Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 65
September 30, 2024
Paul Robinson: Ukraine’s ‘victory plan’ faces sobering realities
By Paul Robinson, Canadian Dimension, 9/27/24
“Next year in Ukraine, expect the unexpected,” I wrote in Canadian Dimension at the end of last year. And indeed, the past nine months have been full of surprises. I don’t know, for instance, of a single military analyst who foresaw that the Ukrainian army would launch a large attack on Russian territory, as it did in the Kursk region a few weeks ago. Wars are inherently difficult to predict.
That said, there comes a time when the general trend in a war becomes evident. Individual incidents may still surprise, but the overall movement of the conflict is no longer in doubt. In the middle of 1942, for instance, it would have been rash to predict the outcome of the Second World War. But by the middle of 1944, it was fairly clear what the result was going to be. The Germans were still able to pull off a few shocks, such as the Battle of the Bulge, but it was obvious that they were doomed.
In much the same way, the general direction of the war in Ukraine is becoming increasingly clear, and it doesn’t look good for the Ukrainians. That’s not to say that it’s glowingly positive for the Russians, but we have reached the stage where the odds of Ukraine achieving its objective of recapturing all its lost territories are vanishingly small. The issue is more likely how much more territory it will lose rather than how much it will be able to recapture.
Today, the Russians are in the process of surrounding and capturing the town of Vuhledar (Ugledar), which is the linchpin of the Ukrainian defence in the southern part of Donetsk province. What remains of the town’s garrison is faced with the grim choice of fighting its way out, staying and dying, or surrendering. The town’s capture now seems inevitable and will be a major victory for the Russian army.
Meanwhile, the Russians are advancing elsewhere, grinding the Ukrainians down with superior numbers of troops, equipment, and ammunition. As one prominent Ukrainian military analyst noted this week, “Unfortunately, the situation on the frontline is dire in many areas. These tiring efforts to paint a rosy picture … are hindering honest discussions and urgent calls for help … Ukraine is going to lose the war unless there are radical changes in how this war is approached.”
There is, however, little prospect of such a radical change, and even if it were to happen it might not matter, for the simple reason that Russia’s resources greatly outmatch those both of Ukraine and of its Western allies (or at least what the latter are willing and able to give it). It is hard to see how the Ukrainians can reverse their decline.
All of which provides a context for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s much-hyped ‘victory plan’ and his visit this week to the United States.
It would appear that while Zelensky continues to talk of restoring all of Ukraine’s lost territory he has begun to wake up to the reality that this is impossible by direct military means. Unable to shift military dynamics in his favour, he is hoping instead to shift the political dynamics by refocusing the Ukrainian war effort away from defending its own territory and towards striking the territory of the Russian Federation. He also perhaps hopes to drag NATO deeper and deeper into the war on his behalf. This could, at least in theory, put political pressure on the Russian authorities to end the war, even as the Ukrainian position on the frontline continues to deteriorate.
This explains the attack on Russia’s Kursk province as well as Zelensky’s repeated demands for permission to use NATO weapons to strike deep into Russian territory and his continued requests that NATO grant Ukraine immediate membership.
The exact details of Zelensky’s victory plan are a closely guarded secret, but press reports suggest that the core of it lies exactly in this—NATO membership and long-range weapons along with permission to use them deep in Russia.
As plans go, it’s not a very good one. NATO membership isn’t on the cards, while if long-range weapons could win the war, Russia would have won it long ago, as it has been using them in abundance against Ukraine for nearly three years. Ukraine’s fundamental problem is Russia’s growing advantage on the ground, in terms of manpower and weaponry. The victory plan fails to address this in any way, merely relying on the hope that damaging Russian infrastructure will somehow change Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mind about continuing the war—a rather long hope indeed.
American officials are supposedly “unimpressed” by the plan. Zelensky’s meeting with US President Joe Biden on Thursday evening passed almost without comment in the media. There were no big announcements indicating a shift in US policy in the direction Zelensky wants. Notably there was no talk of NATO membership, nor of lifting of restrictions on long-range attacks. Zelensky’s victory plan is dead in the water.
That’s not to say that Zelensky is going home empty handed. This week, Biden announced another $8 billion of aid to Ukraine. But it is unclear when the weapons and ammunition associated with this will actually reach Ukraine, beyond which it is just more of the same, and to date it is obvious that the same is utterly inadequate. Thus, while the US has rejected Zelensky’s plan, it hasn’t come up with anything remotely plausible to replace it.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that this is not the last large tranche of aid that Ukraine will receive from the US. Relations between the Republican Party and the Ukrainian government are going from bad to worse. This week, the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives accused the Ukrainian ambassador to the US of electoral interference on behalf of the Democratic Party for having invited only Democrats to accompany Zelensky on a visit to an American military factory. Republicans are already reluctant to spend more money on Ukraine. If, as seems likely, the latter’s military situation continues to deteriorate, that reluctance will probably only grow, as more and more people make the argument that it is pointless, and even counterproductive, to throw more and more money at a lost cause.
Among those making this argument is Donald Trump, who on Wednesday blamed Biden for encouraging Ukraine to continue with a war it could not win, thus bringing ruin to the country. “Any deal—the worst deal—would’ve been better than what we have now,” Trump said. “If they made a bad deal it would’ve been much better. They would’ve given up a little bit and everybody would be living and every building would be built and every tower would be aging for another 2,000 years.”
Dare I say it, but Trump has a point. One of the criteria of just war theory—that body of philosophy that helps one determine if war is justified—is that of “reasonable chance of success.” Given that wars inevitably involve great destruction and suffering, waging one which cannot reasonably hope to succeed cannot be justified. As things stand, it’s very hard to say that Ukraine has a reasonable chance of success. Indeed, it’s very hard even to say any more what “success” might be.
Unfortunately, there is as yet hardly a politician in the West who is willing to admit this. Speaking to Zelensky on Thursday, Biden told him, “Ukraine will prevail, and we’ll continue to stand by you every step of the way.” This is obvious nonsense, as the US clearly doesn’t support “every step” that Ukraine wants to take. It’s unwilling, though, to tell Ukraine that it should consider stepping in a different direction entirely. The result is a slow, but accelerating deterioration of that country’s position. Sadly, it appears that neither the Ukrainians nor their Western allies have a realistic idea of how to improve their situation while also being unwilling to admit that they don’t and to draw the necessary conclusions. This does not bode well for the future.
Paul Robinson is a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. He is the author of numerous works on Russian and Soviet history, including Russian Conservatism, published by Northern Illinois University Press in 2019.
September 29, 2024
US Intel: Russia Likely to Strike, Possibly with Lethal Force, Against US & Coalition Partners if US Long Range Weapons are Approved for Attacks Deep Inside Russia
Russia Matters, 9/27/24
U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Russia is likely to retaliate with greater force against the United States and its coalition partners, possibly with lethal attacks, if they agree to give the Ukrainians permission to use their long-range missiles for deep strikes inside Russia, NYT reported. As the debate continued this week among Ukraine’s Western allies, officials interviewed by WP said that the Ukrainians had expected Joe Biden to have already granted permission by now.
Russia has made fresh gains in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region this week. Moscow’s forces captured the town of Ukrainsk near the logistical hub of Pokrovsk, and looked closer to encircling Vulhedar and Kurakove, which, if taken, would allow Russia to encircle and take Pokrovsk, severing Ukraine’s main supply line to the region according to FT and Ukrainian group DeepState. FT reported that Russian forces have moved within 8 kilometers of Pokrovsk and just 4 kilometers of Myrnohrad. On each of two days last week, the Ukrainian military reported more than 200 clashes between the two sides—the highest such numbers in many months, according to DeepState,
Russia plans to spend 6.2% of GDP on defense in 2025 and sees only slight declines in the following two years as Putin’s war on Ukraine shows no sign of ending, Bloomberg reported. Draft three-year budget proposals seen by Bloomberg News show the government intends to increase defense spending to 13.2 trillion rubles ($142 billion) in 2025 from 10.4 trillion rubles projected for this year. Additionally, the Kremlin is planning to spend more than 40 trillion rubles ($431 billion) over six years to achieve social targets Putin set for his current presidential term, according to Bloomberg.
Fred Weir: Why Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling on Ukraine sounds different this time
By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 9/19/24
Over the course of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has drawn several “red lines” – with ostentatious references to Russia’s huge strategic nuclear arsenal – only to seemingly do nothing when these lines are crossed by Ukraine or its Western backers.
It happened when Ukraine acquired new and more powerful Western arms. It happened when Kyiv used its own drones to hit Russian airfields, refineries, and even the Kremlin itself. Most recently, it happened when Ukrainian forces actually invaded Russian territory. That has led Ukrainians, and many NATO officials, to conclude that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling is an elaborate bluff.
But when Mr. Putin warned last Thursday that Moscow will consider it a direct act of war by NATO if British, French, or U.S.-made missiles are used by Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia, he said this time is different.
Many Russian experts agree. And for now, Washington seems to be heeding his threat and holding off on permitting Ukraine to use the weapons.
“Russia’s frustration has been growing because the West appears to have lost all fear of nuclear war. Deterrence is absent,” says Sergei Strokan, an international affairs columnist with the Moscow daily Kommersant. During the Cold War, he says, that fear drove both sides to the bargaining table, aiming to limit conflicts and control nuclear weapons.
“There is a growing feeling that the West needs some kind of a wake-up call, an event that would make them see they are flirting with World War III if they escalate these attacks against Russia,” he says.
Deterrence and the war in Ukraine
Mr. Putin, responding to a question from a journalist, distinguished the use of the weapon types being discussed – British and French cruise missiles and U.S.-made ATACMS ballistic missiles – from previous red-line scenarios because he said such weapons are too sophisticated to be operated by Ukrainians alone. He claimed they would require hands-on NATO assistance and satellite targeting and guidance to effectively carry out strikes deep inside Russia.
“This will mean that NATO countries – the United States and European countries – are at war with Russia. And if this is the case, then, bearing in mind the change in the essence of the conflict, we will make appropriate decisions in response to the threats that will be posed to us,” Mr. Putin said.
The Kremlin sounds like it’s treating this challenge as the final straw. For over a year Mr. Putin has been under public pressure from hawkish members of his security elite, led by foreign policy dean Sergey Karaganov, to “restore deterrence” by staging a demonstration nuclear strike in order to remind the West that Russia is a nuclear superpower that shouldn’t be trifled with.
It’s not clear what response the Kremlin may be mulling, but the Russian media are a hotbed of speculation about it.
At the mild end of the spectrum are steps such as cutting off diplomatic relations, especially with the NATO country that Moscow views as the most actively hostile one, the United Kingdom. Another idea would be to stage a demonstration nuclear weapons test, something Russia has not done since 1990. Some reports say the old Soviet Arctic nuclear testing site at Novaya Zemlya has already been prepared for that possibility.
Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, says a stronger response might be to attack NATO airfields in Poland and Romania where, he says, “We know Ukrainian F-16s are based. These aircraft would probably be used in launching those NATO missiles at us, so we would regard them as legitimate targets.”
Forthcoming changes to Russia’s official nuclear doctrine may radically change the calculus for unleashing nuclear weapons.
At present, Russia would be prepared to use atomic weapons only in the case that the country is attacked with them by a nuclear-armed power, or if the very existence of the Russian state is threatened amid a conventional conflict.
Mr. Markov says the amendments under consideration would lower the threshold for employing tactical nuclear weapons, perhaps making them an integral part of any future battlefield.
Another revision might change the provision that Russian statehood must be in peril to instead enable the weapons to be used when Russian “strategic interests” are threatened. It would also allow their use against non-nuclear states that are part of a coalition that includes nuclear-armed powers if they are attacking Russia.
Fear of nuclear war
According to Alexei Levinson, an expert with the Levada Center, Russia’s only independent polling agency, fear of nuclear conflict has been growing among the Russian population since the Ukraine war began, from around a quarter of respondents to over a third.
“In our focus groups, we find it is the second biggest fear after concern for the well-being of self and immediate family,” he says. “It has escalated since the beginning of the special operation and is at a constantly high level.”
One of Russia’s top security experts, Alexei Arbatov, told the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta this week that the drift of events is very dangerous because of the widespread belief in the West that Russia would never use nuclear arms.
“This is a very serious misconception: at some point, nuclear weapons will be used, despite the risk of escalation and general catastrophe,” he said.
Mr. Strokan argues that Western observers do not appreciate the extent to which Mr. Putin is under pressure from hawks to his right, such as the nuclear strike advocate Mr. Karaganov.
“Putin is probably the most moderate politician in Moscow right now, and if it weren’t for him we’d probably get a collective Karaganov in power,” he says. “Even now they are expressing open impatience and asking, ‘Why haven’t we pressed the button already?’”
September 28, 2024
Komsomolskaya Pravda: Ukraine Has Lost Over 500,000 People on Battlefield
By Valentin Alfimov, Komsomolskaya Pravda (Machine translation), 9/11/24
The author of the telegram channel “Whisper of the Front” in a conversation with “Komsomolskaya Pravda” named the losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It turned out that they have people left for a year or two.
– How do you count the losses?
– It’s a program that searches by keywords. It monitors the Internet, social networks. Local councils sometimes write obituaries, factories… like, “zaginov” (died – from Ukrainian) such and such “zahisnik” (defender – from Ukrainian). Yes, people post it on social networks – it’s like a cry from the heart for them.
– Can you compare, now the losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are more or less?
– The same or even more. Last week there was a record – 1208 or 1206 obituaries per day. Even during the Bakhmut operation at the peak there were 1100 and something.
“You have a margin of error, don’t you?”
– Of course, so the losses are most likely even greater. But everything comes to light over time: they will post 300-400 obituaries… but after some time, information about new deaths at the same time in the same place arrives.
MANY ARE STILL IN THE FIELDS
– How long have you been doing this?
– Back in 2014, we had a group called “Situation of Novorossiya”. We published all the obituaries that the Ukrainian press printed. In 2014, we counted about 6.5 thousand losses of the Ukrainian army.
– How many do they have now?
– There are 501 thousand obituaries now. This is what I got after painstakingly collecting information for over two years. The figure matches what is confirmed by the Americans, European politicians, the Russian Defense Ministry. Everyone confirms it, except the Ukrainians. Although they publish it themselves, they are afraid to believe it.
– You emphasize that this is the number of obituaries. But how many actually died?
– I think their real losses are around 600 thousand. Plus or minus.
– We talked to you in November 2023. Then you mentioned the figure of 380 thousand obituaries and 420-430 thousand losses. Now there are over 500 thousand obituaries and somewhere around 600 thousand losses…
– Maybe not 600, but 540-550 dead. After all, they can’t put up an obituary when there is no body. And there are still quite a few bodies on the combat line.
– It’s still a lot.
– The final figure of the Ukrainian army, when it loses combat capability, is 800 thousand dead and totally wounded. This is based on the population, the composition of the armed forces, calculated by political scientists and mathematicians of the world. After that, they will not be able to fight anymore. That is, their backbone, which pulls the entire front, is 200-300 thousand still alive. At this rate, it will be for a year or two.
“WILD GEESE”
– Do you count foreigners?
– There are publicly available websites, social media channels. As of today, they have posted 670 names from 56 countries. But they themselves warn that this figure is inaccurate. Then, they write that these are “volunteers”, not mercenaries, former officers. And it is clear that they are deliberately understating. Here they write: “Venezuela – 1, Uzbekistan – 1”. But I know that there were at least 4 people from Venezuela. I think that there are up to a thousand dead foreign mercenaries.
“Where does the most come from?”
– Most of all the English are going. There were a lot of Americans at first. Now a lot of Colombians are taking part. There are enough French, Georgians. Well, of course, some NATO officers are dying – American, even Australian…
– What can you say about the attack on the training base in Poltava?
– I think there are about a hundred casualties – that’s what my Poltava relatives say. And many wounded, some of whom, of course, will not survive, so the number will grow.
– Are there many foreigners?
– There are foreigners. I just saw a clipping from a German newspaper: the mayor’s office of the German city of Hessen posted an obituary. But they didn’t sign who exactly died. As soon as the information comes out, we’ll look for this person.
41 BODIES PER DAY
– The first Ukrainian F-16 pilot was killed by friendly fire. Can such losses be tracked?
– It’s hard. At one time there was a video of Ukrainians killing each other in Kharkov – that was February 2024. They admitted it later, though. But they keep quiet about a lot. Such losses are hidden.
– Is it possible to weed out losses due to illness, lack of medical care for the wounded, due to the incompetence of commanders?
– No, all in one piggy bank. For example, 400-500 names fall out in a day. Somewhere the obituary is 2-3 lines, and sometimes on a page. So, we need to look for where they died, how. It’s almost impossible. And 10-15 percent of obituaries are those who died in hospitals. But they also write there – the hero, died…
– In which hospitals do people die the most?
– The largest flow is given out by the Dnipropetrovsk hospital, the Zaporozhye military hospital and the Kyiv one. One nurse from the Dnepropetrovsk hospital once wrote to me that in a day they pulled out 41 bodies to the backyard.
Those who cannot be helped in the same Zaporozhye are taken to Dnepropetrovsk. That’s why there is such a high mortality rate – especially after their counteroffensive, everyone was taken there.
BY THE WAY
There is no spirit left in Ukraine
– You communicate with those who remained in Ukraine. Can you assess the dynamics of moods?
– Everything is sad there. This is a dying country. If it is still normal in Kyiv, then the cities to the east are suffering – Poltava region, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporozhye. It’s fun only in Transcarpathia – they don’t feel anything there, they earn a lot of money on the “runners”, on the border, on the export of timber…
– And what do people say?
-Sorely… I have relatives in Poltava. They don’t talk. It all comes down to “no comment”.
– Because they are angry?
-Afraid. There are no prospects, everyone is snitching on everyone – God forbid someone notices you in sympathy for Russia. You can’t trust anyone.
– Why don’t the people rise up, don’t protest?
– On the Maidan, it all started with the students, on whom the Americans later played. Do you know how much they spent on it?
5 billion dollars is the official figure. 5 billion to grab such a large country. Everywhere you need to bribe.
The opposition in Ukraine has been knocked out, people are intimidated and bullied – even the TCC (territorial recruitment and social support center) can no longer win – this is specifically the SS, these 3-4 men will twist you, beat your kidneys: “Go serve in our place.” No one in Ukraine is rising up, not in a single region. There is no spirit, nothing. The whole country is watching the telethon. Thank God, at least on the Internet there are people who curse this government.
Moscow Times: 70K Russian Soldiers Confirmed Killed in Ukraine – Independent Tally
Moscow Times, 9/20/24
Over 70,000 Russian soldiers have been confirmed killed in Ukraine since the Kremlin launched its invasion more than two and a half years ago, according to an independent tally by the BBC’s Russian service and the independent Mediazona news website.
The two outlets have been verifying the number of Russian troops killed through open-source information including official statements, newspaper obituaries and social media posts.
The latest death toll update, published Friday by the BBC’s Russian service, highlights how the demographic profile of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine has shifted since the full-scale invasion. Currently, one in five of the dead had signed a contract with the Russian army or the National Guard (Rosgvardia) after the war started, and more than half were not affiliated with the military before Feb. 24, 2022.
In 2022, the average Russian soldier killed was a 21-year-old contract serviceman in elite units like Special Forces, Airborne Forces or the Marines. Now, those dying in the conflict tend to be men in their 40s, 50s or even 60s, often lacking combat experience or specialized training.
The report found a steady rise in casualties among volunteers since October 2023, coinciding with a renewed Russian offensive in the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka. Meanwhile, losses among mobilized troops and prisoners have remained steady.
As of Sept. 20, the republic of Bashkortostan has reported the highest confirmed losses, with 2,775 deaths, while the far northern Nenets Autonomous District has the lowest, with 55 residents confirmed killed.
Russia has lost 4,104 officers in Ukraine, including seven generals. Among the fallen are 458 high-ranking officers, including lieutenant colonels and above, and 1,142 elite command specialists.
The BBC estimates that their count covers only 45% to 65% of the actual death toll. This suggests that the real number of Russian military deaths could range from 107,864 to 155,804.
The tally does not account for fighters from the self-proclaimed Luhansk or Donetsk People’s Republics of occupied eastern Ukraine — the BBC estimates the fighter death toll from there at between 21,000 and 23,500.
The Russian Defense Ministry last updated its official death toll for the war in Ukraine in September 2022, placing the figure at fewer than 6,000 killed.
September 27, 2024
Kyle Anzalone: NATO Prepares for Mass Transport of Wounded Soldiers
By Kyle Anzalone, Libertarian Institute, 9/25/24
As the North Atlantic alliance ramps up preparations for war with Russia, Brussels is considering how it might remove a large number of wounded NATO soldiers from the frontlines should conflict with Moscow breakout.
Lieutenant-General Alexander Sollfrank, the head of NATO’s logistics command, discussed the plans with Reuters. “The challenge will be to swiftly ensure high-quality care for, in the worst case, a great number of wounded,” he said.
Sollfrank believes that NATO will be unable to have air superiority over the frontlines in a conflict with Russia. He said the bloc is considering using hospital trains and buses to move the wounded soldiers. Sollfrank explained, “For planning reasons, all options to take a great number of wounded to medical installations need to be considered, which includes trains but potentially also buses.”
At the end of the Cold War, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, war between Russia and NATO was unthinkable. However, over the past three decades, the North Atlantic alliance has expanded up to Russia’s borders.
At the start of the Joe Biden administration, Washington and Brussels began treating Kiev as a . The ties between Ukraine and NATO provoked the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Throughout the war in Ukraine, the West has steadily escalated its support for Ukraine. The Kremlin has increasingly viewed itself in a direct conflict with the West.
President Biden is considering giving Ukraine the green light to conduct long-range missile attacks inside of Russia with American weapons. Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that if the White House approves the attack, it would mean direct war with NATO.
Gilbert Doctorow: Shoigu makes a comeback
By Gilbert Doctorow, Website, 9/14/24
I have not seen any comments on what I am about to describe in alternative media recently, not to mention in mainstream, which by definition only takes an interest in Vladimir Putin and could not care less about who is who in the Kremlin line-up below Number One. So much the worse for mainstream, because watching the musical chairs in Moscow is no less valuable open source intelligence on where policy is headed than it would be with respect to leading politicians and statesmen in London or Washington or Berlin.
As we all know, Sergei Shoigu, who is as close a friend to Vladimir Putin as anyone in Russia may be said to be, was this past spring unceremoniously removed from his position as Defense Minister, which he occupied for more than a decade, and was made Secretary of the Security Council; which took him out of the line of command and entrusted him with unclear responsibilities of an advisory nature. The reasons for his removal were fairly clear, namely a number of corruption scandals among his direct subordinates, which suggested that it was high time for cleaning house. Moreover, no one had forgotten how Shoigu and the head of the Russian general staff General Gerasimov had been denounced publicly for incompetence and corruption by head of the Wagner Group Pavel Prigozhin in the months before Prigozhin staged his insurrection.
In the intervening period, I would say not so much that Shoigu’s star has risen on its own as that the luster of his successor, Andrei Belousov, and of the aforementioned Valery Gerasimov has been tarnished by the stunning failure of the Russian military leadership to anticipate and prevent the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk Oblast, which has been a big embarrassment for the Putin government even if it is ending badly for Kiev. It should never have happened.
Now in the past several days we have seen proof positive that wind is once again in the sails of Mr. Shoigu. He was present, as a silent witness, to be sure, but present nonetheless as the senior representative of Russia’s siloviki (security and defense apparatus) when Putin received the directors of national security from the BRICS countries at the Konstantinovsky Palace outside Petersburg on Thursday. He was present at the sidelines meeting there of Putin and the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Presumably Belousov was not there because he was busy managing Russia’s largest global naval exercise in 30 years, Ocean 2024, with large scale Chinese naval participation and a great many foreign observers.
Now today’s news indicates that Mr Shoigu is in Pyongyang negotiating directly with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. This can only be about the most serious defense issues, including further shipments of armaments to Moscow.
All of these moves of personnel on the chessboard are yet further proof of Vladimir Putin’s remarkable skills in Human Resources. He never completely discards any of his underperforming subordinates. They are not simply ‘fired’ in the spirit of Donald Trump. No they are held close to him so that their talents may be used at some future point as needed for the country’s greater benefit. And if I may be allowed a side glance at what The Donald was saying in his debate with Kamala, none of those removed from high positions is given the opportunity or the incentive to write a denunciation of The Boss.
September 26, 2024
Dave DeCamp: Putin Orders Changes to Nuclear Doctrine in Major Warning to West
By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 9/25/24
Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday outlined changes that will be made to Russia’s nuclear doctrine as the US and NATO consider supporting long-range Ukrainian strikes inside Russia.
Putin said in a meeting with the Russian Security Council that under the new doctrine, an attack on Russia by a non-nuclear state that’s supported by a nuclear-armed power would be treated as a joint attack, a clear reference to Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory that use NATO weapons and intelligence.
Based on Putin’s comments, it’s unclear if that means such an attack would trigger a nuclear response. But the new doctrine will allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack that poses a “critical threat to Russian sovereignty.”
According to TASS, the doctrine will also allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to “aggression” against Russia and Belarus, and if Russia becomes aware of plans to launch massive airstrikes against its territory.
Putin meeting with his Security Council on September 25, 2024 (photo released by the Kremlin)“Reliable information about a massive takeoff of strategic or tactical planes towards Russia, or the launch of cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic weapons towards its territory may be interpreted as a sufficient reason for a nuclear response by Moscow,” TASS reported.
The new language is more vague than Russia’s current nuclear doctrine, which allows the use of nuclear weapons “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”
The US has supported Ukraine’s attack on Kursk, which came a few months after President Biden gave Ukraine the greenlight to use US weapons on the Russian border region. But the Biden administration is still holding out on supporting long-range strikes.
Putin has said that if the US supports long-range Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory, it would mean NATO is at war with Russia. Despite the clear warning and risk of nuclear war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and many hawks in the US and Europe are pushing hard for the escalation.
Fyodor Lukyanov: Western elites could be about to get a taste of their own ‘color revolution’ medicine
By Fyodor Lukyanov, RT, 9/12/24
There’s a reason why 2024 has been called the year of the big elections. More than half of the world’s population will be called to the ballot boxes, but this time it goes deeper than normal. Voting has always been important, of course, but in calmer – or rather more orderly – times, not every election was considered crucial. Now, on the contrary, consequential elections are routine. Almost every contest is capable of shaking up, if not changing, the course of events. And it’s not just about who wins. More important is the sense of legitimacy, and the recognition by citizens that the results themselves are legitimate.
This should be a well-established, self-evident truth. Firstly, it has always been the case, and secondly, political institutions exist to ensure it. The era of rule by force alone is long gone, and even openly authoritarian regimes have to take account of the interests and demands of the population. And entrenched democracies have to find sophisticated ways to maintain stability and continuity in the face of mistrust of procedures.
Twenty years ago, one of the dominant trends was ‘promoting democracy’. The policy of the neo-conservative US administration (George W. Bush and Dick Cheney) was based on the ideological postulate that the spread of the democratic form of government around the world is the most reliable guarantee not only of the national interests of the US, but also of a positive universal order. They felt that one was inseparable from the other.
The range of tools they had was wide: From actively supporting certain social processes (color revolutions – which raged from the post-Soviet space to the Middle East and North Africa) to direct military intervention to effect regime change (from the Balkans to the Middle East again). Whether Washington wanted it or not, democracy became a political and economic tool for external rather than internal use. The notion of the fundamental importance of having elections recognized by an external arbiter – with the right to certify the result – was what emerged. And if that arbiter wasn’t happy with the outcome, it empowered itself to demand a revision, even by force.
The implication was that problems with electoral legitimacy were only possible in fragile young democracies. However, even in stable, well established democracies, things do not always run smoothly – even if generally institutions guarantee order.
Now, two decades later, the focus has shifted to those same older democracies. Many of these countries are undergoing changes that involve the erosion, if not the loss, of familiar ways of life and ideas about the future. The capitalist economy seems to be solving the problems not of society but rather its own issues. And technology may work wonders, but whether it is to the benefit or detriment of man, is less and less obvious.
Political mechanisms carry a heavy burden. They have to keep the system afloat, and prove its effectiveness and legitimacy. After all, the parties may once have reflected the composition of societies, but many no longer do so. Trust in institutions is falling, as it almost always does in times of great change. And the nature of the mistrust is similar to that which created the conditions for color revolutions in more fragile states. Hence the constant fears (and they may be genuine) of outside interference and influence. The American and Western European establishment knows very well how to intervene in and influence troubled societies – now they think the same will happen to them.
So far, the ruling elites have been strong enough to cope. On the one hand, there are still considerable economic reserves that can be used to plug holes, and on the other hand, there is the adroit use of manipulation that makes it possible not to allow alternatives to take the helm. But these resources are not infinite. Paradoxically, systems accused of being undemocratic are probably better equipped to survive, at least in the short and medium term. They have to constantly demonstrate to citizens that they are capable of solving their problems, whereas a traditional democracy believes that democratic turnover itself is a remedy for problems. In reality, swapping out one party in power for another changes almost nothing, which only exacerbates discontent.
All signs suggest we are now in a transition period, and it is impossible to predict what the future will look like. But the process promises to be long and uneven, and much depends on how – and in what form – the new reality is embraced. What is happening now are attempts to maintain an acceptable status quo in spite of all the obstacles.
This article was first published by the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and was translated and edited by the RT team:
