Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 69

Foreign Affairs: US Permission for Ukraine to Strike Deep Inside Russia Unlikely to Change Course of War

Russia Matters, 9/3/24

A decisive change in the course of the war is unlikely if U.S. and its allies permit Ukraine to use Western-made systems for deep strikes inside Russia, according to Stephen Biddle of Columbia University. If given such permission, Ukraine could strike distant logistical and command targets, including even the Kremlin, and defense enterprises “would reduce the efficiency of Russia’s offensives,” Biddle writes in FA. In addition, “damaging factories or infrastructure inside Russia” in such strikes “might help boost Ukrainian morale… But even if the West lifts its restraints on Ukrainian deep strike capability, the consequences are unlikely to include a decisive change in the trajectory of the war,” he argued shortly before U.S. was reported to be considering transfer of long-range missiles to Ukraine.3 For one, deep strike systems are expensive, while their precision guidance systems are vulnerable to disruption by countermeasures. In addition, Ukraine would need to deploy its new capabilities on a large scale and all at once, which would be problematic, according to Biddle. Thus, “Kyiv’s partners should now ask whether the modest military benefits are worth the escalatory risk,” Biddle writes of deep strike systems.  

Russia has never tried to dictate any narrative to me, unlike the West – Scott Ritter

RT, 8/19/24

As the US government works overtime to stigmatize any journalism possessing connectivity with Russia, the world slides dangerously down a path defined by a Russophobic US-driven agenda that leads toward the inevitability of conflict, and the probability of nuclear war.

When the FBI executed a search warrant on my residence on August 7, they were singularly focused on my professional relationship (I am a self-employed journalist) with the Russian government, and in particular, RT, the widely recognized brand name of Russia Today, a media company founded by the autonomous non-profit organization TV-Novosti in April 2005.

According to the FBI, the US government was concerned that my activities fell under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA).

The FBI has also searched the Virginia home of Dmitry Simes, a veteran Russian-American journalist who currently resides in Moscow where he helps moderate a popular political program, ‘The Big Game’, on Channel 1.

While the FBI has not publicly commented on the raid on Simes’ home, it is most likely due to similar concerns over FARA compliance.

I have been an external contributor (i.e., contactor) to RT since April 2020. Since the initial contract was signed, I have written numerous articles and produced hundreds of videos for which I have been compensated financially in accordance with the terms set forth in the agreements between myself and RT. As stipulated in the signed agreements, I am solely responsible for the content of the work provided.

At no time have I entered into any agreement, written or oral, or have reached any understanding, formal or informal, that I am responsive to the direction or control of either RT/TV-Novosti or the Russian government.

Indeed, the agreement between myself and RT stipulates that I am responsible for determining the topics that will be covered in the content I produce, although as is the case in any editorial/producer relationship with ‘talent’, I have been asked to provide content that is responsive to breaking news.

I am a freelance journalist. This is the life of a freelance journalist.

Nothing more, nothing less.

This relationship is like that which I have as an outside contributor to other journalistic outlets, including TruthDig, the American Conservative, Consortium News, the Washington Spectator, and Energy Intelligence, all of which have published my work on a regular basis during the same period in which I produced content for RT.

In all cases, I am solely responsible for the content I produce. There is, of course, a collaborative relationship with the editors of all these publishing outlets, some more intense/heavy than others. This is the normal reality faced by every journalist in the world.

I can say without fear of contradiction that the editorial ‘touch’ of RT is the lightest of any publisher I have dealt with – there is the standard follow-up questioning on sourcing of information, and some massaging of language for clarity. On a few occasions (I can count them on one hand), RT has turned down articles I have submitted for publication. In every instance, the topics dealt with US domestic issues, and the editors were concerned about being seen as buying into unfounded conspiracies.

How utterly irresponsible of them!

The specific compensation received for work published is confidential in accordance with the terms of the agreement I signed with RT (the FBI seized physical and electronic copies of this agreement, and I have in the past provided copies of the agreement to the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) or their proxies operating within the US banking system.) But I can say this – it is within the industry norm, slightly more than some publishers, and slightly less than others. And in no case can it be considered exorbitant – the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, all of whom have published my opinion pieces in the past, all pay significantly more than does RT.

This reality must be disappointing to the FBI and the Department of Justice, which, through their questioning, seemed caught up in a working theory that I was a controlled asset of RT and, by extension, the Russian government. Their conspiracy theories extended into the person of my wife, Marina, who was questioned by a pair of FBI agents at her place of work at the same time the FBI conducted its search of our residence. The agents showed Marina a copy of an email she had sent to me back in late 2020/early 2021, where she listed the articles that I had published for RT for each month.

I was paid on a monthly billing cycle, with the amount calculated based upon the number of articles published in a given month. On occasion, there would be discrepancies, where my count of articles published did not align with the money paid in compensation. To assist me in working out these discrepancies, Marina would generate a list of articles published by publication date, so that I could more coherently communicate with RT.

“Do you direct the work of your husband?” the FBI asked my wife. “Do you organize his work?”

The answer was self-evident, as my wife informed the FBI.

I am my own boss.

The FBI was also interested in the payment vehicle used by RT to compensate me. The method agreed to contractually was a wire transfer to be made monthly based upon the work published. For this, I provided my banking information, including SWIFT code.

Following the commencement of the Special Military Operation by Russia in Ukraine in February 2022, this method became difficult because of the sanctioning of Russian banks by the US, denying these banks access to the SWIFT system that controls money transfers globally and, most importantly in my case, into the US.

RT developed workarounds which used unsanctioned third parties to execute the wire transfers. Over time, RT made use of two such intermediaries. I have always been totally transparent about this payment method. Indeed, when my bank began blocking payment on instructions from their internal OFAC enforcement units, I reached out to the bank to resolve the issue. Part of the resolution measures agreed to was that I provided the OFAC enforcement unit with copies of my contractual relationships showing that the money received was related to contracted work. This method worked but was very time consuming and inconvenient – wire transfers were often returned to the sender in whole or in part because of the delay in processing the submitted paperwork, which took place every time a payment was received.

I contacted OFAC directly to complain, citing harassment and First Amendment issues, and was informed that they had nothing to do with it. The problem, it seemed, was overzealous employees at the bank itself (the OFAC enforcement unit was an in-house entity, with no formal relationship with the US government or OFAC.)

The solution was simple – I switched banks. In making the application to my new bank, I was transparent about international wire transfers that they would expect, what country these transfers would originate from, roughly in what amounts the transfers would be, and for what purpose (writing.)

The bank in question was USAA, with which I had a relationship dating back to 1984 when I was commissioned as an officer in the US Marines. Last year, USAA ended its relationship with me without warning, closing my bank account and terminating homeowner and auto insurance policies that I had with them dating back four decades.

I opened a new account with my current bank. Once again, I was fully transparent in the application process as to the source and reason for incoming wire transfers.

The FBI, in questioning me, provided the names of the two intermediaries used by RT to make the wire transfers of my compensation. I provided accurate answers to all their questions concerning these entities and my relationship with them.

I have no doubt that the US government will continue to make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for RT to compensate external contributors based in the United States, including myself, for their work.

This is harassment under color of law.

But under no circumstances does it make the work, or any compensation paid to me for this work, a violation of the law.

And under no circumstances does being paid for my outside contributions to RT violate the Foreign Agent Registration Act.

I have been lambasted for publishing my work in RT.

Several US-based publishers, including TruthDig and the American Conservative, have terminated their relationship with me because I also contributed to RT – this after my writing won an award for TruthDig and one of my articles was the most-viewed for the year for the American Conservative. I had just started what was supposed to be a stint as a regular contributor for Responsible Statecraft (RS) when some of their funders balked at having someone who also wrote for RT writing for them (I had just published my first article, only to have it removed from the RS website without warning. RS was willing to pay me for the article in question, but I let them know under no circumstances would I accept money from their organization.)

One of the reasons I enjoy contributing to RT is the global diversity of their audience. But I also appreciate the relative purity of their message – in a world where the US and its compliant minions in the controlled Western press work overtime to manipulate audiences into accepting at face value and without question the American-driven narrative, RT and other non-Western news outlets provide alternatives which are fact-driven.

In March 2011, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton complained about the US “losing the information war” to nations like Russia amongst English-speaking audiences around the world.

The truth, when seen from the perspective of an American secretary of state, hurts.

I have had extensive intimate experience with the US mainstream media dating back to my time as a weapons inspector in Iraq. I bore personal witness to US government officials leaving important Security Council meetings early so they could brief reporters from the New York Times, who would then publish a front-page story about the meeting which bore no resemblance whatsoever to the reality of the meeting and reflected every talking point of the United States.

How did I know this?

Because the Security Council meeting dealt with issues surrounding the inspections I was responsible for leading in Iraq, and with briefings that I helped write and provide to the members present. I was there when the US official walked out, and I knew who he was going to meet.

I was also present when the CIA worked with CNN to make a documentary about the work of the UN weapons inspectors in Iraq. I was one of several inspectors whose stories served as the centerpiece of the documentary. Moreover, I was the point of contact between the CIA and CNN when it came to the release of U-2 imagery and other intelligence-related information to CNN to be used in the documentary.

I worked for NBC News in the months after I resigned from my position with the United Nations. I was an on-air analyst who often appeared with Tom Brokaw and Brian Williams. I would work with NBC News to turn raw news feeds into finished products ready for on-air broadcast. I saw firsthand how NBC manipulated the news to fit pre-conceived notions instead of reporting it as is. I was eventually released from my contract when National Security Adviser Sandy Berger objected to questions being asked of him by NBC White House correspondent Claire Shipman, indicating that he knew I was behind those questions.

NBC had the choice: Defend journalistic integrity, or cave in to White House pressure.

They caved.

After 9/11, I was contracted by Fox News as an on-air analyst for six months, only to have Fox News balk at my assessments which ran counter to the narrative being promulgated by the Bush White House. Fox News decided it was better to pay me and keep me off the airwaves (I was exclusive to Fox at the time) than release me and let me speak out.

The contract was not renewed when it expired.

I was briefly courted by CNN in the fall of 2002, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq. After being questioned in an in-house forum that brought together the major reporters, hosts, and producers of CNN, I was ‘cleared’ by the senior CNN executives, who proceeded to give me a ‘behind the scenes’ tour of their newsroom.

I was shocked when I was taken to the CNN ‘war room’, where the producers were already working with the Pentagon to embed reporters with military units. My questions about this level of collusion led CNN to lose interest in me shortly thereafter.

The bottom line is this – I have seen the American mainstream media up close and personal.

There is zero integrity when it comes to reporting fact-based truth.

In every instance I experienced, the news organizations of these various media companies were literally subordinated to the US government, taking their talking points directly from either the White House, the State Department, or the Pentagon.

In short, these news organizations did not produce news, but rather American propaganda which was designed to deceive the broader American audience about critical issues of war and peace.

The news organizations I observed firsthand were more representative of a state-controlled media than a free press.

And, if called upon to compare and contrast, based upon my own personal experiences, the level of journalistic integrity between these US media outlets and RT, RT wins hands-down.

When it comes to reporting on politically sensitive content, such as the Special Military Operation, I likewise side with RT.

The Biden administration has openly admitted that it purposely declassifies intelligence information it knows to be wrong or misleading so that it can be released to the mainstream media for the purpose of controlling the narrative.

Not for telling the truth.

I have, over the years, had the opportunity to meet and work with several RT journalists and reporters who cover the Special Military Operation.

Every single one has demonstrated impeccable integrity when it comes to reporting the news.

I have also had the opportunity to interface with and interview many of the sources these RT journalists draw upon for their reporting and can say that the assessments I make as an independent analyst often reflect those of the RT journalists.

Not because, as is the case in the United States, we are working from the same government-dictated script – the Russian government has never tried to dictate any narrative to me, nor has RT.

But because both RT and I have an assiduous appreciation for fact-based truth.

Sadly, I can’t say that for any of the mainstream American media organizations I’ve worked with in the past.

My reporting for RT is my own, reflecting my observations and analysis. My most recent reporting from Russia backs this up – a four-part series which RT knew nothing about until I pitched it to them after I completed my most recent trip to Russia.

In writing How the Chechen miracle kick-started the Russian ‘Path of Redemption’, Helping Crimea recover from decades of Ukrainian misrule is a tough but necessary challenge, We are witnessing the bittersweet birth of a new Russia, and Why did it take Russia so long to realize Donbass was worth fighting for?, I provided unique reporting that was unavailable anywhere else in the world – Western media outlets would never allow such reporting to be published on their pages or websites, and Russian news outlets had never seen such reporting from an independent Western perspective.

This is exactly what journalism is supposed to be – hard hitting, probing analysis based upon first-hand observations derived from access to high-level sourcing.

I picked RT as the publisher of these articles because I wanted this reporting to be available not only to a global English-speaking audience, but also to a Russian audience.

This reporting was not the byproduct of close collusion between myself and the Russian government – in fact, when I tried to get official permission to travel to the new territories and Donbass from the Russian Ministry of Defense, I was turned down. It was only because of my persistence, and that of my host, Aleksandr Zyrianov, that I was able to travel to Chechnya, Crimea, the New Territories, and Donbass, and meet with the high-level officials and military officers who feature in my reporting.

Trying to convince a Western audience – be it government officials, journalists, or the consumers of news – that RT is a responsible news organization more committed to telling the truth than their ostensibly ‘free’ Western media counterparts, is a literal mission impossible.

The level of Russophobia that has infected every level of society in the West is mind-boggling. I have been called a shill of Russian President Vladimir Putin more times than I can count, by both the online trolls of the North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO), whose mission is simply to harass any online voice that doesn’t conform to the US/NATO narrative, and ostensibly ‘neutral’ journalists who write for outlets that publish my work. My crime? Reporting accurately on the positions taken by the Russian government – “speaking ‘Putin’”, in the vernacular of my critics.

The consequences of this Russophobia-infected journalism are dire – not only has the ignorance enshrined within the journalism of the West resulted in the destruction of Ukraine, but, if not reversed, is leading the Collective West down the path of inevitable conflict with Russia which would probably end in a general nuclear war.

Trying to head off such a tragic outcome has been the fuel that feeds my work as a journalist these past few years.

And it will continue to fuel my work going forward.

I am grateful to RT for allowing my words to be published and disseminated in both written and video form.

I believe that, in doing so, RT is contributing to the cause of saving the world from the horror of nuclear war.

Even if the Russophobia-infected minds in the Collective West fail to recognize this.

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.

Oliver Boyd-Barrett: Peace So Far, Away

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 9/3/24

Little Prospect for Immediate Peace

The general tone of pro-Russian coverage of NATO’s proxy war against Russia over Ukraine continues to be somewhat triumphal, supported by an empirical reality in the battlefields with which western mainstream media are now largely in agreement (perhaps, as one noted, so as to be ready to blame Zelenskiy for the whole sorry mess once Washington has called the whole thing off).

I have explained in a recent post how my immediate instinct is to distrust triumphal reporting, even when substantiated by the empirical “facts on the ground.” That is because I do not believe that anyone or any group, for or against the War or for or against the position of Russia, or Ukraine or the West in the war, is in possession of all of the facts.

There is far less consensus as to how things will turn out from here, with many commentators eager to discern evidence of a movement towards negotiation and a relatively short war, on the one hand, against those who consider the gap between Zelenskiy’s “peace plan” and Russia’s security and other needs absolutely unbridgeable. With Russia now in a more certain position to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk, some think, Russia will be more inclined to consider negotiations.

The main problems with this expectation, as I see it, are as follows:

(1) Russia’s main enemy is not Ukraine by itself, it is Washington and the West, and parties to negotiation need to include all relevant voices;

(2) Russia’s principal concerns are not concerns that it has only with Ukraine, they are concerns that the Global South has with the West; therefore, the substance of negotiations, if they are to be truly successful, cannot just be about Ukraine. Instead, they need to be about the global order and about reform of that global order in a direction that is more polycentrist, less hegemonic, and regulated by a somewhat re-thought and reformed United Nations, a process in which the BRICS could be an extremely useful intermediary. (I note in passing that Turkey’s request to enter the BRICS has now been formalized).

(3) There are no circumstances in which Russia is going to voluntarily agree to give up Crimea and the four oblasts that it has formally enfolded into the Russian Federation; there are live questions as to whether its security needs can be respected without acquisition of Kharkiv, Kiev, Odessa and any other oblasts that separate Novorussiye from the Dnieper;

(4) There are no circumstances in which Russia is going to agree to talk to a Ukrainian delegation appointed by the current regime, which Russia correctly asserts to be an illegitimate and unelected regime, even by the standards of Ukraine’s own constitution. It is a regime that would be booted out of office in the event that martial law would come to an end, and new elections instituted; regime change is a prerequisite. One cannot negotiate or do deals with people like this.

(5) There are no circumstances so far as can currently be seen in which Zelenskiy and his gang are going to voluntarily give up power;

(6) These considerations, therefore, have two consequences. The first (a) is that practically all discussion in the West about possible endings to this war, together with a great deal of discussion in Russia itself, adopts far too narrow a conception as to what this war is really about and what must happen for it to be won or to reach settlement. The second (b) is that because the gulfs between the main parties – Russia (together with China and other major allies in the BRICS), Ukraine, Brussels, Washington and the West generally – are so broad, no successful negotiation is currently practicable, and the war will therefore continue, finishing only whenever Ukraine collapses, amidst serious fissures and fragmentations within the EU and NATO, or the Russian Federation itself collapses.

(7) For the moment, the first of these two scenarios seems the most likely. This largely results from quantitative and qualitative superiority of Russian forces, weapons, manufacturing capability and alliances (including with China and Iran). The longer the war lasts, the more attrition there will be of Ukrainian forces, specifically, and of Western armories more generally. The pace of Western attrition will speed up if Israel manages to coax the US to fight a war on its behalf with Iran; and if the US manages to provoke a war between China and Taiwan. This would present a three-front challenge to the USA at a time when its ability to fight even only one front seems questionable.

(8) Russia has never at any time indicated that its ambitions went beyond the Donbass. Nor was there any sane reason to think that it did. However, the Western reaction to Russian assertion of its security needs has been so extreme (and, to be frank, so extremely fake), so over-the-top, that Russia must now be obliged to consider the entire West as its enemy. Therefore, against all previous indications to the contrary, Russia may now be planning some broader and more durable defense strategy vis-a-vis NATO.

Fragmenting NATO/ Europe amid Liberal Authoritarianism

As discussed in my previous post, three of the EU’s major powers are in deep water, struggling to climb out of it by ever more authoritarian means.

Britian nears recession, its new government proclaims that ten years of austerity are necessary, yet doubles down on Ukraine and resorts increasingly with dire, repressive measures to crush protests against this clear insanity.

The French President, in the face of an election disaster for his party has manouvered his chips to keep out of power the one party (that of Marine Le Pen) that won the most seats in the general election, and is coopting fragments of the Left alliance to work with his Party and to keep the other fragments out of power.

In Germany, a recently formed party, the AfD, typically described by its Establishment opposition – the SPD (in power) and CDU (principal opposition) – as “far right,” has won over 30% of the votes in two States – Thuringia and Saxony. A new Left party, the BSW, formed only six months ago as a splinter of the traditional Left party Die Linke, and led by Sahr Wagenknecht has won 16% of the votes in Thuringia and 12% of the votes in Saxony.

The AfD and the BSW together, therefore, represent almost half the voting population of these two, formerly East German states. Both parties oppose continuing German participation in the war in Ukraine. A likely alliance in the federal elections of October 2025 between the CDU and BSW (or comparable alliances at several state levels) might therefore force a radical shift in Germany’s stance in the war, and also derail moves by Washington to establish intermediate and long-range nuclear missiles on German soil.

The Battlefields

A Russian Iskander strike with two ballistic missiles struck a military academy in the Central Ukrainian town of Poltava and, according to some reports, also hit a nearby hospital. This has killed over 50 and wounded some 500, according to a source cited at midday today by Dima (i.e. not the 200 I originally saw reported). Poltava is west of the Dnieper. At this time of writing I do not know if all the victims are military or whether, as one might expect, some civilians have also suffered. It was mainly contract soldiers, not cadets, who were hit. The dead included foreign, including several Swedish, instructors, probably assigned there for training courses related to 2 AWACS aircraft that Sweden has gifted Ukraine.

Following Russian strikes elsewhere across Ukraine, there have been reported Iskander explosions in Kharkiv, Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia (where an Iskander destroyed a hotel hosting many foreign instructors). All Russian artillery brigades are now being equipped with Iskander missiles and have the authority to use them.

In southern Donetsk, Russian forces have secured the village of Prechystivka, west of Vuhledar, and have been shelling Urozhaine, Novodonetsk, and Makarivka. From Prechystivka they have advanced north in the direction of Novokrainke, and, as a result, they likely control a large swathe of territory from Novomaiorske up through Prechystivka and Novokrainke, eastwards to Pavlivka. To the northeast of Vuhledar they have taken the South Donbass coalmine together with a nearby stronghold and are poised to enter the eastern outskirts of Vuhledar itself.

In Pokrovsk, Russian forces have moved on Zhelanne Persha, of which they now control 50%. This is east of Lisivko which they took yesterday; they are attacking Ukrainsk nearby to the west, from Dolynivka and Memryk, and poised to move on Zhelanne Druhe, and on Hirnyk to the south. Ukrainian forces have abandoned a swathe of territory that runs from Hstytsynivka in the west to Nevelske in the east and then, moving southwards, to Krasn. In Selydove, Russian forces continue to advance on the town from Mykhailivka to the east and have taken the hospital area. North of Selydove, Russian forces control over a good half of Novohrodivka but there are still significant clashes for control over the western half of the village.

Russian forces are entering deeper into Toretsk, where they have occupied the school area while, to the immediate north, they have established control over Druzba. Russian forces have resumed their offensive towards the center of Chasiv Yar, making new advances and have established a foothold west of Kalinivka to the north of Chasiv Yar, tracing all the way down the western bank of the Kanal to a point south of Kleshchiivka.

South of Siversk, Russian forces have resumed progress towards the taking of Pereizne (they control 50%), and in the very near future are likely to take Fedoriivka to the immediate west. In Kupyansk, Russian forces have moved further from Pishchanne and are within less than two kilometers from the Oskil river at the settlements of Hlushkivka and Kolishnykivka.

In Kursk, there are reports that Russia has recovered a line of villages from Pogrebki down to Malaya Loknya. Dima considers that Ukraine will be forced out of Kursk by the end of the year.

Palestine

Just as consensus accumulates in favor of a triumphal outcome for Russia in Ukraine, there is a gathering unison of pessimistic tone with respect to the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. Netanyahu is proving himself impervious to the unrest of a sizable proportion of all of Israel that protests vehemently for a ceasefire that will bring home all the remaining hostages. He is impervious too to the voices in his own army, the IDF, that express concern that they are barely able to defeat Hamas, let alone Hezbollah in Lebanon, or to win a war against Israel [I think he meant to say Iran – NB].

Writing for Antiwar.com, Caitlin Johnson writes of Israeli and western media reaction to the recent deaths of six hostages:

“Israeli strikes killed 47 Palestinians in Gaza in one 24-hour period between Saturday and Sunday, receiving not the tiniest fraction of the attention as those six Israeli hostages.Israel is extending its military offensives”

Jeremy Scahill reports today the situation in Jenin:

“For nearly a week, the Israeli military has been laying siege to hospitals in Jenin and other cities in the northern part of the occupied West Bank, severely restricting access to medical care, targeting medical workers and ambulances, and cutting off water and electricity, as part of a massive military offensive in the occupied West Bank, the largest operation  in the Palestinian territory in over two decades.”

For Global Research, Steven Sahiounie writes:

“The Israeli military is attempting to pull Hezbollah into a full-scale regional war, through the massive and continuous airstrikes across the south of Lebanon and into the Bekaa Valley. Only Netanyahu benefits from this plan so that he can remain in power and stay out of jail due to being found guilty of corruption. This is the same reason why Netanyahu has continued to refuse a ceasefire in Gaza, despite the massive losses of Israeli military personnel, equipment, and the economy.”

Tunnels and Missiles

In interview today with Judge Napolitano, Alastair Crooke wonders in amazement how it is that neither Israel nor the West seem to understand just how far the nature of war is changing, in the first place, how sophisticated are the stocks of missiles and drones in the hands both of Hezbollah and, even more, Iran, in the second place and how, thirdly, these weapons and their launch systems are increasingly located underground, often unknown and invisible to their enemy.

The New York Times today carries a long article about the Hamas’ networks of tunnels, especially under Gaza, and puts these forward as the reason why Israel’s progress against Hamas has been so slow. The silly pretence is that for the New York Times this is an amazing discovery! Yet for up to a decade or more, the Times and other western mainstream media have eagerly devoured Israeli propaganda stories about the Hamas tunnels as evidence of how evil and threatening to Israeli security is Hamas.

It is obvious that the tunnels have been a major obsession in Israeli security and military planning and that their existence cannot possibly have been a surprise to anyone. Indeed, one only had to listen to Scott Ritter’s analyses since the beginning of the war to know that Israel was likely biting off more than it could chew. If Ritter knew about the tunnels, certainly everyone else who matters knew as well. Finally, one can observe the usefulness of this “tunnel discourse” as forming the basis of a fake justification for Israeli genocide.

Fred Weir: Donald Trump for president? This time, Russia says, ‘No thanks.’

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/24

Russian foreign policy experts express zero enthusiasm for another Donald Trump presidency, should he win the upcoming election. There’s a simple reason why.

They’ve already experienced one term of Mr. Trump in the White House, and it was the worst four years of their lives.

“Even if we assume that Trump genuinely wanted to improve relations with Moscow when he came in the first time, what he achieved was the exact opposite,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “There was chaos in Washington. There was a storm around Trump that affected anything to do with Russia, and it destroyed even the most modest efforts to start a dialogue.”

Russians remain fascinated with U.S. politics. The official media has covered each dramatic turn of the 2024 presidential race over the past couple of months with a mixture of excitement, bafflement, and dark schadenfreude. But gone is any expectation that the winner is likely even to slow the relentless downward spiral of U.S.-Russia relations, much less find the new level of mutual understanding, perhaps a U.S.-Russia compact, that they once hoped for.

Most Russian analysts seem to view Kamala Harris as a continuation of the Joe Biden administration, which has solidly backed Ukraine and hit Russia with the most intense blizzard of sanctions in history. As for Mr. Trump, even his pledge to end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours” is seen as empty verbiage at best or, more likely, a cynical effort to tap into the war-weariness of the U.S. electorate.

“The Russian media coverage of the upcoming U.S. elections seems rather objective to me,” says Lev Lurye, a St. Petersburg-based historian. “The general idea is that either Trump or any candidate from the Democratic Party will be equally bad for Russia.”

Frustration with Trump’s leadership

When it was announced that Mr. Trump had defeated Hillary Clinton back in November 2016 to become president, the entire State Duma – Russia’s lower house of parliament – rose to their feet and delivered a noisy, sustained standing ovation.

Such were the hopes aroused, not only among officials but ordinary Russians as well, by Mr. Trump’s expressions of admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin and promises during his first presidential campaign that he would find ways to “get along with Russia.”

But they quickly were dashed once he entered office.

Many Russians were bemused by the #Russiagate scandal, which saw Mr. Trump mired in accusations that he had colluded with the Kremlin in unsavory ways for years, that he was profiting from lucrative business deals in Moscow, and that Russian internet trolls had helped to secure his election by manipulating social media in the U.S. Most of those accusations turned out to be false or greatly exaggerated, but at the time they dogged any conversation about Mr. Trump’s Russia policy and seemed to make any progress impossible.

It all came to a head at the July 2018 Helsinki summit, where Mr. Putin tried to press Russia’s agenda on issues like the war in Syria and nuclear arms control. But the summit was quickly overshadowed by Mr. Trump’s unusually deferential stance toward the Russian leader, which triggered a strong critical response among U.S. media and officials.

“The main thing that struck me, watching that show in Helsinki, was the total mismatch between the substantive issues that two leaders were supposed to be discussing, and the utter lack of interest in any of those things that was displayed at the press conference,” says Mr. Lukyanov. “Nobody wanted to hear anything about the actual agenda. They were only interested in some supposed secret relationship between Trump and Putin.”

“We thought that Trump was different”

The widespread view in Moscow now seems to be that U.S. hostility to Russia is hardwired, and unlikely to change regardless of whoever becomes president.

“Much of the Russian political elite thinks that the U.S. deep state is in charge, directing events, and no political actors can change anything,” says Alexei Mukhin, director of the independent Center for Political Information, a Moscow think tank. “We thought that Trump was different, but now it looks like he’s just another agent of the deep state.”

But some watch the electoral turbulence, the deep polarization, and the somewhat disorderly changes at the top with a bit of satisfaction. The way the former Soviet Union tried to reform itself with a younger leader, and then collapsed, is a staple analogy in Russian news commentaries.

Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, says Russia is less interested in U.S. political developments and more concerned about the shifting global order, in which Russians perceive the U.S. steadily losing ground. New faces such as Ms. Harris aren’t likely to reverse the underlying dynamics of decay, he argues.

“All that’s happening in the U.S. is just what we’ve been saying for some time,” he says.

“Some Russians are enjoying the spectacle of chaos in American politics, because they think that the more disruption in the U.S., the better things will be for us,” says Mr. Markov. “I think we should be careful what we wish for. This is a very dangerous time, and there is a possibility that expanding crises can lead to a real world war. That would be catastrophic.”

Telegram Founder Pavel Durov’s Arrest in France

Russia Matters, 8/30/24

Pavel Durov, the Russian-born entrepreneur who founded the online communications tool Telegram, has been charged in France with a wide range of crimes for failing to prevent illicit activity on the app, and barred from leaving the country, NYT reported. French law-enforcement procedures with regard to Durov sent alarms ringing in Russia’s pro-war establishment as Telegram is widely used by the Russian military for battlefield communication, according to Politico. “They practically detained the head of communication of the Russian army,” Politico quoted Russian military blogger channel Povernutie na Z Voine as writing about Durov’s 4-day detention in Paris. A number of top Russian officials have decried Durov’s detention, and Russia’s opposition outlet Important Stories reported that the Telegram founder has visited Russia more than 50 times since ‘expulsion’ from Russia in 2014. If accurately reported, Durov’s frequent visits to Russia could not have occurred without the tacit approval of the Russian authorities.*

***

Read Craig Murray’s article, Pavel Durov and the Abuse of Law, at Consortium News here.

Read Andrew Korybko’s article, Pavel Durov’s Naivete Was His Achilles’ Heel, here.

Vast majority of Russians distrust each other – poll

RT, 8/24/24

Nearly 73% of Russians agreed it is necessary to be cautious in interactions with fellow citizens, the latest survey conducted by the long-established Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) has found.

Only about a quarter of respondents (24%) are ready to trust most people, as the remaining 3% are undecided, the poll indicated.

People in Russia, however, seem no less confident in each other than they were six years ago, the researchers noted; in 2018, a similar poll suggested that 74% of respondents demonstrated caution when engaging with others.

Trust in others directly depends on financial stability; the latest poll indicates that confidence was lowest among people with lower incomes. Respondents who assess their family’s financial situation as “very good” and “good” demonstrated a tendency to trust people more often (30%) than those who think that their finances are “bad” or “very bad” (15%).

Men tend to exhibit less trusting behavior toward others than women in social exchanges. Some 40% of male respondents said that they expect other people to deceive them when the occasion arises, while only 30% of females shared their trepidation. Meanwhile, 51% of women and 45% of men expect honest behavior from other people in any situation; 21% and 15%, respectively, were undecided.

The researchers added that responses were different in various age groups, with younger people being more anxious about others’ reliability: 45% of those aged 18–24 fear other people may to let them down at some point, while the share of older age cohorts giving the same answer ranged from 28% to 35%.

Commenting on the results of the latest poll, Valery Fedorov, the head of VCIOM, stated that the level of interpersonal trust between Russians hit its nadir during the 1990s, when the nation underwent a severe crisis and shortages of basic goods due to the rapid transition from a state-planned to a market-based economy.

The official added that the tendency towards the normalization of public life had boosted trust, but was interrupted due to new “traumas” in society, including an extension of the retirement age in 2018, the coronavirus pandemic, and the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict, among other things.

“The younger generation, on which sociologists rest their hopes when it comes to the potential waning of distrustful trends, turned out to be victims of new, difficult times,” Fedorov said.

Euromaidan Press: What the fall of Pokrovsk could mean for Ukraine

By Tataragami, Euromaidan Press, 8/28/24

As Russian forces continue their rapid advance toward Pokrovsk, now just over 10 kilometers from this critical logistical hub in Ukraine’s Donbas Oblast, concerns are growing over the town’s potential loss.

One issue for the public is the lack of clarity about why Pokrovsk is seen as different from any other lost settlement in the Donbas. To fully grasp the current situation, prognosis, and risks associated with the potential loss of Pokrovsk, we need to step back from the tactical level and shift our focus slightly eastward, starting with Avdiivka.

Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, the Avdiivka area played a key role for Ukrainian troops for nearly a decade, serving as a fortress that secured vital logistical routes in the Donetsk oblast. It was also seen as a potential foothold for future Ukrainian efforts to deoccupy Donetsk.

Unsurprisingly, since 2022, Russia has committed substantial resources to capture Avdiivka, raising questions about whether the heavy losses incurred were justified even among Russians.

The goal of the operation was not merely to capture Avdiivka itself, but to gain access to the operational space behind it. Once Avdiivka was secured, it provided the Russians with multiple options and maneuverability.

This is a key aspect because, if we examine the war theater solely from a tactical standpoint – focusing on individual tree lines or single settlements – we may miss the broader operational objectives of the enemy and the potential consequences for Ukraine if these objectives are achieved.

The backbone of Ukraine’s logistics in Donetsk Oblast is under threat

Pokrovsk, a town with a pre-war population of 60,000, is situated west of Avdiivka at a crucial crossroads of multiple railroad lines. It has become a key delivery and railroad distribution hub, facilitating the supply of Ukrainian forces across a broad frontline, from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond.

Currently, only two places in the Donbas serve this vital function – Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk. The significance of the location and length of the supply line becomes clear when viewed on a map:

When assessing the situation, we should remember that Russia doesn’t need to capture Pokrovsk to gain control over the railroad. Mere proximity to the town enables Russian forces to target trains and vehicles with artillery, mortars, and drones, effectively rendering the railroad hub unusable. It’s highly likely that train operations in the town have already been suspended due to these risks.

The significance of Pokrovsk extends beyond its rail connections; the town is also situated at an important road juncture, playing a similar role to the railroads in the transportation and distribution of supplies across the entire frontline.

The road linking Pokrovsk to Kostyantynivka has long been a target of Russian offensive efforts. Cutting off this road would complicate the resupply of troops engaged in the Bakhmut-Horlivka sector.

The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses a serious operational threat to the logistics of the entire region, disrupting supply lines from Vuhledar in the south to Horlivka in the north. The loss of both the road and railroad would exacerbate the situation for Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, leading to the potential loss of Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and areas both south and north of Toretsk.

Another significant concern is the political aspect: Pokrovsk is located just over 20 kilometers from the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Given that Russian forces re-entered Kharkiv Oblast from the north in May 2024, there is little reason to believe that Putin plans to halt at the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

If Pokrovsk falls, Russian forces would face minimal obstacles in advancing toward Dnipro, potentially extending their control into another administrative region of Ukraine and broadening the list of occupied oblasts.

Russia’s rapid advance in Donbas undeterred by Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk Oblast

Since the fall of Avdiivka, Russian forces have advanced more than 25 kilometers westward into Ukrainian territory. The concern is not about the territorial losses, but the pace at which Russian forces are moving through fortified areas.

Starting from July, the rate of Russian advancement in this region has accelerated, allowing them to bypass multiple defensive lines that Ukraine hastily constructed after the fall of Avdiivka.

The Finnish OSINT group Black Bird has mapped Ukrainian defenses visible through satellite imagery, helping to visualize the situation. As seen on their map, Russian forces have moved beyond several defensive positions, and with the full control of Novohrodivka, only one defensive line remains before reaching the outskirts of Pokrovsk itself.

Satellite imagery analysis of the seized positions shows evidence of artillery shelling and bombing, though not as extensive as in other frontline areas. This likely suggests that Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk direction were forced to retreat multiple times, lacking sufficient forces and resources to mount an organized defense.

While there have been many discussions and concerns about the lack of fortifications behind Avdiivka, which are entirely valid, the major issue remains the shortage of available manpower and units to defend those positions. No matter how well-constructed or numerous the defenses are, if they are only staffed at 10-20% of the required capacity, it’s unsurprising that Russian forces are able to overrun them so quickly.

Typically, in situations like this, both Ukraine and Russia deploy additional forces to stabilize the problematic part of the frontline. This often involves pulling one or more battalions from quieter sectors and redirecting them to more critical areas. However, after Ukraine was compelled to redeploy its resources to the Kharkiv Oblast and then to Sumy for the Kursk operation, the number of available units for such stabilization efforts was significantly reduced.

As a result, Ukraine was unable to stabilize this section of the frontline, just like in other areas such as Toretsk and New York, where Ukrainian forces also faced significant challenges and were forced to retreat.

Is the fall of Pokrovsk imminent?

Does this mean that Pokrovsk is definitely lost? No, it does not, but the likelihood of such an outcome continues to grow, given the balance of forces on the ground and the concentrated Russian firepower in the Pokrovsk area. Despite Ukrainian attempts to divert Russian forces from Pokrovsk with the Kursk incursion, Russian leadership remains reluctant to redeploy a significant number of forces from this front, even at the expense of reputational and political costs.

It is imperative for Ukrainian forces to prevent a swift and easy takeover of Pokrovsk, as this could buy Ukraine the necessary time to organize a defense beyond the Pokrovsk area—an opportunity missed in a similar situation in Avdiivka. If Russia exhausts its forces to capture Pokrovsk, it may lack the resources or morale to advance further.

Furthermore, Ukraine has demonstrated a capacity for sudden and effective counterattacks against overextended enemies, an approach that has proven effective given the Ukrainian forces’ greater mobility and more decentralized approach compared to Russian forces.

The Ukrainian leadership has several options to stabilize the line, including deploying newly formed brigades, repositioning forces from the Kursk and Kharkiv areas, or pulling battalions from more stable fronts. Whether the Ukrainian command will take these steps remains to be seen, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

As of today, the situation around Pokrovsk is dire and dangerous, with the potential to create a serious operational catastrophe if the town is lost.

Ben Aris: Ukrainian drones strike 15 Russian regions in tit-for-tat retaliation

by Ben Aris, Intellinews, 9/1/24

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) hit 15 regions of Russia with a barrage of homemade drones on the night of September 1 in retaliation for a massive Russia barrage a week earlier.

Russia launched over 200 missiles and drones on August 26 that mainly targeted what remains of Ukraine’s non-nuclear energy infrastructure as its own retaliation for the Kursk incursion that began on August 4.

Russia claims it shot down 158 inbound Ukrainian drones in a mass attack launched at the weekend targeting refineries and power plants in a total of 15 Russian regions, including Moscow.

Fires and explosions were reported throughout the targeted regions, but no reliable information has emerged of the extent of the damage caused. Russia has extensive air defences, but as the country is so large it remains vulnerable to attacks by single long-range low-flying Ukrainian drones. Ukraine has been targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure since the start of the drone war this January.

The first Ukraine drone strikes on Russia launched in March struggled to reach Moscow only 850km from Ukraine’s borders, but in the last week of July, a Ukrainian drone hit a Russian refinery inside the Arctic Circle over 2,000km from Ukraine.

Russian regions hit

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that at least nine drones were downed in Russia’s capital region, but Ukrainian drones struck the Moscow Oil Refinery, in the southeast of the capital just 15 km from the Kremlin. One of the refinery’s buildings was damaged and a fire was reported following the attack, Russia’s state-owned Ria Novosti outlet reported. The sprawling refinery is owned by Gazprom Neft and one of Russia’s biggest. It has a refining capacity of over 12mn tonnes per year or more than 240,000 barrels of oil per day.

The attack on the Moscow refinery follows on from a drone strike of the Omsk refinery on August 26, Russia’s biggest, accounting for 8% of Russia’s total oil product production, which also caught fire and temporarily lost half its production capacity as a result of the fire. Repairs are already underway.

Amongst other facilities targeted on September 1 were the

Konakovo Power Station in the Tver region, one of the largest energy producers in central Russia, and three drones reportedly targeted the Kashira Power Plant in the Moscow region, Kyiv Independent reports.

Another 34 drones were shot down over the Bryansk region on Ukraine’s border. More than 28 drones were destroyed over the Voronezh region, which also shares a short border with Ukraine. In Belgorod Oblast, the border region above Kursk, 34 drones were shot down, reports Reuters, but others caused damage to houses, cars, and commercial properties, according to local reports. 14 drones targeted the Belgorod region. More drones were downed over the southwest regions of Lipetsk, Kaluga, Ryazan and Tula regions, Kyiv Independent added.

Two drones also targeted the Kursk region, which remains partially under the control of Ukraine, according to the region’s acting governor, Aleksei Smirnov.

Despite the wide-ranging drone attack, Russian authorities report there have been no casualties caused by the barrage, which underscores the relatively small amount of explosives Ukraine’s drones can carry – typically up to 50kg vs the Russian glide bombs that can carry up to 1,400kg of high explosives. While Ukraine’s attacks exclusively use home made drones, Russia has an extensive arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles; it fired more than 236 missiles and drones at Ukraine on August 26, and Syrskyi admitted recently that Ukraine can only bring down at most 10% of the most powerful.

In what may be an unrelated incident, a large fire broke out in Moscow of government buildings on the banks of the river Moskva on August 31. A three-storey administrative building caught fire covering thousands of square metres in the heart of Moscow that burnt for several hours, Russia’s Emergencies Ministry reported. Helicopters, drones and fire-fighting ship “Colonel Chernyshev” were involved in bringing the blaze under control. There have been several reported incidents of suspected arson deep inside Russia since the war started.

Kursk inclusion slowing down

After almost a month, the AFU’s Kursk incursion is slowing down and under growing pressure. Military commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported last week that Russia has brought up some 30,000 fresh troops to face the estimated 7,000-20,000 crack AFU troops in Kursk. Increasingly boxed in, the AFU expeditionary force has started to take up defence positions and is increasingly coming under intense attack from Russia devastating FAB glide bombs against which they have little defence.

Separately, Ukraine’s Ground Forces report that the Russians are wiping the town of Sudzha in Russia’s Kursk Oblast “off the face of the earth” with a barrage of glide bombs. Sudzha is home to the gas pipeline metering stations that carries the Russian gas that transits Ukraine on its way to European markets and was seized by the AFU in the first days of the incursion. Approximately 200 civilians remain in the city out of a population of around 5,000.

“They are killing their own people. Even though Sudzha is located in the rear, the Russians are wiping it off the face of the earth: they are bombarding it with guided aerial bombs (GABs), artillery and kamikaze drones,” Ukraine’s Defence Ministry said in a statement, cited by Ukrainska Pravda. “On Friday, 30 August, a Russian UAV hit a local kindergarten, and enemy aircraft struck houses in a residential area in Sudzha.”

Analysts are starting to questions the assault and ask if it has been a strategic blunder by Bankova (Ukraine’s equivalent of the Kremlin) as, while a huge PR success that has lifted the morale of both the long suffering population and embattled AFU, the move has also weakened Ukraine’s defence of the frontline in the Donbas.

One of the mooted goals of the offence was to give Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy a territorial card to trade in a second peace summit that Zelenskiy has been hoping to organise in November. However, Russia’s veteran Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed that idea as “simple-minded and naïve” on August 31.

“It is very hard to tell what goal and intent they were pursuing. But political analysts are discussing it now. And even [Ukrainian President Vladimir] Zelensky said, he sometimes makes Freudian slips, that they will need this for future exchanges. That’s why they are taking prisoners and want to seize square kilometres. It’s so simple-minded and naive. We do not discuss our territory with anyone. We do not negotiate about our territory,” the minister said in an interview with RT.

Lavrov said that Russian President Vladimir Putin said a year and a half ago that Russia “is not against talks, but those who are against them should realise that the longer they procrastinate, the harder it will be to reach an agreement.”

“In Istanbul, less than a month after the start of our special military operation, compared to what we see now, it was very easy to reach an agreement. They did not want that,” the minister said, referring to the failed Istanbul peace deal agreed in April 2022 and repeating that the Kremlin will talk, but only on the “basis of the reality.”

Russia annexed the Crimea in 2014 and four regions of Ukraine in September 2023 that are now considered to be sovereign territory. Putin has been signalling that the Kremlin was ready for peace talks in July as Ukraine inched towards a ceasefire deal, but Lavrov has become increasingly adamant that that card has been taken off the table since Ukraine invaded Russia last month.

In his first comments on the Kursk incursion, Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the AFU’s incursion is in line with Ukraine’s right to self-defence in an interview with Welt am Sonntag.

“The Russian soldiers, tanks and bases there [Kursk] are legitimate targets under international law…. According to international law, this right does not stop at the border [with Russia],” he said as cited by Ukrainska Pravda.

Tit-for-tat targets

Notably Ukraine exclusively used its own increasingly powerful drones to hit the 15 regions in Russia. Zelenskiy has been calling, almost on a daily basis, for permission to hit targets deeper inside Russia with the more powerful Nato-supplied missiles, but the White House has repeatedly refused. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan repeated again last week that “our policy has not changed,” afraid of an escalation in the war ending a direct clash between Nato and Russia.

Zelenskiy has hinted that amongst the priority targets, should Ukraine be given that permission, would be Russian airfields from which it is launching its glide bombs that must be dropped from Russian fighter jets. Ukraine’s drones continue to mainly target Russian oil refineries and depots, but they are not powerful enough to make runways unusable.

The no-fly zone de facto imposed over Russia for the best missiles by the White House has been the subject of increasing scorn in Ukraine, where the skies remain entirely open to inbound Russian missiles, as highlighted by the August 26 barrage.

Amongst the missiles Ukraine would like to use is the Franco-British made Storm Shadow, but the US has openly refused to grant either Paris or London permission to drop the ban on their use on Russian targets.

Specifically, Zelenskiy has been asking the US for permission to use the US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and in preparation, last week Russia reportedly moved all its aircraft back 90km from their current position in case this permission is granted. However, not only is this permission unlikely to be granted, but unconfirmed reports also surfaced over the weekend that the US have decreased the shipment of ATACMS to Ukraine as well as the size of its military aid packages. The US in the past year sent Ukraine around 200 ATACMS or about 1.4% of all US long-range missiles.

Last week, Zelenskiy announced that Ukraine has developed its own long-range ballistic missile that has a similar range and power as the US ATACMS missiles, but it is unclear if these are already in production and none were used in the September 1 attack.

Zelenskiy has also complained in the last week that despite the new $61bn aid package granted on April 20, promised supplies to Ukraine are coming too slowly and reports from the frontline in Donbas say that the AFU is again running very short of ammunition and men. As bne IntelliNews reported, the US continues to follow its “some, but not enough” weapons supply policy that is part of its “escalation management” policy, designed to prevent Ukraine from not losing the war, but not supplying it with enough to win.

Donbas front collapsing

The pace of the collapse of Ukraine’s position on the frontline in Donbas appears to be accelerating. Intermittent battlefield reports by military bloggers (milbloggers) say the situation is becoming increasingly desperate as the Armed Forces of Russia (AFR) presses ahead with its assault especially for the key town of Pokrovsk and is making increasingly rapid progress. As bne IntelliNews reported, Zelenskiy’s Kursk incursion gamble appears to be unravelling.

“‘I’ve never seen such speed [in a Russian advance],” the commander of a Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance unit fighting in the area told The Telegraph’s correspondent Roland Oliphant in an interview last week.

‘It is very rapid. And our problem is the same: we don’t have infantry, we don’t have enough artillery or shells. We don’t have enough drones… The situation is very complicated, and not in our favour. The most critical thing for us now is the large number of soldiers of the Russian Federation. They outnumber us I reckon by at least five to one”.”

Zelenskiy has faced mounting criticism from his own officers and soldiers in the last few days as if the goal of the Kursk incursion was to relieve the pressure on the Donbas frontline by drawing off forces to retake Kursk, then Syrskyi admitted last week that has not worked and ironically Bankova has weakened its own defences by withdrawing crack troops from the defence to man the incursion at a critical juncture in the war.

Ben Aris: Ukraine war goes into its fifth phase as Ukraine gets its own ballistic missiles

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 8/28/24

Ukraine was pounded by a deadly missile and drone attack on Monday. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was backatcha yesterday during a speech on the occasion of the Ukraine Independence Day celebrations: Ukraine has developed and successfully tested its own ballistic missile that has the range to hit Moscow and well beyond.

Only last week, Zelenskiy announced another new long-range missile, the Palyanytsia, which is named after a local bread and is a word that Russians struggle to pronounce. But they will learn how to say it soon enough if Zelenskiy gets his way. Together with the Kursk incursion, I think we can now say that the war is moving into its fifth, and most dangerous, phase.

The first was the invasion itself and Russia’s botched attempt to take Kyiv. The second was when Ukraine got its act together and Russia abandoned the north, culminating with the Kharkiv offensive. The third was the subsequent stalemate and the failed summer offensive of 2023. The fourth was the start of the drone war. And we are now into a fifth.

What are the characteristics of this fifth phase?

It seems that Bankova (Ukraine’s equivalent of the Kremlin) has taken a leaf out of Israel’s book and the US is losing control of its client. Ukraine is no longer following orders.

Until now, the US has been carefully trying to manage Ukraine’s military response to Russia’s invasion with an “escalation management” policy that can be summed up as “some, but not enough” – Ukraine has been supplied with increasingly more powerful weapons, but always too little, too late so they are never game changes. Ukraine needs some 300 state-of-the-art modern tanks and got 31. It needs some 200 F-16s and got 10. It wanted 22 Patriot batteries but had to make do with seven. And each time only after a huge debate and long delays.

The US doesn’t have a strategy other than to prevent Ukraine from losing. US President Joe Biden has repeatedly ignored Congress’ demands for the White House to lay out its war goals in a policy document despite repeated demands.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has shown amazing patience with this foot-dragging, but after more than two years, Kyiv is finally taking things into its own hands. It’s pretty obvious that the White House would never have okayed the Kursk incursion but as the frontline in Donbas starts to crumble, Zelenskiy had to do something. Crossing the Russian border should have also been crossing one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s red lines, only its turnout not to be a red line. The fact that Bankova dreamt this scheme up in obvious defiance of the White House’s wishes is in itself new.

The same is true with the request to use Nato-supplied long-range missiles on targets deep inside Russia. Zelenskiy is asking for this on a daily basis now. He even drew up a list of high value targets that he wants to hit and submitted it to the White House for approval – which predictably is ignoring it.

Fed up with waiting, and understandably outraged that Russia can hit anywhere in Ukraine with impunity, as it showed again with Monday’s barrage, while Ukraine can’t hit missile launchers parked on the Belgorod highway, just across the Ukrainian border, let alone the airbases 50km in, it’s taken things into its own hands and is developing its own ballistic missile that can strike deep into Russia, without permission from Washington. The US have already said they don’t object to the Kursk inclusion or targeting Russian oil refineries with homemade drones – as they can’t. It’s a fait accompli. The White House can’t do anything to stop Ukraine from using its own missiles to hit things far away in Russia.

And this has actually been going on for a while and the US is not happy about it. If you remember, the attacks on oil refineries started back in January when the Oryolnefteprodukt refinery in Oryol region was hit and have been escalating since then. (I keep a list of the attacks here.)

After a few months of this a semi-public row broke out where the White House asked Bankova to stop the attacks, afraid that they would drive up the price of gas at the pump, a political nightmare for Biden in an election year. But Bankova ignored the request. It hit the Omsk refinery earlier this week, Russia’s biggest.

In the end it didn’t matter as Russia reduced the amount of oil products it exported – it actually banned the export of petrol and diesel – but compensated with increasing the volume of crude exports. All that happened was the weight of refining shifted from Russia to Asia and the amount of oil products on the market stayed the same, as did the prices. The White House needn’t have worried.

Now things are about to go up another level. Up until now Ukraine’s long-range drones can’t carry more than 50kg of explosive so simply putting nets up over Russia’s refineries is enough to prevent serious damage. But if Ukraine can fly a missile carrying several hundred kilos of explosive to the Omsk refinery, that is an entirely different kettle of fish.

Bankova has come a long way from the first token attack on Moscow in March and May last year. Moscow is only 800km from the border, but last week Ukraine hit a target inside the Arctic Circle for the first time, over 2,000km away. I think we can expect some much more serious attacks on Russian energy and military infrastructure that the US will be powerless to prevent, so more red lines will be crossed. Bankova will obviously try to manage this process so hitting residential areas in Moscow is probably off the table, but major energy infrastructure assets or airfields will clearly be on the list.

Zelenskiy’s military goal will be to drive Russia’s forces back from the border like the success Kyiv already has had with emptying the Crimea of Russia’s Black Sea fleet after the peninsula came into range. And airfields will be the first to go as Russia introduced the deadly 3000kg FAB glide bombs this summer against which Ukraine has few defences, but have to be dropped from a fighter jet and only have a 50km range. Russia dropped over two dozen of these on the AFU in Kursk in a single day last week, according to Zelenskiy.

All this will freak the White House out as red lines will start to be crossed on a monthly basis, if – and it remains a very big if – Ukraine can produce enough of these $1mn-a-pop ballistic missiles fast enough. However, even a few hits will escalate tensions again – especially if Russian civilians are blown up in their beds, as Ukrainian civilians are on a daily basis. Having lost control of Ukraine’s access to powerful missiles, the White House will also have lost control of its escalation management programme.

This will only heighten tensions between Kyiv and Washington, which have, as I was writing about yesterday, very different risk profiles.

The US will worry about sparking a direct conflict between Russia and Nato. Zelenskiy doesn’t care. Why should he? An entire generation of Ukrainians have already been killed and the country is in ruins and will take at least two generations to recover if then. Zelenskiy is in this war to win. “I need ammo, not a ride,” he famously said right at the start of this war when the US offered to evacuate him.

Besides, everyone in the West – European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, I’m looking at you – have repeatedly said that they will back Ukraine “for as long as it takes” and until Ukraine’s “victory” which is clearly not the plan. The White House and Brussels will get caught up in its own rhetoric and have to support whatever the AFU decides to do.

Finally, to note that this new even more aggressive fifth stage strategy is also a race against time. Kyiv needs to make a difference before Pokrovsk falls in the next months and the first snows arrive, either of which could contribute a collapse of Ukraine’s defence. Yesterday, Kyiv reported that Russia has brought up 30,000 troops to Kursk, without weakening the Donbas frontline, who will go up against an estimated 12,000 AFU troops in the region. Even military commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that the fight around Pokrovsk is not going well in his Independence Day speech.

Still, Ukraine has been fighting like a lion until now and there is no sign that Zelenskiy has any intention of giving up anytime soon. And now he has some powerful long-range missiles of his own.

41 Years Ago Today, The Soviet Union Shot Down Korean Airlines Flight 007

On September 1st, 1983, a civilian Korean Airlines Flight (007) is shot down by a Soviet fighter jet for violating Soviet airspace. Because of a fatal mistake before take off, all 269 passengers on board tragically died. Tensions between the US and the Soviet Union were extremely high at this point.

Because this program was made well after the end of the Cold War, the Soviet fighter pilot who actually shot down flight 007 is interviewed.

From the Mayday: Air Crash Investigation series.

YouTube link here.