J. Bradford DeLong's Blog, page 40

M��nchau: Merkel���s Successor Must Confront Germany���s Decline���Noted

Since 1945 and since 1995 Germany���s economic growth trajectory has been the most successful and impressive in the entire global north. But, with respect to individual people, there is a rule that the richest are not the wisest and smartest, but rather those who have overleveraged, underdiversified, and been very very lucky. The judgment of the richest of the superrich is, in fact, on average rather poor, and always at least tinged with Dunning-Krueger monomania that the universe has not yet called to account. Is the same true of countries? The very sharp Wolfgang M��nchau fears that it is���that Germany���s economic success has led it to a place in which its institutions are in fact poorly built to manage the future, producing a ���misdirected focus on fiscal surpluses��� and a lack of focus on the need for innovation:

Wolfgang M��nchau: Merkel���s Successor Must Confront Germany���s Decline https://www.ft.com/content/b0dc8008-4f4a-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5: ���The Merkel years... as the moment when Germany lost its technological edge through a misdirected focus on fiscal surpluses and lack of innovation.... Germany���s medium-sized industrial companies��� are still grappling with digitalisation. The country has not made the necessary investments in mobile telecommunications.... The car industry was unprepared for the shift to electric���. Merkel���s spontaneous decision to switch off nuclear power stations has made Germany more reliant on fossil fuels, putting the country on course to miss Paris climate targets...

...Over-specialisation has made Germany vulnerable���German carmakers have invested in sophisticated software to cheat on emissions testers. But they failed to diversify into electric cars and artificial intelligence technologies at the right time.... The task of managing a first-order technology shock that has been left unaddressed for too long, is like escaping from a maze. There is usually only one way out, and many ways to get stuck���

.#economicgrowth #industrialpolicy #noted #2020-06-25

Davies: Belligerent Idiots Are Not Good at Game Theory���Noted

Daniel Davies (2011): The ECB and the Davies Folk Theorem https://crookedtimber.org/2011/11/18/the-ecb-and-the-davies-folk-theorem/: ���If... being [thought] a belligerent idiot with no sensible regard for one���s own welfare was worth the candle, in the sense of conferring benefits which outweighed the cost of gaining it, then everyone would want to get that reputation, whether they were genuinely an idiot or not. But if everyone wanted that reputation, then everyone would know that simply acting like an idiot didn���t mean that you were one, in which case it would be impossible to establish a reputation as an idiot.... It���s one of the more important things in game theory that a signal has to be a costly signal.... A reputation in deterrence theory is something that is worth having, but not worth getting. People who use the word ���signal��� in this context (usually on the basis of a poorly understood or second-hand reading of Schelling) don���t always seem to realise that they are explicitly admitting that the costs of being in Iraq are greater than the benefits��� .#noted #2020-06-24

Gould-Werth: Low-Wage Worker Casey Miller:���Noted

It is essential to dig down through the numbers to the real lives of representative and typical people whom the numbers aggregate: Alix Gould-Werth: What's happening with low-wage workers who are benefiting from the 600 boost in weekly unemployment benefits[?] https://twitter.com/alixgouldwerth/status/1275078011021225992 I���d like to introduce you to one of those workers: Casey Miller. Casey���s job designing and serving high-end cocktails was his passion. He made about 700 a week, including tips...

...When the coronavirus hit, he feared contracting COVID-19 at work. Then, the bar closed, and his worries shifted to his economic future. The servers hosting his state's Unemployment Insurance system crashed. But Casey was persistent. He filed at 3 in the morning, when web traffic was low. Now, each week, he receives $60 in regular benefits and a 600 pandemic-specific top-off. The simple 600 increase lets average workers cash unemployment checks roughly equal to their old paychecks. The lowest earners bring home more than they made on the job, and the highest earners bring home less....

This is a smart way to target benefits. What did Casey do when he received an unemployment check that was larger than his paycheck? He spent it. To make ends meet, he needed every penny of his unemployment check.... While high-earning workers save benefit dollars, low-earning workers spend them out of financial necessity. And these low-earning workers are precisely who is being affected by the coronavirus recession. So, the extra 600 creates a virtuous cycle. Directing cash to those who need it most channels dollars to businesses, which employ more workers, who in turn have income to spend.

Those worrying that the 600 will disincentivize a return to work miss the point: With 4.6 unemployed workers per opening, what jobs are they trying to incentivize people to take? And many low-wage employers are operating at the expense of worker safety. Letting the 600 top-off expire in July spells disaster for our families and for our economy���

.#noted #2020-06-24

Mitchell: Bold Policies to Ensure Broad-Based Recovery���Noted

This. This. This. This will be very much worth spending part of your Thursday watching; David Mitchell: Bold Policies to Ensure Broad-Based Recovery https://equitablegrowth.org/equitable-growth-webinar-will-explore-bold-policies-to-ensure-a-broad-based-economic-recovery/: ���The recovery from the coronavirus recession must be different from the previous recovery.... To have a chance of emerging on a stronger footing, with less economic and racial inequality and more sustainable economic growth, policymakers need to respond with robust, evidence-based measures that attack the underlying problems causing inequality and help achieve economic security for all. As part of our Vision 2020 initiative to ensure that the election-year economic policy debate focuses on big ideas grounded in the latest research, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth is hosting a webinar with top economic experts on June 25 to discuss the kind of bold policy initiatives that can help transform the U.S. economy.... Two panels. The first, ���Democratizing the Economy,��� will focus on the need for new or drastically reformed institutions to address how financial institutions and the Federal Reserve have exacerbated inequality. The second, ���Building Power for Workers and Families,��� will describe how enhanced collective bargaining rights, public benefit and social insurance programs, anti-discrimination protections, and other power-building policies��� .#equitablegrowth #noted #2020-06-25

Campbell: Relative Prices and Hysteresis: Evidence from US Manufacturing���Noted

It was from economic and technological historians like Nate Rosenberg, David Hounshell, and my own great great uncle Abbott Payson Usher���s works that I first learned about the crucial importance of externalities from communities of engineering practice in fueling industrial-age economic growth. Here we have the smart Doug Campbell showing the importance of such factors in slowing US economic growth in the past generation in America, where the political system prioritized tax cuts for the rich and financialization above other concerns:

Douglas Campbell: Relative Prices and Hysteresis: Evidence from US Manufacturing https://ideas.repec.org/p/cfr/cefirw/w0212.html: ���A central tenet of economics is that prices matter. A corollary is that in a world with sunk costs, historical prices can affect current economic outcomes. There exists a large theoretical literature on exchange rate hysteresis, but recent empirical treatments are scarce. To fill the gap, I employ new measures of real exchange rates (RERs) to study the impact of large, temporary RER shocks on the US manufacturing sector. To identify a causal impact of RER movements on manufacturing, I test whether sectors more exposed to international trade respond differently when relative prices appreciate. I also compare the US experience to Canada���s in the mid-2000s, when high oil prices and a falling US dollar led to an equally sharp appreciation of the Canadian dollar. I find that temporary RER shocks have a surprisingly persistent impact on employment, output, and productivity in relatively more open manufacturing sectors, and that the magnitude of the shock in the early 2000s was large enough to have played a role in the onset of secular stagnation, lending support to the Bernanke Hypothesis��� #noted #2020-06-24

Paulus: COVID Was Never ���Under Control������Noted

A conceit of my in-draft economic history of the long twentieth century is that it was the American century, and that it came to an end, finally and ultimately, on November 8, 2016���when the second minority government led by somebody really not up to the job of president in anyone���s estimation took control. But I confess I did not think that even Donald Trump and his enablers could do so much damage. And I confess that I did not think that the most competent rank of Trump enablers would be as��� simply stupid��� as Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin really does seem to be:

Shannon Paulus: COVID Was Never ���Under Control��� in America https://slate.com/technology/2020/06/covid-never-under-control-america.html: ���We need to remember this as we proceed with reopening: If we���ve learned anything in the past several months, it probably ought to be that the coronavirus is hard to contain.... Or at least, some of us have learned that. On Wednesday, in making a case for restaurants opening up indoor seating, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin suggested otherwise: ���I don���t see why on an indoor basis, socially distanced, that restaurants can���t be serving indoors,��� he said. ���Particularly in parts of the country where COVID is under control.��� He also seemed to not understand why indoor dining is a particular point of focus: "This distinction between indoor & outdoor seems a bit random, and I don���t know what people would do when it rains..." Let���s set aside Vox journalist Aaron Rupar���s correct point that people dining indoors is scientifically more dangerous for COVID spread than people dining outside. Mnuchin���s other suggestion is that the virus isn���t really an issue in some places of the country. He thinks that there are some places where case counts are low (this is objectively true) and that in these places we can begin loosening restrictions on activities not slowly and thoughtfully, but significantly... #coronavirus #depression #macro #noted #publichealth #2020-06-24

Goolsbee: 'Rona Cases, Not Lockdowns, Depress the Economy���Noted

Hell of a moment to have a large, loud indoor gathering in Arizona: Austan Goolsbee: 'The results from March-May https://twitter.com/Austan_Goolsbee/status/1275575900499775488 suggest that the fact that cases are back on the rise is very ominous not just for public health but for the economy. If people get scared again, a lot of activity may start to tank.... Short version: they don't do much. Of the 60% drop in consumer activity, only 7 came from shutdown orders. Fear of the virus is the main thing. The collapse of economic activity in 2020 from COVID-19 has been immense.... We have consumer visits to 2.3m businesses in 110 industries through the crisis. We tracked down the county level shutdown orders and can compare across borders in the same metro area where the policy differs.... Evidence of fear as the driver: 1) more covid deaths in your county drive down economic activity signif[icantly] even including metro-week dummies, 2) people heavily shift visits away from larger/busier stores to smaller/less busy ones in the same industry (and especially if lots of local deaths). We have data up to late May and include some states ending their shutdown orders. The increase in economic activity is just as modest coming out as it was going in. Policy itself isn't the driver. But there is one way policy matters: diversion from one kind of business to another. We have essential/non-essential definition in each place. Non-essential business collapses. Essential business soars. Restaurant/bar orders cause massive hit there but an equally big increase to grocery and food stores.... If people get scared again, a lot of activity may start to tank.���

.coronavirus #depression #macro #noted #publichealth #2020-06-23

Marx: Letter to Lincoln���Noted

Author: Marx's letter to Abraham Lincoln https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/iwma/documents/1864/lincoln-letter.htm: ���When an oligarchy of 300,000 slaveholders dared to inscribe, for the first time in the annals of the world, "slavery" on the banner of Armed Revolt, when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one great Democratic Republic had first sprung up, whence the first Declaration of the Rights of Man was issued, and the first impulse given to the European revolution of the eighteenth century...

...when on those very spots counterrevolution, with systematic thoroughness, gloried in rescinding "the ideas entertained at the time of the formation of the old constitution", and maintained slavery to be "a beneficent institution", indeed, the old solution of the great problem of "the relation of capital to labor", and cynically proclaimed property in man "the cornerstone of the new edifice"���then the working classes of Europe understood at once, even before the fanatic partisanship of the upper classes for the Confederate gentry had given its dismal warning, that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy crusade of property against labor, and that for the men of labor, with their hopes for the future, even their past conquests were at stake in that tremendous conflict on the other side of the Atlantic.

Everywhere they bore therefore patiently the hardships imposed upon them by the cotton crisis, opposed enthusiastically the proslavery intervention of their betters���and, from most parts of Europe, contributed their quota of blood to the good cause.

While the workingmen, the true political powers of the North, allowed slavery to defile their own republic, while before the Negro, mastered and sold without his concurrence, they boasted it the highest prerogative of the white-skinned laborer to sell himself and choose his own master, they were unable to attain the true freedom of labor, or to support their European brethren in their struggle for emancipation; but this barrier to progress has been swept off by the red sea of civil war.

The workingmen of Europe feel sure that, as the American War of Independence initiated a new era of ascendancy for the middle class, so the American Antislavery War will do for the working classes. They consider it an earnest of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggle for the rescue of an enchained race and the reconstruction of a social world���

.#noted #2020-06-23




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Are Deniers of the Tulipmania Rational?: Hoisted from the Archives

Hoisted from the Archives: Are Deniers of the Tulipmania Rational?: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds Weblogging https://www.bradford-delong.com/2013/10/are-commenters-on-the-tulipmania-rational-extraordinary-popular-delusions-and-the-madness-of-crowds-weblogging.html: To claim that the tulip market between September 1636 and March 1637 was not a bubble-and-crash���that the market was "impressively price-efficient [and] fundamentally-driven"���is itself yet another striking example of extraordinary popular delusions, and the madness of crowds.

Efficient markets are those in which prices move far and fast only when fundamentals change a lot. And fundamentals change a lot only when a lot of information���information that changes rational assessments of fundamentals���arrives in a very short time. With respect to the seventeenth-century rare tulip market, the fundamentals are the patterns made by the tobacco mosaic virus on infected tulips, human aesthetic preferences, and the biology of tulip reproduction. Those are not fundamentals about which much information can arrive quickly.

Without any such information arrival, attempts to claim that the tulipmania bubble and its collapse was a rational event are not, themselves, examples of human rationality���

C.W. and A.J.K.D. write: Economic history: Was Tulipmania irrational? https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/10/economic-history:

IN THE 1630s��� a��� Semper Augustus��� just before the crash��� was valued at��� the cost of luxurious house in Amsterdam. Prices collapsed in February 1637���. The price swings were not caused by massive changes to production costs. Nor did tulips suddenly become particularly useful. As a result, most people assume that tulipmania was the result of financial market irrationality���. But economic historians provide better explanations���. Peter Garber��� reckons��� bubonic plague��� made people less risk-averse���. Because gambling was illegal��� traders [who] misjudged the market��� could just run off without paying���. According to Nicolaas Posthumus��� serious tulip financiers generally did not participate��� ���mania��� was��� pushed forward by casual traders, drunk on jenever and moral hazard. Only in the month before the crash does Mr Garber find evidence of speculation from more serious traders���

OK.

In reverse order, the argument here is that financial markets and traders were all perfectly, perfectly rational, and the market was perfectly, perfectly efficient, except for:

Serious tulip financiers and traders���but "only in the month before the crash".
Non-serious "casual" traders���but only because they were "drunk on jenever and moral hazard".
Those who sold tulip contracts because the fact that buyers had the option to run off without paying placed sellers on the wrong side of a one-way bet
Those who bought because they feared that they were about to die of bubonic plague���for the argument that it was rational for them to decide to spend the price of a house on a Semper Augustus tulip bulb that they would never see blossom because they would be dead does not pass the laugh test. I mean, a rational fearer of bubonic plague would leave town or hold a party, not buy a tulip bulb for more than its fundamental value.

Thus the statement that

"the Tulipmania was rational"

seems to bear a close resemblance to the statement that

"Mary Todd Lincoln enjoyed her evening at Ford's Theater".

I mean, by the time one has added up the trades and the impact on prices of all those who traded while drunk, all those who traded while gambling with other people's money, serious traders in the last month before the crash, sellers who did not understand the potential for moral hazard, and those crazed by fear of the bubonic plague, we have a market that is functioning in a way very different from that envisioned by Fama and Merton, no?

C.W. and A.J.K.D. continue by citing Earl Thompson:

Earl Thompson��� reckons that the market for tulips was an efficient response to changing financial regulation��� the anticipated government conversion of futures contracts into options contracts���. Investors who had bought the right to buy tulips in the future were no longer obliged to buy them. If the market price was not high enough for investors��� liking, they could pay a small fine and cancel the contract. The balance between risk and reward in the tulip market was skewed massively in investors��� favour���. And any movement of the spot/futures price was determined by simple supply and demand���the fall-out from the Thirty Years��� War, one of the bloodiest in European history, was one important factor. Thompson argued that popular interpretations of tulipmania have failed to distinguish between options and futures. Tulipmania was only a contractual artifact. There was no ���mania��� at all���

One again, Alas!

I lost my confidence in Thompson when he wrote:

Up through the summer of 1636 it looked as though the [Thirty Years'] War was winding down���. Although France��� had entered��� in mid-1635, their early defeats in central France made it appear that the [Thirty Years'] War was basically over. It should therefore be no surprise that tulip prices were generally rising at an abnormally high rate��� increasingly so up to the fall of 1636���

From the perspective of the Netherlands, it is not the Thirty Years' War 1618-1648���that is the German perspective.

From the perspective of the Netherlands, it is the Eighty Years' War 1568-1648, interrupted by a Twelve Years' Truce 1609-1621, and resumed in 1621. Fortunately for the Netherlands, their Spanish-Imperial Habsburg adversaries who wanted to reassert Habsburg right to rule the Netherlands as Duke of Holland, etc., got distracted by the Thirty Years' War with its Bohemian, Palatinate, Danish, and Swedish phases. A winding-down of the Thirty Years' War would not mean peace and prosperity for the Netherlands: the Habsburg armies would not go home but, rather, converge on the Netherlands, which would not be good for the tulip markets of Amsterdam and Haarlem. To say that a winding-down of the Thirty Years' War in 1636 was good for tulip prices is to misread the political-military situation to an astonishing degree.

And, of course, the Thirty Years' War was not winding down in 1636. France had just entered the war.

But getting the fundamentals about the Thirty Years' War wrong is not the only problem I see with Thompson.

Thompson sees the big price movements as efficient responses to rational forecasts of changes in regulation. He thus attributes rises in futures prices starting in November 1636 to the conversion of futures contracts into options at the end of February 1637. But the contractual transformation to be made three months in the future affected only contracts entered into after November 30, 1636���leaving the November purchasers high, dry, and broke. To bet that the tulip-sellers are wrong in the belief that contracts mean what they say���and then to be wrong in your bet���is not how an efficient market moves

Thompson's explanation for the rise in prices in 1636?

That the sellers proved politically more powerful than expected.
That innocent buyers in November 1636 had acted in reliance on the belief that all contracts entered into after mid-October would be transformed from futures contracts into options contracts.
That such buyers "were the real victims��� because they thought they were buying an option but were forced to pay the falsely-assumed exercise price out as a futures prices because the contractual conversion was delayed a month beyond the��� previously-announced date."

Thompson characterizes the tulip market as "impressively price-efficient [and] fundamentally-driven".

But Thompson also characterizes the market as one in which sellers think they are selling a futures contract and buyers think they are buying a call option���and in which buyers then turn out to be wrong for November, and then wrong again about what the price of the call option was to be (was it to be 0% of the exercise price, 3.5% of the exercise price, or was it 10%?)

I am sorry, but such a market is not "impressively price-efficient [and] fundamentally-driven".

For a market to be efficient, there has to be agreement, first of all, on what the commodity being sold is and on what quoted prices mean.

Without that, you cannot even begin to talk about market efficiency and rationality.

Rational traders do not buy financial securities just because the seller whispers to them "I know the contract says that this is a futures, but I happen to know that it is going to be transformed into a call option, so pay no attention to what the piece of paper says���I'm really offering you a very good deal".

And when there is uncertainty, a rational market does not respond with volatility. Rational markets are volatile not when situations become uncertain���then their prices hug the prior mean. Rational markets exhibit volatility when uncertainty is resolved.

And there is even a deeper problem with Thompson: Thompson says it was rational to offer to pay the price of an Amsterdam house for a Semper Augustus tulip bulb in January 1637 because you were really merely paying 0% (or 3.5%, or 10%���nobody knew how much) for a call option on a Semper Augustus tulip bulb with a strike price of an Amsterdam House because you anticipated the legal shift of February 24, 1637. Doesn't it, then, make sense after February 24 to offer the same amount to buy what is then explicitly the call option? But we don't see any such contracts traded after the crash, even though the legal security of buyers' claims that the contract is a call and not a future is much, much stronger after February than before.

Some facts remain clear:

There were no items of significant news about fundamental tulip values between September 1636 and March 1637.
There were no items of significant news about the variance of the distribution of fundamental tulip values between September 1636 and March 1637.
In efficient markets with rational traders, big price moves in the underlying come only with big pieces of fundamental news.
In efficient markets with rational traders, big price moves in options come only with big pieces of news about the volatility of fundamentals.

To claim that the tulip market between September 1636 and March 1637 was not a bubble-and-crash���that the market was "impressively price-efficient [and] fundamentally-driven"���is itself yet another striking example of extraordinary popular delusions, and the madness of crowds.

.#cognition #finance #highlighted #hoistedfromthearchives #2020-06-23

Farrell & Schneier: Information Attacks on Democracies���Noted

I find this incredibly difficult to grasp and retain, but I do think it is one of the most important arguments of this decade: Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier: Information Attacks on Democracies https://www.lawfareblog.com/information-attacks-democracies: 'Democracy is an information system. That's the starting place of our new paper: ���Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democracy.��� In it, we look at democracy through the lens of information security, trying to understand the current waves of Internet disinformation attacks. Specifically, we wanted to explain why the same disinformation campaigns that act as a stabilizing influence in Russia are destabilizing in the United States. The answer revolves around the different ways autocracies and democracies work as information systems...

...We start by differentiating between two types of knowledge that societies use in their political systems. The first is common political knowledge, which is the body of information that people in a society broadly agree on. People agree on who the rulers are and what their claim to legitimacy is. People agree broadly on how their government works, even if they don't like it. In a democracy, people agree about how elections work: how districts are created and defined, how candidates are chosen, and that their votes count���even if only roughly and imperfectly.

We contrast this with a very different form of knowledge that we call contested political knowledge, which is, broadly, things that people in society disagree about. Examples are easy to bring to mind: how much of a role the government should play in the economy, what the tax rules should be, what sorts of regulations are beneficial and what sorts are harmful, and so on.

This seems basic, but it gets interesting when we contrast both of these forms of knowledge across autocracies and democracies... [which] have incompatible needs for common and contested political knowledge.... Democracies draw upon the disagreements within their population to solve problems... groups vie for political influence by persuading voters. There is also long-term uncertainty about who will be in charge and able to set policy goals. Ideally, this is the mechanism through which a polity can harness the diversity of perspectives of its members to better solve complex policy problems.... In order for this to work, there needs to be common knowledge both of how government functions and how political leaders are chosen. There also needs to be common knowledge of who the political actors are, what they and their parties stand for, and how they clash.... Furthermore, this knowledge is decentralized... since ordinary citizens play a significant role....

Contrast this with an autocracy. There, common political knowledge about who is in charge over the long term and what their policy goals are is a basic condition of stability. Autocracies... strive to maintain a monopoly on other forms of common political knowledge... suppress common political knowledge about potential groupings... popular support... coalitions.... If no one really knows which other political parties might form, what they might stand for, and what support they might get, that itself is a significant barrier to those parties ever forming.

This difference has important consequences for security. Authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to information attacks that challenge their monopoly on common political knowledge... vulnerable to attacks that turn contested political knowledge���uncertainty about potential adversaries of the ruling regime, their popular levels of support and their ability to form coalitions���into common political knowledge. As such, they are vulnerable to tools that allow people to communicate and organize... provide citizens with outside information and perspectives....

Democracies, in contrast, are vulnerable to information attacks that turn common political knowledge into contested political knowledge... the results of an election... whether a census process is accurate... what the other perspectives in society are, who is real and who is not real....

This is what seems to be Russia���s aims in their information campaigns against the U.S.: to weaken our collective trust in the institutions and systems that hold our country together. This is also the situation that writers like Adrien Chen and Peter Pomerantsev describe in today���s Russia, where no one knows which parties or voices are genuine, and which are puppets of the regime, creating general paranoia and despair.

This difference explains how the same policy measure can increase the stability of one form of regime and decrease the stability of the other.... Open information flows have benefited democracies while at the same time threatening autocracies. In our language, they transform regime-supporting contested political knowledge into regime-undermining common political knowledge....

Other uses of the same information flows undermining democracies by turning regime-supporting common political knowledge into regime-undermining contested political knowledge....

The same fake news techniques that benefit autocracies by making everyone unsure about political alternatives undermine democracies by making people question the common political systems that bind their society....

We need to treat attacks on common political knowledge by insiders as being just as threatening as the same attacks by foreigners.

There���s a lot more in the paper....

.#noted #2020-06-21