet about the event. DiPersio believed he could identify the caller but refused to disclose the name to officials feasibly due to its criminal origins.

Blasi would return to the Giancana home several days later and assured DiPersio he would receive back pay and handle all the mounting bills sent to the house. This seemingly would pacify DiPersio, Giancana’s creditors, and let Blasi continue in service of the Chicago mafia while also maintaining his contacts with officials. Since he was at times a functional Bureau informant it seems officials were unwilling to compromise this source to prosecute the death of a crime boss. They had the motive, the murder weapon, and the only person with adequate opportunity to enact the crime but did nothing. One file notes after Salvatore’s murder Charles Nicoletti resented his old mentor’s execution and the FBI believed Nicoletti’s subsequent murder was due to this lingering dispute with later Mafia bosses. It appears even Giancana’s enduring loyalists may have been purged years later for not coming to heel upon his death.viii Yet we now can feasibly state based on verifiable evidence what group killed Sam Giancana, why, the means they used, and that officials had little reason to solve the case.
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

References:
i. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Federal Bureau of Investigation Subject File, G-H, Correlation Summary, The Mary Ferrell Foundation, maryferrell.org, pp. 1-20, National Archives and Records Administration Identification Number: 124-10195-10024
ii. HSCA, FBI Subject File, K-L, Criminal Activities, Political Ties, MFF, pp. 9-10, NARA ID: 124-10277-10302
iii. HSCA, FBI, G-H, February 24, 1964, SGI, pp. 1-2, NARA ID: 124-10195-10000
iv. Ibid, G-H, September 16, 1966, SGI, pp. 1-3, NARA ID: 124-10198-10120
v. Ibid, (n.d.), SGI, Murder, Gun, NARA ID: 124-10202-10476
vi. Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 27, 1979, Judith Campbell Exner, pp. 2-5, NARA ID: 124-10356-10302
vii. HSCA, FBI, G-H, January 30, 1975, SGI, BKG Invest, Murder, Assoc, pp. 1-7, MFF, NARA ID: 124-10205-10076
viii. HSCA, May 22, 1978, No Title, Charles Nicoletti, p. 12, NARA ID: 180-10109-10350

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The Men Who Did Not Kill Kennedy pt. 1
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The Men Who Did Not Kill Kennedy pt. 1

The shadowy mystique cloaking the assassination of President John F. Kennedy has in some respects grown deeper over the decades. The public has been left seeking historical clarity after more than half a dozen Congressional and Executive branch investigations. What remains are cleaved government findings that have denied and supported the existence of a plot to murder America’s past head of state. Authors, experts, and former officials have further over time weighed in to support or deny the existence of a deadly plot but definitive evidence to support popular claims remains scant or just does not exist. Often endorsements, attributions of guilt lacking documentary proof, and recycled past claims with new twists are the standard fare given to the public for consumption. Yet the proof largely dispelling the array of stories created by official and public figures is too often left unspoken.

Ideas of a criminal element related to the American Mafia and other foreign gangsters being directly responsible for the death of President Kennedy are quite popular in modern times. However, several reside upon myths which utilize an infamous criminal that was not involved based upon legal documents or might rely upon the theory of an unreliable or deceased source. Dispelling the claims which utilize these sometimes popular but untenable figures narrows the sweeping ranks of people so many prematurely have decided are responsible. A reduced list with continued expansion can allow for more reliable suspects and possibly lead to one who is viable. Thus, offered for your inspection are two noted suspects which evidence supports had nothing to do with the events of that fateful day.

Las Vegas Racketeer JOhnny Roselli

Amongst the most infamous gangsters claimed to be present in Dealey Plaza either firing shots or facilitating some aspect of a criminal conspiracy is fixer Johnny Roselli. He was born Fillipo Sacco near the beginning of the last century but adopted the name John Roselli during the nineteen twenties and made a longstanding connection with Al Capone’s gang in Chicago. Reportedly later that decade the gangster financially enriched himself running a Los Angeles bootlegging operation and by operating prostitution rings.i ii Johnny was increasing his gambling holdings, extorting money from a wire service, and amid the late fifties had sent mafia allies to murder at least two people. Notably, the mafioso is not killing his opponents himself but using others to do so for his benefit. Roselli spent years expanding his Los Angeles rackets and during the sixties additionally gained significant financial kickbacks from some Las Vegas gambling operations.

Chicago Mafia Boss Sam GIANCANA

Official documents note that amidst the fall of nineteen sixty Roselli was contacted by Central Intelligence Agency employee Robert Maheu to discuss the potential use of criminals for one of its several plots to assassinate Fidel Castro.iii Subsequent meetings included Chicago mob boss Sam Giancana and would provide him means to blackmail officials by quashing other unconnected criminal charges. Tampa boss Santo Trafficante was also present for a meeting playing the role of courier and one further syndicate member was later involved. While this would present Roselli’s official importance in making contacts with criminal syndicate leaders, it features him only in the role of bad faith facilitator. He is not a trained assassin and when he did have the opportunity to undertake a murderous conspiracy, he used this chance instead to extort officials. Some claim despite the facts this notorious figure was involved with that precise sort of plot.

All stories that rely upon Roselli’s presence during President Kennedy’s assassination do not account for the official records that disprove such assertions. Unknown to many is the Federal Bureau of Investigation was surveilling him for years prior and following the events of Dealey Plaza.iv Officials monitored Johnny’s apartment and telephone in Los Angles while tracking him during November of nineteen sixty-three across the United States. He went to Arizona, California, and ended in Las Vegas where Bureau informants reported him residing at the Desert Inn Hotel.v vi vii viii Documents support Roselli at this location outside Texas in the days before and following the Kennedy assassination preclude his ability to participate in the crime.ix Official surveillance notes he even accepted a phone call from Judith Exner in his Nevada hotel room on November 22, 1963. Johnny Roselli was a violent criminal, who met a violent end amid nineteen seventy-six, but the facts support he did not kill America’s president.

Hit Squad Leader Charles Nicoletti

Another popular asserted suspect in the Kennedy case is hit man Chuckie “The Butcher aka Typewriter” Nicoletti. This mafioso at least was noted for possessing the skills and record of eliminating multiple rivals and other targets. Charles possessed the means to undertake a lethal crime and the Kennedy Justice Department by increasing organized crime prosecutions hypothetically give such a person a plausible motive. Yet a final essential part of Nicoletti’s asserted participation is lacking, the opportunity to committee the act. He likely did not possess this because he was many states away in the period before the assassination and Nicoletti, similar to Johnny Roselli, was also under extensive official surveillance.

Charles was born within the Illinois city of Chicago amidst the winter of nineteen sixteen and raised by Fillipo and Grazia Nicoletti. He resided in that area for most of his life and during the nineteen thirties attained a minor enforcer position within local mafia circles. After Nicoletti’s established a reputation being a hit man he practiced these skills aiding Felix “Milwaukee Phil” Alderisio, the subordinate of Chicago mafia leader Sam Giancana. Johnny Roselli contacted the hit man seeking logistical ideas during the nineteen sixties for a CIA’s assassination plot and one document would subsequently call Nicoletti the syndicate’s “chief executioner”. He was given control of gambling operations in the town of Cicero and during nineteen sixty-two was not regularly performing murders but “planning” hits “in the Chicago area ordered by Sam Giancana”. Nicoletti would “plan each contract and arrange for the personnel to carry out same”. He reportedly followed the hit squad in a different vehicle “to see that the operation was carried out properly” and “no problems arose which would jeopardize” the “Outfit”.x Alderisio and Nicoletti would be arrested that year inside a “hit car” specifically designed with hidden compartments to conceal weapons and switches for turning off its outer lighting.

CHicago Loan shark Sam DeStefano

Nicoletti was observed by an FBI source during the middle of November nineteen sixty-three at the Chicago home of loan shark Sam “Mad Sam” DeStefano playing cards, this gathering occurred shortly before the murder of a suspected federal informant. The next day an FBI source was told by DeStefano that “his ‘fat friend’ Leo Foreman was dead” and bail bondsman’s wife reported him missing the same day to local police. Due to past altercations with DeStefano and Nicoletti evidence notes both were suspected of killing the presumed turncoat.xi Leo’s body was discovered by police in a the trunk of a car November 19, 1963 and this incited greater official investigation of both DeStefano and Nicoletti.xii Further inquiry revealed that Foreman was not reporting to officials and police discovered a notebook in his possessions naming the slain man’s criminal and official contacts.

The FBI notes the following day Sam DeStefano attempted to stem the accusations of Foreman’s murder and “submitted to numerous television and newspaper interviews”, which likely brought even greater attention to all involved.xiii Nicoletti feasibly attempted to stay out of the media spotlight and federal officials state in this period their “knowledge” of DeStefano and his “associates” was provided to local authorities. Nicoletti, a current police murder suspect, cannot just sneak away unnoticed while also scrutinized by FBI phone and informant surveillance and with a close associate drawing media attention. The hit man likely attempted to quietly distance himself from the Foreman murder and did not rush across the country to commit a slaying that would generate even more press. Two days later President Kennedy was assassinated and only claims lacking evidence place Charles Nicoletti anywhere near Texas in that period.

In the course of nineteen sixty-seven Giancana had been replaced by Sam Battaglia and Nicoletti was selected to arbitrate internal syndicate problems for his new boss. Six years later Tony Accardo, Joseph Auippa, and Gus Alex were leading Chicago’s syndicate and Nicoletti had became a prominent figure responsible for controlling a group of hit men called “The Blazers”.xiv Nicoletti’s faction within the Chicago mafia pushed for the entire syndicate to deal narcotics, as he was the prior decade, but failed to sway his superiors.xv As nineteen seventy-three passed he was now semi-retired but still maintaining extensive rackets and in that period Sam and Mario DeStefano were among those facing trial for the death of Leo Foreman. Following his court room antics Sam DeStefano was killed and his brother Mario would be convicted of murder. Charles Nicoletti during nineteen seventy-seven was killed outside an Illinois restaurant by an unknown assailant and his body was left in a car similar to his prior associates victim.
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

References:
i. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Federal Bureau of Investigation Subject File, Q-R, Subject: John Roselli aka AR, June 8, 1965, pp. 1-4, The Mary Ferrell Foundation, maryferrell.org, National Archives and Records Administration Identification Number: 124-10288-10198
ii. Ibid, December 12, 1957, Subject: John Roselli, Criminal Activities: Gambling-Horse Racing, pp. 11-13, MFF, NARA ID: 124-10200-10419
iii. HSCA, Segregated Central Intelligence Agency Files, Roselli, Johnny; Summary of Activities in Cuba, pp.1-4, NARA ID: 1993.06.28.18:21:05:560310
iv. HSCA, FBI Subject File, No Title, John Roselli, Anti-Racketeering, pp.1-3, NARA ID: 124-10278-10062
v. Ibid, November 23, 1963, No Title, John Roselli, pp. 1-2, NARA ID: 124-10222-10401
vi. Ibid, November 19, 1963, No Title, John Roselli, pp. 1-3, NARA ID: 124-10222-10404
vii. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Church Committee Boxed File, April 23, 1976, Testimony of John Roselli, p. 5, NARA ID: 157-10014-10000
viii. HSCA, FBI Subject File, John Roselli, Elsur, pp. 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 28, NARA ID: 124-10353-10149
ix. Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 02, 1963, [No Title], JRO, pp. 1-2, NARA ID: 124-10222-10405
x. FBI, July 18, 1962, No Title, NARA ID: 124-10308-10119
xi. FBI, November 21, 1963, THP, ACT, Foreman, Leo, Murdered, Info, pp. 1-2, NARA ID: 124-10200-10106
xii. HSCA, FBI Subject File, C-D, Richard Cain, Murder of Leo Foreman, p. 69, NARA ID: 124-90095-10036
xiii. Ibid, November 22, 1963, THP, ACT, ASSOC, BKG, Numerous Individuals, pp. 7, 12, NARA ID: 124-10200-10102
xiv. Ibid, A-B, Gus Alex, April 20, 1973, No Title, pp. 14, 15, NARA ID: 124-10196-10353
xv. Ibid, May 24, 1973, Anti-Racketeering, pp. 1,2, NARA ID: 124-10197-10261

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The Lone Gunman Podcast: Symphony of Destruction with Carmine Savastano

C.A.A. Savastano returns to The Lone Gunman Podcast with Rob Clark and Joe Borelli! Among the subjects reviewed is evidence proving an expansive file purge by military and Defense Department officials. They also discussed a request to the Defense Intelligence Agency to confirm this prior document obliteration that was given a “reply”, the importance of reliable sources, combating myths, and other notable figures related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Government Officials Destroying the Evidentiary Record (JFK Assassination Files)

An important responsibility of ethical government agencies is the ability to provide documentary evidence of viable importance for later historical study. To occlude, purposefully withhold files, and even destroy evidence is the antithesis of government transparency and provides reasons to doubt official intentions regarding any matter of controversy. Official concerns about the public reaction to noted violations of law are irrelevant and do not provide a legal reasoning for destroying records. Yet by nineteen sixty-seven the Dallas Police investigation, FBI Investigation, Warren Commission, and Garrison Case had left several questions in the public mind regarding assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was also during this period that military intelligence was undertaking several illegal programs that further incentivized the need for destroying files.

During the nineteen sixties military intelligence sought to destabilize and counter the demonstrations of Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War groups within the United States. A DOD statement regarding the need for a future oversight program reveals that United States Army units required intelligence gathering to perform their missions and teamed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to surveil threats. The required information exceeded the ability of the Bureau and thus Army intelligence began to domestically collect information. The Defense Department notes “Eventually, DoD intelligence personnel were using inappropriate clandestine and intrusive means to collect information in a nationwide data bank, and sharing this information with law enforcement authorities.” Officials reported that several targets were not “legitimate DoD targets…” and “posed no foreign threat” but instead were “U.S. persons who were exercising their First Amendment rights”. Varying types of communications used by military targets were intercepted and using media cover military intelligence had even “infiltrated the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago”.i Obviously the unintended expansion of military projects or “mission creep” had taken hold and morphed from just limited subjects to include nearly anyone who fulfilled the vague definition of a domestic threat.

US Defense Secretary MElvin LAird

President Richard Nixon’s first Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was appointed during nineteen sixty-nine and several programs that later decried by Congressional officials continued unabated. These military problems were inherited from the actions of his predecessors under past administrations. A United States Army officer would order the destruction of files regarding any “non-DOD affiliated persons and organizations” during 1971 and this vague classification would allow future damage to important evidence. House Select Committee on Assassinations counsel Robert Blakey stated amongst the impropriety occurring was the aforementioned destruction of military intelligence files. One interview of Blakey states “In 1972, largely as a result of the investigations into military intelligence...the Defense Department destroyed all the military intelligence files they had about American citizens”.ii It notes that all the officers involved in related evidentiary destruction were interviewed but Congressional officials retained only testimony and never actually reviewed the material in question. This purge according to the interview was attributed to bureaucratic mistakes that rendered unintended damage to the evidentiary record. Yet this quaint prior repeated excuse to avoid responsibility does not explain the destruction of evidence in this matter because documentary obliteration continued past this claimed date. The destruction of these files was largely masked in the political upheaval of the summer of nineteen seventy-two as public’s eyes were first drawn to the arrest of the Watergate burglars.

Agency Director Richard Helms

Later that same year Richard Nixon would reportedly attempted to force the Central Intelligence Agency to impede the FBI’s investigation of the Watergate matter. He instructed Agency Director Richard Helms and his subordinate Vernon Walters to cover up the facts based on the advice of his staff. This command was ignored by Helms and for a time the CIA would remain outside the machinations of Nixon to bury the truth.iii Amidst January of nineteen seventy-three the embattled Nixon fired Agency Director Richard Helms, likely due to his noncompliance with orders to obstruct related legal investigations. During the same period former FBI agent George Gordon Liddy and former CIA operative E. Howard Hunt, the last two Watergate burglars, were found legally guilty. Just a day before the month ended Nixon would appoint the new Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson and less than six months later the President had replaced the DOD’s leader two additional times.

Committee CHairman SAM Ervin

“February 5, 1973, Senator Edward Kennedy” put forth a Congressional resolution to “establish a Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities...related to the presidential election of 1972.”iv The US Senate quickly approved the idea and Senator Sam Ervin was named the chair of the committee’s investigation. This would immediately signal to all related intelligence groups a potential reckoning which could target any of the organization related to illegal domestic activities. Further, this investigation began a series of inquiries which touched upon of several matters of historical importance that included the Kennedy investigation files. However, despite the beliefs of prior investigators and reporters, all the files related to the Kennedy case were not destroyed in the time period they believed.

The destruction of files would be ongoing under multiple Defense Department leaders and the uncertain nature of the DOD’s lead position seemingly added to already existing confusion. While the highest level of the Defense hierarchy was repeatedly shifting amongst ninteen seventy-three, those lower ranking officials intent on destroying select files among the DOD’s evidentiary holdings were more enduring. An official file regarding Lee Harvey Oswald’s records held by the DOD states “Access to Oswald’s Military Intelligence file, which the Department of Defense never gave to the Warren Commission” was also denied to the subsequent House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). According to Defense Department officials they destroyed the Oswald file as part of a program to eliminate all files pertaining to nonmilitary personnel begun with an Army directive years prior to eliminate such documents. Yet Lee Harvey Oswald’s files did not fit the criteria for destruction based upon the Army’s order.

Lee Harvey Oswald was enlisted with the United States Marines before he defected and in time was given his infamous official status as President Kennedy’ alleged murderer. Oswald had multiple issues while serving and faced military punishment for his disobedient conduct and ignoring military procedures. He clearly was a past DOD related personality of historical significance and based upon official records it was military procedure to hold the records of those with derogatory information for “twenty-five years”.v The Department of Defense should have maintained Oswald’s file until at least the nineteen eighties if regular procedure were followed and would have been among the documents legally protected from deletion by later investigations. Instead the Defense Department states “Dossier AB 652876, Oswald, Lee Harvey, was identified for deletion from IRR (Intelligence Records and Reports) holdings on “(1 March 1973) as stamped on the microfilmed dossier cover.” Lyndall E. Harp was the IRR clerk identifying Oswald records and named them for removal but officials could not offer when or who exactly eradicated these files but they guessed “that the destruction was accomplished within a period not greater that sixty days following the identification…”.vi Harp would transfer later that year to the Defense Investigative Service and remained a civil service employee until at least the nineteen seventies. Notably the stated reasoning for several past evidentiary removals does not explain the targeted attacks upon files related to just the Kennedy investigation. As evidence has prior demonstrated, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a subordinate of the DOD, would later not excise just files regarding unrelated people in the manner claimed but specifically tore apart all of its holdings regarding the Kennedy assassination case.

When paired with the actions of DOD subordinate groups we can observe the destruction of Oswald’s files preceded a growing attempt to scrub the legal record which violated the Department of Defense’s own protocols. While investigators noted the Army did not have specific requirements for the destruction of files, the Defense Department clearly did as evidence proves. Just months following the destruction of Oswald’s files, a fire struck the Army’s National Personnel Records Center and destroyed “16.5 million files on Army Personnel who served before 1960.” Quite the happy coincidence, as elements of the Defense Department had already begun the destruction of several files before procedure would have allowed it. This immense loss of intelligence and information was largely brushed aside into historical events with the public’s attention largely directed elsewhere.

The Kennedy case evidence would again be requested in the course of nineteen seventy-five as official inquiries began to materialize with creation of the Rockefeller Commission. The Church and Pike Committees soon followed and congressional investigations by each were ongoing in the course of nineteen sixty-six. The same year an executive order by Gerald Ford demanded greater accountability regarding prior military operations in violation of law. The Department of Defense subsequently established the office of Inspector General and launched its Oversight Program amid nineteen seventy-eight to combat the overreaching actions of its personnel. They sought to analyze and report about conducting multiple domestic surveillance and intelligence operations targeting US citizens in violation of constitutional law. The same year the HSCA would be informed by the DIA that it had destroyed all of its files related to the assassination of President Kennedy. Yet investigators remained unaware of the enormous scope of evidence the DOD and its subordinates destroyed before their investigation had even begun.
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

References:
i. United States Department of Defense, n.d., History of the Department of Defense Oversight Program, dodsioo.defense.gov
ii. Bill Rockwood, November 19, 2013, Interview of G. Robert Blakey, Frontline, PBS, pbs.org
iii. Nixon Admits Asking CIA to Block Watergate Inquiry, Says It Refused, March 25, 1990, Los Angeles Times, latimes.com
iv. United States Senate, n.d., Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, senate.gov
v. House Select Committee on Assassination, April 20, 1978, Numbered Files, Department of Defense, p. 4, archives.gov, United States National Archives and Records Administration Number: 180-10084-10094
vi. House Select Committee on Assassinations, n.d., Communications, The Mary Ferrell Foundation, maryferrell.org, pp. 104-106, NARA No: 180-10147-10163

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New Documents Reveal officials destroyed far more evidence related to the Kennedy Assassination Than Prior Believed

Comparing physical alteration claims and verified Evidence Destruction

Historian Mike Swanson stops by the Ochelli Effect to discuss past claims of body alteration that persist despite most evidence. Researcher C.A.A. Savastano offers updates regarding his prior discovery of massive evidence destruction by an element of the Department of Defense. Chuck Ochelli and his guests further discuss upcoming new evidence and additional found damage to the evidentiary record by related officials.

How The Stories of These Soviet Cold War Defectors Reveal The Intelligence Abyss pt. 7

With the passing of nineteen sixty-six the hunt for traitors within the Central Intelligence Agency continued rapidly expanding. Greater targets brought a renewed vigor to assess each in a growing pool of potential victims chosen using the loose parameters set by prized KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn. The desperate search undertaken by the Counterintelligence Staff Special Investigations Group (CISIG) had now consumed significant Agency resources for years while displacing and ending the careers of multiple loyal officers. Several instances of contrived guilt were feasibly due to CISIG gazing too long at the shadows cast by legitimate defectors, employees, and officers. When a detail struck investigators as relevant they often became convinced of deviltry at work in spite of the contrary facts. All this occurred in the name of a hunt unleashed by James Angleton and his subordinates many years earlier for a forever elusive penetration agent.

CIA’s Alexander “Sasha” SOGOLOW

Amongst the new counterintelligence staff targets appearing was Russian born CIA employee Alexander “Sasha” Sogolow. While he did have a Slavic name and served in Germany, like many others Sogolow did not fit most of the original parameters set by officials for their quarry. Sogolow’s last name did not begin with K, Sasha was not his pseudonym but the Russian moniker for Alexander other people used. Sogolow further was not a vital agent of influence but a case officer that handled some foreign agents from headquarters amid the nineteen sixties. He would confide to fellow case officer Richard Kovich that CISIG was going to come after him because of his nickname, and he was eventually proven correct in this assumption. CISIG member Newton Miler later admitted that the investigation of Sogolow produced “nothing” and was predicated on Golitsyn’s ideas connecting Sogolow to other suspects.

Anatoliy Golitsyn’s perpetual seeming intent was to discredit all following defectors and thereby render himself the CIA’s most important adviser regarding Soviet intelligence. The rumors he earlier began and fueled with Angleton’s help, such as that Soviet Russia Division leader David Murphy was a Soviet plant, crippled the ability of the CIA to recruit and use multiple viable defectors and operations. Essentially rumors of a mole lingering for nearly a decade wasted vast amounts of resources, incited staff mistrust, and damaged Agency relations with allied organizations. The very purported existence of a traitor could produce or exceed the damage of actual penetration agent if some officials failed to view the situation with great clarity. Seemingly that is precisely what occurred due to the often vague assumptions made by US officials seeking to unearth a mole.

Newton “Scotty” Miler noted at least roughly fifty officers were transferred or removed from the Soviet Division while he participated in the mole hunt. This constitutes just under a quarter of all the functioning officers in that division and surely affected a multitude of projects. Further Agency officers and employees that were damaged because of the ongoing hunt included Vasia Gmirkin, Igor Orlov, George Goldberg, and even President's “Warren” Commission member and former Russian Ambassador William Averell Harriman.i Reportedly Anatoliy Golitsyn had contrived an entire scenario involving Harriman which included an illegitimate Russian child that was Soviet leverage, but none of these claims were substantiated. Apparently the prestige of an outside bureaucrat would not dissuade the seekers in CISIG from locating Sasha by any means necessary using the ideas offered by its favored defector. Ironically, Harriman was among those who saw defector Yuri Nosenko’s contending original statements and dismissed them.

Bureau Officer WIlliam Sullivan

Prior consultations between the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation leaders concerning many of the aforementioned suspects offers “CIA was informed there appears to be no basis...for a full-scale investigation of these men...on the basis of allegations by Golitzyn (sic)...based on interviews of Orlov…nothing has been developed.” Bureau officer William Sullivan further stated “...nothing was developed which would support Golitzyn’s allegations against the other two suspects, Richard Kovich and David Murphy. Furthermore, CIA has furnished no documentary material regarding Kovich or Murphy which would in any way support Golitzyn.”ii The Bureau rightfully had vast differences with the assumptions made by the Agency counterintelligence staff because of lacking evidence. It appeared that James Angleton’s past significant influence with Bureau leaders had drastically receded when he championed Golitsyn’s most unlikely ideas.

Yuri Nosenko, like several other defectors, had inflated his rank and importance seeking to establish credibility with his sponsors and begin a new life for himself. Nosenko during this period was still imprisoned under brutal conditions for his denials of continued service to the KGB and prior informing US intelligence leaders the Soviets did not use Lee Harvey Oswald. Conversely, Golitsyn was rewarded for offering a vast unproven disinformation plot which included penetration agent claims, inflating his access to KGB secrets, and importance to US intelligence efforts. One insight we can gather was the obvious lack of similar treatment when comparing Nosenko to Golitsyn, despite their similar bonafides which are overlooked by some. While Golitsyn was praised and rewarded for his several postulations with access to CIA files, Nosenko was decried and illegally held for years in the closest thing to a gulag on American soil.iii Nevertheless, Yuri Nosenko shockingly would receive better treatment by his Agency captors than fellow defector Yuri Loginov.

KGB Defector Yuri Loginov

Yuri Nikolayevich Loginov was the son of a Soviet official and his wife born in Russia amid nineteen thirty-three. He was raised within the city of Kursk and later moved to the Russian capital in the course of WWII. Following his education Loginov was recruited during the nineteen fifties by the KGB to serve in the role of “illegal”. Illegals were one type of agent used by the KGB that could be implanted within foreign countries to establish cover histories and conduct operations under these false identities. Loginov was assigned to Finland during nineteen sixty-one and later the same year Anatoliy Golitsyn would defect in that very nation. “...Soviet intelligence suffered terrible blows from internal treason...KGB officer Yuri Loginov became an agent for U.S. Intelligence.”iv

Loginov similar to Nosenko was considered a legitimate defector for years until the Agency’s mole hunt caused Anatoliy Golitsyn to notice him again. Potentially it was during the period Golitsyn had access to Agency employee files that offered mole “suspect” Richard Kovich was for a time Loginov’s case officer. Yet the seeming death knell for Loginov’s credibility was his subsequent confirmation of Yuriy Nosenko’s statements that sat in stark contrast to Golitsyn’s claims. Nor was Loginov the first defector to earn the displeasure of Angleton or CISIG by reaffirming Nosenko’s statements. A different past Soviet defector to Britan’s MI5 intelligence group named Yuri Krotkov had previously affirmed Nosenko was a genuine defector. James Angleton advised English officials they should hand Krotkov back to the Soviet’s because he was an obvious plant, a suggestion to which they balked and refused. Loginov would not fare so well in the hands of the Agency’s mole hunters and the CIA revealed him publicly to South African officials amongst nineteen sixty-seven.

Yuri Loginov was quickly arrested by South African police and faced years of imprisonment without trial similar to Yuri Nosenko. He would according to one press story on the matter “Loginov, 36, was arrested in Johannesburg in 1967...He was held for two years without trial and was said to have ‘sung like a canary’ giving interrogators a list of his contacts in 23 countries.”v Obviously Loginov had provided CIA valid intelligence and this was later gained by South African officials under numerous interrogations. Agency officials “burned” him and South African officials did the same two years later when they traded Loginov back to the Soviets for ten West German agents. He obviously retained value for the KGB that Western intelligence failed to appreciate and his information that did not conform to desired official narratives rendered him persona non grata. Thus, Loginov was handed back against his will to Russian officials and reportedly sent to his doom via a firing squad.vi However the growing list of poor tradecraft decisions authored by James Angleton and CISIG would begin to have serious consequences.

James J. Angleton

An ongoing erosion of James Angleton's influence within intelligence circles accelerated in the course of nineteen sixty-seven. His devoutly held belief in Anatoliy Golitsyn’s claim of moles throughout Western intelligence placed enduring suspicion upon innocent defectors and numerous Agency employees. The counterintelligence leader supported theories which hampered multiple division undertakings and damaged CIA operational capability with ceaseless unproven accusations. Most of Golitsyn’s claims about varying officers from Richard Kovich to David Murphy without evidence had rightfully been disbelieved. The morale of Agency officials began to suffer and persistent doubts about employees unfairly targeted by CISIG had finally taken its toll.

By the year’s end Yuriy Nosenko would be released and compensated for his illegal captivity with eager apologies. This act was perhaps the greatest refutation yet of Golitsyn's varying claims and his CIA sponsor. James Angleton based on the account of one related Agency officer was drinking heavily and flinging threats at his detractors in this period. Strongly worded official requests that he take a break from his duties caused the waning counterintelligence leader to spend time in a coastal part of the Middle East later that year. Angleton faced increasing setbacks that would impede his overwhelming urge to find an elusive mole hidden within the CIA’s ranks. However, similar to the creator of any monstrous situation in which all were suspects and sending men to their death was permissible to achieve its ends, the monster would in time come for those who created it.
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

References:
i. David Wise, 1992, Molehunt: The Secret search for Traitors that Shattered the CIA, Random House, New York, pp. 172-178
ii. Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 6, 1970, Memo from Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach, Relationships With CIA Alleged Penetrations of CIA, pp. 1-2, Mary Ferrell Foundation, maryferrell.org, National Archives and Records Administration Identification Number: 124-10185-10098
iii. David Stout, August 27, 2008, Yuri Nosenko, Soviet Spy Who Defected, Dies at 81, The New York Times, nytimes.com
iv. Vladislav M. Zubok, 1994, SPY vs. SPY: THE KGB vs. THE CIA, 1960-1962, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 4, The Wilson Center, wilsoncenter.org, p. 27
v. Russians Make 10-for-1 Spy Swap, August 29, 1969, Page A-10, The Washington Post, washingtonpost.com
vi. A Counterintelligence Reader Volume 3, Chapter 2, Intelligence Resource Program, The Federation of American Scientists, irp.fas.org, pp. 115-116

Find the Wall Street Window version here and other articles by C.A.A. Savastano

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JFK Lancer Conference Presentation 2023

C.A.A. Savastano shares research and documents concerning his speech “Official Alteration and Destruction of the JFK Evidence” presented at this year’s 2023 Lancer NID Conference. Topics range from minor suppression of evidence to the wholesale destruction of thousands of documents revealed in later government archive releases. The following links provide connected investigation materials about each matter and offer the extent some leaders would undertake to alter or damage the evidentiary record.

The CIA’s publicly disavows a plot and later privately alters its position to consider a conspiracy
Evidence: Memo from Richard Helms to Winston Scott

The Destruction of J. Edgar Hoover’s Files
Article: New Documents Reveal officials destroyed far more evidence related to the Kennedy Assassination Than Prior Believed (WSW)
Evidence: FBI evidence regarding the destruction of Hoover’s Files

The Defense Intelligence Agency Destroys All its JFK Documents
Article: New Documents Reveal officials destroyed far more evidence related to the Kennedy Assassination Than Prior Believed (TPAAK)
Evidence: NSA memo regarding the Defense Intelligence Agency’s complete destruction of all JFK documents it possessed

JFK Lancer Website

A Return to the Ochelli Effect

Authors Mike Swanson and Carmine Savastano join the Ochelli Effect to discuss evidence spanning intelligence history to their more recent discoveries in the latest official released documents. Join them and Chuck as they review current articles and research offered by TPAAK Historical Research and The Wall Street Window.

How The Stories Of These Soviet Cold War Defectors Reveal The Intelligence Abyss pt. 6

Within the aftermath of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination the Central Intelligence Agency had internally declared Lee Harvey Oswald guilty within forty-eight hours.i The Federal Bureau of Investigation granted the alleged shooter seventy-two hours before its determination of guilt the same day Jack Ruby shot Oswald. American intelligence groups were desperate to find an expedient solution and their suspect’s inability to defend himself was ideal. However, some within the CIA’s leadership believed this had to be another Soviet plot and Oswald was cast in the role of Soviet agent. Such ideas endangered the US government’s allegations that Oswald acted by himself but those not privately endorsing this idea became suspects in Central Intelligence Agency’s hunt for traitors.

“Yuri” Nosenko Amid Nineteen Fifty-seven

Amongst the earliest targets of the CIA’s mole hunt to discover false agents was KGB defector Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. He was the son of a Russian government minister and following Nosenko’s time in the Soviet Navy he was assigned to the GRU Soviet intelligence organization. Yuriy was subsequently transferred to the KGB and provided information to Agency officers within Switzerland during the early nineteen sixties. The KGB officer had seemingly proved his bonafides and was accepted for a time by officials as reliable. Yet Nosenko’s credibility two years later had been tarnished by the allegations of prior KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn.

Counterintelligence Staff Chief James Angleton had Soviet Russia Division officer Tennent Bagley review Anatoliy Golitsyn’s files. This inspection convinced Bagley that KGB defector Yuriy Nosenko was a Russian plant despite prior approving the Soviet defector's credentials.ii When Nosenko reached out again to make contact Bagley assumed it was a provocation but case officer George Kisevalter supported the former Soviet official was genuine. Two months following the death of America’s president Bagley and Kisevalter would travel to Switzerland amid a blustery winter night to meet Yuriy Nosenko. A seeming repetition of history amongst nineteen sixty-four brought all three men together again inside a Geneva safe house years after Nosenko’s first debriefing. As can be imagined Lee Harvey Oswald was a highly discussed topic and the information the KGB officer provided would stun them.

The President’s Commmission Inspected John F. Kennedy’s Death

Nosenko claimed that he personally observed regular notations within Oswald’s file and denied the KGB had ever attempted to use the dead man for operational purposes. His statements disturbed some at the Agency who already had decided the Soviets used Oswald and the investigating President’s Commission disregarded Nosenko’s words. The defector would additionally provide the Agency with operational information and later that fall one lead provided would reveal a Soviet operative named “Sasha” in the US Army fitting Anatoliy Golitsyn’s mole description. Nosenko defected a month later while supposedly facing recall to Moscow and petitioned the CIA for relocation to the US. His request was sent to Agency headquarters and they agreed to protect and exfiltrate the defector from Europe to America. Kisevalter observed the situation as potentially useful for additional intelligence gathering while Bagley seemingly believed this presented an opportunity to snare a Russian plant. Nosenko was accepted despite the varying motivations of those overseeing his case but his new life in America would soon resemble a prison when that spring passed.

Newton Miler Amongst the nineteen Forties

The Counterintelligence Staff Special Investigations Group (CISIG) was still determined to find the presumed mole within the Agency’s ranks amidst the same period. Birch O’Neal was James Angleton’s direct subordinate overseeing CISIG’s secret review of government employees. He was one of many former Federal Bureau of Investigation agents that subsequently left its ranks for employment with the CIA. Under a cloud of mystery O’Neal supported by CISIG Deputy Chief Newton S. Miler would undertake related investigations. “Scotty” Miler was recruited by US intelligence in the course of nineteen forty-six and served the Agency in the role of case officer handling agents during the nineteen fifties. As the next decade passed Miler was a station chief in Ethiopia and transferred at James Angleton’s request to CISIG. Amongst his time working for the special investigations unit Miler was drawn into the Golitsyn accusations while other members not adhering to a mole’s existence left the counterintelligence group.

A significant amount of the Agency counterintelligence staff’s attention was set upon examining mole hunt suspects within varying official groups. Officials did not consider how much of the CIA’s resources were spent elsewhere that should have been dedicated to assisting the President’s Commission investigation. The counterintelligence staff’s would oversee the Agency’s later Kennedy investigation and its preoccupation with hunting moles likely affected whatever support it offered the Commission. Angleton believed that Nosenko was lying about Lee Harvey Oswald and thus Golitsyn’s alleged immense Deszinformatsiya (Disinformation) Plot was seemingly underway. The counterintelligence staff believed, as several in the Agency did, that President John F. Kennedy’s assassination was just another Soviet authored plot. A deed the KGB sought to distance themselves from by sending “false” defectors akin to Nosenko.

Richard Kovich After Career with the Agency

CISIG was inspecting Soviet Division officer Richard Kovich based on the parameters set by defector Anatoliy Golitsyn amongst the summer of nineteen sixty-four. Kovich joined the Agency and by the nineteen fifties was assisting George Kisevalter in the handling of several valuable defectors that included Pyotr Popov and Mikhail Federov. He trained agents on defector procedures at headquarters and served in the role of recruitment agent for division sources abroad. Kovich in the course of nineteen sixty-four was returning from an extended assignment to the Agency’s Vienna Station but no promotion awaited him. Despite his success undertaking oversees projects he was placed in a proverbial employment limbo due to James Angleton blocking his promotion.iii The unfortunate Yuriy Nosenko was simultaneously entering a literal hellscape crafted by some of the CIA’s leadership.

Nosenko was in the beginning handled akin to other KGB defectors but several internal official beliefs and suspicions would conspire to alter his circumstances. He was provided housing, a vacation, and spending money before they began hostile interrogations. Ironically, it was leaders in the eventually crippled Soviet Russia Division that supported early doubts regarding Nosenko and the need to break his will. The FBI would again inform the Agency that Nosenko appeared legitimate and his information was useful but to no avail. The Soviet defector was captured and incarcerated within a cell following a fixed result polygraph. Officials inspecting the polygraph would later attest the examination’s “conclusions...were a gross misinterpretation...in some instances the Subject was deemed to be lying when it is know he was telling the truth.”iv

Further review of Nosenko’s treatment states “Although Nosenko had already contributed considerable intelligence of value...Nosenko was treated as one whose guilt had been established.” Yet no trial occurred, contrary evidence was disregarded, and the Agency hunters did not bother to prove what them claimed. Yuriy was moved from one holding area to a cramped attic with stifling heat inside a CIA safe house under twenty-four hour observation. One related document states the only “break” the defector received from solitary confinement were his varying interrogations. In the course of these interrogations Anatoliy Golitsyn began advising officials how to force Nosenko to confess and they determined a policy of removing the scant freedoms he was permitted. If Nosenko did not conform to the requests of his interrogators he would lose “cigarettes, table, chair, reading material, ruler, paper and pencil”. Yet this seemingly nightmarish attic cell with no human contact beyond accusations was heavenly compared to the years of captivity awaiting Nosenko.

The counterintelligence staff at Golitsyn’s suggestion began a deeper investigation of Kovich as nineteen sixty-five passed and within two years had Kovich’s home phone under constant surveillance. Yet the Federal Bureau of Investigation disputed that Golitsyn’s varying ideas would lead to a KGB mole and by extension contended the research of Agency counterintelligence staff. v vi James Angleton began to observe potential suspects at nearly each turn and denied the promotion of useful officers without any evidence of their guilt. Documents additionally support the mole hunters focused on lower ranking division officers and staff for multiple strategic reasons. Angleton likely realized that accusations targeting leading Agency officers might damage his own power base and end the widespread search. CISIG’s quest had thus far weakened the ability of the CIA to conduct Soviet operations due to a presupposition that most sources would be disinformation agents. Peter Karlow, Richard Kovich, and Yuriy Nosenko were just the beginning of a growing list of the mole’s hunts victims.
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

i. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Segregated Central Intelligence Agency File, Staff Notes, (n.d.), CIA Performance Study, Mary Ferrell Foundation, maryferrell.org, National Archives and Records Administration Number: 180-10147-10179
ii. Central Intelligence Agency, (n.d.), Study: “The Monster Plot” aka The “Hart Report”, MFF, maryferrell.org, pp. 13-15, NARA ID: 104-10534-10205
iii. Adam Bernstien, February 27, 2006, CIA Officer Richard Kovich, The Washington Post, washingtonpost.com
iv. CIA, Study: “The Monster Plot”, p. 36
v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 15, 1965, No Title, Interview...With Anatoliy M. Golitsyn, NARA ID: 124-10333-1007
vi. Central Intelligence Agency, Janaury 4, 1967, File Card Review, U.S. Citizens General Tab, Surveillance-Electronic-Kovich, R., NARA ID:104-10096-10321

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How The Stories Of These Soviet Cold War Defectors Reveal The Intelligence Abyss pt. 5

As the calendar fell upon the days of late 1962, the mole hunt inside Western intelligence began to expand within the United States. Fears of disinformation, false defectors, and the assumption of a traitor within its ranks began to internally damage the Central Intelligence Agency. Official attempts to discover and track disloyal intelligence employees had yet to render any solid leads or suspects. The effort to seek turncoats within the US intelligence community gained momentum with each new accusation and it began to spread. Other nations soon would be influenced by America’s search for penetration agents based upon the claims of a single defector.

KGB Defector ANATOLIY Golitsyn

Varying case officers of the CIA’s Soviet Division sought greater detail regarding the claims of defector Anatoliy Golitsyn. Yet Anatoliy began to grow tired of such questioning by the fall of 1962 and this was likely due to all the past accusations offered since his defection. One accusation Golitsyn offered to case officer Donald Deselyna in that period was the KGB developed a prior “contingency plan” to assassinate Richard Nixon if he was elected amidst 1960. The details however were vague and Deselyna, a later advocate for Golitsyn, could not offer verifiable evidence to corroborate the purported conspiracy.i Deselyna was seemingly a true believer in the KGB defector akin to James Angleton and even claimed that “none of the information ever provided by G had been disproven”. This is clearly false, just one of several disproven claims by Golitsyn was Israeli Prime Minster Golda Meir served the KGB. What Golitsyn claimed and others believed compared to his proven allegations were two entirely separate things.

Amidst this earlier period the defector turned adviser further told related officials not just the US had a problem with unseen traitors, but France did as well. Golitsyn would allege that spies had entered the French government and lurked in two of France’s intelligence groups. Golitsyn asserted the Direction de la Surveillance du Territorie (DST) responsible for internal French security and Service de Documentation Exterieure et dec Contre-espionnage (SDECE) conducting foreign operations were breached. These allegations were heeded by officials and the KGB defector was debriefed by French intelligence but they did not follow up on several of his allegations. The official response appears due to some claims by Golitsyn lacking evidence but others were ignored because of potential damage to US and French political relations. Finding this intolerable, James Angleton began to directly accuse members of France’s intelligence community of being traitors. Despite the attempts of French officials, Angleton’s claims led to some internal political backlash and damaged intelligence relationships for a time but no moles were discovered.ii

The Mole inside MI6, H. “KIM” Philby

Anatoliy Golitsyn’s further alleged the British government and intelligence agencies had been infiltrated by the KGB. Indeed British moles such as members of the Cambridge Five and compromised officials were revealed during the 1950s and widespread suspicion was palpable in that era. To address these allegations James Angleton contacted Security Service (MI5) counterintelligence officer Arthur Martin and he debriefed the KGB defector. As 1963 began Harold “Kim” Philby confirmed his past decades of betraying Western Intelligence and defected from Beirut to Moscow.

James Angleton subsequently was consumed with apprehending Golitsyn’s purported mole in part due to his prior friendly associations with Kim Philby. Angleton, like so many others, had been convinced by the facade of the devious past British intelligence operative before his unmasking. This grand failure was a harsh reminder to several officials in Western intelligence and many were determined to never allow it to happen again. Golitsyn reportedly was exhausted from continued Agency debriefings but was provided a welcome diversion months later. MI5’s Arthur Martin invited Anatoliy and his family to England for additional intelligence debriefings amid the spring of 1963. Golitsyn’s allegations spread to a third nation and the mole hunt within England’s intelligence groups had begun.

UK Prime Minster James H. Wilson

The British political landscape was already rife with political scandals and intelligence failures following the arrival of Anatoliy Golitsyn. Agency officials later confirmed the KGB defector informed English intelligence that Labour Party opposition leader Harold Wilson served Moscow. Based on rumor, speculations, and Golitsyn’s own contrivances he deemed the KGB had assassinated Wilson’s predecessor to empower him. Thus Wilson according to some in MI5 had been tainted by Soviet intelligence and this claim would affect the English government for several years.iii Many people in the English politician’s social circles fell under suspicion after Golitsyn’s accusations spread including some who fled Soviet held areas following WWII. Wilson’s second term resignation was reportedly due to his paranoia and the continuing intervention of his own government’s intelligence group.

Despite the enormity of his charge, Golitsyn after further collaboration with British intelligence claimed MI5’s leader Sir Roger Hollis and others connected to him were also Russian pawns. Following these declarations staff within MI5 began surveil and investigate their own leaders in search of additional moles akin to Kim Philby. One investigating member of MI5 regarding Hollis stated, “I had faith in his treachery as another man might have faith in God.” Yet the faith demonstrated by some in US and British intelligence was often misplaced without evidence to prove their assumptions. This series of claims would haunt the British landscape beyond the retirement of both MI5 suspects without any mole discovered. Golitsyn’s stay in England was cut short after his name was leaked to the international media and he returned to American in the summer of 1963. British and US intelligence relations were damaged after each accused the other of publicly revealing the defector’s identity to further their own interests.

CISIG Leader B.d. O’ neal

As Golitsyn returned to James Angleton’s supervision the hunt for moles ended the career of Serge Peter Karlow.iv Angleton now would begin allowing Golitsyn to search for the elusive mole code named “Sascha” within classified materials and Agency employee files. The mole hunt was managed then by Counterintelligence Staff’s Special Investigations Group (CISIG) Chief Birch O’Neal with roughly seven other agents. O’Neal was a Californian with a law degree and was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the 1930s. He was the chief of multiple Agency stations amongst the next decade and by 1954 he was supporting operation PBSUCCESS to overthrow the government of Guatemala. He was reassigned to headquarters and became part of the Counterintelligence Staff amidst the nineteen sixties but he could not manage the endeavor alone.

Now armed with classified employee files and the support of CISIG Golitsyn decided he found a new suspect with necessary traits, Richard Kovich. He possessed a Slavic background, his name began with the letter K, and he supported defector operations. These details were seemingly enough for the CISIG to begin operations targeting the latest mole suspect and Kovich’s days were numbered. Despite the endless faith invested within Golitsyn by the CISIG, other groups such as West German intelligence were not impressed or convinced of his bonafides during this period.v They contemplated if Golitsyn was responsible for compromising some of their agents and operations with his vast array of claims.

The KGB officer’s prior allegation that defectors following him were provocation agents increased official paranoia and fueled James Angleton's pursuit of a presumed traitor. As these men widened the field of suspects the rift amongst officials became an expanding intelligence abyss. A preemptive mistrust of nearly anyone conforming to Anatoliy Golitsyn’s vague biography of Sascha began to destabilize some operations and morale. By these standards if a suspect had any ties to Russia or even have traveled to the Soviet Union it was indicative of guilt. Peter Karlow was the first lost career inside the abyss of suspicions, but its first seeming victim was Russian intelligence employee Alexsandr Cherepanov.

Amidst November of 1963 KGB Second Chief Directorate officer Alexsandr Nikolaevich Cherepanov gave a package of documents to a couple for delivery to the US Moscow Embassy. The visiting couple did as he requested and this seeming intelligence boon was the source of friction among American officials. The Chief of Moscow Station Paul Garbler was embroiled in a heated exchange with embassy diplomatic staff concerning the documents sent by Cherepanov. Legally ranking diplomatic officials believed the documents should be returned to Russian authorities but Garbler utterly disagreed and believed their return would cause whomever sent them to be killed. American diplomats allowed Garbler to copy the documents but returned them and Russian officials sent the files to the KGB for review.

Upon a late November morning within the city of Dallas that same year President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, his alleged murderer was killed two days later. Desperate Agency leaders without evidence were quick to internally blame Russian intelligence a mere day later.vi Lee Harvey Oswald had been to Russia and thus anyone in that period with Soviet connections was a possible CISIG suspect. The next month Alexsandr Cherepanov was arrested fleeing the Soviet Union because the papers he gave American diplomats were returned to the KGB.vii The documents led Russian intelligence to Cherepanov and he was subsequently executed for the attempt to collaborate with US officials.
Sincerely,
C.A.A. Savastano

References:
i. House Select Committee on Assassinations, August 26, 1978, Security Classified Files, Contact Report with Donald Deneslva, United States National Archives and Records Administration Number: 180-10110-10145, pp. 1-3, archives.gov
ii. David Wise, 1992, Molehunt: The Secret search for Traitors that Shattered the CIA, Random House, New York, pp. 106-112
iii. Malcolm Gladwell, July 20, 1994, Trust No One: Kim Philby and the hazards of mistrust, The New Yorker, newyorker.com
iv. C.A.A. Savastano, How The Stories of These Soviet Cold War Defectors Reveal The Intelligence Abyss pt. 4, TPAAK Historical Research, tpaak.com
v. Central Intelligence Agency, October 6, 1963, Dispatch from Chief of Munich Base, archives.gov, p. 2, National Archives and Records Administration Number: 104-101272-10217
vi. CIA, November 23, 1963, Cable from Chief, SR Division, re possible KGB role in Kennedy Slaying, archives.gov, p. 2, NARA ID: 104-10431-10060
vii. Frank J. Rafalko, (n.d.), A Counterintelligence Reader Volume 3, Chapter 2: Counterintelligence in the Turbulent 1960s and 1970s, Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Research Program, fas.org, pp. 195-196

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