K. Lee Lerner's Blog, page 4
June 15, 2022
Hispanic rejection of exploitive identity politics may save us all
I have been warning my respected friends on the left in Washington and Cambridge that Hispanics in Texas do not want to be seen or treated as “people of color,” and most assuredly not lumped in with — or treated — like they were black. Hispanics have watched as prominent Democrats, including Biden himself, treat themselves as arbiters of blackness or treat blacks as a monoculture whose votes are always in the Dem’s hip pockets (e.g., Biden’s “you ain’t black” comment). Volumes of polling data show Hispanics crave meritocracy not exploitation or perpetual marginalization as victims. They see the failures of progressive Democrats to acknowledge the differentiation within the black community in terms of history, education, achievement, viewpoints and concerns as a warning. My Hispanic colleagues deeply resent POC presumptions made by the DNC and white liberals who benefit from both the overt and inherent racial exploitations of the identity politics cult.
Trends in Hispanic voting in 2020 — especially along the Texas border — were extended last night in the election of Flores. Hispanics voting red are now a tangible political force in Texas. Trump did surprisingly well with Hispanic voters not because they liked or respected the man, but because they far more deeply resented the presumptions made by the DNC about the nature of Hispanic self-image, concerns, and aspirations.Biden’s disastrous border policies which — despite the many polls and signs that should warn them otherwise— leftist Dems errantly think Hispanics overwhelmingly support, are deepening a growing rift with Hispanics.Moreover, proud cultural traditions and values among Hispanics are fundamentally at odds with much of progressive “woke” culture. The harder the left pushes that agenda, the faster Hispanics will walk away from the Dems.
June 1, 2022
Policymakers must now assume that Iran has the enriched uranium it needs to build a nuclear weapon
Policymakers must now assume that Iran has the enriched uranium it needs to build a nuclear weapon
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33868.69760
[Additional background for non-scientists is appended]
June 1, 2022
Policymakers must now assume that Iran has the enriched uranium it needs to build a nuclear weapon. Containment is a failure. Iran’s breakout time is now essentially at zero
According to estimates prepared from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports and Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Iran now has sufficient stores of highly enriched uranium (e.g., HEU or 60 percent enriched uranium ) to fashion a crude nuclear weapon. [1]
As I predicted in March, Iran now has sufficient HEU, the required centrifuges, and the skill to rapidly increase enrichment of weapon-grade uranium (e.g., WGU or 90 percent enriched uranium) within a few weeks. [2]
After allegedly abandoning its nuclear program in 2003, (e.g., the Amad plan led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh who was assassinated in November 2020), Iran has built secret nuclear facilities, obstructed IAEA inspections, and repeatedly denied or downplayed its ongoing efforts to enrich uranium International efforts, primarily via the deeply flawed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) focused on limiting Iran’s supply of HEU. It is now clear that JCPOA failed and lack of inspections and enforcement, allowed Iran the time to build its enriched uranium stores to their present state.
Despite the manifest failure of the JCPOA and Iran’s history of deception and obstruction, the Biden administration and others in the west dangerously and naively continue efforts to renegotiate a still weaker agreement, even though independent IAEA verification of any deal will again prove to be futile.
Using worst-case timeline estimates, according to David Albright and Sarah Burkhard at ISIS “Iran’s breakout timeline is now at zero… In parallel, within a month, it could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear explosive from its existing stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium. Whether or not Iran enriches its HEU up to 90 percent, it can have enough HEU for two nuclear weapons within one month after starting breakout.” Withing six months Iran could produce at least five nuclear weapons.
As Albright and Burkhard point out in their report, even if a new JCPOA was negotiated and implemented, any Iranian pullback from its current capacity would be went into force, any recalibrated Iran breakout date would be an illusion, impeding Iran for a matter of weeks not the minimum year JCPOA once envisioned.
The ISIS report also concludes that Iran “could test a nuclear explosive underground or deploy a crude nuclear weapon within several months, certainly within six months, and deploy nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles in a year or two.”
Over the years the IAEA has repeatedly warned that Iran was hiding both nuclear materials and enrichment capacity as well as violating other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions. Evidence Iran submits to IAEA has also repeatedly failed to withstand independent scientific and engineering scrutiny.
Based on a recent International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Iran Verification and Monitoring Report of March 3, 2022 [3], and subsequent Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) analysis [4], Iran is continuing to advance its nuclear capabilities, hide nuclear research facilities, and thwart international inspections.
Since February 2021, Iran has denied the IAEA the ability to inspect and/or monitor known/declared Iranian nuclear research facilities (including Esfahan or Karaj sites). Gaps also exist in both monitoring and Iran’s accounting for the number and use of centrifuges at other facilities including the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.
Although Iran has sent 23.3 kg of it HEU to its Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) in Isfahan, according to ISIS, “it is expected that only a tiny fraction will be converted into targets. As such, the production of targets will not remove the proliferation and breakout risks posed by Iran’s stockpile of HEU. This step should be viewed as a cynical attempt by Iran to place a civilian mask on an inherently military material and lay a precedent for future production of HEU.” [4]
in early February 2021, Iran began producing uranium metal (see background information below) from both 20 percent enriched uranium and 60 percent enriched uranium for by the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). This an open violation of its JCPOA commitments. In an article published in Science on 15 July 2021 (“Iran’s plans for research reactor fuel imperil revival of nuclear deal”), Andrea Stricker, a nonproliferation analyst at the nonprofit Foundation for Defense of Democracies countered Iran’s claim that it was using the metal to produce medical isotopes. “Iran is pursuing a strategy of brinkmanship,” said Stricker, “It is using civil-use justifications as a pretext to brazenly advance its nuclear weapons–related knowledge.”
=================
[1] David Albright and Sarah Burkhard. “Iran’s breakout timeline is now at zero.” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). June 1, 2022. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/det…
[2] Lerner, K. Lee. Iran’s nuclear breakout window narrows. Taking Bearings. March 9, 2022. https://blogs.harvard.edu/kleelerner/ira…
[3] IAEA report. “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files…
[4] David Albright and Sarah Burkhard. “Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report.” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). March 2022. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/det…
[5[ David Albright and Sarah Burkhard. “Entering Dangerous, Uncharted Waters: Iran’s 60 Percent Highly Enriched Uranium,” ISIS. April 11, 2022, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/det…
===========
Additional background for non-scientists
Uranium, atomic number 92 on the Periodic Table is the heaviest naturally occurring element on Earth. The uranium nucleus contains 92 protons but a variable number of neutrons to create uranium-238, uranium-235, and uranium-234 isotopes of uranium. About 0.72 percent of natural uranium is U-235 All uranium isotope are radioactive as they decay, but only U-235 is capable of fission (a spitting of the nucleus) when it absorbs a neutron. This splitting releases tremendous energy
Uranium ore treated to form uranium oxide (“yellowcake”) and then combined over a series of steps with anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluorine gas to form uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Uranium hexafluoride can exist as a gas used in further enhancement or as a liquid or solid for storage and shipping. Uranium hexafluoride does not react with atmospheric gases (oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, etc.) but is reacts with water and water vapor in the air to form hydrogen fluoride (a corrosive) and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2).
During gaseous diffusion, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas passes through hundreds of fine porous filters that help separate the faster moving U-234 and U-235 atoms from the heavier and slower moving U-238 isotopes. Accordingly, two output streams — one enriched in U-235 and the other depleted in U-235 are observed. With further processing of the enriched uranium the percentage of U-235 increases.
To be used as nuclear fuel the uranium must be enriched 3 to 5 percent. Highly Enriched Uranium is 60 percent U-235 and weapons grade-uranium is 90-plus percent U-235
Centrifuges produce a force much stronger than the normal gravitational force. The spinning of gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6) creates a sight separation of heavier U-238 and relatively lighter U-235 atoms. By drawing off the U-235 enriched region and repeating the process thousands of times through a chain or cascade of high-speed centrifuges that spin about 100,000 rpm, one obtains increasing purified or enhanced U-235. Adding calcium to the enriched U-235 creates a salt and a pure uranium metal for fuel rods or if enriched to weapons grade U-235, nuclear weapons.
Iran now has the enriched uranium it needs to build a nuclear weapon
Iran now has the enriched uranium it needs to build a nuclear weapon: Containment is a failure as Iran’s breakout time is now essentially at zero.
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33868.69760
[Additional background for non-scientists is appended]
June 1, 2022
Iran has what it needs to build a nuclear weapon: Containment is a failure. Iran’s breakout time is now essentially at zero
According to estimates prepared from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports and Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Iran now has sufficient stores of highly enriched uranium (e.g., HEU or 60 percent enriched uranium ) to fashion a crude nuclear weapon. [1]
As I predicted in March, Iran now has sufficient HEU, the required centrifuges, and the skill to rapidly increase enrichment of weapon-grade uranium (e.g., WGU or 90 percent enriched uranium) within a few weeks. [2]
After allegedly abandoning its nuclear program in 2003, (e.g., the Amad plan led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh who was assassinated in November 2020), Iran has built secret nuclear facilities, obstructed IAEA inspections, and repeatedly denied or downplayed its ongoing efforts to enrich uranium International efforts, primarily via the deeply flawed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) focused on limiting Iran’s supply of HEU. It is now clear that JCPOA failed and lack of inspections and enforcement, allowed Iran the time to build its enriched uranium stores to their present state.
Despite the manifest failure of the JCPOA and Iran’s history of deception and obstruction, the Biden administration and others in the west dangerously and naively continue efforts to renegotiate a still weaker agreement, even though independent IAEA verification of any deal will again prove to be futile.
Using worst-case timeline estimates, according to David Albright and Sarah Burkhard at ISIS “Iran’s breakout timeline is now at zero… In parallel, within a month, it could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear explosive from its existing stock of near 20 percent low enriched uranium. Whether or not Iran enriches its HEU up to 90 percent, it can have enough HEU for two nuclear weapons within one month after starting breakout.” Withing six months Iran could produce at least five nuclear weapons.
As Albright and Burkhard point out in their report, even if a new JCPOA was negotiated and implemented, any Iranian pullback from its current capacity would be went into force, any recalibrated Iran breakout date would be an illusion, impeding Iran for a matter of weeks not the minimum year JCPOA once envisioned.
The ISIS report also concludes that Iran “could test a nuclear explosive underground or deploy a crude nuclear weapon within several months, certainly within six months, and deploy nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles in a year or two.”
Over the years the IAEA has repeatedly warned that Iran was hiding both nuclear materials and enrichment capacity as well as violating other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions. Evidence Iran submits to IAEA has also repeatedly failed to withstand independent scientific and engineering scrutiny.
Based on a recent International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Iran Verification and Monitoring Report of March 3, 2022 [3], and subsequent Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) analysis [4], Iran is continuing to advance its nuclear capabilities, hide nuclear research facilities, and thwart international inspections.
Since February 2021, Iran has denied the IAEA the ability to inspect and/or monitor known/declared Iranian nuclear research facilities (including Esfahan or Karaj sites). Gaps also exist in both monitoring and Iran’s accounting for the number and use of centrifuges at other facilities including the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.
Although Iran has sent 23.3 kg of it HEU to its Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) in Isfahan, according to ISIS, “it is expected that only a tiny fraction will be converted into targets. As such, the production of targets will not remove the proliferation and breakout risks posed by Iran’s stockpile of HEU. This step should be viewed as a cynical attempt by Iran to place a civilian mask on an inherently military material and lay a precedent for future production of HEU.” [4]
in early February 2021, Iran began producing uranium metal (see background information below) from both 20 percent enriched uranium and 60 percent enriched uranium for by the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). This an open violation of its JCPOA commitments. In an article published in Science on 15 July 2021 (“Iran’s plans for research reactor fuel imperil revival of nuclear deal”), Andrea Stricker, a nonproliferation analyst at the nonprofit Foundation for Defense of Democracies countered Iran’s claim that it was using the metal to produce medical isotopes. “Iran is pursuing a strategy of brinkmanship,” said Stricker, “It is using civil-use justifications as a pretext to brazenly advance its nuclear weapons–related knowledge.”
=================
[1] David Albright and Sarah Burkhard. “Iran’s breakout timeline is now at zero.” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). June 1, 2022. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/det…
[2] Lerner, K. Lee. Iran’s nuclear breakout window narrows. Taking Bearings. March 9, 2022. https://blogs.harvard.edu/kleelerner/ira…
[3] IAEA report. “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files…
[4] David Albright and Sarah Burkhard. “Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report.” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). March 2022. https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/det…
[5[ David Albright and Sarah Burkhard. “Entering Dangerous, Uncharted Waters: Iran’s 60 Percent Highly Enriched Uranium,” ISIS. April 11, 2022, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/det…
===========
Additional background for non-scientists
Uranium, atomic number 92 on the Periodic Table is the heaviest naturally occurring element on Earth. The uranium nucleus contains 92 protons but a variable number of neutrons to create uranium-238, uranium-235, and uranium-234 isotopes of uranium. About 0.72 percent of natural uranium is U-235 All uranium isotope are radioactive as they decay, but only U-235 is capable of fission (a spitting of the nucleus) when it absorbs a neutron. This splitting releases tremendous energy
Uranium ore treated to form uranium oxide (“yellowcake”) and then combined over a series of steps with anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluorine gas to form uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Uranium hexafluoride can exist as a gas used in further enhancement or as a liquid or solid for storage and shipping. Uranium hexafluoride does not react with atmospheric gases (oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, etc.) but is reacts with water and water vapor in the air to form hydrogen fluoride (a corrosive) and uranyl fluoride (UO2F2).
During gaseous diffusion, uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas passes through hundreds of fine porous filters that help separate the faster moving U-234 and U-235 atoms from the heavier and slower moving U-238 isotopes. Accordingly, two output streams — one enriched in U-235 and the other depleted in U-235 are observed. With further processing of the enriched uranium the percentage of U-235 increases.
To be used as nuclear fuel the uranium must be enriched 3 to 5 percent. Highly Enriched Uranium is 60 percent U-235 and weapons grade-uranium is 90-plus percent U-235
Centrifuges produce a force much stronger than the normal gravitational force. The spinning of gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6) creates a sight separation of heavier U-238 and relatively lighter U-235 atoms. By drawing off the U-235 enriched region and repeating the process thousands of times through a chain or cascade of high-speed centrifuges that spin about 100,000 rpm, one obtains increasing purified or enhanced U-235. Adding calcium to the enriched U-235 creates a salt and a pure uranium metal for fuel rods or if enriched to weapons grade U-235, nuclear weapons.
May 30, 2022
Memorial Day Reflections
I don’t care much about monuments. Throughout history and across cultures they rise and fall. Things change, and history is always a battlefield. I do, however, care about graves and honoring those who died for their country because soldiers, for both better and worse, do not usually fight for the grand ideologies shifting histories or dishonest historians might eventually ascribe to them.Most soldiers are pawns of war. Some were conscripted, many more mustered their courage to selflessly respond to the call of their country — or what they thought of as their country — based on noble perceptions of patriotism, sense of honor, duty to protect their home and others, etc. In the end, most soldiers fight and die not for a cause, but for each other, for their brothers in arms.We should also take care with our memories of soldiers, for the winds of history shift.Look at the rhetoric of our own time, with phrases such as “illegal wars,” “wars for oil,” “neo-colonialist interventions,” etc., frequently and mindlessly uttered by the ignorant, the politically exploitive, the grifters of history, cowardly misfits, and the chronically malcontent — may one day be used to tear down monuments and to soil the service and memory of those who served with honorable intentions in a host of American wars and conflicts (including Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan).The most malicious and malignant among us, for example, would now have us taint our Revolutionary War soldiers as “fighting for slavery, etc.” when the historical record (including primary source diaries, letters and records) is clear that what they fought for was a country and a system that eventually overcame the horrors of slavery and other systems of bondage and indenture that so long profited its Old World founders.Equally malicious and malignant, of course, are those who disrespect the service, pain, and sacrifice of our POWs.America has many scars, but today it still stands proudly as the last flawed but capable defender of liberty and Enlightenment ideals in a dark and dangerous world.Accordingly, we should take caution not to taint those who guard its walls and take care to honor the memories of those who fell doing their duty. Our fallen soldiers, veterans, and soldiers serving today literally provide the “safe space” in which dissent, change, and evolution toward a better country can take place.I have no tolerance for “America first” types, because thousands of American soldier’s graves around the world prove that a mature America — an America at its best — overcomes the isolationism that helped preserve a nascent republic to fight and care for others. We have rebuilt other countries with our blood and treasure. Americans by their nature are not selfish and it is in the DNA of our people to fight for freedom, stand up to tyrants, and to — sometime eventually — do the right thing. We need not be bullies, but we should likewise not fail to stand with others in a just cause.I have no respect for jingoists and “America right or wrong” types because nationalism should not be confused with patriotism (I plan a series of posts on this leading up to July 4th this year) and dissent can also be patriotic. I have little tolerance for those who equate a specific political party or ideology with patriotism, because patriotism can be manifest across a wide spectrum of ideologies. I have still less regard, however, for those who improperly tout — or deny — American exceptionalism because they simply show they do not intellectually understand what the term means.Is right and proper to question wars, policies, and our flaws, and to protest same when in accord with one’s lights (soldiers died to defend that right), but I also have absolutely zero place in my life —and hold an intrinsic disdain — for those without pride in America. I think they are, at best, shallow souls ignorant of history, geopolitical realities, and the very real perils of this world.Especially on Memorial Day, we must always remain careful to honor service and sacrifice for our country. It is never proper to disparage soldiers who served who honorable intentions. In fact, most soldiers, if at times begrudgingly, accord due regard to other soldiers who fought with honor (and that term is key) and equal courage as their enemies.If you want a guide as to how to regard the soldiers of history, listen to the veterans of those conflicts. Listen also to how their recollections change over time, as they age, and the intimate horrors of the battlefield grew more distant. The weight of individual sacrifice and loss may diminish across generations, but within individual soldiers, it increases with time.=============================================(1) Amble, John. A REFLECTION ON HOW WE MARK MEMORIAL DAY. https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/a-r... The grave of an unknown Confederate soldier, Confederate Rest Cemetery, Point Clear, Alabama. K. Lee Lerner. 2022
May 19, 2022
Defense Challenges Multiply – Part 1
Part I
While we remain focused on Ukraine. defense challenges to the west and western companies multiply. America’s lead in technology has narrowed with China and in some key facets it has evaporated. Over the next few weeks, I will be examining threats and potential threats to both countries and companies from an array of lesser known radiologic, biologic, chemical, and cyber perils. Many of these threats relate to microchip security and energy demand and supply.
Some of these threats involve both low and tech components.
For example, at a military airshow in 2016, China demonstrated the capacity to
launch multiple precision-guided rockets concealed in standard shipping containers hauled aboard cargo ships. There is no open confirmation that China has widely implemented the system, but the demonstration sounded alarms in Washington, London, and European countries with maritime exposure.
The potential threat remains real. Such systems could overwhelm U.S. defense systems and cripple our ability to strike back after an attack. Like submarines, cargo ships are independently positional and controllable systems that can pose a threat from nearby international waters where the cargo containers are beyond inspection. (See “China is building long-range cruise missiles launched from ship containers.” News Navy Naval Maritime Defense Industry. April 2019, Available at https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.ph…)
Without costs of nuclear programs and weapons, these containerized threats can remain subnuclear and thus skirt a strategic nuclear stalemate to yield tremendous tactical advantages.
China has, for example a YJ-18C long range cruise missile that could be modified to launch from containers. China also has hypersonic missiles that, given the combination of offshore proximity and their speed, would be difficult to intercept and shoot down. There are also potential weapons that can generate EMPs (electromagnetic pulses) that can cripple unhardened communications and weapon systems for both military and commercial entities.
Israel has demonstrated the capacity to launch its own Lora missiles from containers, and the Lora is similar to Russia’s four-pack of satellite-guided Club-K cruise missiles that Kontsern-Morinformsistema-Agat demonstrated back in 2010. (See, “Deadly new Russian weapon hides in shipping container.” Reuters. April 2010. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russi…).
According, despite current defeats in Ukraine it remains dangerous to dismiss Russian capacities as well as the ability of rogue states like North Korea and Iran to acquire and/or develop such weapons systems.
The maritime environment is brutal enough for systems not subject to monitoring and constant maintenance, but these systems require significant computing power operate fully independent tracking and targeting systems. The seriousness of the threat these container-concealed missile systems pose, in part ,depends on power and their own microchip security (more about this in Part II and Part III of this series) They computers needed to run the systems require significant electricity and generate traceable heat signatures. Accordingly, the. U.S. is currently countering the container threat with the development and deployment of tracking and senor systems that can also detect trace amounts of volatile rocket fuel compounds.
To reduce demands of computing systems, assets are often used to “paint” targets and all sides are moving to space-based measurement and control systems that have access to essential tracking data and satellite imagery. Techniques like virtualization and other means to automatically digitize functions can significantly reduce power and computing demands.
Still, relative to larger defense systems, the development and deployment of smaller, smarter and less expensive weapons systems can conceivably match and impair America’s ability to extend influence with advantages in aircraft carriers, fighters, and missiles.
Continued in Part II
May 10, 2022
Insurrection, Coup d’état, Revolution: Know the difference
[Originally published May 10, 2022. Updated: July 3, 2022.]
I denounced the insurrection on January 6th. I did so on the day, and I do so now. Regardless what the protestors may have initially intended, the resulting violent assault on the U.S. Capitol — including violent assaults on law enforcement officers — turned them into insurrectionists. Regardless their self-proclaimed patriotism, the actions of those who committed violence were despicable and deplorable.
Despite the garb and gear on display, many months of investigation have shown that the mob contained about the same percentage of veterans — people who have sworn to defend the Constitution — as is found in the general population. I find it of some comfort that the rioters contained a lot of pretend soldiers out on a pretend mission, yet I still find it unfathomable that anyone who had sworn to support and defend the Constitution of the United States could violently breach its Capitol.
Many years before his 2016 election, I declared former President Trump unfit for office. Few things he did in office proved me wrong. immeasurably crude, even when implementing effective policies, was the best Trump could ever muster as president. But did Trump, after his election defeat, orchestrate an attempted coup d’état with the goal of remaining in office?
What I am exploring herein is one about words and terms — specifically the words insurrection, coup (herein, unless further modified, to mean coup d’état) , and revolution. It is not to be construed as an attempt to mitigate or lessened Trump’s series of insidious, reprehensible, and possibly illegal actions that Trump undertook as he clearly lashed about trying to find a way to prove that he had won the 2020 election. Typical of Trump, he accepted no other argument , conclusion, or judgment than his own that the election had fraudulently denied him a second term. There is no doubt that by January 6th, the last hope of the Trump’s toxically quixotic quest to retain power misguidedly focused on obstructing the largely electoral certification of President-elect Biden.
Trump explored way to challenge and change the certification process, he encouraged protests he thought might sway the outcome, and pressured members of Congress and his own Vice-President (who procedurally and ceremonially presided over the process) to change the outcome.
Whether Trump did so out of a sincere belief that he was the rightfully elected President on called to preserve the legitimacy of government and Constitutional integrity, or whether his actions were the illegal acts of a petty potential tyrant engaged in orchestrating a criminal conspiracy are now matters of partisan taste and may one day be matters of fact for a jury to decide.
But that argument is beyond this essay. Words count, and I will argue below they count for important reasons.
Accordingly, it is fair to ask whether the insurrection itself was a coup, and/or whether it was a component of an attempted coup.
I will argue herein that the January 6th attack on the Capitol was certainly an insurrection but, absent needed elements for a coup described below, was not a coup. I will also explore whether the January 6th insurrection could be considered an instrument or component of a coup.
The insurrection tarnished the cherished American tradition of a peaceful transition of power. I will also explore why the facile application of the term coup further harms America.
Insurrection, Coup d’état, and Revolution
An insurrection is simply a violent uprising against an authority or government. It transcends protest. As such, that the term has been vasty underused in recent years is now a topic set aside for another essay.
There is, however, no universally accepted definition of the term coup d’état). No definition of a coup is definitive, unproblematic, and all are subject to personal or political bias.
Accordingly, the term is best defined by its historical use in the news and in scholarly literature. The term is also subject to modification by adjectives that describe type of coups which contain some, but not all, of the traditionally accepted elements of a coup.
Because there is no definitive argument one can mount that the events of January 6th did, or did not, constitute an attempted coup, we are left to semantics and contextual arguments based on the legality of underlying actions.
Like facts, however, semantics count. In practice toward others (e.g., in determining when a coup has taken place elsewhere, the U.S. has narrowly defined what constitutes a coup. Our relations with other countries often depend on how we characterize their changes of power. We may, for example, suspend aid to nations run by leaders who come to power by what we deem a coup. Our European allies follow similar practices. In determining whether January 6th as an attempted coup or part of an attempted coup, I argue that we should apply the same standard to ourselves as we do others.
Coups resulted in a seizure of power and change in leadership of state. Historically, coups have ranged from actions by a small group to wider military efforts to displace an existing government. The mechanisms ranged from direct displacement at arms to displacement following seizure of critical infrastructure or government processes.
Many coups are acute and rapid. In fact, the term coup is French meaning “stroke” a fluid or rapid motion. Some coups take place more slowly vias a series of events (Hence the need to modify some coups as “slow motion coups”).
[I] The necessary elements of a coup.
Coups share many of the same elements that define revolution (a change in the form of government), rebellions, civil wars, a putsch, and other forms of governmental change, but the traditional definition of a coup d’état includes the following three elements: A coup or coup attempt is an (1) ILLEGAL attempt by (2) the military or others holding office or in the STATE apparatus to (3) unseat the SITTING executive.”
All three of these constitutive elements are necessary to classify an event or series of events as a coup.
Accordingly, the insurrection itself can’t be considered a coup. A coup is performed by actors within or belonging to the state. Accordingly, a coup may only be executed by the military, a legislature, the judiciary, or members of the bureaucracy (a deep-state coup). There is no evidence yet present that anyone so classified DIRECTLY participated in the trespass and violence at the Capitol and this is precisely why the House Committee is trying to tie Trump or and other members of the government to the events of January 6th.
Moreover, the insurrection itself was not a coup because a coup changes or attempts to change an existing government or head-of-state and Trump was already the sitting president.
In a more general sense, the first element, that of LEGALITY of actions, is key to understanding whether the insurrection was, perhaps, a component of a coup, but questions of legality and illegality can’t be judged by the one-sided prosecutorial proclamations and prime-time presentations being made by the blatantly partisan House Committee investigating the January 6th insurrection.
Extraordinary political pressure applied while disputing an election outcome may be unwarranted by underlying facts, and such pressure and related actions may be unethical, unprecedented, and even deplorable, yet not rise to being illegal.
Although not part of the three essential elements of a coup, where there is a constitution there is also commonly at least a suspension of the constitutional order. This criterion distinguishes a coup from legal procedures of removal allowed in democracies (impeachment, popular recall, vote of no confidence, court orders, etc.).
Congress certification of the 2020 election — an official process government — was certainly was certainly briefly interrupted by the January 6th insurrection, but there was never a suspension of constitutional order in the United States.
[II] Coups with adjectives (adjective coups)
Events that may not contain all the tradition elements of a coup — or highlight some unique aspect of a coup — may be described as coups with adjectives. The adjectives modify or add something to the essential criteria defining a coup.
There are now “constitutional coups,” “electoral coups,” “judicial coups,” “parliamentary coups,” “self-coups,” “slow-motion coup,” “soft coups,” “parliamentary coups,” and more.
Lugo in Paraguay, Rousseff in Brazil, Zelaya in Honduras, Maduro in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua are all examples where facts need to be carefully parsed to determine whether their removal from office was the result of a legal process or form of coup. For example, was Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff removed from office via legal impeachment or a coup?
While most coups are acute and quick events – indeed term coup itself in French means “stroke” (i.e., a fluid or rapid motion) — slower evolving coups with many components that unfold over time are now often described as “slow motion coups.”
As before, a coup is an action or blow against an existing administration. If acts are illegal and the perpetrators are part of the government or military, but the beneficiary is the sitting president (i.e., Trump) while the target is a president elect (i.e., Biden), then the events constitute a self-coup (also called an autogolpe or incumbent take-over).
Some contend that Trump’s action constituted an electoral coup, but that term is traditionally reserved as the use of elections as a tool to illegally keep or change power.
[III] The illegality element of a coup is critical
When we talk about the appropriateness of the use of the term coup, we must consider whether we are applying it specifically to the events of January 6th, or, as the House Committee is doing, casting the events of the insurrection as part of larger coup or self-coup attempt by Trump (e.g., the House Committee’s seven-point presentation).
What the current January 6th House Committee evidence presented shows — and it must be strongly noted that the current presentation is akin to a prosecutor’s opening statement where facts are both blatantly cherry-picked and, more importantly, not yet subject to rebuttal and cross-examination — was that then President Trump, from the time of his election defeat in November 2020 to January 6th was actively seeking a way to contest his election defeat with the intent to stay in office.
In an essay published in Politico just days after the insurrection, Fiona Hill argued that the January 6th insurrection was an attempted “self-coup.”
Hill correctly asserted that there’s a standard coup checklist that analysts use to evaluate coups. To successfully usurp or hold power, coup-plotters need to “control the military and paramilitary units, communications, the judiciary, government institutions, and the legislature; and mobilize popular support.”
While Hill needlessly dissected many of these facets in tortured paragraphs , she consistently ignored the key element of illegality. Once again, as above, extraordinary political pressure applied while disputing an election outcome may be unwarranted by underlying facts, and such pressure and related actions may be unethical, unprecedented, and even deplorable, yet not rise to being illegal.
I have yet to see a persuasive argument that Trump’s belief that he was a victim of election fraud, or his overtly false declarations related to his beliefs were illegal per se.
Hill did, however, correctly point out that some of the elements people commonly associate with a coup, especially “the idea that a coup is a sudden, violent seizure of power involving clandestine plots and military takeovers” did not preclude considering Trump’s actions taken over “a period of months and in slow motion” to be form of self-coup to “keep himself in power.”
I also think Hill was correct in observing that “Maduro perpetrated a self-coup in Venezuela after losing the 2017 elections.”
Following his election loss, Trump remained Commander-in-Chief until noon on January 20, 2021. As Hill alleges, Trump may have regarded the military to be his “Pretorian Guard,” but that did not make them so. The military consistently pushed back on matters about concerning what constituted legal orders and the proper role for the military to play in matters like quelling violent U.S. protests and riots. The military also played no part in the January 6th insurrection, not even tacitly. While tactical-looking paramilitary uniforms seemed to be plentiful in news coverage, analysis of the crowd and those subsequently charged show that the percentage of those insurrectionist who were veterans with real military service and training only slightly exceeded the percentage found in the general population.
Given the prevailing power dynamics, harangued state election officials and other form of political intimidation may have moved Trump’s actions closer to illegality, but whether they crossed the line remains an open question. Whether, for example, Trump’s actions in Georgia and other places to recount or scrape up votes to change the election were illegal has yet to be decided.
While Republicans in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin met in December 2020 and passed “alternate” slates of electors claiming that Trump won their state. These were merely sent to Congress (and the National Archives). There is no evidence of a coordinated plan by government officials or agents to, via naked force or intimidation, push the adoption of these “alternative” slates on January 6th.
Many claim that Trump’s pressuring of Pence to not certify elector’s slates — or to perhaps accept alternate slates — perhaps trips closest to criminality. The record is clear that Trump pressured Pence, but whether such pressure rose to criminality is not as clear.
The constitutional independence of the Vice President (he is not technically subordinate to president, nor is he in the chain of military command). This would be important if, as Hill alleged, President Trump “ordered” then Vice President Pence to block the formal election certification process because the President has no such authority. Nor did Pence have the Constitutional authority to block certification.
Refusal to honorably concede for the good of the country, as Al Gore did in 2000, would have required a patriotic gear Trump consistently lacked. But refusal to concede is not Constitutionally mandated or illegal.
Although arguably harmful to the republic in other ways, Trump’s persistent attempts to discredit “mainstream media” were not illegal. Nor was the exercise of his presidential authority to appoint questionably qualified or partisan judges (an act par for the course in any administration). Nor was it illegal for Trump to hope that a legally appointed judiciary and Supreme Court might side with him in election disputes. Thankfully, as Hill points out, with regard to election fraud, the judiciary consistently ruled otherwise.
I agree with Hill’s contention Trump’s actions amounted to “stress testing the U.S. democratic system” and I agree with Hill that the president’s actions and falsehoods “shattered America’s democratic norms, exacerbated its political divisions and put people’s lives at risk.”
Regardless, a self-coup is not a traditional coup — it does not contain all the essential elements of a coup — but rather a subtype of a coup where those who are part of the government perpetrating illegal acts do so to retain power.
If the critical element of illegality is ever proved , I would probably agree with Hill that Trump perpetrated an attempted self-coup with the intent to stay in power.
[IV] If not a coup or self-coup, did Trump participate in a fraud or otherwise criminally obstruct the election process?
If the DOJ were so disposed by the evidence, prosecutors might find an easier time charging a Klein Conspiracy fraud under US Code Title 18 Sec. 371. The key question would then become whether Trump’s efforts to pressure Vice President Pence rise to obstruction of an official proceeding.
That’s tough because Pence openly rejected such pressure.
In fact, the very fact Trump clung to — and still clings to his false belief that the election was stolen may be mitigating in that it makes it harder to prove intent to obstruct rather than Trump simply exercising the broad powers granted a President.
The House Committee knows this, and so what they are trying to present is a case where Trump was willfully blind to the truth he lost. That’s also very difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
[V] If not a coup, then what was January 6th?
The terms “riot” and “violent protest” are woefully insufficient terms to describe January 6th. At a minimum it was an insurrection. I would not want to see it cast as a “rebellion,” “revolt,” or “uprising,” because I would argue could be construed as casting those involved as somehow heroic or even patriotic. It was neither.
Did January 6th contain acts of sedition? Sedition is an “incitement of resistance to or insurrection against lawful authority.” For the vast majority of participants in the events of January 6th, the violence of the insurrection was not preplanned, and their participation was, in fact, spontaneous. For those reasons most have been charged with lesser counts. Some insurrectionists, however, have been charged with more serious felony counts, including seditious conspiracy.
While most of participants in the insurrection did little more than illegally trespass, some participants committed inexcusable assaults on law enforcement officers, some issued criminal threats, some either stole or destroyed government property. Some have already been convicted of felony obstruction of government.
No shots were fired by the insurrectionists, but the evidence is persuasive that some participants in the insurrection advocated and carried out planned violence. The insurrection put people — including government officials and elected member of Congress– in fear of their lives or safety. There is also testimony that some extremists planned to murder government officials, but directly tying Trump or anyone in government directly to the violence on January 6th insurrection has, however, proved a steep legal hill that the evidence thus far is unable to climb.
In the events leading up to January 6th and on the day itself, I think it is fair to argue that Trump — not for the first time — used irresponsible and self-serving rhetoric that functionally and morally makes him responsible for the insurrection. At this point, however, no “smoking gun” or indisputably clear evidence exists that ties Trump or other members of the government directly to planned violence.
I would also argue that no fair lay contextual reading of Trump’s speech on January 6th rises to criminal incitement, but whether Trump illegally incited insurrection requires some contentious legal analysis best left to others better qualitied in interpreting the relevant statutes and applicable case law,
[VI] What the January 6th insurrection was not
The January 6th insurrection –as horrendous as it was — is also subject to partisan hyperbole. Moreover, the presentation of unrebutted and cross-examined evidence about the events of January 6th by the House Committee still leaves us with an insurrection, not a coup.
The insurrection wasn’t the “worst attack on our democracy since the Civil War,” that dubious distinction belongs to the Axis forces of WWII.
The insurrection wasn’t as deadly or destructive as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, dozens of riots (some facilitated/instigated/promoted by foreign agents and extremists that are functionally domestic terrorist groups), a slew of mass shootings, etc.
The insurrection did not — as chairman of the Jan. 6 committee, Rep. Bennie Thompson, farcically claimed — come “dangerously close to succeeding” in compromising “American democracy.” Rep. Adam Kinzinger’s claim that the insurrection threatened “self-governance” is equally ludicrous.
The insurrectionists did not claim themselves to be a new government, they did not issue orders or make decrees as a new government. They did not try to entice the support of the military or law enforcement (quite the opposite). They did not try to hold the building. They were not ousted, they left near curfew.
A few insurrectionists may have planned to disrupt the acceptance and counting of electors’ ballots, but the interruption lasted just a few hours. Vice President Pence had, for example, already rejected efforts to have him reject electors’ ballots, etc. Electoral votes had already been counted. Nothing done, literally under the influence of insurrectionists, would have survived subsequent scrutiny.
As despicable as the January 6th insurrection was, even if the insurrection wildly exceeded the goals of some of its most extremist participants (e.g., had they held the Capitol, taken hostages, executed government officials, etc.) nothing would have stopped President-elect Biden from taking office at noon on January 20, 2021.
To claim otherwise is a backhanded slap in the face at our military, law enforcement officers, and other governmental institutions.
[VII] Even if the evidence is strong, should Trump be charged?
Even if Trump can be charged, the DOJ would need to then exercise discretion regarding whether he should be charged.
The DOJ can’t decide on political grounds, at least not in theory, nor if they want to preserve DOJ integrity. In addressing issues of prosecutorial discretion, the DOJ would need to consider whether the subsequent politicized spectacle might not lead to a never-ending carrousel of charges against former officials with every swing of the political winds that bring new administrations to power.
When Trump won in 2016, calls for doing away with the electoral college or for faithless electors to change the outcome of the election were not prosecuted as seditious or characterized as an attempted coup. Nether were the lies of Russiagate — promulgated by many on the January 6th Committee — or calls to have Trump removed from power via the 25th Amendment seen as an attempted coup.
Even Trump’s most dedicated political opponents would concede that a failed prosecution would leave Trump freshly empowered and emboldened.
There is also the impact of both successful and failed prosecutions on America’s reputation of the world, and that is my primary concern in arguing that we should be parsimonious in using the term.
[VIII] Why we should be parsimonious using the term coup.
Partisan rhetoric –some errant, some deliberately dramatic — recklessly flies about these days, why should use of the term “Coup” be any different?
Just as some Republicans still defend an indefensible insurrection, some Democrats carelessly casting about rhetoric in the same manner and with the same arrogant Dunning Kruger ignorance that pushed Russiagate falsehoods. They apparently don’t care about the deleterious effect their partisan rhetoric has on America’s reputation or standing in the world.
Their interests come first. America be damned.
Ironically, that puts them (and the media pundits who parrot similar views ) in the same rhetorical bed already containing our former lout-in-chief.
The term coup (with or without adjectives) is politically loaded and used to delegitimize an opponent. In fact, Coup is so pejorative that prior military leaders in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay carefully called their rise to power as revolutions or the act of political “movements” instead of coups
Across much of the world a coup is a revolution instigated by the military or other security forces. Al Ortiz, vice president of standards and practices at CBS News initially warned news staff against dramatic labels like terrorist attack or attempted coup. The Associated Press also initially advised against describing January 6th as a “coup” or “attempted coup” because as used around the world, where the term coup carry military overtones absent from the events on January 6th.
America’s enemies are listening. As with the bogus Russiagate allegations, sloppy partisan rhetoric is used by Russian and Chinese officials to denigrate America. Just as false claims of election fraud dimmish respect for America and cast doubt on the legitimacy of America’s government, false and premature use of the term attempted coup — or of derivative adjective coups — seriously injures America’s standing in the world and confidence in its government. Accordingly, we should be sure that all the necessary elements are in place before we call January 6th an attempted coup, or part of an attempted coup.
References
Bartelson, J (1997) Making Exceptions: Some Remarks on the Concept of Coup d’état and Its History. Political Theory 25: 323–346.
Bello (2016) When a “coup” Is Not a Coup. The Economist, 9 April. Available at: https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2…
David, SR (1987) Third World Coups d’état and International Security. Baltimore, MD; London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, L The Use of Coup d’état and Golpe de estado in Books . (2015b) In Search of Democracy. London: Routledge.
Keating, JE (2012) Coups Ain’t What They Used to Be. Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/27/cou…
Kotze, JS (2017) Africa Faces a New Threat to Democracy: The “Constitutional Coup.” The Conversation. Available at: http://theconversation.com/africa-faces-…
Marinov, N, Goemans, H (2014) Coups and Democracy. British Journal of Political Science 44: 799–825.
Marshall, MG, Marshall, DR (2018) Coup d’état Events, 1946–2017. Center for Systemic Peace, May 2. Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/CSPCo…
Thyne, CL, Powell, JM (2016) Coup d’état or Coup d’Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008. Foreign Policy Analysis 12: 192–213.
Varol, O (2017) The Democratic Coup d’état. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Was the January 6th insurrection a coup d’état?
Originally published May 10, 2022. Updated: June 16, 2022.
I denounced the insurrection on January 6th. I did so on the day, and I do so now. The actions by the insurrectionists were deplorable and indefensible . I think to any patriot they are also wholly unfathomable.
Before the 2016 election also I declared Trump unfit for office, and few things he did in office proved me wrong. Unfathomably crude, even when implementing effective policies, was the best Trump could muster. But did he, after his election defeat, orchestrate an attempted coup with the goal of remaining in office?
I will argue herein that January 6th was certainly an insurrection but, absent needed elements described below, fell short of being what we would traditionally consider a coup.
There is no universally accepted definition of the term coup (herein, unless modified, short for coup d’état), Accordingly, the term is best defined by its historical use in the news and in scholarly literature. The term is also subject to modification by adjectives that describe type of coups which contain some, but not all, of the traditionally accepted elements of a coup.
No definition of a coup is definitive, unproblematic, and all are subject to personal or political bias.
Because there is no definitive argument one can mount that the events of January 6th did, or did not, constitute an attempted coup, we are left to semantics and contextual arguments based on the legality of underlying actions.
Like facts, however, semantics count. In practice toward others (e.g., in determining when a coup has taken place elsewhere, the U.S. has narrowly defined the term. Our relations with other countries often depend on how we characterize their changes of power. We may, for example, suspend aid to nations run by leaders who come to power by what we deem a coup. Our European allies follow similar practices.
In determining whether January 6th as an attempted coup or part of an attempted coup we should apply the same standard to ourselves as we do others.
[I] The necessary elements of a coup.
Coups resulted in a seizure of power and change in leadership of state. Historically, coups have ranged from actions by a small group to wider military efforts to displace an existing government. The mechanisms ranged from direct displacement at arms to displacement following seizure of critical infrastructure or government processes.
Many coups are acute and rapid. In fact, the term coup is French meaning “stroke” a fluid or rapid motion. Some coups take place more slowly vias a series of events (Hence the need to modify some coups as “slow motion coups”).
Coups share many of the same elements that define revolution, rebellions, civil wars, a putsch, and other forms of governmental change.
The traditional definition of a coup d’état includes the following three elements: A coup or coup attempt is an (1) ILLEGAL attempt by (2) the military or others holding office or in the STATE apparatus to (3) unseat the SITTING executive.”
All three of these constitutive elements are necessary to classify an event or series of events as a coup.
LEGALITY of actions is the first constitutive element and key element of my argument that it is thus far improper to use the term coup. That can only change if Trump or other MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT or STATE APPARATUS (i.e., not the campaign) are ever charged, brought to trial, and convicted of an act thought to be part of a coup or coup attempt.
Extraordinary political pressure applied regarding an election procedure outcome may be unwarranted by underlying facts, and such pressure and related actions may be unethical, unprecedented, and even deplorable, yet not rise to being illegal.
A legislative hearing, questions regarding legality related to the January 6th insurrection, can’t be judged by the one-sided prosecutorial presentation being made by the House Committee on prime time in June 2022.
In accord with the second essential element, a coup is performed by actors within or belonging to the state. Accordingly, a coup may only be executed by the military, a legislature, the judiciary, or members of the bureaucracy (a deep-state coup). There is no evidence yet present that anyone so classified DIRECTLY participated in the trespass and violence at the Capitol and this is precisely why the House Committee is trying to tie Trump or and other members of the government to the events of January 6th.
Lastly, while one could certainly argue that Trump and other members of government incited an insurrection, the resulting insurrection itself was not a coup attempt because a coup changes or attempts to change an existing government or head-of-state and Trump was already the sitting president.
Although not part of the three essential elements of a coup, where there is a constitution there is also commonly at least a suspension of the constitutional order. This criterion distinguishes a coup from legal procedures of removal allowed in democracies (impeachment, popular recall, vote of no confidence, court orders, etc.).
Congress certification of the 2020 election — an official process government — was certainly was certainly briefly interrupted by the January 6th insurrection, but there was never a suspension of constitutional order in the United States.
[II] Coups with adjectives (adjective coups)
Events that may not contain all the tradition elements of a coup — or highlight some unique aspect of a coup — may be described as coups with adjectives. The adjectives modify or add something to the essential criteria defining a coup.
There are now “constitutional coups,” “electoral coups,” “judicial coups,” “parliamentary coups,” “self-coups,” “slow-motion coup,” “soft coups,” “parliamentary coups,” and more.
Lugo in Paraguay, Rousseff in Brazil, Zelaya in Honduras, Maduro in Venezuela, Ortega in Nicaragua are all examples where facts need to be carefully parsed to determine whether their removal from office was the result of a legal process or form of coup. For example, was Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff removed from office via legal impeachment or a coup?
While most coups are acute and quick events – indeed term coup itself in French means “stroke” (i.e., a fluid or rapid motion) — slower evolving coups with many components that unfold over time are now often described as “slow motion coups.”
As before, a coup is an action or blow against an existing administration. If acts are illegal and the perpetrators are part of the government or military, but the beneficiary is the sitting president (i.e., Trump) while the target is a president elect (i.e., Biden), then the events constitute a self-coup (also called an autogolpe or incumbent take-over).
Some contend that Trump’s action constituted an electoral coup, but that term is traditionally reserved as the use of elections as a tool to illegally keep or change power.
[III] The illegality element of a coup is critical
When we talk about the appropriateness of the use of the term coup, we must consider whether we are applying it specifically to the events of January 6th, or, as the House Committee is doing, casting the events of the insurrection as part of larger coup or self-coup attempt by Trump or other members of the government (e.g., the House Committee’s seven-point presentation).
What the current January 6th House Committee evidence presented shows — and it must be strongly noted that the current presentation is akin to a prosecutor’s opening statement where facts are both blatantly cherry-picked and, more importantly, not yet subject to rebuttal and cross-examination — was that President Trump, from the time of his election defeat in November 2020 to January 6th was actively seeking a way to contest his election defeat with the intent to stay in office.
In an essay published in Politico just days after the insurrection, Fiona Hill argued that the January 6th insurrection was an attempted “self-coup.”
Hill correctly asserted that there’s a standard coup checklist that analysts use to evaluate coups. To successfully usurp or hold power, coup-plotters need to “control the military and paramilitary units, communications, the judiciary, government institutions, and the legislature; and mobilize popular support.”
While Hill needlessly dissected many of these facets in tortured paragraphs , she consistently ignored the key element of illegality.
Hill did, however, correctly point out that some of the elements people commonly associate with a coup, especially “the idea that a coup is a sudden, violent seizure of power involving clandestine plots and military takeovers” did not preclude considering Trump’s actions taken over “a period of months and in slow motion” to be form of self-coup to “keep himself in power.”
I also think Hill was correct in observing that “Maduro perpetrated a self-coup in Venezuela after losing the 2017 elections.”
Following his election loss, Trump remained Commander-in-Chief until noon on January 20, 2021. As Hill alleges, Trump may have regarded the military to be his “Pretorian Guard,” but that did not make them so. The military consistently pushed back on matters about concerning what constituted legal orders and the proper role for the military to play in matters like quelling violent U.S. protests and riots. The military also played no part in the January 6th insurrection, not even tacitly. While tactical-looking paramilitary uniforms seemed to be plentiful in news coverage, analysis of the crowd and those subsequently charged show that the percentage of those insurrectionist who were veterans with real military service and training only slightly exceeded the percentage found in the general population.
Given the prevailing power dynamics, harangued state election officials and other form of political intimidation may have moved Trump’s actions closer to illegality, but whether they crossed the line remains an open question.
Whether Trump’s actions in Georgia and other places to recount or scrape up votes to change the election were illegal has yet to be decided.
While Republicans in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin met in December 2020 and passed “alternate” slates of electors claiming that Trump won their state. These were merely sent to Congress (and the National Archives). There is no evidence of a coordinated plan by government officials or agents to, via naked force or intimidation, push the adoption of these “alternative” slates on January 6th.
Many claim that Trump’s pressuring of Pence to not certify elector’s slates — or to perhaps accept alternate slates — perhaps trips closest to criminality.
The constitutional independence of the Vice President (he is not technically subordinate to president, nor is he in the chain of military command). This would be important if, as Hill alleged, President Trump “ordered” then Vice President Mike Pence :to block the formal election certification process because the President has no such authority. Nor did Pence have the Constitutional authority to block certification. The record is clear that Trump pressured Pence, but whether such pressure rose to criminality is not as clear.
Refusal to honorably concede for the good of the country, as Al Gore did in 2000, would have required a patriotic gear Trump consistently lacked. But refusal to concede is not Constitutionally mandated or illegal. I have yet to see a persuasive argument that Trump’s delusional belief that he was a victim of election fraud, or his overtly false declarations were illegal per se.
Neither is it illegal to discredit “mainstream media,” or appoint questionably qualified or partisan judges (par for the course in any administration), nor was it illegal for Trump to hope that a legally appointed judiciary and Supreme Court might side with him in election disputes. Thankfully, as Hill points out, with regard to election fraud, thankfully the judiciary consistently ruled otherwise.
I agree with Hill’s contention Trump’s actions amounted to “stress testing the U.S. democratic system” and I agree with Hill that the president’s actions and falsehoods “shattered America’s democratic norms, exacerbated its political divisions and put people’s lives at risk.”
Regardless, a self-coup is not a traditional coup — it does not contain all the essential elements of a coup — but rather a subtype of a coup where those who are part of the government perpetrating illegal acts do so to retain power. If the critical element of illegality is ever proved , I would probably agree with Hill that Trump perpetrated an attempted self-coup with the intent to stay in power.
[IV] If not a coup or self-coup, did Trump participate in a fraud or otherwise criminally obstruct the election process?
If the DOJ were so disposed by the evidence, prosecutors might find an easier time charging a Klein Conspiracy fraud under US Code Title 18 Sec. 371. The key question would then become whether Trump’s efforts to pressure Vice President Pence rise to obstruction of an official proceeding.
That’s tough because Pence openly rejected such pressure.
In fact, the very fact Trump clung to — and still clings to his false belief that the election was stolen may be mitigating in that it makes it harder to prove intent to obstruct rather than Trump simply exercising the broad powers granted a President.
The House Committee knows this, and so what they are trying to present is a case where Trump was willfully blind to the truth he lost. That’s also very difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
[V] If not a coup then what was January 6th?
The terms “riot” and “violent protest” are woefully insufficient terms to describe January 6th. At a minimum it was an insurrection. I would not want to see it cast as a “rebellion,” “revolt,” or “uprising,” because I would argue could be construed as casting those involved as somehow heroic or even patriotic.
It was neither.
Insurrection is proper because a generally accepted definition of insurrection is “an act or instance of revolting against civil authorities or an established government.”
Sedition an “incitement of resistance to or insurrection against lawful authority” may is also justified for many of the insurrectionists.
In the events leading up to January 6th and on the day itself, President Trump — not for the first time — used irresponsible and self-serving rhetoric that functionally and morally makes him responsible for the insurrection. At this point, however, no “smoking gun” or indisputably clear evidence exists that ties Trump or other members of the government directly to planned violence.
Tying Trump or anyone in government directly to the January 6th insurrection has, however, proved a steep legal hill that the evidence thus far is unable to climb.
The evidence is persuasive that some participants in the insurrection advocated and carried out planned violence.
The insurrection at the Capitol involved serious criminal acts including brutal attacks on law enforcement officers, resulted in the death of an insurrectionist, and briefly brought a ceremonial part of our election process to a halt. The insurrection put people — including government officials and elected member of Congress– in fear of their lives or safety.
The insurrection was a criminal act that for some was intentional and not the result of spontaneous acts of protest that simply got out of hand. While most of participants did little more than illegally trespass, some participants committed inexcusable assaults on law enforcement officers, issued criminal threats, some either stole or destroyed government property, some have already been convicted of felony obstruction of government.
Intent matters.
For the vast majority of participants, insurrection was not preplanned and was in fact spontaneous and that is why most have been charged only with illegal trespass or felony counts related to obstructing a government proceeding, rather than more serious.
Whether Trump illegally incited insurrection requires some contentious legal analysis I’ll leave to others better qualitied in interpreting the relevant statutes and applicable case law. But the development and presentation of unrebutted and cross-examined evidence about the events of January 6th by the House Committee still leaves us with an insurrection, not a coup
[VI] What the January 6th insurrection was not
The January 6th insurrection –as horrendous as it was — is also subject to partisan hyperbole.
The insurrection wasn’t the “worst attack on our democracy since the Civil War,” that dubious distinction belongs to the Axis forces of WWII.
The insurrection wasn’t as deadly or destructive as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, dozens of riots (some facilitated/instigated/promoted by foreign agents and extremists that are functionally domestic terrorist groups), a slew of mass shootings, etc.
The insurrection did not — as chairman of the Jan. 6 committee, Rep. Bennie Thompson, farcically claimed — come “dangerously close to succeeding” in compromising “American democracy.” Rep. Adam Kinzinger’s claim that the insurrection threatened “self-governance” is equally ludicrous.
Both claims are farcical.
The insurrectionists did not claim themselves to be a new government, they did not issue orders or make decrees as a new government. They did not try to entice the support of the military or law enforcement (quite the opposite). They did not try to hold the building. They were not ousted, they left near curfew.
A few insurrectionists may have planned to disrupt the acceptance and counting of electors’ ballots, but the interruption lasted just a few hours. Vice President Pence had, for example, already rejected efforts to have him reject electors’ ballots, etc. Nothing done, literally under the influence of insurrectionists, would have survived subsequent scrutiny.
As despicable as the January 6th insurrection was, even if the insurrection wildly exceeded the goals of some of its most extremist participants (e.g., had they held the Capitol, taken hostages, executed government officials, etc.) nothing would have stopped President-elect Biden from taking office at noon on January 20, 2021.
To claim otherwise is a backhanded slap in the face at our military, law enforcement officers, and other governmental institutions.
[VII] Even if the evidence is strong, should Trump be charged?
Even if Trump can be charged, the DOJ would need to then exercise discretion regarding whether he should be charged.
The DOJ can’t decide on political grounds, at least not in theory, nor if they want to preserve DOJ integrity. In addressing issues of prosecutorial discretion, the DOJ would need to consider whether the subsequent politicized spectacle might not lead to a never-ending carrousel of charges against former officials with every swing of the political winds that bring new administrations to power.
When Trump won in 2016, calls for doing away with the electoral college or for faithless electors to change the outcome of the election were not prosecuted as seditious or characterized as an attempted coup. Nether were the lies of Russiagate — promulgated by many on the January 6th Committee — or calls to have Trump removed from power via the 25th Amendment seen as an attempted coup.
Even Trump’s most dedicated political opponents would concede that a failed prosecution would leave Trump freshly empowered and emboldened. There is also the impact of both successful and failed prosecutions on America’s reputation of the world, and that is my primary concern.
[VIII] Why we should be parsimonious using the term coup.
Partisan rhetoric –some errant, some deliberately dramatic — recklessly flies about these days, why should use of the term “Coup” be any different?
Just as some Republicans still defend an indefensible insurrection, some Democrats carelessly casting about rhetoric in the same manner and with the same arrogant Dunning Kruger ignorance that pushed Russiagate falsehoods. They apparently don’t care about the deleterious effect their partisan rhetoric has on America’s reputation or standing in the world.
Their interests come first. America be damned.
Ironically, that puts them (and the media pundits who parrot similar views ) in the same rhetorical bed already containing our former lout-in-chief.
The term coup (with or without adjectives) is politically loaded and used to delegitimize an opponent. In fact, Coup is so pejorative that prior military leaders in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay carefully called their rise to power as revolutions or the act of political “movements” instead of coups
Across much of the world a coup is a revolution instigated by the military or other security forces. Al Ortiz, vice president of standards and practices CBS News initially warned news staff against dramatic labels like terrorist attack or attempted coup. The Associated Press also initially advised against describing January 6th as a “coup” or “attempted coup” because as used around the world, where the term coup carry military overtones absent from the events on January 6th.
America’s enemies are listening. As with the bogus Russiagate allegations, sloppy partisan rhetoric is used by Russian and Chinese officials to denigrate America. Just as false claims of election fraud dimmish respect for America and cast doubt on the legitimacy of America’s government, false and premature use of the term attempted coup — or of derivative adjective coups — seriously injures America’s standing in the world and confidence in its government. Accordingly, we should be sure that all the necessary elements are in place before we call January 6th an attempted coup, or part of an attempted coup.
References
Bartelson, J (1997) Making Exceptions: Some Remarks on the Concept of Coup d’état and Its History. Political Theory 25: 323–346.
Bello (2016) When a “coup” Is Not a Coup. The Economist, 9 April. Available at: https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2…
David, SR (1987) Third World Coups d’état and International Security. Baltimore, MD; London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Diamond, L The Use of Coup d’état and Golpe de estado in Books . (2015b) In Search of Democracy. London: Routledge.
Keating, JE (2012) Coups Ain’t What They Used to Be. Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/27/cou…
Kotze, JS (2017) Africa Faces a New Threat to Democracy: The “Constitutional Coup.” The Conversation. Available at: http://theconversation.com/africa-faces-…
Marinov, N, Goemans, H (2014) Coups and Democracy. British Journal of Political Science 44: 799–825.
Marshall, MG, Marshall, DR (2018) Coup d’état Events, 1946–2017. Center for Systemic Peace, May 2. Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/CSPCo…
Thyne, CL, Powell, JM (2016) Coup d’état or Coup d’Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008. Foreign Policy Analysis 12: 192–213.
Varol, O (2017) The Democratic Coup d’état. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
April 27, 2022
Iran’s nuclear capabilities: “I say it here, it comes out there”
I wish.It took six weeks for the Biden administration to admit what I warned on March 9th regarding the Iran breakout window (i.e., that there was high confidence that Iran was just weeks away from being able to develop a primitive nuclear weapon.That capacity is well inside the old Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) year safety buffer, and essentially makes any attempt to revive it moot.Why did it take so long? Perhaps to keep the failing JCPOA negotiations on life support? Perhaps to please those who have had their head-in-the-sand (or inserted in other places) about Iran’s nuclear programs and/or intentions for years?The Iran nuclear story was a 15 second sound clip from the White House yesterday. Today it’s a one minute read on Reuters. Meanwhile hours are spent on what? Partisans melting down or cheering because Elon again outsmarted the non-elite elites to buy Twitter?We collectively deserve to live in caves..https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-worried-iran-could-develop-nuclear-weapon-weeks-2022-04-26/?fbclid=IwAR2igWTyb6BN1RRSvBnZinrV2tv1wYTubAR-7DOQsmJHtPDoDK_fHPnCZtMhttps://blogs.harvard.edu/kleelerner/irans-nuclear-breakout-window-narrows/?fbclid=IwAR1bd3PqrU4GKdqZR1gVRdrR_1ONsODt0h87eWRcAbwwyrxJF7YwJbOEEAQ
March 26, 2022
Putin’s take it or break it strategy in Ukraine and his perilous nuclear options
March 26, 2022
Ten things to know about the war in Ukraine, including Putin’s potential use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine
Time is now an ally of Ukraine. With Western logistical support, time is now on Ukraine’s side. Until recently time was viewed as something that worked against Ukraine. Given Russia’s superior numbers, the defeat and occupation of Ukraine was widely viewed (myself included) as just a matter of time. The stout Ukrainian resistance combined with Russian Army and Air Force arrogance and incompetence have now, however, turned time into a Ukrainian asset. Absent substantial help from China, or Putin’s use of tactical nuclear weapons (for political purposes his most viable WMD option) the war has devolved into one of attrition that gives a constantly resupplied Ukraine a fighting chance.2. Putin’s WMD reasoning. A war of attrition increases the potential that Putin will resort to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. How likely is it that Putin might pursue a nuclear option? If Putin is irrational then rational analysis will not yield medium or high confidence assessments of his potential decisions, but one way to approach this problem is to assess negative outcomes a rational Putin might weigh in deciding whether to use a nuclear device.
3. Perilous options. Should Putin attempt the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, he not only faces the prospect that (1) subordinates may not follow orders, but also (2) that a nuclear weapon fizzles. If either of those things happen, it is the end of the Putin regime.
4. A military plundered by corruption. How much confidence does Putin have in his command and control? Putin’s recent shake ups of his military and intelligence show he is worried about discontent and loyalty in the ranks. Given the underwhelming performance of the Russian Army and Air Force, the emerging “country plundered by oligarchs” narrative that allows Russian army officers to save face may be the biggest threat to Putin staying in office.
5. How potent is the Russian nuclear threat? There is also great uncertainty regarding the state of Russian nuclear weapons. Given the state of Russian military infrastructure and performance, it is questionable whether the Russian have adequately maintained and replenished enriched uranium or plutonium stocks. Nuclear weapons also depend on other components that degrade with time.
6. Putin’s gambit to force Zelenskyy’s government to flee so that he could install a puppet government has failed. It has become apparent that given the stout Ukrainian resistance, Putin is highly unlikely to think he can militarily occupy Ukraine. Accordingly, some form of Ukraine will remain free. The lessons of recent history are stark and, given his deployment of forces, it is increasingly clear Putin will keep the separatist provinces, Crimea, and perhaps other southern port territories. It is likely these gains will be a component of any ceasefire and/or political settlement.
7. What Putin can’t have; he will break. Putin is now destroying infrastructure he would need to govern Ukraine. It is increasingly apparent his strategy is to leave it broken and impoverished so that perhaps over time, a desperate Ukrainian people will more likely accept a puppet, or at least Moscow-friendly government.
8. Putin will seize and/or destroy critical research and energy infrastructure. More specifically Putin will attempt to seize or disable Ukrainian’s nuclear and electrical infrastructure. If he can’t seize it, he will destroy it. Under the manufactured guise of protecting Russia from alleged Ukrainian ambitions to WMD, Putin will destroy Ukraine’s research and energy infrastructure (e.g., the shelling of a neutron generator at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, and seizure of nuclear plants).
9. Putin’s attempts to disable Ukrainian communications and energy infrastructure with cyberattacks has thus far failed. If Putin resorts to a nuclear option, the politically safest use would not be directed at a Ukrainian city where civilian casualties would irrevocably render Putin a pariah on the international scene. It is more likely that use would be directed against military, communications, and or energy infrastructure or perhaps a “demonstration” that would also create an EMP intended to destroy or substantially cripple Ukraine’s communications and energy infrastructure.
10. Rebuilding Ukraine. While the war is still hot and its outcome uncertain, Western government and business leaders must construct a plan to rebuild Ukraine, including its energy infrastructure.
Whatever Ukraine emerges from this conflict will need substantial Western aid to rebuild and simultaneously resist Moscow’s attempts to win politically what it could not win militarily.
March 25, 2022
North Korean missile test reveals both increased capacity and Pyongyang’s smokescreen
As recently anticipated by U.S. intelligence and other monitoring agencies, North Korea’s conducted a full-scale test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The March 24, 2022, test — part of a recent uptick in testing — not only violates U.N. Security Council resolutions, it ruptures Kim Jong-un’s moratorium on such tests that he self-imposed prior to meeting with former President Trump in 2018.
Based on reports by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Open Nuclear Network (ONN) and other open source intelligence, here are 10 things you need to know about the North Korea missile program and the latest North Korean missile test:
With a flight duration of 71 minutes, the March 24, 2022 test, assumed to be a Hwasong-17 missile test, was the longest duration flight by a North Korean ICBM. The missile reached an estimated altitude of 3730 miles (6,000 km) and 3850 miles (6,200 km) according to respective reports from Japan and South Korea. The launch was nearly vertical, ranging only 730 miles (1,180 km) to fall into the Sea of Japan, but if the missile had been launched on a standard ballistic missile trajectory, the estimated range would reach across the continental United States.
The March 2022 test increases North Korea’s range — twice-demonstrated in 2017 –with its launch of Hwasong-14 missiles capable of reaching western Europe and approximately half the continental U.S. The March 2022 test further affirms North Korea’s increased ability to strike anywhere in the continental U.S. The November 2017, a nearly vertical test of a Hwasong-15 missile reached an altitude of around 2,780 miles (4,475 km) and ranged about 590 miles (950 km). On a standard ballistic missile trajectory, the estimated range of that missile –if mounted with a single nuclear warhead — was about 8,000 miles (13,000 km), a range sufficient to reach any point in the continental United States.
The March 2022 test marks another escalation in and active North Korean missile program. The test was the first full range test since 2017, but also at least the 11th test of ballistic missile technology by Pyongyang since the start of the year. The most recent being an apparently failed test on March 15th, following successful tests on March 4th and the launch of a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) from Sunan, on February 26, 2022.
The Hwasong-17 appears to be MIRV capable (i.e., capable of carrying multiple warheads or multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles), which not only increases the lethality of North Korean missiles but also makes verification of their capacity more difficult as warheads are easier to hide from reconnaissance than Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) vehicles. (see more about TEL development below)
If MIRV mounted, the Hwasong-17 would launch a MIRV bus into a suborbital ballistic flight path. TheMIRV bus is then guided by an onboard inertial guidance system that adjusts its flight path using smaller thrusters toward independent points of release for each independently-targetable reentry vehicle and/or decoy designed to overwhelm tracking and defense systems.
Prior North Korean tests demonstrated crude capacity to reorient or change vehicle trajectories but they have yet to demonstrate a maneuverable, hypersonic warhead capable of surviving reentry or evading U.S. missile defense systems.
In violation of international sanctions, North Korea obtained at least six WS51200 heavy-duty trucks from China that they then modified into (TELs). North Korea has apparently increased its indigenous capacity to produce TELs or modify other vehicles into TELs. The number of known launchers is important because, at maximum, they could each launch two ICBMs before retaliatory strikes could knock them out.
The flight dynamics and range of the multiple staged liquid-fueled Hwasong-17 will also increase North Korea’s ability to launch reconnaissance satellites according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency.
North Korea first revealed the Hwasong-17 during a military parade in Pyongyang in October 2020. Prior test of the liquid-fuelled Hwasong-17 were single stage tests If confirmed to be a Hwasong-17 missile, it build on technology developed during the Taepodong and Unha/Kwangmyongsong missile programs as well as predecessor Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 ICBM tests.
The latest rocket launch, part of a recent uptick in testing, confirms that the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un fooled former President Trump with promises of arms reductions while continuing to advance Pyongyang’s missile programs. The smokescreen for development was effective enough that after meeting with Kim Jong-un, in June 2018 then-President Trump declared “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.”
It is anticipated that the UN, U.S., and other western countries will issue the usual condemnations.
