Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 14

Nicolai Petro: NOW Political Collapse Is Inevitable: NATO Can’t Save Ukraine

YouTube link here.

Russia-West clash not about ideology – Putin

YouTube link to excerpt of Putin interview here.

RT, 7/13/25

Western nations’ hegemonic aspirations and dismissal of Russia’s security concerns have led to the ongoing standoff between Moscow and the West, President Vladimir Putin said in an interview released on Sunday. Ideological differences are only a pretext to advance the West’s geopolitical interests, he claimed.

Putin added that he expected the collapse of the USSR to alleviate tensions between Russia and the West.

“I also thought that key disagreements [between us] were ideological in nature,” he stated. “Yet, when the Soviet Union was gone… the dismissive approach to Russia’s strategic interests persisted.”

The president went on to say that his attempts to raise Russia’s concerns with Western leaders were in vain. “The West decided… they do not need to follow the rules when it comes to Russia, which does not have the same power as the USSR.”

All of Moscow’s proposals regarding mutual security, strengthening international stability, and reaching agreements on offensive weapons and missile defense were rejected, Putin said. “It was not just negligence. It was based on a clear desire to reach some geopolitical goals.”

“It has become clear that, unless Russia positions itself as an independent sovereign nation… we will not be reckoned with,” he added.

The Russian president has accused Western nations of betraying Russia and not fulfilling their promises. Last month, he said Moscow was “blatantly lied to” about NATO expansion for decades as the US-led military bloc approached Russia’s borders.

“Everything was good as long as it was against Russia,” he said at the time, adding that Western nations have supported separatism and even terrorism directed against the country.

Moscow has listed Kiev’s NATO ambitions and Western military assistance to Ukraine key reasons behind the Ukraine conflict. Prior to the escalation in early 2022, Russia sought to address its security concerns by seeking guarantees from US and NATO, as well as non-aligned status for Ukraine, which were rejected by the West.

Simplicius: Rubio Claims Russia Suffered 100k KIA in Six Months, Ukrainian Casualties Remain ‘Vague’

By Simplicius, Substack, 7/11/25

The topic of casualties is one we periodically revisit when necessary. Now is such a time, as Marco Rubio has made the absurd claim—coordinated with MSM outlets—that the Russian Army has suffered a whopping 100,000 deaths just since January of this year alone; purely deaths, not even total casualties:

This was immediately backed up by new articles, like the following from the Economist, which likewise claims Russia is experiencing its deadliest year on the front yet, with 30,000+ deaths just in the past couple months alone:

https://www.economist.com/interactive/graphic-detail/2025/07/09/russias-summer-ukraine-offensive-looks-like-its-deadliest-so-far

The above article is a particularly egregious example. Just take a look at their methodology, or lack thereof. This small extract constitutes the entirety of their ‘scientific’ premise for Russian losses:

There is no official tally of losses on either side. But our daily war tracker offers some clues. Our satellite data and shifts to areas of control suggest when the fighting is intensifying. This lines up well with more than 200 credible estimates of casualties from Western governments and independent researchers. By combining this data we can, for the first time, provide a credible daily death toll—or an estimate of estimates.

In short, they claim their satellite data alerts them to where fighting happens to ‘intensify’, and from that they—by some incredible leap of logic—infer that Russian forces are experiencing massive losses. The baffling part is that this facile methodology should apply to the AFU in parallel as well, yet when it comes to Ukraine’s losses, the Economist’s staff are without even a hint of curiosity:

Read that again: satellite data showing “intense fighting” inherently points to Russian losses merely on the assumption that any fighting, as a general rule, results in Russian but not Ukrainian losses. This is an astoundingly juvenile, biased, and to be frank, fraudulent, level of analysis.

Recall this previous revelation, which tells us everything about the West’s info-hygiene:

These publications claim to have such ‘sensitive’ attunements to the battlefield fluctuations as to give exact Russian figures, but when it comes to Ukraine, they are suddenly lacking data.

The fact is, there’s a reason why MediaZona very abruptly changed up their methodology to include “projected” deaths rather than real counted ones, as done previously—because contrary to this coordinated propaganda campaign, Russian losses have actually been at the lowest in a long time. This is precisely the reason such an orchestrated campaign was necessary: Ukraine is badly losing, and the only remaining aspect of the war the propagandists could feasibly utilize to try and spin the narrative are the casualty figures, because they are typically the most ‘subjective’ and ambiguous in nature—which makes them perfect fodder for devious manipulation.

Presently, MediaZona has the total Russian death toll at ~117k as of early July:

If you highlight only January 1st to present, you get 9,849 confirmed deaths:

https://en.zona.media/article/2025/07/04/casualties_eng-trl

You can do this yourself at the official site to confirm.

That means through the first six months of this year, they have registered a mere 9,849 Russian deaths, which amounts to 1,641 per month. Western and Ukrainian publications, on the other hand, claim Russia is suffering that many deaths per day. The discrepancy shows an unprecedented detachment from reality.

We do know MediaZona has a ‘lag’ because it takes time to confirm most recent deaths, and so the number will likely rise, but probably not by an inordinate amount. There is no evidence whatsoever that Russia is taking anywhere near the kinds of losses the West claims. In fact, someone made a good point: since it is Ukraine that purports that 70-90% of their kills on Russian soldiers come by way of drones, they should be able to show all these vast amounts of losses via drone camera recordings; yet there is nothing—and we know the AFU loves nothing more than showing off its ‘successes’.

In an article two months ago, I had highlighted the timeline of the Russian Army’s growth from Ukraine’s own sources. It went as follows:

2023: Bloomberg announces Russian troop count at 420,000.2024: Head of Ukraine’s military intelligence tells Economist the number had swelled to 514,000.Early 2025: It was 600,000.

And what do we have now, at the midpoint of 2025? Straight from Zelensky’s own mouth:

So, to reiterate and simplify:

400k troops in 2023, 500k in 2024, 600k in early 2025, and already 700k in mid-2025.

This is all from Ukrainian sources, the originals of which you can find in my previous article here.

How can Russia possibly be suffering a claimed 100,000 dead in just six months—as per Rubio—when it is literally gaining over 100,000 per year?

In order for Russia to suffer 100k deaths in six months—annualized to 200k per year—and still gain 100k+ men per year, Russian recruitment would have to be staggering, given the contract churn we outlined previously. Hard to imagine people willingly signing up under the dark cloud of such losses, while in Ukraine—suffering “far fewer casualties”—people have to be forcibly kidnapped from the streets and herded into vans like cattle.

Strange how it’s Ukrainian cemeteries that continue to infamously fill up, rather than Russian ones, and how the past year’s ratio of dead body exchanges has jumped to such an astronomical disparity as to be off the charts:

Any honest journalist would pucker at such incongruities in the data—but alas, that species is about as common as a three-legged emu.

As a recent glimpse into Russian losses during active assaults, here is one honest post from Russian military sources about a settlement that was captured. They write that they suffered four “200s” during the operation:

There are many such assaults per day, so you can multiply the four by the daily amount to get a reasonable count—but it certainly isn’t hundreds, much less thousands.

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Neue Zürcher Zeitung has a new piece which spells out that Ukraine only has two options to prevent collapse:

https://www.nzz.ch/pro/jetzt-geht-der-kreml-aufs-ganze-ld.1892551

Now the Kremlin is going all out.

The Russian operational plan aims to tear apart the Ukrainian ground forces. The general staff in Kiev still has two options to prevent a breakthrough.

They begin by aptly noting that Putin spelled out the strategy himself at a recent forum:

“They already have too few personnel,” Putin went on to analyze, “and they are withdrawing their forces there, which are already lacking in the decisive theaters of armed conflict.” Putin is making little effort to conceal his operational intentions: the Russian General Staff wants to tear the Ukrainian army apart – and then attempt a breakthrough at a suitable point.

Then they reveal the two options Ukraine faces, which I’ll annotate:

Sirski, on the other hand, still has two basic options for saving Ukraine from a military defeat in the current situation:

1.Delay: The aim is to lose as little ground as possible during the Russian summer offensive and to avoid encirclement of larger troop units. In the fall, the front could then be consolidated and a starting point for negotiations created. At present, Kiev appears to be pursuing this course – in the hope that the USA will resume its military aid.

Here, they admit that Ukraine’s best chance is merely to stall until “negotiations” can be effected; but we know Russia has zero incentive for such a thing, unless you kowtow to the fake figures of Russian losses and believe Russia is “on its last leg”, as per Strelkov and the rest of the doomer clan.

Their second option is to withdraw to the new defensive line reportedly being constructed a few dozen kilometers behind the current LOC:

2. operational withdrawal: The Ukrainian ground forces could gradually withdraw from the front and take up new positions protected by natural and artificial obstacles. The aim is to prevent a capitulation and to maintain the army to protect sovereignty even in the event of an unfavorable outcome to the negotiations. One indication that this option is being examined is the construction of a Ukrainian fortification line 20 kilometers behind the front from the Kharkiv area to Zaporizhia in the southwest of Ukraine.

There are not enough forces for a surprise anywhere along the front, and the pinpricks in the depths of the Russian area will hardly have any effect except in the information area. The Ukrainians lack fighter aircraft such as the F-35 to gain at least partial air superiority. In addition, ammunition for the Himars missile artillery, the Taurus guided missiles, supplies for air defense – the list is well known in Western capitals.

Europe has gone on summer vacation and Trump is at least considering sending defensive weapons to Ukraine again. But the risk of a Russian breakthrough is growing. If a gap opens up somewhere, the occupying forces can suddenly maneuver and use the bridgeheads at Sumi and Kharkiv for large-scale operations. Sirski then gradually ran out of options.

However, the decision to switch from delay to operational withdrawal in good time does not lie with the head of the army, but with President Volodimir Zelensky in Kiev and his dilemma: between military necessity and the political principle of hoping that the Western allies will stand by their big words after all. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is going all out – politically and militarily.

But what would that do? Just like the inherent nonsensical nature of the first option, the second would hardly give Russia pause. We know Ukraine relies on PR to maintain continuity and casualty figures are one facet of this which can be deftly hidden, while territorial changes cannot. This means the organ grinder-in-chief Zelensky would prefer to quietly keep composting thousands of his men while feigning ‘strong resistance’ and pretending that Russia is ‘making no gains’. If a sudden large-scale breakthrough swallowed up a chunk of Ukrainian territory, Western support would likely collapse over night as Ukraine would be deemed a dead case.

—

Lastly, in anticipation of Trump’s supposed “big announcement” on Monday, several MSM publications are reporting that Trump is preparing to launch an unprecedented global oil embargo against Russia:

https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/trump-global-oil-embargo-russia-r2pg8kw6t

It describes a fancifully unrealistic plan to shackle any country in the world that buys oil or uranium from Russia with a massive 500% tariff. The chances of this passing are laughable, as it would destroy the economies of the US and its allies, rather than harming Russia.

The squabbles over ‘control’ discussed last time rear their head again:

Senators have said they would be willing to grant Trump the power to waive the tariff for up to 180 days, provided there was congressional oversight. The White House is, however, insisting that Congress should have no power to intervene if the president decided to end the sanctions.

Maximilian Hess, a fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute, predicted Trump would baulk at the 500 per cent tariff in the bill, which would be equivalent to a global embargo on Russian oil.

Hess elaborates:

“As it’s written, in my view it’s just too strong to ever be used, unless Trump gets out there and says, ‘We need to face the risk that Russia poses to Europe and the globe and we have to accept oil prices of closer to $100 or maybe even higher’,” he said. “Which I just cannot see Trump doing.”

The reason Trump wants such control is because he’s merely using the threat of these laughable ‘sanctions’ to try and frighten Putin into concessions, and wants the ability to immediately pull out, TACO-style, as soon as it backfires. The neocon segment of Congress—Graham, Blumenthal, and co.—want to deviously ‘bake in’ the sanctions by having power over them, so that Trump is forced into a major confrontation with Russia; obviously, the freewheeling deep state moles in Congress cannot allow a US-Russian rapprochement and need to create fissures at all costs.

It is also why they recently ‘leaked’ the audio of his threats to bomb Moscow at an opportune time: they’re doing everything in their power to stir the pot and fan the flames of the narrative of confrontation to browbeat Trump into escalation against Moscow.

The big question is, does Trump have the backbone to stay the course?

—

Lastly:

Ukraine reports Russia has accumulated a record number of missiles—2,000 total:

Even as we speak, another major strike on Ukraine reportedly featuring hundreds of drones and a few dozen missiles is ongoing—all unopposed, as usual:

How are those Patriots coming along?

Russia Matters: Trump Threatens Putin With Tariffs, Arms Supplies to Kyiv, But How Serious Are His Threats?

Russia Matters, 7/14/25

While hosting NATO’s SG Mark Rutte on July 14, President Donald  Trump  unveiled a deal with this alliance that would send weapons to Ukraine within days while also threating Russia with stiff penalties in his renewed effort to end hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. “We’ve made a deal today where we are going to be sending them [Ukraine] weapons and they [NATO countries] [are] going to be paying for them,” Trump was quoted by Wall Street Journal as saying in Rutte’s presence. During the same event the U.S. president also threatened Russia with “secondary tariffs” unless a deal to end the hostilities in Ukraine is reached by early September. “We’re going to be doing very severe tariffs if we don’t have a deal in 50 days, tariffs at about 100%, you’d call them secondary tariffs,” Trump was quoted by Financial Times as saying. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick later said Trump could choose to impose either tariffs or sanctions on countries that do business with Russia, according to Wall Street Journal. Last week saw Trump repeatedly state his unhappiness with Putin’s unwillingness to agree to an unconditional end of hostilities in Ukraine, promising a “major statement” on Russia on July 14. Thus, his July 14 threats came as no surprise, but they were also met with some skepticism. “It is unclear if… Putin will take Trump’s threat seriously,” Alexander Ward and his co-authors wrote in Wall Street Journal on July 14.“For a frequent flip-flopper like him [Trump], can anyone ever tell which flip or flop is for real?” Susan Glasser wondered in the New Yorker. “The president is a late and very reluctant convert to the approach of trying to confront and isolate Mr. Putin” and the approach he is taking “seems designed to keep him at least one arm’s length away from the conflict,” David Sanger and Maggie Haberman explained in New York Times. That Trump is “coming around on Ukraine” represents a decision that “isn’t isolationist or internationalist but realistic,” according to Peggy Noonan.“Russia’s factories have begun churning out vast quantities of attack drones over the past year, producing a deadly fleet that is now taking to Ukrainian skies in record numbers almost daily,” Matthew Luxmoore and Jane Lytvynenko reported in a July 10 article for Wall Street Journal. Writing for the same newspaper Jillian Kay Melchior also noted the surge in Russian drone production, as did Andrew Kramer of The New York Times. “As Russia’s defense industry continues to ramp up, military analysts expect Russia to routinely launch more than 1,000 drones per volley by autumn,” Kramer warned. These articles indicate that the mainstream U.S. media outlets are catching up with the recent changes in correlation of drone production in Ukraine and Russia in the latter’s favor. In the first and second year of Russia’s full-fledged invasion into Ukraine, such outlets as Wall Street Journal were reporting how use of drones by Ukraine helped to  turn the tide  in Kyiv’s favor while New York Times reported how “ Ukraine has stayed ahead in the drones arm race .” In the third year of the war  Forbes  declared that “For the first time, Ukraine is launching more long-range drone attacks than Russia.” The coverage of the drone race began to change, however, in 2025. For instance, in January of this year,  ECFR ’s Ulrike Franke published an article on the web site of this think-tank that estimated that Russia was matching Ukraine’s pace of drone production. Five months later, the press was also noticing this change. For instance,  The Times of London’s  Anthony Loyd reported from Donbas: “Russia has taken the lead in the drone race, outproducing Kyiv in the manufacture and use of medium-range FPV drones and fiber optic variants that have changed the shape of the entire 1,200 km front line.” Loyd’s May 2025 article was echoed by Politico’s Veronika Melkozerova, who reported in June 2025, citing Zelensky himself, that “Ukraine produces about 100 long-range drones a day, while Russia has managed to scale up production to 300 a day and is aiming for 500.” Russian drone producers managed to boost long-range drone production from 15,000 in 2024 to more than 30,000 this year, as well as up to 2 million small tactical drones, according to Melkozerova.Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s decision to nominate first deputy prime minister Yulia Svyrydenko as his next PM is a victory for his powerful chief of staff Andriy Yermak for whom there appears to be little love lost in Washington. “Svyrydenko is considered a close ally” of Yermak, according to July 14 article in Financial Times. Apart from the new prime minister, changes are expected at education, health, culture, social policy and possibly finance, according to the Economist. The Economist reported on July 6 that a cabinet reshuffle is “imminent” and that is being driven by Yermak whose lecturing approach to diplomacy Americans despair at. While being allied with Yermak, Svyrydenko is also seen as having “strong ties with Donald Trump’s team after leading the minerals talks alongside U.S. Treasury secretary Scott Bessent,” according to Financial Times.

The War in Ukraine Has Shattered the West’s Digital-Age Delusions

by David Betz and Michael Rainsborough, The Daily Sceptic, 6/15/25

David Betz is Professor of War in the Modern World at King’s College London. Michael Rainsborough is Professor of Strategic Theory at the Centre for Future Defence and National Security.

For all the breathless commentary, one awkward truth has loitered beneath the surface of the Russia-Ukraine war, which is that most people beyond the immediate theatre of conflict don’t have any clear sense of what’s happening on the ground. The fog of war has been thickened not only by competing narratives along with fragmentary info-snacking YouTube clips of drone strikes, but by something more persistent — Western wishful thinking.

For nearly three years, a chorus of commentary penned by pundits whose proximity to the war — geographically or intellectually — is open to question have served up a diet long on optimism but short on evidence. A rotating cast of Atlanticists from Anne Applebaum to Timothy Snyder, along with just about every op-ed in the Daily Telegraph, have reliably assured readers that Ukrainian victory is in sight, or that Putin’s regime has been humiliated or teeters on the edge of collapse. These forecasts, rarely tethered to battlefield realities, have functioned less as analysis and more as morale management — designed to reassure rather than inform.

This faith-based commentary sits uneasily alongside the equally confident illusions that once animated post-Cold War Western military thinking. Western politicians and strategists imagined war in the digital age would be light, precise and swift — waged by lean expeditionary forces wielding smart weapons and networked command systems. The result, they hoped, would be relatively bloodless victories achieved from a polite distance, preferably before lunchtime.

Instead, they got Bakhmut.

As this short essay will seek to disclose, the war in Ukraine has shattered a generation of digital-age delusions. It has exposed the brittle realities beneath Western military thinking and underscored the extent to which the strategic balance has shifted—less due to enemy cunning than to Western self-delusion.

The End of History did not arrive. The Return of Artillery did.

The Digital Mirage

In short, digitalisation — once regarded as the West’s ultimate strategic advantage — has failed to deliver the political returns its proponents anticipated. The concept was deceptively simple: combine precision weaponry with real-time data and operational mobility to achieve swift, efficient and low-cost victories. In the words of one tract in the mid-1990s, the aim is to apply massive shock with minimal force, such that the enemy is stunned into compliance.

Yet war, as the Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz long ago observed, remains a clash of wills — reciprocal, unpredictable and fundamentally political. It is not a frictionless exercise in systems management, nor a technological showcase. It is organised violence pursued for political ends. Always messy and brutal. And always resistant to tidy solutions.

What Western strategists often overlooked was a basic fact: adversaries adapt. And many of them have invested not in apps or digital platforms, but in mass, resilience and industrial depth.

The assumption that digital superiority would render conventional war obsolete, where the future of war belongs not to mass armies and tanks, but to decentralised networks and precision strikes’, has not merely proven false — it has been inverted. Russia and other actors have appropriated these same tools, stripped them of their idealistic framing and employed them pragmatically — effectively, economically and at scale.

The West, by contrast, became increasingly enamoured with the imagined virtues of the digital society: a realm where information moves at light speed and liberal pieties hitch a ride on the algorithm. Nowhere was this more evident than in the enthusiasm for cyberwarfare — an area long hyped, but whose strategic effects have often fallen short. Figures such as then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson notably proclaimed that such high tech was transforming the nature of conflict.

The practical outcome of actual warfare, however, has not been the digitalisation or dematerialisation of war, but rather its real-time mediation — live streamed, framed and packaged for distant audiences. In a hyper-connected world, conflict is increasingly staged for global spectatorship. But if the medium has changed, the consequences have not: war remains bloody, destructive and — for all the intrusion of high-tech drones and AI onto the battlefield — still deeply human. “Technology may change how we kill, but not why we kill or what killing does to us.”

The Return of Walls: Fortresses in the Age of Fibre Optics

We should recall the broader intellectual mirage in which Western military thinking once basked—a time of post-Cold War euphoria when history had allegedly ended and borders were passé. Remember when Francis Fukuyama serenely informed us that ideological conflict was over? When Zygmunt Bauman waxed lyrical about ‘liquid modernity’, Michael Mandelbaum speculated about the obsolescence of major wars and Kenichi Ohmae proclaimed the borderless world, flattened by markets and lubricated by technology?

Yes, well: these ideas have not aged like fine wine.

Far from dismantling fences and ushering in a frictionless utopia, the digital age has made fortification fashionable again. Border walls, missile shields and fortified strongholds are proliferating. Bunkers are booming — economically, if not always structurally.

And on the battlefield — from Gaza to Donbas — it isn’t data packets, viral hashtags, networks or narratives that are seizing territory. It’s bulldozers, concrete and men in trenches or ankle-deep artillery shell casings.

The war of the future, we were told, would be weightless, networked, almost antiseptic. While it is true that drone warfare has made a dramatic appearance as highly advanced form of surveillance and precision guided artillery, these new technologies have serviced very traditional modes of warfare. Instead of some new conception of war in the digital age, what we got instead was a flashback: steel, trenches and the long, grinding calculus of attrition.

War hasn’t dematerialised. It has reindustrialised — only now with high-definition targeting and better graphic design.

Ukraine: A Cautionary Tale in Three Acts and No Exit Plan

The Ukraine conflict was supposed to be a masterclass in Western strategic superiority — a proxy war in which Ukraine would draw upon NATO’s high-end technology, soft power, economic leverage and moral confidence to reduce Russia’s ambitions to rubble. Instead, it’s begun to resemble a doomed product launch — overpromised, underdelivered and still limping along on the exhaust fumes of its own marketing, too costly to cancel outright and too awkward to acknowledge as a failure.

Let’s count the miscalculations:

Soft Power : Meant to win hearts and minds. But hearts, as it turns out, aren’t for sale — and minds are busy doomscrolling through drone footage on TikTok, or more often tuning out altogether. Influence, it seems, doesn’t flow so easily from Pride-flag waving embassies and finger-wagging hashtags.Economic Warfare: The so-called ‘sanctions from hell’ were supposed to crush the Russian economy in record time. Instead, Russia’s GDP has outpaced much of the Eurozone, while Germany’s once-vaunted industrial base has gone into self-induced hibernation — collateral damage in a moral crusade that forgot to run the numbers.Strategic Credibility: Once burnished by Cold War mystique, NATO’s reputation now wobbles somewhere between ceremonial relic and crisis PR firm. The alliance increasingly resembles a séance for departed strategic purpose — hands clasped around the table, muttering slogans, hoping the ghost of 1991 will manifest and tell them what to do. It lurches between virtue-signalling and threat inflation, unsure whether it’s meant to deter adversaries or simply reassure itself that it still matters.

The unspoken truth in all this is bleak but not especially complicated: strategically, Ukraine has already lost. So too — albeit less dramatically and more expensively — has Europe. And for anyone paying attention, this wasn’t an unpredictable ending. It was the opening scene, played out exactly as the script always hinted it would. Viewed alongside the other glittering triumphs of Western statecraft — Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Syria — it raises the uncomfortable question: why does strategic failure keep happening and who keeps hiring these people? At this point, a moderately alert housecat could have produced a more coherent grand strategy — if only by knocking the relevant documents off the table before they reached Cabinet.

BRICS and Mortar: Realignments in a Shattered Order

One of the most egregious strategic miscalculations — and one that yet again should have been foreseen by anyone not still mainlining end-of-history optimism — was the West’s attempt to isolate Russia. In practice, this bold stand for ‘rules-based order’ only served to hasten the very multipolarity it once dismissed as a paranoid fantasy. China and Russia are now closer than at any point since the Brezhnev era. BRICS, once dismissed as a loose acronym in search of a purpose, is gaining unexpected traction — with countries like Turkey and Indonesia now eyeing membership as a potentially better seat at the global table. De-dollarisation, once confined to fringe economists and survivalist blogs, is edging into the mainstream.

Meanwhile, the West’s effort to turn the ruble into rubble instead left it suspiciously intact — at times more stable than a few G7 currencies. Meanwhile, the grand strategy to ‘cancel’ Russia economically has largely backfired, inflicting more damage on Western industry than even the most vodka-marinated of Kremlin plotters might have dared to dream. German manufacturing sends its regards — from behind a padlocked factory gate.

Geopolitically, the unintended consequence is a slowly forming Eurasian compact: one increasingly convinced that the West — at least in its EU-NATO incarnation — is decadent, distracted and no longer capable of setting the global agenda. It’s not quite the overturning of the world order, but it’s one where states feel they have greater options than merely to choose between Western modernity and pariahdom. One thing is for certain, it is not the world order that Washington or Brussels believe they are still running.

Mass Isn’t Dead. It Just Moved East

For years, Western military doctrine enshrined speed, agility and precision as the hallmarks of modern war. Mass, by contrast, was treated as a dusty artefact — something best left in museums next to the flintlock and the bayonet. According to one set of commentators: “Mass is no longer a requirement for victory. Information superiority and speed of command will displace attritional warfare.” Large-scale mobilisation, in other words, was seen as a clunky relic of industrial wars: too slow, too costly, and too reminiscent of the bad old days when wars actually lasted longer than a news cycle.

Then came Ukraine. And Gaza. And with them, the blunt truth reasserted itself: mass matters. Industrial capacity — measured not in white papers but in shells, drones and replacement parts — still wins wars.

The hard numbers from Ukraine are telling:

Russia is producing artillery shells at a ratio of roughly 3:1 over the combined output of the West.It manufactures more armoured vehicles, drones and missiles than all of NATO put together.It’s done all this without running up colossal debts or collapsing its domestic economy — relying instead on retrofitted Soviet factories and a grimly effective wartime mobilisation.

By contrast, the West struggles to supply even its own forces — let alone those of its Ukrainian proxy. The US production rate of SM-3 interceptor missiles, for example, is a grand total of 12 per year. That’s not a misprint. It’s barely enough to protect a single aircraft carrier, let alone a continent.

What we’re witnessing is not just a clash between Russia and Ukraine. It’s a collision between two theories of war: the Western model of information-age finesse, and the industrial-age brute force its strategists once declared obsolete. The former looks increasingly like a TED Talk. The latter, like it’s winning.

Manoeuvre vs Attrition: When Theory Meets Mud

Western military theory has long exalted manoeuvre warfare — rapid, fluid operations designed to outpace the enemy, strike weak points and collapse morale before a proper defence can even form. It’s a vision of war as ballet: swift and elegant, and preferably done by last orders at the wine bar. Attrition, by contrast, is treated as a kind of doctrinal embarrassment — too crude, too slow, too First World War.

But the battlefield, tells a different story.

Ukraine’s much-vaunted counter-offensives have bogged down in kilometre-deep minefields and trench networks that look like they were lifted from 1916. Russia’s static defences — dismissed early on as archaic — have proven not only resilient but maddeningly effective. Gaza, too, offers little comfort to the manoeuvrists: less lightning war, more bloodied crawl.

The promised revolution in precision warfare — guided missiles, smart bombs and real-time targeting — hasn’t rewritten the rules so much as underlined the old ones. ‘Smart’ weapons may hit what they aim at, but they don’t change the fact that the other side is still dug in, still shooting back, and often still there after the smoke clears.

What has emerged isn’t the war of tomorrow, but the war we thought we had left behind — less networked lethality and more Verdun with drones. And despite the glossy brochures, war, it turns out, still favours the side that can take a punch, not just throw one.

Operational Tempo: Fast, Dumb and Going Nowhere

Speed, we were assured, kills the enemy. Victory belongs to the swift. Wars must be fought fast, finished faster and ideally wrapped up in time for the next election cycle. The longer they drag on, the more politically toxic and strategically incoherent they become. But once again, theory has collided with reality — and reality, as usual, has no interest in being tidy, televised or tactically convenient.

From Iraq to Afghanistan to Ukraine, the West’s ‘fast’ wars have displayed an unfortunate tendency to turn into drawn-out strategic purgatories. Initial momentum gives way to mission creep, political drift and tactical improvisation dressed up as doctrine. Tempo without purpose quickly devolves into noise. Being able to react faster doesn’t help much if you have no idea what you’re reacting to — or why.

What we’re left with is movement masquerading as progress. Digital velocity, for all its dashboards and situational awareness apps, is no match for old-fashioned things like strategic patience, industrial resilience or political staying power. The West has become excellent at starting wars quickly. It has rather less to show when it comes to finishing them.

Information Wars and the Hollow Victory

Few phrases have received more adoration in recent years than ‘information war’: the idea of gaining advantage by protecting access to information flows, while destroying and disrupting those of the adversary. Think tanks, officials and consultants alike have extolled the virtues of strategic communications, narrative shaping and viral content as if policy papers and social media posting could substitute for tanks.

Ukraine, by almost every Western measure, has won the information war hands-down: cinematic footage, clever memes and Zelensky’s branded defiance — all flawlessly packaged for global consumption. Most recently, this spectacle was crowned in early June by the daring drone strike against Russia’s strategic bomber fleet deep inside its own territory.

Launched from modified civilian lorry containers, the operation thrilled the op-ed writers but carried rather less charm for anyone concerned with nuclear stability, risking as it does, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and practically inviting Russian reprisals against Western targets. One can only hope Moscow — or any other future adversary — isn’t tempted to return the favour in kind. After all, there is a certain irony in Western commentators applauding such actions as bold and justified while assuming, quite serenely, that their own military bases will be sacrosanct.

But the point is though, that none of this moves the needle in Ukraine’s favour. It is Russia that occupies territory, fires more shells and steadily dictates the tempo of the war.

The paradox is hard to ignore: while Western commentators celebrated Kyiv’s narrative dominance and drone-delivered showmanship, Moscow focused on artillery. One side perfected the aesthetics of resistance; the other brought bulldozers and blasting tactics. It turns out that shaping perceptions doesn’t stop projectiles — and that going viral is no defence against shrapnel.

Winning the narrative, in other words, is not the same as winning the war. It may not even be relevant once the shells start falling.

The West’s Strategic Malaise: ‘Something Must Be Doneism’

Since the Cold War, Western wars have rarely been existential. They’ve been gestures — emotional reactions to tragedy, terrorism or televised horror. The political logic has been consistent, if not exactly strategic: be seen to act. It’s foreign policy as theatre — enough engagement to look principled, but not enough to get seriously hurt or to seriously imperil the national homeland.

The results speak for themselves. Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq — all launched with moral fanfare and media buzz, all ending in fatigue, withdrawal or the polite burying of lessons left unlearned.

Ukraine, however, is different. The stakes are higher. The adversary is stronger. And yet the habits remain the same. The West’s response has been a familiar mix: morally emphatic, logistically improvisational and industrially unsustainable. It’s as if NATO is attempting to wage a 20th-century land war on 21st-century terms — with 1990s stockpiles and attention spans measured in quarterly press briefings rather than prolonged campaigns.

In truth, many of these interventions seem designed less for the battlefield than for the curated stage of liberal respectability — crafted to win plaudits in opinion pages, panel discussions and policy forums where moral posturing always trumps material constraint. They are calibrated for the approval of the right-thinking, not the requirements of strategic success. Here, victory is optional, while virtue-signalling is mandatory.

Conclusion: Welcome to the Post-Post-Cold War

We were told the digital age would flatten borders, replace firepower with fibre optics and swap armies for narratives. Instead, we got trenches, mass mobilisation and a resurgent Eurasian bloc. It’s not quite the holographic future imagined by the PowerPoint prophets.

The West’s military models aren’t failing for lack of virtue, but because they’re built on expired assumptions. The future didn’t arrive on schedule — and the past, rather rudely, refused to stay buried.

What lessons emerge?

Industrial capacity matters: You can’t tweet your way to artillery shells.Mass still wins wars: Precision is nice, but only if you have a lot of it.Soft power is not eternal: A civilisation unsure of itself can’t expect others to follow its lead.Digital illusions are just that: Cyberspace didn’t transcend the battlefield; it just added lag, disinformation and another excuse for inaction.

In the end, strategic success depends not on who reacts fastest or trends hardest, but on the dull, unglamorous verities that underlies modern war: production, patience and purpose.

And right now, those are in short supply west of the Dnieper.

Sylvia Demarest: How Corporations became people, money became speech, usury was legalized, and the civil rights movement was used to advance neoliberalism

By Sylvia Demarest, Substack, 7/6/25

Sylvia Demarest is a retired trial lawyer.

On May 7th this Substack published an essay titled: The Chicago School, law and economics, and the monopolization of the American economy. The essay discussed how the counter-revolution against the New Deal began at the University of Chicago with the organization of a Free-Market Study Group, how it progressed through the Mont Pelerin society, the Chicago School of Law and Economics, and various organizations, leading to the creation of neoliberalism and its takeover of our economy and legal system. This essay will further this discussion by reviewing the history that led to the judicial decisions creating corporate personhood, equating money with speech, dismantling the protections against usury, and allowing money to dominate our elections.

The end of “the great leveling” and the civil rights movement

The era between the New Deal and the rise of neoliberalism became known as “the great leveling”. This period was characterized by the historically low disparity between the wealthiest and the poorest people in our society. It was also a time of historically high economic growth, leading to the rise of a huge middle class in the USA.

Left out of this economic prosperity was a huge underclass of Black citizens burdened by economic and racial discrimination. The civil rights laws of the 1960’s were designed to address this discrimination, but the political backlash to these laws ended up undermining the political majorities that had voted for and benefited from the New Deal’s mixed economy.

This era was also characterized by anti-war fervor, race-baiting, and the rise of a segment of society labeled the “Silent majority”. After the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960’s, Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” used the backlash to these laws to separate southern whites from the Democratic Party. Sadly, it was racial fear, resentment, and the militarism of the Vietnam War, that killed the political consensus behind the New Deal. Americans did not realize they were voting for laissez-faire economics, because Nixon was not campaigning on free market ideology, but on grievance and fear. The policy was bought and sold politically as a promise to stop the protests, stop the riots, and stop a civil rights movement the white majority believed had gone haywire, by opening public accommodations, and using bussing to integrate all white schools.

Economists in the emerging school of neoliberalism such as Alan Greenspan, Gary Becker, George Stigler, and Milton Freedman were suspicious of civil rights laws, despite finding discrimination distasteful. Economists, such as Gary Becker and Geroge Stigler argued that the answer to discrimination was the free market. In other words, government intervention in the economy had created discrimination. In a free market, they assumed, discrimination would die out because it created excess costs for the discriminatory white employer. These theories were wrong.

These economists were dreaming, there was no theoretical society where markets were efficient, opportunity was equal, and trade was based on price. Under Jim Crow, discrimination was not a cost, especially to whites who had long benefited from racial discrimination. Discrimination had created its own market forces. But, unfortunately, the damage to the New Deal consensus was done.

Neoliberalism re-defines corporate social obligations

Corporations are legal constructs created by social agreements and enforced by state law. The Constitution gives states the ultimate power over chartering and regulating the corporations they create. Corporations were historically seen as having public duties, not only because most had benefited from public investments, government contracts, and trade protections, but because state charters mandated these duties. In 1969 the chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission noted the power and influence of corporations in society urging them to “meet the needs of the nation as a whole.”

The civil rights crisis led to discussions about corporate civic obligations. These discussions were influenced by the publication of popular business books in the 1950’s and 1970’s. The outside Counsel of General Motors at the time, Donald Schwartz a partner at Williams & Connolly, noted that “social concerns should not be an afterthought but central to the corporate mission. “

Neoliberals such as Milton Freedman disagreed declaring that such statements were preaching nothing “but unadulterated socialism” that was “undermining free enterprise”. Freedman issued one insult after another; the idea of corporate responsibility was “faddish and unscientific”, “lacking in rigor”, and undermining the “foundations of a free society.” Friedman concluded that “corporations have no higher purpose than maximizing profits for their shareholders.”

Lewis Powell, the Powell Memo, and Powell’s tenure on the US Supreme Court

In February of 1971 one of the most significant documents in the neoliberal transformation of America was written by Lewis Powell. Powell, a well-respected corporate lawyer, issued a memorandum titled: “Attack On American Free Enterprise System”. The memo was addressed to Eugene Sydnor, Chairman of the US Chamber of Commerce. Powell claimed that the American economic system was “under attack”. The victim of the attack was the “American business executive”. Attacking consumer advocate, Ralph Nadar, directly Powell claimed that “economics” had to be protected from Nadar’s “economic illiteracy” about “tax loopholes” and other anti-corporate rhetoric. Putting the words rich and poor in quotations, Powell warned that setting “business against the people” was “the cheapest and most dangerous kind of politics.”

Powell advocated two approaches to countering democratic demands on corporations. First, he advocated a long-term plan to change hearts and minds through propaganda via education and the media. Second, Powell advocated the quiet accumulation of legal and political power through legal changes hidden from public view. The first was addressed by the Chicago School of Law and Economics, and other organizations, including textbooks, publications, seminars, and training like-minded people to serve as scholars and jurists, The second was to change law itself through changes in judicial jurisprudence.

The US Chamber of Commerce organized a task force of 40 executives, funding was raised, and plans were set in motion to implement Powell’s recommendations. For example, in 1972 the Business Roundtable was organized and in 1973 the Heritage Foundation was founded. Other organizations founded as the result of the Powell Memo include, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in 1973, the Cato Institute in 1977, and the Manhattan Institute in 1978. Money from Coors, John Olin, the Bradelys, the Koch Brothers, and other wealthy businessmen provided long-term financial support for these efforts and the scholars and functionaries who carried out the resulting plans. A permanent structure supporting neoliberal policy and reforms was organized. This structure is still active today–all funded by tax deductible charitable contributions under 501 c 3 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Lewis Powell on the US Supreme Court

Two months after issuing his memo, Powell was nominated by President Richard Nixon to become an associate justice of the US Supreme Court. Powell was 65 years old when he was nominated, too old to really take advantage of life tenure, but such tenure was not the reason for his appointment. Powell was appointed to inject changes in the law in specific areas, banking, corporate power, corporate personhood, money in politics, and interest rates. Powell proved to be extraordinarily effective.

Once Powell was confirmed in1972 he began to quietly transform the law. Over time Powell planted neoliberal principles into the law, empowering corporations while curtailing state power. Powell planted ideas into court jurisprudence that did not manifest for years. This was despite being considered a moderate. For example, the Burger Court decided Roe v. Wade, in 1973, with Powell voting with the majority.

Commercial Speech: One of the first cases providing Powell the opportunity to direct the law, was a case brought by Ralph Nader’s organization challenging a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacies from advertising drug prices. The case was Virginia State Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc. The argument was that unlisted prices were harmful to consumers who could not seek better alternatives. The fatal error was to argue the case on First Amendment grounds, that prices were information the public wanted to hear. This allowed the First Amendment to be applied to commercial speech. While the consumer group did not ask the court to determine that prices (corporate speech) was protected by the First Amendment, they handed the Court the opportunity to make that distinction. The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmon, opened the door through which Powell would maneuver the First Amendment toward the elimination of any distinction between corporate and individual speech.

Rehnquist was not fooled and dissented lamenting the elevation the advertisement of products to the ideological market place of ideas, seeing this as an over-extension of the First Amendment. Rehnquist concluded by arguing that the majority had not only failed to accord proper weight to the judgment of the legislature but that the protection of the First Amendment ought to be limited to political and social issues.

Campaign limits: The next significant case in 1976 was Buckley v. Valeo. The issue before the court was how much Congress could regulate campaign contributions without running afoul of the First Amendment. The case did not deal with “corporate speech” but with limits on spending by wealthy people on political campaigns. A complex 150-page opinion by the 5-person majority (including Powell) upheld many of the mandates but struck down the limits on individual spending. This meant that a person or group, including the candidate, could spend as much money as they wanted on a campaign. The majority waived away any government interest in protecting elections from “the corrosive influence of money” or in “equalizing” democratic participation, holding that the idea that the government could restrict the speech of some elements of society to enhance the voice of others was “wholly foreign to the First Amendment”.

The dissent was not fooled. Justices Marshall and White argued that the majority had evaded the law’s purpose and had enabled endless spending. Marshall argued that even the appearance that the political arena was the exclusive province of the wealthy was a valid governmental concern. Unfortunately, after Buckley the government’s hands were tied.

Corporate Free Speech: In 1977 the case of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti came before the court. The issue was a long-standing Massachusetts law that prohibited corporate spending on ballot initiatives unrelated to the company’s business. The case divided the court. Some justices felt that since corporations were creatures of state law, the state had the right to regulate them. Rehnquist again raised the same red flags he had raised in Virginia Pharmacy and quoted Chief Justice John Marshall who had clearly distinguished the First Amendment rights of corporations from those of natural persons.

Powell sprung the trap, pointing out in a memo to the court that it was “too late” to hold that persons who elect to do business in the corporate form could not express opinions through the corporation, and for the court to turn its back on this now would be a serious infringement of corporate First Amendment rights. Powell wrote the opinion stating that there was “no question” that corporations had First Amendment rights, but how far those rights extended. Powell’s response was they extend very far.

In the case of Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York in 1980, Powell took the opportunity to carry the court further along in interpreting the First Amendment as a shield for corporations against state regulatory laws.

The progression of cases: Each of these decisions can be seen as a step-by-step process leading to the 5-4 decision in 2010 in Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Commission, eviscerating federal laws on campaign spending and endorsing corporate personhood and First Amendment rights for money as majority jurisprudence. In doing so the court relied heavily on Buckley.

The progression is as follows: Buckley cleared away all constraints on political spending by wealthy donors and groups; while Virginia Pharmacy, Bellotti, Central Hudson Gas, and Citizen’s United extended free speech protections to corporations. Citizen’s United cleared the last remaining barriers protecting democracy from the corrupting influence of money. Now we have “dark money” and “soft money” as well as protection for commercial speech and for money, in effect, using the First Amendment to achieve deregulatory goals amounting to theft, waste, and graft. This is also known as empowering “rent seeking”. This kind of corruption increasingly crowds out productive activity.

Neoliberalism has succeeded, and in the process, has corrupted the First Amendment and the Constitution.

The impact on campaign spending: After the Buckley case the amounts spent on presidential campaigns rose from $20 million in 1960–to $107 million in 1980–to $186 million in 1992–to $300 million in 2000–to $696 million in 2004–to $1 billion in 2008, to $2 billion in 2016–to $14.4 billion in 2020–to who knows how much in 2024. These amounts do not include “dark money” nor the cost of other campaigns at the local, state, and federal level.

State laws on corporate campaign donations: Many states, including Montana, had laws on their books banning corporations from contributing to political campaigns. Montana’s law was passed in 1912. In the case of American Tradition Partnership Inc v. Bullock, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that law. In 2012 a 5-4 decision the United States Supreme Court reversed that decision citing United Citizens as precedent. The Brennan Center had submitted an Amicus supporting the law, to no avail. There are no longer any state laws restricting corporations from spending money on political campaigns.

Usury and interest rates: For decades many states had limits on the interest that could be charged on debt. The case of “Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.” decided in 1978 established that state anti-usury laws cannot be enforced against nationally chartered banks based in other states. This allowed banks and other business to charge higher interest rates. This ruling enabled banks to offer credit cards with interest rates that exceed state limits. One state that allowed unlimited interest to be charged was South Dakota, where most of the credit card companies are now domiciled. This means credit card customers who cannot pay their balances in full every month, are charged as much as 35% interest on their balances.

The centrality of Alan Greenspan, and the Fed, to the survival of neoliberalism

It is difficult to express the dichotomy between what economists like Alan Greenspan, Milton Freedman, George Steigler were preaching about the “free market” and the actual results of these policies. The example of Greenspan’s economic legacy clearly demonstrates this dichotomy.

Before the outbreak of the Watergate Scandal, President Nixon asked Alan Greenspan to head up the President’s Council of Economic Advisors. By the time Greenspan took the job in 1972, Nixon had resigned. Greenspan remained part of the inner circle of presidential advisors for every subsequent president except for Jimmy Carter (1976-1980). Perhaps no other individual left more of a mark on the US and the global economy than Alan Greenspan.

Greenspan was made Chairman of the Federal Reserve by President Ronald Reagan in 1987–he served until 2006. By the time he left office, Greenspan held more power over global markets than any president he had served.

Here’s Mehrsa Baradaran:

“Greenspan’s legacy as Fed chairman was a financial system so reliant on Fed support that it is near impossible today to delineate where government economic policy ends and financial markets begin. In crisis after crisis, Greenspan’s policy “stabilized” the market, which led banks to take risks with confidence that the Fed would step in to save them, if necessary. The libertarian economist who once convinced Nixon that the only solution to America’s apartheid regime was “to help the Negro help themselves” took a much more helpful stance towards the market. Each time a crisis loomed, Greenspan plied banks with loans, bought distressed assets to place on the Fed’s balance sheets, lowered interest rates, purchased Treasury bonds to boost bank profits, and promised any“backstops” necessary to return banks to profitability. The measures were so common that they came to be called “the Greenspan put”.

The policies followed by Alan Greenspan were completely different from the free-market rhetoric employed by the neoliberals. The result of Greenspan’s policies? Wall Street profits are guaranteed by the public, and wealth is transferred from the bottom to the top of the economy. Meanwhile, the risk of loss is transferred from the wealthy to public. This is the exact opposite of what neoliberalism promised.

Neoliberalism should be seen not as a reaction to socialism abroad or Keynesianism at home, or even as a backlash against the Civil Rights movement, but as a clever way for entrenched power to gain and keep wealth and power.

Conclusion

The contribution of people like Alan Greenspan and Lewis Powell to our current political and economic reality has been enormous. Lewis Powell contributed to the creation of an infrastructure supporting neoliberalism that endures to this day, making political and economic reforms more difficult. Justice Powell contributed to a jurisprudence that gives corporations the same constitutional protections as people and deems the spending of money equivalent to speech. This jurisprudence has turned our democracy into an auction were politicians and policies are sold to the highest bidder. Yet, many of these decisions was by a bare majority of the court, 5 to 4, and could be reversed by a similar majority.

There is dwindling public support for neoliberal policies or for the corrupting influence of money in politics. Unfortunately, the public is uninformed about the history of how these policies and opinions came about. If properly informed, there is little doubt the vast majority would support serious reforms in every area discussed in the Substack. This is why education and discussion are so important. Please, help spread the word by encouraging your friends to sign up for a free subscription to this Substack so we can continue to explore where we are, how we got here, and what can be done to reform our politics and economics.

***

On a related note, The Lever reported on July 8th the following:

Citizens United 2.0, here we come. While corporate interests spent a whopping $2 billion secretly influencing the 2024 election, the dark money problem is poised to get even worse. That’s because the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case this fall that could abolish some of the last barriers separating political candidates and wealthy donors’ unlimited buckets of cash. National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission, which originated from a lawsuit by now-Vice President JD Vance, is a corruption bomb designed to allow SCOTUS to permit more unfettered, untraceable corporate election influence than it did in its landmark 2010 Citizens United decision. 

Friends in high places. While Vance has since exited the case, he and his colleagues filed suit in 2022 against federal restrictions limiting coordination between national party committees and candidates. If those rules are abolished, corporate interests could spend freely on these committees as an end-run around limits on how much they can directly give candidates. While the suit lost in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, several of the judges agreed with its argument and urged SCOTUS to take up the case — including one who formerly employed Vance’s wife, Usha Vance, when she worked as a law clerk.

The gang’s all here. Before SCOTUS took up the case, a who’s who of conservative heavyweights filed amicus briefs urging it to do so. That included not just the Republican Governors Association and Sen. Mitch McConnell (R.-Ky.), but also the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, D.C.’s most powerful business lobbying group, and the Institute for Free Speech, a nonprofit funded by the Leonard Leo-helmed dark money network that helped install five of the six current conservative justices. Even the Trump Justice Department joined in, admitting in its brief that while it “has a longstanding policy of defending challenged federal statutes,” the campaign finance law in question “violates core First Amendment rights.”

Get ready to rumble. SCOTUS also allowed three major Democratic groups — the Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee — to intervene in the high-stakes case. Depending on the results, the decision could further corporate power’s decades-long master plan to legalize corruption. As one Sixth Circuit judge warned, the case has the potential to allow “the Supreme Court to rework campaign finance, First Amendment, and constitutional law in new and audacious ways.”

Reporting contributed by Joel Warner

Kamal Shahin: How a Spyware App Compromised Assad’s Army

By Kamal Shahin, New Lines Magazine, 5/26/25

Kamal Shahin is a Syrian journalist who worked for decades covering political and social issues

The Syrian army’s failure to repel a modest opposition attack on Aleppo in December, which ultimately culminated in the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, defies explanation. 

The opposition’s military strength and its use of drones were contributing factors, no doubt, but they were hardly enough. The Syrian army had previously reclaimed vast swaths of territory from rebel forces. By the summer of 2024, Assad’s government controlled two-thirds of the country. The sudden unraveling and the conventional explanations behind it belie what unfolded beneath the surface of the military event itself.

In a previous interview with New Lines, a high-ranking Syrian officer, who recounted the final days of the regime’s existence, disclosed a revealing detail that I decided to spend some time pursuing. A closer examination revealed it to be the key to understanding the regime’s collapse from a different angle, not merely as a logistical or battlefield failure, but as the result of a silent, invisible war. 

The snippet of information was this: A mobile application, distributed quietly among Syrian officers via a Telegram channel, had spread rapidly in their ranks. In truth, the app was a carefully planted trap, the opening salvo of a hidden cyberwar — perhaps one of the first of its kind against a modern army. Militias had weaponized smartphones, turning them into lethal instruments against a regular military force.

Beyond revealing the contours of a cyberattack against the Syrian army, this investigation seeks to understand the application itself, its technology and reach, and to uncover the nature of the information it siphoned from within military ranks. This, in turn, leads directly to the potential impact on Syria’s military operations.

The larger question remains: Who orchestrated the cyberattack, and to what end?

The answers may point to players within the conflict itself — factions of the Syrian opposition, regional or international intelligence services, or other, still unseen hands. In any case, the attack must be understood within its full political and military context.

In February 2020, a mobile phone left behind by a Syrian soldier inside a Russian-made Pantsir-S1 air defense vehicle helped to turn the entire system into a fireball. Israeli forces tracked the phone’s signal, pinpointed the battery’s location, and launched a swift airstrike that obliterated the system before it could be rearmed. The incident, revealed by Valery Slugin, the chief designer behind the Pantsir system, in an interview with the Russian news agency TASS, showed how a single mobile phone could trigger catastrophe, whether by design or by sheer ignorance. 

The consequences were devastating: critical equipment and personnel were lost at a moment when the army could least afford it. The soldier responsible — a survivor of the Israeli strike — may have been an informant or a recruited agent or, more likely, had no grasp of the damage he had caused. According to Slugin, all communication devices, such as phones or radios, should have been shut off during operations, and the battery location changed immediately after launching missiles to avoid detection. These are standard security protocols. Yet the Syrian crew’s failure to follow them turned an ordinary phone into a beacon, a live marker that guided the enemy’s strike straight to its target.

By the basic logic of military science, the Syrian authorities should have launched a full investigation after the Pantsir’s destruction — banning mobile phones within the ranks or devising countermeasures to stop them from becoming roving surveillance nodes. But that never happened. The Syrian army, this time and many times after, behaved with the same fatal irresponsibility — and paid for it dearly.

What was most striking after the events of Nov. 27, and the fall of Aleppo to the opposition, was how suddenly the Syrian army ceased to fight. Most units simply watched as opposition forces advanced, offering little more than sporadic resistance until the rebels reached the outskirts of Damascus on the morning of Dec. 8. In the rural areas of Idlib and Aleppo, opposition factions swept past dozens of positions belonging to brigades of the 25th and 30th Divisions, as well as narrow outposts in hilly terrain. They covered more than 40 miles in just 48 hours.

By then, the Syrian army was a shadow of its former self. After a decade of grinding warfare, marked by tens of thousands of casualties and irreparable material and moral losses, there was little strength left to rally. Years of conflict had left the forces battered not just by battlefield defeats, but by a more insidious collapse from within: The Syrian pound’s freefall, from 50 pounds to the dollar in 2011 to 15,000 in 2023, had turned soldiers’ and officers’ salaries into a cruel joke — barely $20 a month. Many no longer fought for “the country and the leader,” but simply to survive. Transportation costs had doubled; the salary of a high-ranking officer could no longer feed a family. One officer from the 47th Regiment recalled that they often received only half of their scheduled meals, made up of half-raw, unprepared food. In many units, a privileged few officers dined separately, which fueled bitter resentment among the rank and file.

Beyond the economic collapse, worsened in part by Western sanctions, Syria had, by 2018, sunk into a deep military and political stagnation. Fronts grew paralyzed. Morale sagged. Commanders reinvented themselves as smugglers of Captagon and fugitives. Meanwhile, the regime clung stubbornly to power, rejecting even the most pragmatic solutions, whether offered by yesterday’s enemies among Arab states, by Turkey or by the West.

The stagnation, and the suffocating sense of a future foreclosed, birthed a grotesque kind of entrepreneurship within the army. Officers and soldiers no longer focused on military duties; they scrambled for any opportunity that might sustain them. They traded anything and everything just to stay alive, without exaggeration.

Imagine an army where officers sold the remains of stale bread rations meant for their men. Where senior officers bought solar panels and rented out charging services to soldiers desperate to light their shelters or charge their phones. It seems those who thought to weaponize this moment knew exactly what they were looking at — and what they could exploit.

In the early summer of 2024, months before the opposition launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression, a mobile application began circulating among a group of Syrian army officers. It carried an innocuous name: STFD-686, a string of letters standing for Syria Trust for Development.

To Syrians, the Syria Trust for Development was a familiar institution: a humanitarian organization offering material aid and services, overseen by Asma al-Assad, Bashar’s wife. It had never ventured into the military sphere. None of the officers or sources we spoke to could explain how the app found its way into army hands. The likeliest explanations point to collusion by compromised officers — or a sophisticated deception.

What lent the app its credibility was that its name and information were publicly available. To heighten its aura of authenticity, and to control its spread, the app was distributed exclusively through a Telegram channel also bearing the name Syria Trust for Development, hosted on the platform but lacking any formal verification. The app, promoted as an initiative personally endorsed by the first lady, sidestepped scrutiny: If her name was attached, few questioned its legitimacy, or the financial promises it lured them with.

The STFD-686 app operated with disarming simplicity. It offered the promise of financial aid, requiring only that the victim fill out a few personal details. It asked innocent questions: “What kind of assistance are you expecting?” and “Tell us more about your financial situation.”

The expected answer was clear: financial help. In return, users would supposedly receive monthly cash transfers of around 400,000 Syrian pounds — roughly $40 at the time — sent anonymously via local money transfer companies. Sending small sums across Syria, whether under real or fictitious names, required nothing more than a phone number, and the black market was teeming with intermediaries ready to facilitate such transfers.

On the surface, the app appeared to offer a special service for officers. Its first disguise was a humanitarian one: claiming to support the “heroes of the Syrian Arab Army” through a new initiative, while showcasing photos of real activities from the official Syria Trust for Development website.

The second mask was emotional, employing reverent language that praised the soldiers’ sacrifices: “They give their lives so that Syria may live with pride and dignity.” The third was nationalistic, and framed the app as a “patriotic initiative” designed to bolster loyalty, and this mask proved the most persuasive.

The fourth mask was visual: The app’s name, both in English and Arabic, mirrored the official organization exactly. Even the logo was an identical replica of Syria Trust’s emblem.

Once downloaded, the app opened a simple web interface embedded within the application, which redirected users to external websites that didn’t display in the app bar. The sites, syr1.store and syr1.online, mimicked the official domain of Syria Trust (syriatrust.sy). The use of “syr1,” an abbreviation of Syria, in the domain name seemed plausible enough, and few users paid much mind. In this case, no special attention was given to the URL; it was simply assumed to be trustworthy.

To access the questionnaire, users were asked to submit a series of seemingly innocent details: full name, wife’s name, number of children, place and date of birth. But the questions quickly escalated into riskier territory: the user’s phone number, military rank and exact service location down to the corps, division, brigade and battalion.

Determining officers’ ranks made it possible for the app’s operators to identify those in sensitive positions, such as battalion commanders and communications officers, while knowing their exact place of service allowed for the construction of live maps of force deployments. It gave the operators behind the app and the website the ability to chart both strongholds and gaps in the Syrian army’s defensive lines. The most crucial point was the combination of the two pieces of information: Disclosing that “officer X” was stationed at “location Y” was tantamount to handing the enemy the army’s entire operating manual, especially on fluid fronts like those in Idlib and Sweida.

According to an analysis by a Syrian software engineer, what the officers dismissed as a tedious questionnaire was, in reality, a data entry form for military algorithms, turning their phones into live printers that generated highly accurate battlefield maps. “The majority of officers often ignored security protocols,” the engineer said. “I doubt any of them realized that behind these innocent-looking forms, traps were laid for them with the innocence of a wolf.” He added that while the mechanism of espionage was technically old, it remained devastatingly effective, especially given the widespread ignorance of cyberwarfare within the Syrian army.

At the bottom of the application’s web page, another trap lay in wait: an embedded Facebook contact link. This time, the user’s social media credentials were siphoned directly to a remote server, quietly stealing access to personal accounts. If the victim somehow escaped the first snare, there was a good chance they would fall into the second. 

After harvesting basic information through embedded phishing links, the attack moved to its second stage: deploying SpyMax, one of the most popular Android surveillance tools. SpyMax is an advanced version of SpyNote, notorious on the black market, and typically distributed through malicious APK files (files designed to install mobile apps on Android phones), disguised on fake download portals that appear legitimate. Crucially, SpyMax does not require root access (the highest level of access to the phone’s operating system) to function, making it dangerously easy for attackers to compromise devices. While original versions of the software sell for around $500, hacked versions are also freely available. In this case, the spyware was planted via the same Telegram channel that distributed the fake Syria Trust app and installed on officers’ phones under the guise of a legitimate application.

SpyMax has all the functions of RAT (Remote Access Trojan) software, including keylogging to steal passwords and intercept text messages; data extraction of confidential files, photos and call logs; and access to the camera and microphone, allowing real-time surveillance of victims. 

Once connected, the victim can appear on an attacker’s dashboard, the live feed displaying everything from call logs to file transfers, depending on the functions selected.

The spyware targeted Android versions as old as Lollipop — an operating system launched in 2015 — meaning a broad range of both older and newer devices were vulnerable. An examination of the permissions granted to the app showed it had access to 15 sensitive functions, the most critical among them including tracking live locations and monitoring soldiers’ movements and military positions, eavesdropping on calls, recording conversations between commanders to uncover operational plans in advance, extracting documents like maps and sensitive files from officers’ phones and camera access allowing the person who launched the spyware to, potentially, remotely broadcast footage of military facilities.

Once the initial information was extracted, fake servers took over, routing data through anonymous cloud platforms to make tracing the source of the malware nearly impossible. The app was also signed with forged security certificates, much like a thief donning a fake police uniform to slip past security. The attack combined two deadly elements: psychological deception (phishing) and advanced cyberespionage (SpyMax). The evidence suggests the malware was operational and the infrastructure ready before June 2024, five months before the launch of the operation that led to the Assad regime’s collapse.

A review of the domains associated with Syr1.store revealed six linked domains, one of which was registered anonymously. Through SpyMax, whoever was behind the app extracted a devastating range of data from the officers’ phones, including their ranks and identities, whether they were responsible for sensitive posts and their geographical locations (possibly in real time). They would have access to troop concentrations, phone conversations, text messages, photos and maps on officers’ devices, and be able to monitor military facilities remotely. The phishing site itself collected myriad sensitive data from military personnel, including their full names, names of family members, ranks and service positions, dates and places of birth and Facebook login credentials if they used the social media contact form.

The potential uses are also myriad, and would have allowed the operators to pinpoint gaps in defensive lines, which were exploited in Aleppo, as well as locating weapons depots and communication hubs, and assessing the real size and strength of deployed troops. It would have allowed those with access to the information to launch surprise attacks on exposed sites, potentially cutting off supplies to isolated military units, issue contradictory orders to troops and sow confusion among military cadres, in addition to blackmailing the officers. 

It’s at least clear that the Assad regime’s enemies benefited from the app in some way — although exactly how is difficult to confirm, and it is difficult to surmise who was behind it. For example, one of the domains linked to the hackers appears to be hosted in the United States, which had ties to the armed opposition, but the location of the server could have been masked as a misdirection. Israeli airstrikes in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime destroyed almost the entire conventional military capacity of Syria, and one Syrian army officer, who served in the air defense units of Tartous Governorate, told New Lines that the application had been active at his site. That meant that Syrian officers had already, through their own carelessness, uploaded the blueprints of Syria’s defensive fronts to a cloud server — accessible to anyone who knew where to look.

But the compromised data could have also been helpful to the opposition, which carried out attacks such as a clandestine operation targeting the military joint operations room in Aleppo, which this magazine previously reported on, leading up to the broader campaign that unseated Assad. 

And perhaps this is what makes this spyware unique: While other spyware operations have largely targeted individuals, like the use of the application Pegasus to spy on activists in the Middle East, this particular campaign seems to have been focused on compromising an entire military institution through a primitive but devastating phishing attack. 

It is difficult to determine exactly how many phones were compromised in the attack, but the number is likely in the thousands. A story published on the same Telegram channel in mid-July noted that 1,500 money transfers had been sent that month, with other posts referencing additional rounds of money distribution. None of those who received money through the app agreed to speak with me, citing security concerns.

Compromised military command may also help explain some of the stranger episodes that surrounded the regime’s collapse, in addition to the rapid military success of the opposition’s campaign.

One example is the exchange of fire that erupted on Dec. 6, 2024, between forces loyal to two senior Syrian commanders — Maj. Gen. Saleh al-Abdullah and Maj. Gen. Suhail al-Hassan — in the Hama region’s Sibahi Square. At the time, at least 30,000 Syrian army fighters had gathered in the area. According to witnesses, al-Abdullah issued orders for a southern withdrawal, while al-Hassan commanded his forces to advance north and engage opposition units. The conflicting commands led to a firefight between the two factions that raged for more than two hours. This clash can also be explained by the likelihood that each commander had received contradictory orders, either due to direct infiltration of the command structure or because external actors were using compromised channels to issue false instructions. It remains unclear how much of the command might have been compromised.

In an interview with Syria TV following the fall of the Assad regime, Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim leader, revealed additional details about Operation Deterrence of Aggression, the name given to the campaign that ousted the former dictator. He stated that planning for the operation had spanned five years and that the Syrian regime had known about it, but failed to stop it. This, he emphasized, is a matter of certainty.

How did he know? 

It is unlikely that any one thread that can be traced in the dramatic fall of the Syrian regime was responsible for unraveling the entirety of the system, and the story of the days leading up to the final campaign may never be fully uncovered. But the Syrian Trojan horse may point to one significant part of that story.

Asia Times: Why Anwar’s ASEAN is reaching so robustly to Russia

By Phar Kim Beng and Luthfy Hamzah, Asia Times, 5/19/25

It may seem paradoxical that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is now deepening its engagement with Russia after publicly reaffirming its commitment to “sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity” in a communique soon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Yet ASEAN’s diplomatic posture should be viewed not through the lens of moral idealism but rather strategic realism. For ASEAN and this year’s chair, Malaysia, engagement is not endorsement.

Rather, it is a highly conscious effort to anchor Russia within an evolving regional framework that prizes dialogue over confrontation and sustains a long-standing tradition of hedging and strategic autonomy amid major power rivalries.

Last week’s meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow—expected to be followed by Putin’s attendance at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025—marks a critical moment.

ASEAN was never meant to be a sanctions-driven alliance, nor an adjudicator of great power misconduct. It is a convening architecture—ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—that emphasizes inclusion, consensus and continuous dialogue.

It was designed precisely to accommodate rivals, outliers and even belligerents on the assumption that talking is always better than total disengagement. Thus, engaging Russia through ASEAN channels is not a contradiction—it is the essence of ASEAN diplomacy.

Welcoming Moscow to the EAS in Kuala Lumpur is a diplomatic bet that Russia may still be seeking avenues of cooperation over confrontation. It is also a message to the world that ASEAN does not subscribe to bloc politics or enforced isolation as a pathway to peace.

Avoiding a Bipolar Trap

Malaysia and ASEAN envision an Indo-Pacific that is diverse, multipolar and strategically balanced—not one held hostage by zero-sum US-China dynamics. ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) is a clear expression of this intent.

Russia’s involvement, alongside India, Japan, South Korea and Australia, ensures that no single hegemon dominates the regional agenda. This multiplicity is ASEAN’s insurance policy and safeguard against being subsumed by external rivalries.

For this reason, a constructive Russian role in East Asia is not only acceptable—it is essential. It helps ASEAN retain policy flexibility and geopolitical space, allowing it to maneuver without choosing sides in an increasingly polarized world.

Even amid sanctions and international condemnation, Russia remains a relevant economic actor. It is a major exporter of energy, fertilizer and arms. Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets remain in active service in Malaysia’s air force. Countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia still maintain defense ties with Moscow, recognizing both cost-effectiveness and strategic diversification.

Severing these links in the name of moral absolutism may satisfy some, but it could erode national security and economic resilience across Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, continued technical cooperation with Russia is not about blind dependence—it is about avoiding overreliance on any one country or bloc, especially in defense and energy security.

Russia’s activities in Central Asia, the Arctic and along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) may seem remote, but they matter for ASEAN’s long-term connectivity agenda.

The convergence of Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) signals an emerging transcontinental corridor that could reshape Asia-Europe trade flows, complementing ASEAN’s regional integration ambitions.

Engagement, therefore, offers ASEAN influence—however subtle—over the trajectory of Russian involvement in Eurasian and Arctic dynamics. By including Russia in multilateral dialogues, ASEAN helps steer that engagement toward peaceful integration rather than exclusionary blocs.

Defining Russian test

Putin’s potential visit to Malaysia in October 2025—potentially his first ever—will be closely watched far and wide, including in Washington. Putin’s visit would be more than protocol; it would be a test of whether Russia can conduct diplomacy on ASEAN’s terms, i.e. inclusive, peaceful and future-oriented.

Will Russia remain trapped in historical resentments and revisionist impulses? Or will it see the summit as a moment to reset its engagement with Asia? The ball, diplomatically speaking, is in Moscow’s court.

Malaysia, as the pivotal summit’s host, has an opportunity to send a clear signal. Prime Minister Anwar’s stated personal commitment to justice, multilateralism and civilizational dialogue gives him standing to engage Putin—not as an apologist, but as a moral and strategic interlocutor.

In an era defined by economic fragmentation and great power antagonism, ASEAN’s outreach to Russia is not a betrayal of values—it is a reclaiming of diplomacy’s purpose. To isolate a nuclear power is to risk escalation; to engage it is to seek transformation.

Russia, under the right conditions, could evolve from a source of disruptive conflict to a contributor to regional stability. The 2025 East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur will be its opportunity to show that such a transformation is possible.

ASEAN, and especially Malaysia, are offering the table. The question now is: will Russia take the seat and rise to the occasion?

Matt Taibbi: Brennan, MSNBC Can’t Stop Lying About Trump and Russia

By Matt Taibbi, Substack, 7/10/25

Last evening, former CIA director John Brennan made his first public comments since news broke that the FBI under Kash Patel has opened a criminal investigation into his conduct in the Trump-Russia investigation. He was interviewed on MSNBC, where he is a paid contributor. The one piece of salient information host and former Bush administration spokesperson Nicolle Wallace didn’t leave out is that Brennan is a “Senior national security and intelligence analyst right here at MSNBC.”

This was after Wallace interviewed former Hillary Clinton lawyer Marc Elias, who in 2016 was the point man responsible for hiring the “research” firm Fusion-GPS, which in turn hired former British spy Christopher Steele to compile reports on Donald Trump. Elias in other words paid the firm that shopped bogus reports to virtually every news agency in America, along with the FBI and politicians like John McCain, in an effort to kick-start a political investigation of a political rival.

What did Elias have to say about investigations into Brennan and Comey? Abandoning all self-respect, humorously hoping no one would remember his entire political raison d’être has been leveraging iffy information into legal trouble for antagonists, he said, “Like honestly, I’m just imploring the media, do NOT report” the news of the investigations. Priceless:

The amusing Elias video means people like the former Clinton lawyer are worried that not only conservatives, but friendly audiences at places like MSNBC might begin exploring what actually happened in 2016-2019. If those audiences put even minimal effort into learning the basics of these cases, it’s possible mainstream public opinion will finally turn — not on Trump, but on the concocted Trump-Russia mania of those years, which deserves a place in history next to or even above the WMD scandal as the biggest intelligence fiasco of our time.

The Wallace interview with Brennan was similarly comic. A summary of the segment is included for those who believe he’s innocent. This article isn’t paywalled, so Racket readers can circulate it to anyone who they feel may still be holdouts on Trump-Russia island. If that describes you, the MSNBC segment below is a small, jewel-like example of how you’ve been lied to by media and by officials like Brennan:

https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/rt3mt4mURts?rel=0&autoplay=0&showinfo=0&enablejsapi=0

Note that Wallace early on says “exactly what conduct is being investigated is not clear.” That’s not strictly true. It’s been reported in multiple places (including here) that the FBI is looking at perjury and conspiracy charges. Wallace does say investigations are in connection with Brennan’s handling of a January 6th, 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment, but she doesn’t tell you why this is important.

Nor does the New York Times, whose headline read, “Administration Takes Steps to Target 2 Officials Who Investigated Trump,” as if the gravestone modifiers for Comey or Brennan might be, THEY INVESTIGATED TRUMP. The Times, like Elias, is going with a “misuse, abuse, [and] authoritarian takeover” theme, insisting these investigations signal only that “Trump’s appointees intend to follow through on his campaign to exact retribution against his perceived enemies.” The Washington Post used the same construction, highlighting Trump’s campaign-trail promise to “exact retribution against many of his political enemies.”

It’s probably true Trump is anxious for payback — he denounced Comey and Brennan as “very dishonest people” in the wake of the investigation news and suggested there may be a “price to pay” — but that doesn’t mean these goofs have no real exposure. Mainstream press audiences just haven’t been told what both men did, and specifically how both benefited from an illegal leak of material from their January 2017 Intelligence Assessment, material that was both bogus and classified.

In early 2017, it wasn’t inevitable that President-Elect Donald Trump was going to face years of exhaustive Russia investigations. Contrary to popular legend, as of January 6th, 2017, neither the FBI nor the CIA had developed intelligence supporting a conclusion that Vladimir Putin “aspired” to interfere with our presidential election specifically to help Trump. In fact, there was evidence in the opposite direction, suggesting Russia and Putin were less than thrilled by the prospect of a White House run by the “unreliable” Trump, and may have seen Clinton as “manageable and reflecting continuity.” However, the Democratic Party by the end of 2016 already committed publicly to the idea that Putin aided Trump’s win. On December 16, 2016, for instsance, Hillary Clinton blamed her loss on Putin’s “personal grudge” against her.

There was no reason government officials had to co-sign this conclusion in the Intelligence Assessment Barack Obama commissioned, but they did. To get there, they had to use material from Steele, who had already been dismissed as a source by the FBI on November 1st, 2016, after he leaked reports for a Mother Jones story by David Corn.

Without Steele material, there would have been no pre-inauguration report saying “Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton.” In order to keep that storyline, the FBI had to take seriously Steele’s assertions about the existence of a “well-developed conspiracy of cooperation” between him and Russia. With Trump about to enter the White House and FBI investigations into Carter Page, Michael Flynn, and Trump stalling, this “Assessment” was the whole ballgame, the last chance to keep Trump-Russia going. Two actions were crucial: the controversial internal decision to include the Steele stuff, and the near-immediate leak of the report’s classified contents to the public before Trump was sworn in.

Here’s how first Wallace, then Brennan handled this:

Nicolle Wallace (at 2:22 above):“But the report or the Note doesn’t dispute the conclusion of the intelligence community. And that conclusion is that Russia interfered.”This is a silly mischaracterization of John Ratcliffe’s “Note,” which didn’t even look at the question of whether or not Russia “interfered.” Ratcliffe and the CIA instead “focused particular attention on the ICA’s most debated judgment— that Russian President Vladimir Putin ‘aspired’ to help then-candidate Donald Trump win the election.” Ratcliffe did “dispute” that conclusion, repeatedly.The CIA chief said that “placing a reference to the [Steele] material” as a “supporting bullet for the judgment that Putin ‘aspired’ to help Trump… elevated unsubstantiated claims to the status of credible supporting evidence.”He also noted the CIA and FBI should not have said they had “high” confidence in the notion that Russia aspired to help Trump, given that multiple quality sources are required for “high” confidence, and they didn’t have those. As reported last year, the ICA authors — like the authors of the original WMD report — also suppressed “credibly sourced reporting” that “suggested Putin was more ambivalent about which candidate won the election.”Nicolle Wallace (at 4:34 above).“In fact, a report authored in part by Donald Trump’s current secretary of state and current national security advisor, then-Acting Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Marco Rubio, actually did look into the process of how the intelligence community came to this conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. And that report… says this: “Every witness interviewed by the committee stated that he or she saw no attempt, no attempt to pressure or politicize the findings.”Wallace is describing a five-part Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the 2016 election. She’s right that it’s odd Marco Rubio took part in a report concluding Russia engaged in an “extensive” campaign to meddle for Trump. What Wallace didn’t mention is that the Senate relied on different evidence than the CIA/FBI’s 2017 Assessment to come to the same conclusion, a transparent indictment of the 2017 report.If Brennan and Comey got it right in 2017, why was a second report with all-new evidence necessary? The Senate report was a repair job, designed to replace Comey and Brennan’s car-wreck of a 2017 paper with a Senate product whose chief assertions — particularly around former Paul Manafort aide Konstantin Kilimnik, whose tie to Trump they said posed a “grave” intelligence threat — were not even reviewable, since lines like “Konstantin Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer” were not backed by visible evidence.John Brennan (at 10:27)“But you’re supposed to be interviewing the people involved in this to try to get a better understanding of the context for a lot of the actions that were taken.”Brennan’s unintentionally hilarious complaint is that John Ratcliffe didn’t bother interviewing him for the 8-page note released last week.This is the same Brennan who included an explosive “annex” of classified material from ex-spy Christopher Steele that upended American politics for years without interviewing Steele, his “Primary Sub-Source” Igor Danchenko of the Brookings Institute, or any of the Russian sources who ostensibly provided the pillars of Steele’s reports: tales of Trump “employing a number of prostitutes to perform a ‘golden showers’ (urination) show,” the “well-developed conspiracy” between Trump and Russia, and the notion that “Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting… Donald Trump, for at least five years.”When Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz put out his review of these issues in 2019, he pointed out that nobody interviewed Steele’s “Primary Sub-Source” until January of 2017, i.e. after the Assessment was released. When the FBI finally did talk to Steele’s sources, they disavowed almost every key point of Steele’s: the prostitute romps (“rumor and speculation,” the sub-source said), the “well-developed conspiracy” (there was “nothing bad” in communications between the Kremlin and Trump, per the source), and the notion that Trump and Page had been offered “the brokerage of up to a 19 percent (privatized) stake in Rosneft” in exchange for lifting sanctions (the sub-source “never stated that [Rosneft] had offered a brokerage interest”). Beyond that, no American official during this entire process ever picked up the phone to call key players/suspects like Julian Assange or Konstantin Kilimnik. It’s rich for Brennan complain no one interviewed him.John Brennan (10:40).“That’s why we went to extraordinary lengths to protect the sensitive intelligence that really undergirded the assessment that was extensively footnoted in the assessment. But also, as I said, to protect individuals involved, including Donald Trump. To make sure that none of this intelligence that could have been seen as inflammatory and as something that was, you know, very damning, would get out. And so that’s why we wanted to make sure it was done in a very appropriate and meticulous and diligent manner…”In a wounded tone, Brennan notes that he and James Comey went to extraordinary lengths to “protect the sensitive intelligence that really undergirded the assessessment” and “also… to protect individuals involved, including Donald Trump.”The timeline on this: Brennan, Comey, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, and NSA chief Michael Rogers decided to present a 2-page summary of the classified Steele material to Trump on January 6th, 2017. It was decided Comey would tell Trump the bad news that “Russians allegedly had tapes of him and prostitutes” at the Ritz-Carlton in 2013.“I said media like CNN had them and were looking for a news hook,” Comey explained. “I said it was important not to give them an excuse to say the FBI has the material or [redacted] and that we were keeping it very close-hold.”Four of the nation’s most senior intelligence chiefs gave a briefing of classified information to the President-Elect of the United States on January 6th, 2017. One might expect that experienced intelligence officials handling classified information might be able to keep a lid on for at least a week.No luck. The whole story was on every front page and every TV station within four days. Here’s the CNN headline from January 10:The lede of the CNN piece contained details only someone with advanced knowledge of the meeting would know. “Classified documents presented last week,” the four CNN writers said, included “allegations that Russian operatives claim to have compromising personal and financial information about Mr. Trump” and that “there was a continuing exchange of information during the campaign between Trump surrogates and intermediaries for the Russian government.” Material was presented in “a two-page synopsis that was appended to a report on Russian interference in the 2016 election,” and “came, in part, from memos compiled by a former British intelligence operative.”That’s what Brennan means by going to “extraordinary lengths” to protect information. The CNN story in one swoop outed classified intelligence, blew its source (all of Washington knew which “former British intelligence operative” CNN meant, which is why Buzzfeed could publish Steele’s dossier within hours) and betrayed the target, Trump. That’s a rare trifecta of incompetence. A coked-up Tourette’s patient would have done a better job guarding information. Are there really people left who believe these people?

A short history of US/Russia relations and the potential for peace with Russia

Populist Talk, Populist Message, Substack, 5/29/25

History of early US Russia relations

The Revolutionary War –1775-1783—Catherine the Great significantly affected the outcome of the American Revolution through her diplomacy. Catherine’s diplomacy helped the US gain independence. Catherine, though her foreign advisor, Nikita Ivanovich Panin, remained officially neutral during the war. Russia refused to assist Great Britain militarily and insisted on peace talks that linked a resolution of the American Revolution with the settlement of separate European conflicts. Catherine’s insistence on diplomacy, at least indirectly, helped the Americans win the Revolution and gain independence.

The Civil War–1861-1865–Russia supported the Union during the Civil War believing that a unified US could act as a counter force to Europe–especially Great Britian. In 1863, the Russian Navy‘s Baltic and Pacific fleets wintered in the American ports of New York and San Francisco, discouraging outside interference and preventing sudden attacks on Union port cities. To Tsar Alexander II, the main reason to support the Union was clear and it was that they were fighting on the side of emancipation and freedom. Tsar Alexander II was the Tsar that abolished serfdom in the Russian Empire and he believed that Lincoln shared his similar beliefs and championed the side of emancipation. This was one of the main reasons why the Russian Empire continued its support of the Union throughout the American Civil War.

The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1991— The communist takeover of Russia was opposed by the US and by most Russians. The philosophy of Communism was not indigenous to Russia, and Christian Russians were not aligned with the Bolsheviks. Communism extracted an enormous toll on Russia where an estimated 61 million Russians died from the various efforts to create a communist society. The USSR was peacefully dissolved on December 26, 1991. This marked the first time in history that an empire surrendered its empire without firing a shot. It also marked the end of communism.

The continuation of US militarism. The capture of Russia by communism, along with the occupation of Eastern Europe by the USSR after WW2, gave rise not only to the Cold War, but to many of the current tensions as well. The US did not disarm after World War 2 instead; the Cold War began, and US militarism was born. The old Cold War ended in 1991, but a new cold war began sometime after 2001 as the US, NATO and the CIA became more involved in Ukraine, but especially after the US backed coup in Ukraine in 2014. Meanwhile, US militarism continued even after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.

Russia is no longer a communist country. Russia is a mixed economy that is primarily capitalist in orientation. The Russian people suffered during the long and brutal transition from communism to capitalism that took place during the 1990’s. At least 7 million Russians died, but this disgraceful period is beyond the scope of this essay. For those interested, please see The Harvard Boys Do Russia. Since 2000 Russia has regained her footing economically and, on a purchasing power parity basis, is the 4th largest economy in the world.

The second World War–The US and the then USSR were allies. The German defeat, and the destruction of the German Army by the USSR, in Operation Barbarossa, essentially won the war. Over 27 million Russians died in World War 2 including almost 9 million military personnel. Today, the entire west refuses to acknowledge Russia’s sacrifice and Russia is not even invited to attend memorials to this horrid war. Increasingly, historical references discount or eliminate the contribution of the USSR to the Nazi defeat.

Two of the largest military campaigns in history were fought on Russian soil. In both cases, the invaders were defeated, and the capital of the invading country was captured

Napolean invades Russia—In 1812 Napolean sent his “Grande Armee” of 651,000 men and arms to invade Russia. The idea was to force Russia to comply with Napolean’s demand of a continental blockade of the United Kingdom.. That army perished in Russia along with hundreds of thousands of Russia civilians. In 1814 a coalition, including Russia, defeated Napolean in the Battle of Paris, conquering Paris, and forcing Napolean to abdicate.

Hitler invades Russia–On June 22, 1941, Hitler sent the flower of the German military to conquer the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. For this campaign, the Germans allotted almost 150 divisions of about three million men. This included, 19 panzer divisions, about 3,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery pieces, and 2,500 aircraft. It was the largest and most powerful invasion force in human history. The Germans’ strength was further increased by more than 30 divisions of Finnish and Romanian troops. This entire force was destroyed, crippling German’s war fighting power. The Soviet Army marched across Eastern Europe and from April 16-May 2, 1945 fought the Battle of Berlin in revenge for the suffering of the Soviet people. The city fell to the Soviets, and the Soviet flag was raised above the Reichstag.

What is the value of Russia’s resources?

Russia’s natural resources are estimated to be worth a staggering $75 trillion. Russia’s vast wealth is composed of a wide array of commodities, including crude oil, natural gas, coal, and rare earth metals. Russia also leads in developing the Artic and has vast timber and freshwater resources. This positions Russia as a major global player in the energy and resources sector. The scale of Russia’s resources impacts both the global energy markets and geopolitical dynamics. These resources are also unencumbered as Russia has very little debt. These facts also make Russia a target by highly leveraged economies searching for resources and assets.

The USSR (Russia) was promised that NATO would not expand eastward one inch

The promise of US Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would expand “not one inch eastward” has been documented by declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu).

The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.” President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests.

Despite these promises NATO expanded. This is the history of NATO expansion: in 1999 NATO was expanded into The Czech Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia), Hungary, and Poland. 2004 saw the largest increase in NATO members since the Alliance’s foundation. Perhaps even more notable, though, is that republics of the former Soviet Union were now joining (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Bulgaria (formerly of the Warsaw Pact) Estonia Latvia Lithuania Romania (formerly of the Warsaw Pact) Slovakia Slovenia (successor to Yugoslavia) In 2009, NATO’s foothold in East Europe grew firmer: with the addition of Albania (formerly of the Warsaw Pact), and Croatia (successor to Yugoslavia). The additions to NATO in 2017 and 2020 are successor states to Yugoslavia: Montenegro (in 2017) North Macedonia (in 2020). NATO was now at Russia’s doorstep, all that remained was Ukraine and Georgia and NATO would border Russia, including the areas that had been used in the past by European countries to invade Russia.

NATO and the US begins to conduct “exercises” with Ukraine along Russia’s border

Larry Johnson did a series on NATO exercises conducted, with Ukraine, along the Russian border. Many of these exercises mimicked a decapitation strike against Russia. They include: Understanding Military Exercises; The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 1; The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 2; The Road to War in Ukraine — The History of NATO and US Military Exercises With Ukraine — Part 3 Here’s Larry Johnson:

“The ten-year period — 2011 -2021 — marked a dramatic surge in the size of the Ukrainian military. Although the number of active-duty soldiers stabilized at 200,000 starting in 2018, the Ukrainian reserves grew by a factor of 10. These reserves were made possible by Ukraine’s annual military training with NATO and USEUCOM forces. The stage was set for going to war with Russia.”

The US/NATO knew that attempting to expand NATO to Ukraine would force Russia to intervene

A very strong case can be made that the US began the process of creating conditions for war with Russia as far back as 2008. Senior US government officials knew that the threat of adding Ukraine to NATO would be seen as a serious “military threat” by Russia, a threat that would crosse Moscow’s security “redlines” and could force it to intervene.

At the annual NATO summit back in 2008, the George W. Bush administration publicly called for adding Russia’s neighbors Ukraine and Georgia to the military alliance. NATO’s secretary-general declared that the two countries would eventually become members. But privately, US diplomats knew that this move would be seen as an existential threat by Moscow and could provoke Russian military intervention in Ukraine.

Former US Ambassador to Russia William J. Burns, who later became CIA director, admitted in a classified 2008 embassy cable that NATO expansion to Ukraine crosses Moscow’s security “redlines” and “could potentially split the country in two, leading to violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force Russia to decide whether to intervene.”

President Putin discussed these and other issues in an address he gave at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. It was a clear statement of Russian foreign policy including the need for multilateralism. Although the speech was mostly ignored in the West, some have compared it to the speech given by President John F. Kennedy at American University in June of 1963. Both were appeals for diplomacy rather than war.

Russia tries to avert war with the Minsk Agreements

In 2014, after the Maidan coup, a civil war broke out between Kiev and several eastern Ukrainian republics. This is a complex story but to simplify–in 2014 and 2015 agreements were entered into in Minsk, ie the Minsk agreements—aimed at restoring peace in the region by ending the separatist war. France and Germany were to oversee the agreements. Both Hollande and Angela Merkel have both admitted that the Minsk Agreements were designed to buy time for an arms buildup for Ukraine. Ukrainian government forces and pro-Russian separatists had been fighting in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine since 2014 in a conflict that Kyiv says has claimed some 15,000 lives.

Russia proposes a new security treaty in December 2021

Despite the risk of war, Western leaders continued to insist that Ukraine would join the US-led military alliance. In December of 2021, Russia submitted a proposal for a new mutual security guarantees to the United States. At this very time, NATO was conducting another exercise in the Black Sea. The proposal was immediately dismissed by NATO and the US.

The US and NATO had apparently forgotten the words of President John F. Kennedy: “while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world.”

On February 18, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov voiced alarm on Friday over a sharp increase in shelling in eastern Ukraine and accused the OSCE special monitoring mission of glossing over what he said were Ukrainian violations of the peace process.

February 22, 2022, Russia intervenes in Ukraine

Who provoked who? We have all heard the mantra that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was “unprovoked”, but there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. Ukraine built significant fortifications in the Donbass and had been shelling civilian areas for several weeks. There were also fears that Ukraine was preparing a military campaign against the pro-Russian population of the Donbass. Russia argued that intervention was necessary to prevent the Donbass from being overrun. The fortifications are so extensive that Russia is still clearing these areas.

Sanctions on Russia. The US and the EU implemented extensive sanctions on Russiaincluding excluding Russia from the SWIFT clearing system and seizing over $300 billion in Russian assets. The belief was that the sanctions would crash the Russian economy and lead to the overthrow of President Putin. This did not happen. The Russian economy adapted and continued to grow.

The US has run this war. On March 25, 2025 the New York Times printed an enormous story titled: The Partnership: The Secret History of the War in Ukraine. The US has provided the weapons and financial support to Ukraine, but the US and NATO assistance went much further. The Times story revealed a secret operation in Wiesbaden, Germany where US and NATO forces formed a partnership with Ukraine “…of intelligence, strategy, planning and technology that would become the secret weapon.” In this operation “…American and Ukrainian officers planned Ukraine’s counter offenses. A vast American intelligence-collection effort both guided big-picture battle strategy and funneled precise targeting information down to Ukrainian soldiers in the field.”

In other words, the US and NATO were directly involved in killing Russian soldiers and Russia knew this was happening. This operation was supported by a finding signed by President Biden.

Conclusion– The US and Russia have a long very positive history going all the way back to the founding of our nation. We were allies in World War 2 even though Russia was in the grip of communism at that time. Russia is no longer a communist country. Why are we essentially at war with Russia today? The only possible reason is that Russia insists on being a sovereign nation and on using her resources to benefit her people rather than transnational financiers. Under the Wolfowitz Doctrine from 1992, the US is to act to prevent a rival power from arising in the EU, Asia or the former territory of the Soviet Union. Unless this doctrine is set aside it implies that the US will go to war with Russia and China–wars the US is unprepared to fight. This fact is demonstrated in these articles by Lt Col (Retd) Alex Vershinin: The Return of Industrial Warfare (Jun 17 2022) The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine – RUSI May 2024 Battlefield Conditions Impacting Ukraine Peace Negotiations – Russia Matters, Apr 18 2025 republished by Responsible Statecraft: Ukraine’s battlefield position is deteriorating fast May 5 2025.

Certain people within the US and NATO acted to force Russia to intervene in Ukraine. The people of Ukraine have been used as a proxy so the US and NATO could safely confront Russia. Since February 2022 the Russian Federation has basically been at war with the United States and NATO. Russia has carefully conducted this war as a war of attrition designed to exhaust the US and NATO and force a new security architecture–and as the above essays discuss, this is a war Russia is winning. Russia has adapted to all the weapons provided Ukraine and continues to expand and improve her military technology, and her weapons. Military recruitment is strong in Russia and her people are united and quite angry at the insults, and the lies. Isn’t it time we made peace?

As Otto von Bismark noted–Russia is slow to saddle up but fast to ride. Russia is now riding very fast.

In the face of powerful interests, can President Donald Trump be the president of peace? Trump ran on the promise to be a “peace president”, specifically promising to end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, stating in his inaugural address that he wanted to be known as “a peacemaker and unifier.”

Significant elements within the national security state are opposed to peace–not only in Russia, but in Iran and Gaza as well. Senator Lindsey Graham has split with the president and claims to have 81 Senators prepared to support more sanctions on Russia. The President has business before the Senate and needs their support.

There is also opposition to peace with Iran. AIPAC and Israel want the US to go to war with Iran and are demanding zero enrichment and a complete dismantling of nuclear energy. Iran says there will be no deal if this is the demand. Like with Russia, a US war with Iran is beyond current US military capabilities.

A term has been circulating on the internet–TACO, short for Trump Always Chickens Out. The term, coined by the Financial Times columnist Robert Armstrong, has been used to describe how markets tumble when the President issues threats, usually over tariffs, then rebounds when Trump gives way. This phenomena, lucrative for traders in the know, is the subject of a story in today’s New York Times. Asked about the term President Trump lashed out at the reporter: “I chicken out? I’ve never heard that,” he said. “Don’t ever say what you said,” he told the reporter. “That’s a nasty question. To me, that’s the nastiest question.”

President Putin recounts that he has dealt with 3 US Presidents, none of whom were able to carry out the promises they made. His conclusion? The president may change but US policy stays the same. Will this be the case with this president on the question of peace with Russia, Iran and Gaza?

At this moment in history–our lives may depend on the answer.