Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 26

Russia Matters: Slowdown of Russian Gains; US Signals End of Mediation of Ukraine Talks

Russia Matters, 5/2/25

In the week of April 22–29, Russia gained 14 square miles (the equivalent of just over half of Manhattan island)—a major slow-down as compared to the previous week’s 40 square miles gained, according to the April 30, 2025, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. As for Ukrainian forces, they controlled only 3 square miles of Russia’s Kursk region as of April 28, according to ISW’s data, compared to 482 square miles they claimed to have captured last August. Moreover, chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov claimed in his report to Vladimir Putin earlier this week that Russian forces had completed pushing the Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region1 even though Ukrainian officials denied this claim.Inferring lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian war, the U.S. Army is “embarking on its largest overhaul since the end of the Cold War, with plans to equip each of its combat divisions with around 1,000 drones and to shed outmoded weapons and other equipment,” according to Wall Street Journal’s April 30 report. One day after that disclosure by Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg reported that Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth wants the U.S. Army to increase its use of drones as part of a broad overhaul of the military’s largest service.Confusion continued to reign this week with regard to whether Russia and Ukraine can be brought together to agree on a durable ceasefire,2 to say nothing of a full-fledged peace deal, as the U.S. signaled a possible end to its mediation. On April 25, Trump wrote after Putin had hosted his envoy Steve Witkoff for talks that “they are very close to a deal, and the two sides should now meet, at very high levels, to ‘finish it off.’” On April 26, however, Trump appeared to have changed his tack, writing that maybe Putin “doesn’t want to stop the war, he’s just tapping me along.” To hear Trump’s deputy, JD Vance, tell Fox TV on May 1, there is a “very large gap” between the positions of Ukraine and Russia regarding the end of the war. Marco Rubio—who on May 9 may become the first U.S. government minister to pay a public visit Moscow in years—concurred with Vance’s assessment, acknowledging in an interview on the same day that “they’re still far apart.” It also remained unclear in what capacity the U.S. may continue to pursue peace. On May 1, the State Department’s Tammy Bruce  told  reporters that the U.S. “ will not be the mediators ” going forward.On April 30, the Trump administration finally secured an  agreement  with Ukraine, giving the U.S. preferential access to the country’s contested natural resources—such as aluminum, graphite, oil and natural gas.3 The agreement establishes the “United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund” that Washington and Kyiv will pay into to fund development, infrastructure and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine, according to ISW. The text of the agreement made no mention of the security guarantees that Kyiv had long sought, though part of the fund’s income will go to reimbursing the U.S. for future military assistance to Ukraine,4 according to Bloomberg. Neither does the deal cover Ukraine’s nuclear power producer Energoatom, which will remain in Ukrainian state ownership, Bloomberg reported.5 Accessing Ukraine’s minerals won’t be easy, according to experts interviewed by the U.S. press. For one, maps showing trillions of dollars of mineral deposits scattered across Ukraine are based largely on outdated studies, and proper surveys could take several years to complete, according to experts interviewed by Wall Street Journal and New York Times. Also, somewhere between 20% and 40% of Ukraine’s deposits are critical minerals located in areas of the country currently under Russian occupation, George Ingall of Benchmark Minerals Intelligence told Wall Street Journal.  

James Carden: The New York Times Presents: Russia for Dummies

By James Carden, Substack, 4/14/25

Jonathan Mahler, a sportswriter who hit it big with his 2005 book Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bronx Is Burning: 1977, Baseball, Politics, and the Battle for the Soul of a City, has turned his attention to something that he probably should have been advised not to: The tangled web of US-Russian relations. It’s hard to know who still bothers to read it, but for those who don’t, sportswriting has become yet another vehicle to advance liberal cliches and pieties; athletes are held up as exemplars of teamwork and social conscience in materialistic, lazy, and, yes, irredeemably racist, America.

Mahler is undeniably a successful writer. But with his latest offering for the New York Times Magazine, ‘How the G.O.P. Fell in Love With Putin’s Russia,’ he shows himself to be woefully out of his depth. Worse, his thesis, that Trump has embarked on a deeply un-American love affair with alien, authoritarian, far-Right Russia, is deeply unoriginal.

Seven years ago I pointed out in the pages of the journal American Affairs that the US foreign policy establishment had embarked on a “cold war culture war.”

“America’s growing animus towards all things Russia is,” I wrote, “characterized by the hostility borne of a frustrated project of liberal cultural imperialism.”

…Putin’s Russia—conservative and predominantly Orthodox Christian—today serves as a kind of all-purpose bogeyman for young journalists-on-the-make and for opportunistic politicians looking to cash in on the current hysteria. Over the course of the past several months, the American media has invariably painted Russia as a kind of dark bulwark of hardline Christian Right values standing athwart the forces of light and worldwide social progress.

Mahler’s screed in the Times is only the latest manifestation of this tendency among American liberals to blame every American shortcoming and problem at Putin’s door.

Generalities being the sportswriter’s stock-in-trade, Mahler paints with a broad brush. Advocates for better relations with Russia are—they must be (!)—unpatriotic. After all, in Mahler’s telling,

…Russia has long served as much more than a geopolitical rival for America. It has been an ideological other, a foil that enabled the United States to affirm its own, diametrically different values. In the words of the historian David S. Foglesong, Russia is America’s “imaginary twin” or “dark double,” the sister superpower that the United States is forever either demonizing or trying to remake in its own image. Or at least it was. Trump’s policies and rhetoric seem aimed at nothing less than turning America’s dark double into its kindred soul.

The scholar-diplomat George F. Kennan, from whose writings Mahler might learn something, long criticized the American habit of seeing in Russia a “dark double.”

In this regard, an interview Kennan gave to the Times in 1978 is instructive:

Q: Well, if, as you say, there are, in this country, these wildly erroneous impressions about. the Russians, where do they come from’? Why are the hardliners so strong today?

A: That’s a very good question, a very good question. You know, it sometimes seems to me that people have a need for the externalization of evil. They have the need to think that there is, somewhere, an enemy boundlessly evil, because this makes them feel boundlessly good. They can’t stand life without the image of an enemy somewhere. This is the nature of the militant mentality.

That this “militant mentality” has gained wide acceptance among liberals is only too obvious. It also helps explain why the Times no longer gives space to dissident opinions such as those once expressed by Kennan.

Mahler makes a further misstep when he attempts to lump the writer Christopher Caldwell in with a group of Putin-loving American “reactionaries” and “fringe ideologues” such as Ann Coulter. I know and like Christopher Caldwell; there is no American writer on the scene today with a deeper, more nuanced understanding of European politics. The idea that he is somehow representative of “far-right” influencers who mindlessly parrot Kremlin talking points would be laughable if it wasn’t so absurd.

***

This past Friday, I met with several Ukrainian women in Georgetown. They traveled to Washington to tell their stories; of the friends and family they have lost, of homes destroyed and hometowns abandoned, of husbands and friends fighting on the front lines—even now. And while their politics differed in a number of respects—a native of Donetsk will not, generally speaking, see completely eye-to-eye with a native of Lviv—they traveled to Washington with a message for American journalists and policymakers: They want the war to end, now. It seems to never occur to journalists like Mahler (and they are legion) that ending the war is also something that many Ukrainians want. Were these women also in the pocket of the Kremlin? Nothing could be further from the truth.

The late Russian scholar (and former colleague of Kennan’s), Stephen F. Cohen, once wrote that, “Patriotism is never having to say you didn’t know.” In that sense we critics of American policy in Eastern Europe can never fairly be accused of unpatriotic disloyalty, because taking the time to know and to understand what role our government played in bringing about the catastrophe that is modern-day Ukraine is the essence of patriotism. Patriotism is about more than slapping a yellow and blue flag on your bumper, dialing up the latest installment of Pod Save Whatever or voting BLUE no matter who.

Are there a few fringe characters on the American far-right who fetishize Vladimir Putin and all his works? Probably, yes. Does their influence explain Trump’s overtures to Moscow? That would be a stretch. In fact, Trump’s outreach to Russia is not dissimilar to the policies pursued by other Republican administration over the past 75 years.

Anyone with even a cursory familiarity with the history of American foreign policy since 1950 (and it is clear Mahler does not) will recognize that it has been the Republicans that have acted as the party of dialogue and diplomacy when it comes to Russia, beginning with the first postwar Republican administration under Dwight Eisenhower. His Democratic successor, during an all-too-brief 13 month period following the Cuban Missile Crisis, attempted to put an end to what was then a decade and a half of Cold War. But, as it happens, Kennedy’s was the last Democratic administration that took seriously the imperative of establishing normal, reciprocal relations with Russia.

Presidents Nixon and Reagan, each in their own ways, pursued a policy of detente—a policy Nixon and Kissinger borrowed from the conservative French president, Charles de Gaulle, as well as from the social democratic German chancellor Willy Brandt.

George H.W. Bush warned against the danger of unleashing the demons of parochial nationalism (such as were unleashed during the 2014 Maidan revolution) in the post-Soviet space. After 9/11, Putin helped to facilitate both the establishment of US military bases in Central Asia and the Northern Distribution Network which provided US cargo planes overflight rights over Russia to supply American troops in Afghanistan. Such was the extent of Russia’s willingness to cooperate with Bush after 9/11 that Brookings Institution scholar Fiona Hill noted in June 2002,

…When Russian President Vladimir Putin picked up the phone to express his sympathy to President Bush in the aftermath of September 11 and then followed up by providing concrete assistance to the campaign in Afghanistan and quickly acquiescing to U.S. plans to establish bases in central Asia, Washington policymakers and analysts concluded Putin had made a strategic, even historic, choice to align Russia’s foreign policy with that of the United States. It was a reasonable conclusion to make.

From the beginning of his presidency in January 2000, Putin pushed the idea of a concerted campaign against terrorism with American and European leaders. He was one of the first to raise the alarm about terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and to warn of linkages between these camps, well-financed terrorist networks, and Islamic militant groups operating in Europe and Eurasia.

Bush’s approach to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war (set off by Washington’s client, then-Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili, who shelled Russian peacekeepers in Ossetia—a fact confirmed by a subsequent EU report on the matter) was not to portray the Russian move on Georgia as a metastasizing cancer on the “Free World,” as Biden did with Ukraine. Instead Bush explicitly ruled out military support for Georgia—and Saakashvili was quietly, behind the scenes told to cool it—which is exactly what Obama should have told the Ukrainians during the Maidan coup.

So what changed in the intervening two decades? Part of the answer has to do with the cold war culture war (of which Mahler’s essay is a prime example) which has marginalized and stigmatized dialogue, diplomacy and cooperation with Russia.

Given what America is and what it is in the process of becoming (i.e. the world’s northernmost banana republic), the motive for normalizing relations with Russia has little if anything to do with culture. The administration’s parley with Moscow has to do with security. Mahler seems blissfully unaware that Russia is a nuclear superpower with 4,477 nuclear warheads; has an army of 1.5 million active duty soldiers; and has deep bilateral relations with China and Iran.

In the end, power is what matters. The US has it. Russia has it. China has it. Trump, whatever his faults, understands this—and his policy toward Russia isn’t some kind of aberration; it is a reversion to common sense.

Stephen Bryen: Estonia cribbing Ukraine’s script for provoking Russia

By Stephen Bryen, Asia Times, 4/12/25

​On June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princeps, a Bosnian-Serb radical, shot and killed Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg. Princeps did not act alone.

He was one of at least six principals in an organization called Young Bosnia, and his group and others were seeking independence from the Austro-Hungarian empire. He also received help from a secret organization, the Black Hand, that provided training and weapons, including bombs and pistols.

The assassination of the Austrian Archduke, the immediate successor to emperor Franz Joseph I, was a provocation that a month later caused the so-called July crisis that culminated in a July 23 ultimatum to Serbia. By then, Germany had pledged support for Austria, and Russia and France would mobilize in support of Serbian nationalism.

World War I could have been avoided, but it was not. The perpetrators of the crime in Bosnia were tried, some jailed (because they were too young for execution, including Princeps) and others executed. The Austrians vastly overestimated their military capabilities. For them, at the end of the war, the Austro-Hungarian empire would cease to exist.

Are we in a similar situation today? There have been countless provocations by Ukraine and some of its supporters, including Joe Biden, who authorized long-range ATACMS strikes deep inside Russia, some aimed at Russia’s early warning radars and nuclear bomber bases.

Not to be outdone, the Ukrainians on May 3, 2023, launched drone attacks on the Kremlin, targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s office.

Such attacks are inconceivable without technical help from NATO, especially as long-range drones need satellites for communications and targeting. The White House has denied allegations it was involved recently in attacks.

At the same time, Ukraine and its supporters have promoted and carried out a cultural war against Russia. One of the top provocateurs is Estonia.

Estonia is the most northern of the Baltic states. It fronts on the Baltic Sea where its capital city, Tallinn, is located. Estonia’s town of Narva is just next to the border with Russia. About half of Narva’s population is Russian.

Estonia has a population of 1.37 million, based on data from 2023. Between 20-25% of Estonia’s population are Russians, depending on how the count is made.

For a number of years, Estonia has been waging a cultural war against Russia while at the same time utterly depending on NATO for its security. The Estonian army has only 7,700 active duty personnel, of which 3,500 are conscripts.

It has a reserve force that is significantly larger, but it does not have the equipment to support its reserves, so it is largely a paper force. Estonia has no air force to speak of, only two Czech-made (Aero Vodochody) L-39 trainers and two small M-28 Polish transports.

One would think that Estonia would not want to create trouble for itself, but it seems that the reverse is true, largely deriving from the Estonian belief that NATO is there to back it up and that Russia would not attack a NATO state.

Provocations are not something new for the Estonians, whose hate for Russians borders on the extreme. By practically denying citizenship to their Russian inhabitants to attacking the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia through legislation, Estonia has made it clear it will do whatever it can to humiliate its own Russian population and Russia itself.

In April 2007, the Estonians decided to move the monument there known as the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. That monument also was the site of a number of graves of Soviet Russian soldiers who were killed fighting against the Nazis.

The graves were dug up, their families in Russia notified they could collect the remains or they would be relocated in the Tallinn military cemetery along with the monument.

Now, in 2025, we have another round of monument-busting, as the Estonians are tearing down Russian war memorials once again. This includes defiling Russian graves in the Tallinn military cemetery and damaging and destroying war memorials.

If there is one single unifying principle these days in Russia it is the great importance given to Russia’s decisive role in the defeat of Nazi armies in World War II. Each year, on May 9, Russia holds its annual Victory Day celebration, which focuses on a show of military power.

It is followed by a more somber but clearly important citizen’s march known as the Immortal Regiment. In this march, families proudly carry posters and photos of family members who perished in the Great Patriotic War (Russia’s terminology for World War II.)

Estonia’s show of contempt for Russia’s World War II victory, along with its spotty, some would say, compromised behavior supporting the Nazis, is increasingly irksome to the Russians.

One can add attempts to keep Russians living in Estonia from achieving citizenship or even voting in elections. Estonia has now stepped that up by adding new legislation to make it even more difficult for Russian residents to be treated equally.

Estonia is also trying to block out any relationship between Russian Orthodox Churches in Estonia to the Moscow Patriarchate. It is not surprising that Estonia’s actions parallel and were perhaps inspired by Ukraine, which is doing the same thing.

The Estonian action against the Moscow-led church would create revulsion and horror elsewhere if, for example, European or American Catholics were not allowed to communicate with the Pope in Rome.

Among the pro-war advocates in Europe, Estonia is at the forefront. Its former Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, is now the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

She is now a major voice in promoting a massive European defense expansion and sending troops to Ukraine. Of the six nations who have apparently pledged to send troops to Ukraine, Estonia is leading the list even though it does not have anyone to send.

The trouble with provocations is that they can cause wars. The hysteria now apparent in official channels in parts of Europe (for example, France, UK, Germany and Estonia) reflects huge anxiety that Ukraine will not survive the Russian onslaught.

Instead of helping US President Donald Trump find a peaceful solution to the conflict, the French and British, in particular, have done their best to undermine his efforts.

While some of this can be explained as a bailout for Europe’s economic issues by substituting military production for civilian manufacturing, deficit spending of this kind will never be enough to salvage Europe’s economic and industrial problems.

Meanwhile, small countries such as Estonia can cause big problems and an escalation leading to conflict in Europe.

Russia’s victory, EU’s decline, and a just world order: Highlights from Medvedev’s speech

RT, 4/29/25

Moscow’s victory in the Ukraine conflict will lay the groundwork for a more just world based on mutual respect and stable development, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has said, adding that this vision is supported by most of the world’s population.

The senior official, currently serving as deputy chair of the Russian Security Council, outlined Moscow’s foreign policy priorities and recalled the history of the West’s confrontational approach to Russia during a public lecture in Moscow on Tuesday.

Here are the key points of Medvedev’s speech.

1. Ukraine Conflict

Medvedev stated that the Ukraine conflict stems from decades of Western hostility toward Russia and the fostering of neo-Nazism in Ukraine by the “Anglo-Saxon crowd.” He argued that Russia’s military response was necessary to address these provocations, stating that even US President Donald Trump acknowledged that Washington, Brussels, and Kiev are responsible for the Ukraine crisis which has nearly triggered World War III.

The former president also stressed that Russia’s ultimate goal is to destroy the “Kiev neo-Nazi regime,” not the Ukrainian state itself. He emphasized that Russia would not allow hostile regimes to re-emerge on its borders and called for a complete denazification of Ukraine, as well as Europe. 

He also warned that all foreign fighters and any future foreign contingents in Ukraine are legitimate military targets under international law, and promised that war criminals would face justice.

Commenting on Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky, Medvedev described him as a “pathological figure” and suggested he would “end very badly.”

He predicted that after the conflict ends, Russia would establish a new national holiday to commemorate its victory in Ukraine which, according to Medvedev, is essential to ensure lasting security.

2. Russia and the West

Medvedev has described Russia’s relationship with the West as a long history of confrontation, rooted in persistent efforts by ”Anglo-Saxon powers” to weaken Russia. He recalled that even during World War II, Britain and the US considered plans to attack the Soviet Union, referencing ”Operation Unthinkable,” which was secretly developed under Winston Churchill’s orders in 1945. Medvedev argued that after the war, the West squandered the chance to build a fair international order, instead creating a system based on double standards, cynicism, and attempts to isolate Russia.

Medvedev stated that while Russia had always sought peaceful coexistence, it now faces a situation where it must counter the West’s ”peace through strength” strategy with its own doctrine of ”peace through fear,” asserting that only the threat of strong retaliation, including nuclear deterrence, can keep the West from taking hostile actions.

At the same time, he rejected claims that Russia might attack Europe, calling them ”nonsense” designed to frighten European populations and justify rampant militarization.

The former president also concluded that Russian-EU relations have passed the ”point of no return,” arguing that there are no independent, strong leaders left on the continent, only ”spineless Russophobic figures” and ”cowardly marionettes.” Medvedev expressed little hope for meaningful dialogue with current EU governments, and suggested that future interaction would be limited or nonexistent. At the same time, he claimed that many ordinary Europeans are growing disillusioned with their leaders’ policies toward Russia.

3. EU’s decline

Medvedev described today’s Western Europe as suffering from “feeblemindedness without courage.” He argued that the continent has abandoned its traditions and fallen under the control of radical, Russophobic leaders.

He claimed that Western Europe is increasingly embracing extremist ideologies and must also undergo a process of denazification alongside Ukraine. Medvedev pointed to the decision by European authorities to invite Ukrainian nationalists – whom he linked to WWII-era Ukrainian far-right leader Stepan Bandera – to the 80th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II, while deliberately excluding representatives from Russia, calling it an act of profound cynicism.

Medvedev went on to state that the EU is not only politically weak but also morally degraded, lacking any real leadership or strategic independence, and on the verge of collapse. He predicted that the bloc would continue to oppose Donald Trump and traditionalist forces in the US, reflecting a deep ideological split between globalist elites in Europe and rising conservative movements elsewhere in the West.

4. Just world order

The former president suggested that Russia is fighting with “truth and justice” on its side, positioning itself as the defender of genuine international law against Western hypocrisy.

He argued that Russia’s victory in the Ukraine conflict would mark the first step toward the creation of a fair, multipolar world order.

Medvedev claimed that the Western “rules-based order” is illegitimate and called for its replacement with a true international system grounded in mutual respect and real international law. He noted that most of humanity, particularly the Global South, already supports this vision, while acknowledging that creating such a multipolar world would likely take many years.

Medvedev also stated that despite their geopolitical rivalry, Russia and the US do not have to be permanent enemies and argued that pragmatic cooperation between the two countries is crucial for global stability, especially given their roles as the largest nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. He expressed cautious hope that dialogue with Washington could resume on a more pragmatic basis, while dismissing the EU as an increasingly irrelevant actor.

Thomas Graham: Could Putin Play the United States Against China?

By Thomas Graham, The National Interest, 4/14/25

Thomas Graham, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as the senior director for Russia on the US National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration and as managing director of Kissinger Associates from 2008 to 2019.

As the United States pivots toward Russia under President Donald Trump, speculation is mounting that his strategy reflects a “reverse Kissinger.” That is, instead of playing the China card (allying to wedge the two communist powers apart) against the Soviet Union as Kissinger allegedly did in the 1970s, Trump seeks to play the Russia card against China. 

His strategy is to use the promise of restoring diplomatic relations to decouple Russia from China, thereby diminishing the strategic challenge that the Asian giant poses.

These suppositions are absolute fantasy. 

Russia’s Positions Against the United States and Alongside China

Russia has good strategic reasons for sustaining close working relations with its dynamic neighbor in Asia. 

It wants to share the economic vitality China exudes, which Russia lacks. Fifteen years ago, China became Russia’s leading trading partner; since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, it has become the largest importer of Russian oil and natural gas.

Geopolitically, Moscow benefits from maintaining tranquility along the 4,000 km-long border with China, which has been a source of tension throughout history. The Kremlin will not abandon those benefits for a relationship with the United States, and this status quo will endure beyond Trump’s term as president, especially given the deep-seated anti-Russian animosity within the American foreign-policy establishment.

Russian president Vladimir Putin might, however, be tempted to play the role of Kissinger himself, to use the “U.S. card” to rebalance relations with China. Although he regularly boasts that relations have never been better, and he and Chinese President Xi Jinping talk of taking the lead together in building a new world order, Putin has to be wary of how a future Chinese leader might exploit the burgeoning asymmetry in power and fortune that separates the two countries today to China’s advantage.

Depending on how it is measured, China’s economy today is five to nine times larger than the USSR’s GDP in the early 1990s. 

China has overtaken Russia as a technological power, mounting stiff competition against the United States in artificial intelligence and robotics, among other things. Further, China is a rising space power, while Russia is falling behind.

How Will Russia Keep Up with China?

To preserve its strategic autonomy in these circumstances, Russia needs a hedge against China. 

In the short term, that would ensure that the deals it cuts with China are not tilted so heavily in the latter’s favor as they are today. In the long term, a hedge is necessary to protect against China’s abandoning partnership in favor of strategic competition with Russia.

Putin understands this logic, so he supports the BRICS alliance and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which Russia and China are leading members. He hopes that enmeshing China as a web of relations will somehow constrain its ambitions. However, the hard truth is that Russia will not be able to forge a reliable hedge out of the countries of the global south; their power potential simply does not measure up to China’s. 

For better or worse, the United States offers the only reliable strategic hedge against the Chinese superpower.

Just as Kissinger exploited hostility between the Soviet Union and China to advance U.S. strategic goals, Putin could do the same with the United States and China. Like the American statesman confronting the Soviet Union and China, he would have no interest in exacerbating the growing tension between the United States and China. That would only raise the risk of an economic or military confrontation with debilitating consequences for Russia and the two belligerents. 

Aligning with the United States against China would make no strategic sense, given the reasons noted above, while forging an ever-closer alignment with China against the United States would jeopardize Russia’s strategic autonomy. As Kissinger did, Putin would need to pursue more subtle diplomacy, one that creates incentives for each side to seek better relations with Russia by playing on each one’s fear of the consequences of Russia’s strategic alignment with its rival.

It is Putin’s good fortune that Trump, for his purposes, wants to normalize relations. That means that he has to make fewer concessions to draw closer to the United States than he would have had to if he had sought to restore relations during the Biden administration. This reality is already evident in the way Putin is manipulating Trump’s avowed desire for an early settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war to gain U.S. support for Russian goals vis-a-vis Ukraine.

How far this rapprochement with the United States will go and whether it will be sufficient to rebalance relations with China remains to be seen. Trump’s continuing support for normalization and hints of some nervousness in Beijing suggest that Putin is on the right track if he is channeling Kissinger. 

However, he must tread carefully. As was true for Kissinger, success requires that all sides draw some benefit from the triangular relations. Thus, Putin needs to enable the United States to advance some of its strategic goals due to improved relations while creating concern that the rapprochement could harm China’s position so that Beijing can make concessions to Russia without backfiring. 

It is an intricate game, especially for a country that is the weakest of the three parties, but perhaps Putin learned something from all those conversations he had with Kissinger after he rose to power.

Report: Putin Maintains Demand for Full Control of Ukrainian Oblasts Claimed by Russia for Peace Deal

By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 4/29/25

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand full control of four Ukrainian oblasts claimed by Russia as a condition for a potential peace deal, Bloomberg reported on Tuesday.

The report said that President Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, sought to convince Putin to drop the demand and agree to a ceasefire that froze the current battle lines, but the Russian leader declined and maintained his demand for complete control of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia.

The Financial Times reported last week that Putin was willing to freeze the current battle lines for a peace deal, but the Kremlin quickly signaled that this wasn’t the case.

Military situation on April 29, 2025 (SouthFront.press)

Ukraine has also appeared to reject the conditions of a US proposal for a potential peace deal. The Bloomberg report said that negotiations are now at an impasse as an agreement seems less and less likely.

When Russian and Ukrainian officials held peace talks in the early days of Russia’s invasion in 2022, Russia’s main demand was for Ukrainian neutrality. Those efforts were discouraged by the US, and later that year, Russia declared its annexation of the four Ukrainian oblasts and added the recognition of that territory as Russia to its demands to end the war.

Since Russia has the momentum on the battlefield, it’s unlikely that it would accept a peace deal with terms dictated by the US. If the negotiations fall apart, it remains unclear if the Trump administration would continue fueling the war by arming Ukraine. As time goes on, the terms of a settlement will likely get less favorable for Ukraine.

On Monday, Russia declared a three-day ceasefire starting on May 8, but Ukraine rejected the idea and proposed a 30-day truce. Russia has dismissed the Ukrainian counteroffer and is casting doubt on whether the three-day ceasefire will hold.

***

Moscow ready to seek ‘balance of interests’ with Ukraine and US – Lavrov

RT, 4/27/25

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has rebuked CBS host in an interview on Sunday repeating that Moscow is ready to seek a “balance of interests” both with Ukraine and with the US. The network’s journalist Margaret Brennan has said that she haven’t heard from the top diplomat that Moscow “is willing to make any concession on anything to date.”

“No, my brief answer is you are wrong,” Lavrov told Brennan.

“I have been emphasizing repeatedly, in relation to Ukraine, in relation to strategic relations with the United States, I have been emphasizing our readiness to seek balance of interests. If- if this is not what your station considers readiness for negotiations, then I don’t know how to be even less eloquent in trying to be brief in my answers,” he added.

Lavrov confirmed that Russia is continuing contacts with Washington regarding Ukraine and welcomed US President Donald Trump’s efforts to mediate.

“There are several signs that we are moving in the right direction,” Lavrov said. He emphasized that Russia demands guarantees that any ceasefire “would not be used again to beef up Ukrainian military” and that arms supplies to Ukraine should stop.

Russian President Vladimir Putin held lengthy talks on Friday with US special envoy Steve Witkoff at the Kremlin. Presidential adviser Yury Ushakov described the meeting as “constructive and very useful,” adding that the discussion touched on the idea of resuming direct negotiations between Moscow and Kiev.

Trump, commenting on the state of the negotiations, said Ukraine and Russia “should now meet, at very high levels, to ‘finish it off.’ Most of the major points are agreed to.”

In the interview, Lavrov reiterated Russia’s position on Crimea, stating, “Russia does not negotiate [over] its own territory,” and praised President Trump for acknowledging the peninsula’s status.

Crimea “will stay with Russia” in any peace deal, Trump told Time Magazine in an article published on Friday. He said that even Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky understands this. “It’s been with them [Russia] for a long time,” the US president stated, noting that Russia had its submarines there “long before any period that we’re talking about” and that the majority of Crimeans speak Russian.

Russian officials have repeatedly said that Moscow is open to a negotiated solution, but have emphasized that any agreement must reflect the territorial realities on the ground and address the root causes of the conflict.

Zelensky insisted on Wednesday that Kiev would never officially recognize Crimea as Russian. Trump sharply rebuked that statement as “very harmful to the Peace Negotiations with Russia in that Crimea was lost years ago.”

Stephen Bryen: Ukraine partition a possible option – just not Kellogg’s version

By Stephen Bryen, Asia Times, 4/15/25

Is a partition plan a realistic outcome for ending the Ukraine war. General Keith Kellogg’s proposal appears to have already encountered difficulties. However, that does not mean that some type of partition is out of the question.

Kellogg’s “plan” would carve up Ukraine into four zones

-British, French, and Ukrainian troops, with the potential for others to join, would make up the first zone, western Ukraine. That zone would stretch from the Polish border to the Dnieper river.

-The second zone. East of the Dnieper would be under Ukrainian control, defended by Ukraine’s army.

-A third zone would be a buffer area with a depth of 18 miles.

-A fourth zone would include the Russian “occupied areas” including Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaphorize, Kherson and Crimea. The Kellogg plan does not address the actual boundaries.

The Russians have already said, referring to Kellogg’s plan, that putting NATO or NATO-state soldiers in Ukraine is unacceptable.

The Kellogg plan leaves the juridical status of the areas with Russian troops unclear and it leaves Ukraine’s army at full strength. One implication of the plan is that the war could re-start at any time.

Taking a step back, it is worth asking what the Russians’ end game may be and the likelihood they will achieve it.

The first and clearly the most important point is that the Russians are attempting to restore their relationship with Washington and want to persuade President Trump to support the immediate Russian goal of legitimizing those territories Kellogg puts into the fourth zone.

Were Trump to accede to Russia’s territorial objectives, essentially granting de jure legitimacy status to the Russian territorial gains in the war, it would be highly controversial in Congress. Trump would face censure for acquiescing in an illegal invasion of Ukraine.

This is more problematic than Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, where the US simply left by pulling out its forces. While the Taliban took over as the pro-US Afghan government disintegrated, the US did not recognize the new government or offer any overt concessions to it. Today, the US maintains an Afghan affairs office in Doha, Qatar, but has no diplomatic relations with Afghanistan.

The Kellogg plan is not, despite his statements, like the Berlin agreement. People remember that at the end of World War II, the Allies divided Germany into four zones – the US, UK, France and Russia. Similarly, the Allies split Berlin, Germany’s capital within the Soviet zone, into four sectors (though the US, British, and French sectors later merged).

The background of the German partitioning came about because of serious disagreements among the allies over Germany’s future and a shift in the outlook of the US and UK, who saw Germany as a geopolitical asset and the USSR as a threat.

For Ukraine, officially the conflict is between Ukraine and Russia, with third parties (especially NATO) supporting Ukraine with arms, advisers, technical support, training, supplies, financial aid and intelligence. Unlike Ukraine, the Russians have been mostly on their own, although China has helped them under the table – as has North Korea, even supplying a few thousand soldiers.

Russia’s major advantage is a significant military-industrial base and a large recruitment pool for soldiers. Ukraine, on its own, would have long since disappeared: It is entirely a creature of NATO from a support and resources point of view.

Those differences aside, some kind of partitioning of Ukrainian territory is not out of the question in the future. It could be an outcome under some circumstances that are by no means far-fetched.

Looked at along a timeline where the negotiations either fail or drag out without resolution – which may be convenient for the United States and for the Russians, especially if Trump and Putin can’t find a mutually acceptable formula and the Zelensky government continues to act in the mode of enfant terrible – the Russians may be successful in defeating Ukraine’s army on the battlefield.

Short of that dramatic result, they may destroy a significant part of the Ukrainian army in the field – precipitating a real crisis in Kyiv. Zelensky, who cannot really negotiate with Russia (assuming he actually wanted to do so), would face an enormous risk keeping his government in Kyiv.

Facing the prospect of either being captured by the Russians or being replaced by extreme nationalists in the army and intelligence services, Zelensky may find it convenient to retreat to the west, potentially establishing a Ukrainian government in Lvov, which is far enough away from Russia to be considered more or less secure.

With a new government in Kyiv, likely pro-Russian, Ukraine would be practically partitioned. Essentially, Kellogg’s Zone 1 would become the Zelensky-led Ukraine headquartered in Lvov, and Russia would control everything east of the Dnieper, even possibly Odesa, a city founded by Catherine the Great and which Russia considers Russian.

If this scenario plays out, then some sort of European rescue army could plant itself in Zone 1, avoiding a total defeat for Europe, the EU and NATO.

There are many downsides and upsides to this scenario. NATO will probably remain in a part of Ukraine, and Russia will not get international recognition for its military conquests. This would reduce the US and NATO burden of militarily, economically and politically supporting Ukraine.

The US would be free to focus its attention elsewhere, mainly Asia and China, and rebuild stockpiles of weapons depleted during the Ukraine war. Europe could boast it stood by Ukraine, but without the consequence of the war spreading outside Ukraine’s borders. NATO would not lose face, nor would Washington.

There is already talk in Europe about reopening Europe (especially Germany and France) to “cheap” Russian energy. That’s a signal that the endgame is in sight. Europe cannot afford an economic collapse that would create upheaval on the continent, stimulate social revolution and purge the ruling elites responsible for the mess.

Even Europe, despite all the war talk, will have to face the necessity of adjusting its vision or face chaos.

Joe Lauria: Downplaying Ukraine Connection in Latest Trump Plot

By Joe Lauria, Consortium News, 4/14/25

Included in the F.B.I.’s affidavit charging a 17-year old Wisconsin teenager for murdering his parents in February and plotting to assassinate President Donald Trump with explosives dropped from a drone are the transcripts of Telegram chats the suspect had with one or more people in Ukraine. 

In all three communications cited by the F.B.I., the suspect, Nikita Casap, uses the handle @accelerationist. The first transcript reads:

“@accelerationist: ‘what country do you think will get the blame for this [Trump’s assassination]?’

 Unknown: Russia will be blamed for it, this is the goal.” 

Casap then asks Unknown how he should send his 3-page manifesto outlying his reasons to assassinate Trump and possibly Vice President J.D. Vance:  to create the needed chaos to overthrow the U.S. government and “save the white race” from “Jewish controlled” politicians.  Casap asks if his manifesto will be edited and Unknown simply tells him to send him photographs of the document.

The F.B.I. then described the second Telegram conversation:

The phone number in the document is found on a Facebook page called “DIY soapmaking” with no further information other than an email address. Consortium News wrote to the address but received an “Address Not Found” response. A call placed to the number by CN indicates that the number, unsurprisingly, is no longer working. 

In the third chat, Casap received instructions from someone writing in Cyrillic. 

This could be either the same person or someone else in Ukraine or conceivably in Russia writing in Cyrillic. The F.B.I. reports third-hand from a classmate of Casap that Casap told him he was in contact with someone in Russia. 

The F.B.I. does not make clear whether “Unknown,” “POMaH BiKTOBNWY,” and “forest” are different people. But whether one or three, they are clearly directing Casap to change his license plates, to drive from Wyoming back east to Kansas, south to Oklahoma and then west to California. 

He did not make it that far however. On Feb. 28, police in WaKeeney, Kansas arrested Casap just 85 minutes after his step father’s car was listed by police as stolen. In the car was a .357 magnum revolver, jewelry, $14,000 in cash and several electronic devices.

Earlier that day police in Waukesha, Wisconsin had discovered the dead bodies of his mother, Tatiana Casap, 35, and his stepfather, Donald Mayer, 51, in the family home.  

Nikita Casap had killed them both about two hours apart on Feb. 11, police determined. A neighbor saw Casap leaving with the family dog in Mayer’s SUV on Feb. 23. He had lived with his parents’ decomposing bodies for 12 days.

The F.B.I. says Casap killed them to get the financing and “autonomy” needed to carry out the assassination.

The bureau says the Telegram “messages in Russian” took place between Feb. 14, three days after police say he killed his parents, and Feb. 24, four days before he was arrested. The conversation about making it look like Russia did it took place on Jan. 25, however, according to the affidavit. 

In what appears to be a possibly fourth Russian language chat with someone the F.B.I. does not identify, Casap is instructed what to do with his parents’ bodies.

“a. ‘Reply to them all and say [you] got sick.

b. ‘Take [drag] them to the basement.’”

The F.B.I. contacted Mayer’s employer who told the bureau he had not showed up for work for two weeks but had sent several messages saying that he was sick.  Casap did not drag the bodies to the basement but left them where he had killed them. He covered them with blankets and was charged with “hiding a corpse” as well as plotting to kill the president. 

A Plot Directed From Ukraine

One can only conclude from this early evidence that Casap was directed from Ukraine in a plot to kill Trump. The F.B.I. says Casap had already bought drones and explosives. He received instructions on how to use the drones to extend their range and avoid detection but the F.B.I does not say where these directions came from.  Casap had a Telegram chat with someone named Angel of Death about purchasing a “drone with a dropping mechanism” in bitcoin for about $1,200 to $1,500. The affidavit does not say where Angel of Death is located.

We know that one or more people in Ukraine instructed Casap every step of the way: to move his parents’ bodies, to text his father’s workplace, to change the license plates on his stepfather’s SUV, to follow a circuitous route to California, and to send his manifesto to Ukraine. 

Casap also communicated to them about the plan for him to settle in Ukraine once the assassination was carried out. And perhaps most significantly someone in Ukraine told him that the goal of the operation was to make it look like Russia had assassinated Trump.

At this point there is no indication who this person or persons may be in Ukraine. The F.B.I. says Casap was involved in a Satanic group. (He also praised Hitler in his manifesto.) The bureau provides chat transcripts with like-minded Satanists but none of these are said to be in Ukraine.

Eureka, California appeared to be his final destination some time in March. There’s no indication yet that he would come into possession of the drone or drones there and the explosives. Trump did not visit Eureka, the scene of several recent anti-Trump protests, in the month of March or so far in April. 

Earlier Ukraine Connections

This is the second time a connection to Ukraine has arisen in a plot to assassinate Trump. Ryan Routh was arrested for attempting to kill Trump on his golf course in West Palm Beach, Florida on Sept. 15, 2024. 

Routh told The New York Times and Newsweek that he flew to Ukraine in 2022 to fight but was rejected because he had no military experience and was in his mid-50s. So he turned to recruiting foreign fighters for Ukraine, but apparently failed at that too.

There is no indication Routh maintained any connection to Ukrainian authorities. 

A week ago on April 8, federal prosecutors said in a court filing that in August 2024 Routh tried to purchase an anti-aircraft weapon from a Ukrainian weapons dealer which prosecutors are tieing to Routh’s surveillance of Palm Beach International airport, where candidate Trump flew into and out of. 

The court filing says: “Attempting to purchase a destructive device to blow up President Trump’s airplane lies squarely within the realm of an attempt on his life, and Routh’s statements about the purpose of the purchase drives home his intent.” 

He allegedly wrote to the arms dealer: “Send me an rpg [rocket-propelled grenade] or stinger [anti-aircraft missile] and I will see what we can do … [Trump] is not good for Ukraine.” 

Media Downplay 

Given the extent of the evidence divulged in the F.B.I.’s affidavit about the involvement by one or more persons in Ukraine in a plot to assassinate a president of the United States it should cause great wonderment why the leading media in the U.S. and abroad either downplayed or completely ignored the Ukraine connection in this story. 

In the fourth paragraph of The Washington Post ‘s account we read that the F.B.I. “found messages in Russian and communications on TikTok and Telegram,” without any mention of Ukraine. It leaves the impression that the messages originated from Russia. 

The 11th paragraph reads: “A review of Casap’s communications also found that he planned on leaving the United States for Ukraine after carrying out his plot.” No mention of him discussing this with someone in Ukraine, however. 

As an afterthought, CNN’s account leaves it to the penultimate paragraph to say, out of the blue, with no context or explanation:  

“According to the Waukesha County complaint, detectives found messages indicating Casap planned to leave the US for Ukraine. In one Telegram message, he asked, “So while in Ukraine, I’ll be able to live a normal life? Even when it’s found out I did it?”

The BBC reported without proof that Casap was in touch with people in Russia about killing his parents, that he planned to go to Ukraine and was simply “in touch” with other parties about killing Trump.  It reported:

“The court documents allege the suspect was speaking with people in Russia about plans to kill his parents.

Authorities said the teenager paid for a drone and explosives to use in an attack – and had plans to escape to Ukraine.

‘He was in touch with other parties about his plan to kill the president and overthrow the government of the United States,’ investigators wrote.”

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation just stuck in the middle of its report:

“In court, prosecutors alleged the teen was in touch with a person who spoke Russian and shared a plan to flee to Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors alleged Nikita’s manifesto outlined his reasons for wanting to kill Mr Trump and included ideas about how he would live in Ukraine.”

Perhaps worst, The New York Times does not mention Ukraine once.

Neither The Guardian nor The Wall Street appear to have covered the story at all.

Joe Lauria is editor-in-chief of  Consortium News  and a former U.N. correspondent for  T he Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe , and other newspapers, including The Montreal Gazette, the London Daily Mail and The Star of Johannesburg. He was an investigative reporter for the  Sunday Times  of London, a financial reporter for Bloomberg News and began his professional work as a 19-year old stringer for  The New York Times.  He is the author of two books, A Political Odyssey, with Sen. Mike Gravel, foreword by Daniel Ellsberg; and How I Lost By Hillary Clinton, foreword by Julian Assange.

Uriel Araujo: Greek-Turkish conflict imminent? Tensions expose NATO’s fragile unity

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 4/25/25

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

The simmering tensions between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies supposedly, over territorial claims in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean have once again thrust the Atlantic alliance’s internal contradictions into the spotlight. Ongoing military talks between the two nations, starting this week, aim to de-escalate disputes over maritime boundaries and airspace violations; yet the underlying issues reveal a deeper fissure within NATO’s structure.

At the heart of the Greek-Turkish standoff are competing claims over resource-rich waters and historical grievances rooted in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey’s assertive “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which seeks to expand its maritime influence, clashes with Greece’s efforts to secure its sovereignty over Aegean islands and its exclusive economic zone. Some analysts have accused Athens of leveraging Western support to sidestep geopolitical realities. While Greece’s position is framed as defensive, Turkey’s actions—such as deploying seismic research vessels or challenging Greek island militarization—are seen by Ankara as legitimate assertions of sovereignty.

These disputes are not merely bilateral; they ripple across NATO, threatening the alliance’s unity at a time when its European member states seek to project strength. For a few years, some analysts have been discussing the likelihood of a Turkish-Greek war breaking out, with episodes intensifying over the last three years at least. For example, in 2022, Ankara accused Athens of using an S-300 missile system to lock onto Turkish jets conducting NATO missions over the Mediterranean on August 23, 2022.

The broader geopolitical context amplifies these tensions. A notable example is the reported opposition by a pro-Israel, pro-Greece lobby in the United States to Turkey’s rumored plan to transfer Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems to Syria. This lobbying effort underscores how external actors are able to exploit NATO’s internal divisions to advance their own agendas. Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400s, which led to its exclusion from the U.S.-led F-35 program, has long been a point of contention within NATO, with Washington imposing sanctions and Greece capitalizing on Turkey’s isolation to bolster its own defense ties with the U.S. and France. Greece’s ambitions include modernizing its air force with F-35 jets and strengthening naval capabilities, moves that Turkey perceives as a direct challenge.

These developments highlight NATO’s structural weaknesses. The alliance, designed to counter a supposed monolithic Soviet threat, struggles to mediate conflicts between its members in a world where national interests increasingly diverge. Turkey’s pivot toward strategic autonomy and regional hegemony—evidenced by its balancing act between Russia, Ukraine, and the West—clashes with NATO’s expectation of unwavering alignment.

Despite the “balancing” acts, Turkey’s assertive naval expansion in the Black Sea, leveraging the Montreux Convention to restrict Russia’s fleet, risks escalating tensions with Moscow, as I recently argued, thereby threatening Eurasian stability. To further complicate things, Turkey’s strategic maneuvers, including plans of promoting a “Turan Army” to counter the CSTO, does align with NATO’s efforts to undermine Russia and China, further destabilizing the region.

In a complex “who plays who” game, at the same time, Turkey’s actions, including its S-400 purchase, challenge NATO’s cohesion.

Be it as it may, the ongoing Greek-Turkish dialogue, while a step toward de-escalation, is unlikely to resolve these deeper fissures for the time being. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has expressed willingness to visit Turkey despite recent tensions, signaling a pragmatic approach. However, Greece’s efforts to limit Turkey’s access to EU defense collaboration, and its alignment with France and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean suggest a strategy of containment which can only be interpreted as a defensive reaction to Ankara’s ambitions. Turkey, meanwhile, faces domestic pressures and elections, which may embolden its assertive rhetoric, as seen in President Erdoğan’s warnings against Greek island militarization.

One should keep in mind that despite Turkey’s denunciations of Greek militarization in the Aegean, it is Ankara that aggressively pursues naval hegemony through its “Blue Homeland” doctrine, expanding maritime claims. Turkey’s neo-Ottoman agenda, marked by provocative naval maneuvers and territorial assertions, escalates tensions and undermines regional stability.

In any case, NATO’s response to these tensions has been predictably tepid. The alliance’s secretary generals have historically mediated Greek-Turkish disputes, but their solutions—such as the “Recognized Air Picture” over the Aegean—are superficial, failing to address root causes like maritime delimitation or energy resource disputes. As Dimitris Tsarouhas (head of the Turkey Research Program at the Center for European and Transatlantic Studies at Virginia Technotes) notes, a realistic path forward would require both nations to prioritize cooperation over confrontation, yet the Atlantic Alliance’s framework offers little incentive for such compromise when external powers, including the U.S. and France, take sides.

In an emerging multipolar world, the Greek-Turkish standoff is a microcosm of NATO’s obsolescence. The Alliance’s reliance on U.S. hegemony (to the point it seems quite “lost” now when facing Washington’s partial “withdrawal” from Eastern Europe, for instance) and its inability to accommodate diverse national interests—particularly those of pivotal members such as Turkey—expose its fragility.

Turkey’s Black Sea maneuvers reflect a broader shift on the way it plays NATO while pursuing its own goals of hegemony and regional autonomy (the way it sees it). This is a trend NATO cannot really contain without risking further fragmentation. Such tensions underscore the need for a new security architecture—one that respects sovereign aspirations and fosters equitable dialogue, free from NATO’s outdated unipolar vision.

Putin’s Meeting with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov on Removal of All Ukrainian Forces from Kursk

Kremlin website (machine translation), 4/26/25

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief heard via video link the report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov on the completion of the defeat of the Ukrainian formations that invaded the Kursk region.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Valery Vasilyevich, I know that you have information on the latest developments in the Kursk direction. What are the results of combat work over the past day and for the entire previous period?

Vladimir Gerasimov: Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief,

Today, the last settlement in the Kursk region – the village of Gornal – has been liberated from Ukrainian units.

At the same time, units of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 72nd Division, the 810th and 40th Separate Marine Brigades, the 177th Separate Marine Regiment and the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment distinguished themselves.

Thus, the defeat of the armed formations of the armed forces of Ukraine, which invaded the Kursk region, has been completed. The plans of the Kyiv regime to create a so-called strategic bridgehead and disrupt our offensive in the Donbass have failed.

На начальном этапе операции продвижение противника вглубь нашей территории было остановлено с последующим сокращением площади вклинения, украинские подразделения вынужденно перешли к обороне. В дальнейшем нанесением встречных ударов с флангов вдоль государственной границы двумя десантными дивизиями, 76-й и 106-й, а также действиями 155-й и 810-й бригад морской пехоты основная группировка вооружённых сил Украины была изолирована, а в последующем рассечена и уничтожалась по частям.

The most active phase of the operation began on March 6 of this year. As a result of the offensive actions of the units and military units of the Kursk group simultaneously in all directions, as well as the breakthrough into the enemy’s rear by the underground landing force consisting of the Veterans volunteer formation, personnel of the 11th airborne assault brigade, the 30th motorized rifle regiment and the Akhmat special forces unit through the gas transportation system pipeline, the defense of the Ukrainian armed forces collapsed. A chaotic retreat of the Ukrainian units began. And within five days, the area of ​​the wedged-in area decreased by 2.5 times.

During the subsequent actions, the few remaining Ukrainian elite units were defeated and driven out of the Kursk region.

During the operation, the enemy suffered significant losses, in order to maintain the number of his group at the level of about 60 thousand people, he was forced to constantly transfer reserves and units from other sectors to the Kursk direction. The total losses of the formations of the armed forces of Ukraine amounted to more than 76 thousand people, servicemen, killed and wounded. In fact, one composition of the original enemy grouping and even more was knocked out. Over 7,700 units of military equipment were destroyed, including 412 tanks, 340 infantry fighting vehicles, 314 armored personnel carriers, and about 2,300 other armored combat vehicles.

I would like to note separately the participation in the liberation of the border areas of the Kursk Region of the military personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who, in accordance with the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between our countries, provided significant assistance in defeating the wedged group of the Ukrainian armed forces. Soldiers and officers of the Korean People’s Army, performing combat missions shoulder to shoulder with Russian servicemen, during the repulsion of the Ukrainian invasion, showed high professionalism, showed resilience, courage and heroism in battle.

Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief!

Currently, in the liberated areas of the Kursk region, measures are being taken to identify single servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine trying to take refuge on Russian territory. Forest areas, basements and abandoned buildings are checked. Local authorities are being assisted in restoring peaceful life. Engineering units of the Sever group and the International Mine Action Center of the Military Engineering Academy are conducting complete demining of the territory and the destruction of explosive objects. 19 settlements were fully checked and cleared. 110 demining groups are involved in these works, this is more than 1000 personnel.

In accordance with your instructions, the creation of a security zone in the border areas of the Sumy region of Ukraine continues. Four settlements were liberated. The total area of the controlled area is more than 90 square kilometers.

In addition, in the Belgorod region, units of the North group of troops completed the destruction of Ukrainian sabotage groups in the area of the village of Popovka. The search and elimination of individual servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hiding in the border forest belts is being carried out.

In other directions, the Joint Group of Troops (Forces) continues to perform tasks in accordance with the plan of the special military operation.

I have finished my report.

В.Путин: Валерий Васильевич, на протяжении нескольких месяцев Вы регулярно докладывали мне о ситуации в Курской области и отмечали наиболее эффективно действовавшие наши подразделения. Не могу не назвать их сегодня еще раз.

These are the 76th Airborne Division, the 234th Airborne Assault Regiment of this division, the 237th Airborne Assault Regiment and the 104th Airborne Assault Regiment of this division; the 106th Airborne Division and its 119th Parachute Regiment, the 137th Parachute Regiment, and the 51st Parachute Regiment. These are the 56th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Airborne Assault Division; two Akhmat regiments – the 204th Special Purpose Regiment Akhmat and the 1434th Motorized Rifle Regiment Akhmat; The 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 72nd Division, the 11th Airborne Assault Brigade, the 83rd Separate Airborne Assault Brigade. Finally, our Marines, glorious Marines – the 155th Marine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, the 810th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet. And of course, you just mentioned it, the volunteer formation “Veterans”, who carried out a daring underground landing in the Sudzha area and created the conditions for its complete liberation.

I congratulate all personnel of all military units that took part in the defeat of neo-Nazi groups that invaded Russian territory in the Kursk region.

The Kyiv regime’s adventure has completely failed, and the enormous losses suffered by the enemy, including among the most combat-ready, trained and equipped forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including those with Western equipment – and these are assault units and special forces – will undoubtedly be reflected along the entire line of combat contact.

The complete defeat of the enemy in the Kursk border region creates conditions for further successful actions of our troops in other important areas of the front, and brings the defeat of the neo-Nazi regime closer.

I congratulate all personnel, all fighters and commanders on this success, on the victory. I thank you for the courage, heroism, for serving our Fatherland and the people of Russia.

Thank you.

V. Gerasimov: I serve Russia!