Derek Nudd's Blog - Posts Tagged "naval-intelligence"

Women in Allied Naval Intelligence in the Second World War: A Close Secret by Sarah-Louise Miller

My rating: 3 of 5 stars


Perhaps the title of this book is missing a word - it should be 'Women in Allied Naval Cryptographic Intelligence in the Second World War'. The author deals almost exclusively with cryptography. She justifies her focus by stating in Chapter 2, ‘The most useful form of intelligence, rather, was communications intelligence (COMINT)…. To study the wider picture here would limit the depth of the research into the true nature and implications of the women’s work, and so it is necessary to choose a small number of case studies.’ The Conclusion recognises that this leaves other fields unaddressed and that more work will be needed to complete the picture. Undoubtedly the Y (intercept) service and codebreakers accounted for the largest number of both men and women co-opted into intelligence work, as well as the greatest investment in equipment. Even so...
Miller excavates some interesting personal stories of Wrens sucked into different aspects of the work, particularly as it expanded to face the threat from Japan. The scramble to train Japanese linguists is covered, though the course sponsored by Bletchley is given fuller treatment than the one at SOAS. It is slightly surprising that she didn't pick up on Sadao Oba's account in The Japanese War: London University's WWII Secret Teaching Programme and the Experts Sent to Help Beat Japan. It os also surprising that she does not mention Helen Fry's Women in Intelligence: The Hidden History of Two World Wars. Overall it adds little to our understanding of the Wrens' part in the conflict.
Where the book does score however is in the parallel accounts of the Royal Navy's Wrens and the US Navy's WAVES (and their civilian oppos). The latter's contribution, at least to my knowledge, is far less explored. The similarities and contrasts are illuminating. One thing that struck me was that the WAVES seem to have known a lot more about the content and destination of the messages they handled than their British equivalents, being far less compartmentalised. Equally GCCS Naval Section passed its output to the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, which synthesised intelligence from multiple sources and disguised its origin before passing it out to the fleet. American operational commanders seem to have been far more aware of the source of the intelligence they received.
A personal beef: if I had been Miller's editor I would have encouraged her to go a bit easier of the phrase 'kill chain', which she seems inordinately fond of. Nonetheless it is a pleasure to read a book written in clear, concise English and which clearly has been edited before publication.



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