Randal Rauser's Blog, page 170

Another failed attempt to demonstrate that Calvinism is irrational (due to a contradiction)

A few days ago Fr Alvin Kimel invited the readers of his blog to formulate an argument demonstrating the incoherence of Calvinism.

The point of this challenge was to offer a rebuttal to my claim that one should be prepared to worship God if it should turn out that Reformed theology is broadly correct qua the divine nature and human election. In short, if one can present an argument that Reformed theology is incoherent, then one need not countenance the counterfactual possibility that Reformed theology could possibly be correct.

Fr Kimel has now returned with an argument from one of his readers. To be honest, I found his reader’s formulation a bit confusing on a first reading. But I’ve reproduced it in full below and below that I offer a reformulation of the reader’s argument after which I offer a response. (Readers who have limited time may be inclined to proceed to my critique and only refer back to the original statement of the argument as needed.)

* * *

I think a simple Modus Tollens argument effectively counters the claim given. To review, Modus Tollens follows this form.

(P1): If P then Q

(P2): Not Q

(C): Therefore, not P

This is a valid deductive argument, which is what Rauser requested of you. We can make the following substitutions.

P = God is perfectly good and maximally loving. This is a premise in Rauser’s article, so it should not be objectionable.

Q = God will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love. Rauser may find this (“Q”) to be objectionable. However, purposely creating something that cannot experience God’s love is an action that does not maximize love. Therefore, “Q” flows from the same premise that contains “P.” So objecting to “Q” would be to treat contrary to his first premise of God being perfectly good, maximally loving, etc.

So we have our “P1”: If P, then Q being, “If God is perfectly good and maximally loving, then He will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.”

“Not Q” would be a the creation of a creature who cannot experience His maximal love. This flows directly from his second premise which contains the election to damnation (from double predestination). In this case, the reprobate, or damned, are created specifically such that they experience Hell in lieu of God’s maximal love. This is the definition of being damned. Thus, we have a true (logically true) “P2” statement, “Under Calvinism, God creates creatures for the purpose of denying those creatures His maximal love,” which equates to “not Q.”

Since Modus Tollens is a valid deductive argument form, the only conclusion that follows is “not P” or the conclusion that under Calvinism, God is not perfectly good nor maximally loving. But this conclusion contradicts Rauser’s first premise. Therefore, either that first premise (from which we derived “P”) is false, or the election to damnation (from which we derived “not Q”) of his second premise is false. I think none of us find a problem with his first premise. So the problem must lie in the second premise — specifically the election to damnation portion.

* * *

Getting Clear on the Argument

I said that I found this presentation confusing. Let’s begin with definitions. To recap:

P = God is perfectly good and maximally loving

Q = God will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.

And now the premises, as filled in by the reader (note that I’ve inserted “P” and “Q” into the premises). Please note that for the sake of clarity I’ve rewritten (P2) to make it clearer. In addition, I’ve added a (P0) to establish the contradiction in Calvinism:

(P0) [P] God is perfectly good and maximally loving.

(P1): “If [P] God is perfectly good and maximally loving, then [Q] He will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.”

(P2): [Not-Q] “God will create creatures for the purpose of denying those creatures His maximal love.”

(C): Therefore, [Not-P] God is not perfectly good and maximally loving.

So we have a contradiction between (P0) and (C). Therefore, Calvinism is incoherent, right?

Not so fast.

It’s all about (P1)

In my response I’m going to focus criticism on (P1) for one simple reason: if a rational person can reject (P1) then the rest of the argument is a moot point anyway.

Perhaps it would make sense at this point to reiterate the high evidential burden that Fr Kimel has assumed. He wants an argument that is so strong that it shows not only that Calvinism is likely false but that it must be false. Put another way, Fr Kimel needs an argument so strong that it can establish that Calvinism can only be accepted as true on pain of irrationality. After all, if a person can rationally accept the core claims of Calvinism, then the non-Calvinist should be prepared to concede that they would worship God if it turns out that Calvinism is true.

So can a reasonable person reject (P1)? To recap,

(P1): “If [P] God is perfectly good and maximally loving, then [Q] He will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.”

The answer is, yes, a person can rationally reject (P1). One good reason to reject a premise is because it is ambiguous, and (P1) is ambiguous. More specifically, the problem is with Q which fails to distinguish between creation for the purpose and creation for the sole purpose.

For example, God might have created Mary for the purpose of giving birth to Jesus. But it doesn’t follow that God created Mary for the sole purpose of giving birth to Jesus. And claims about the sole purpose are far more contentious than claims about a purpose. Nor need the Calvinist be committed to the claim that God created reprobate human beings for the sole purpose of being reprobated.

Furthermore, an action can be undertaken to meet a hierarchy of purposes. For example, imagine that your friend from a far flung part of the world is attending his first western wedding in your company. At the moment the groom produces a ring, he whispers “Why’s he holding that ring?” You whisper back: “To put it on her finger.” “And why does he want to put it on her finger?” You reply: “Because that’s the ceremony by which they become married.”

So an act like producing a ring can have a nested hierarchy of purposes. A groom produces a ring to place on a woman’s finger and to bring oneself into matrimonial union with that woman.

Now consider the act of God deliberately creating a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love. Just as no groom would suggest that the ring is produced for the sole purpose of placing it on a bride’s finger, so no Calvinist would say that God’s creating a creature is for the sole purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.

So what additional purposes might God have? I already provided one scenario in “Calvinism is perfectly coherent. In which I continue defending a view I reject.” In that scenario, God creates some people who will be reprobated for the purpose of expressing his divine nature more fully to the larger share of creation. You can refer back to that article to see my delightful Bruce Wayne analogy.

Please note, as well, the important analogy I draw in that article  between Calvinism and Arminianism. To apply that analogy here, we can note that the non-universalist Arminian proposes that God creates some libertarianly free creatures knowing that they will freely reject his love and end up eternally alienated from him.

There is a sense on this Arminian framework in which God creates that creature “for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.” The point is that God desires, on this scenario, to create a world of libertarian free creatures in which some freely choose him and others freely reject him and each individual reprobated individual fits into that divine economy and the purposes behind it. But it hardly follows that their reprobation is God’s sole intent. As with the Calvinist, there are nested purposes at work.

Suffice it to say, Q ought to be rejected in present form, and (P1) with it. As a result, the attempt to demonstrate that Calvinism is incoherent fails.

Running to make cancer history, one step at a time

In his magisterial book The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer, Doctor Siddhartha Mukherjee tells the story of a dreaded disease, and the indomitable human spirit that has fought it throughout our history.

Cancer is a hydra-headed beast, and our struggles with it will only increase in the future. As the fight continues, it recruits countless doctors, researchers, and other professionals to fight in the war. And along the way, countless brave souls are conscripted to fight individuals battles. I lack the medical knowledge to offer a frontline contribution to the war, and by God’s grace I have yet to be conscripted to the battle, though my own mother has fought the battle … and won.

What I can do, however modest it may be, is contribute to the war using my modest means of fundraising. And so on this Sunday, October 4th, I will be Running for the Cure, a 10 km run focused on raising donations for the fight against breast cancer. In this capacity I will be running with my own daughter and her school team.

Five readers of my blog generously donated to my last fundraising run for Habitat for Humanity a couple weeks ago. I would ask the rest of you to consider offering your support as I run for the cure this Sunday. You can make a donation at the following address and I thank you for your support.

http://cibcrunforthecure.supportcbcf.com/goto/RandalRauser

All about Eve: Wm. Paul Young Speaking in Edmonton

William Paul Young’s first book, The Shack, sold enough copies to give everyone in Australia a copy. His second book, Cross Roads, returned him to the New York Times Bestseller list. Likewise for his latest book Eve which is just out this month.

Not only is Paul an engaging and provocative writer: he’s also an excellent speaker. And next Tuesday morning (Oct. 6) he will be speaking at my school, Taylor Seminary in Edmonton, AB. The event is free and open to the public so please come on out if you can and spread the word. In the evening there is also another event at Gateway Alliance Church.

The information for both events is below.

The Golden Rule of Caricaturing the Beliefs of Others

People love to caricature the beliefs of others. And it’s not hard to see why. After all, let’s be honest: it’s fun. Caricaturing the beliefs of others makes them look stupid and makes yourself feel smart. It builds your self-confidence at the expense of others. And what could be wrong with that?

Consider, for example, this caricature of atheism:

Now that’s a great way to make atheists look stupid and make yourself feel smart.

(Momentary pause for high fives with Christian friends.)

But there is a downside with all this caricaturing of others: those others might start caricaturing you. For example,

Now wait a minute, that’s not funny. That’s a complete, disrespectful caricature of the Christian doctrines of Trinity, incarnation, and atonement.

(Momentary pause to grumble over the rank injustice with Christian friends.)

So to sum up, caricaturing others can be loads of fun. But, if you do it, you must be prepared to receive caricatures in kind.

Or, as the Golden Rule of caricaturing states, Caricature the beliefs of others only if you would like them to caricature your beliefs.

Calvinism is perfectly coherent. In which I continue defending a view I reject

In “Calvinism as a logical contradiction,” I reproduced Zeno’s very detailed attempt to demonstrate that Calvinism entails a logical contradiction. I’m grateful for Zeno’s efforts and his clearly evident acumen. Despite this fact, I’m wholly unpersuaded by his efforts.

In this response I’m going to direct my criticism at premise (10) of Zeno’s argument. To recap,

(10) Necessarily, it is wicked to freely decree the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of one’s glory. (a priori moral truth)

The problems begin with the fact that Zeno fails to present the strongest form of his interlocutor’s position. This leaves him susceptible to the charge of a Strawman fallacy.

God’s glory and Batman

There are two primary problems with this premise and they relate to the phrases “sake of one’s glory” and “freely decree”.

To begin with, the phrase “for the sake of one’s glory” is deeply misleading here. After all, it conveys the sense of a person perversely seeking to gratify themselves through the suffering of others. Frankly, this is a caricature if not a rank perversion of the Reformed position. Certainly it is a caricature of the Reformed position that I’ve adumbrated several times in the discussion threads precipitated by my initial argument.

The point of God’s issuing decrees of election and reprobation is not to glorify God for God’s sake but rather for the cumulative benefit of creation. Any Reformed theologian will tell you that God exists a se and his glory is infinite independent of creation. His glory is already infinite and cannot be increased. What can be increased, however, is the creature’s grasp of God’s glory. And since God is perfect, he always acts to maximize the creature’s grasp of his glory, not for his own benefit but rather for that of the creature.

Next, the Reformed position I’ve defended here proposes that the maximization of God’s glory for the sake of the creature requires the opportunity for God to demonstrate every one of his attributes.

Consider an analogy. Imagine that Bruce Wayne gets married, has a child, and settles into comfortable suburban life. One might think that for the child to know their father most fully, they would have to experience Bruce Wayne not only as the laid back suburban dad, but also as the foreboding, nocturnal, crime fighting Batman: black cape, mask, raspy voice, and all. And if this is the case, then Bruce Wayne would require some conflict as an occasion for him to assume his Batman persona and thereby exhibit the full range of his traits so that his child might know him more fully, not only as the suburban dad, but also as the crime fighting superhero.

That analogy, imperfect though it may be, gives us some sense of the intuition at work here. Just as Bruce Wayne requires conflict to demonstrate his crime fighting attributes, so God requires some degree of conflict to demonstrate his attributes of justice, wrath (for the reprobate) and mercy (for the elect). It is only by way of some degree of conflict and rebellion in creation that God can most fully maximize his glory for the benefit of his creatures.

From what I’ve said thus far, it should be clear why “freely decree” is equally problematic. On the Reformed view I’m defending here, God is not free to create creatures without reprobating a subset of those creatures insofar as the reprobation of some of those creatures is a requirement for the divine drive to maximize God’s glory.

God and the Trolley Dilemma

So if Zeno wanted a more accurate premise, he’d need to drop (10) and substitute something like this:

(10′) Necessarily, it is wicked for God to issue a decree of reprobation for a subset of creatures even though this decree is issued for the cumulative benefit of the majority of creatures.

At this point, the Trolley Dilemma is relevant. Imagine God standing by the railroad tracks. The trolley is hurtling down the tracks and if it is not averted, it will egregiously injure untold numbers of people. This is equivalent to the world in which, per impossibile, God never issues a decree of reprobation, resulting in all creatures being deprived of the full maximization of the divine glory.

And so, in all possible worlds in which there are creatures that can benefit from the maximal presentation of the divine glory, God acts to secure the benefit of the majority by flipping the switch and sending the trolley onto the sidetrack wherein exists a decree of reprobation that aversely affects a subset of humanity whilst benefiting the majority.

The intuitive appeal of the Trolley Dilemma and Compatibilist Free Will

Note as well two additional points that support the intuitive appeal of this account.

First, most people sympathize with the reasoning behind the Trolley decision. We need not be straight up utilitarians to recognize that there are instances where we have a forced choice and we act to minimize the harm (and maximize the good) to the greatest number. So if human beings can envision the occasion where we might need to flick the trolley switch, we should concede the possibility that the maximally great creator and sustainer of all might likewise have occasion to flick a cosmic switch of election … and be well within his rights when he does.

Second, please keep in mind that on this account, compatibilism is true. That is, the free will of creatures is consistent with the divine determination for them to act. And compatibilism is the majority position among philosophers when it comes to free will. So on this account God violates no person’s free will. Nor does he force them to do anything. Statements to the contrary are simply mistaken and suggest that the objector really has a problem with compatiblism as a theory of free will rather than with Calvinism per se.

The Arminian Dilemma

Finally, let’s also note that Arminians who retain their objection to the propriety of God treating the reprobate in such a “callous” way need to address their own dilemma. Consider two scenarios of election based on the assumption of libertarian (Arminian) freedom:

In world 1, Randal freely chooses to follow God and is saved while Adolf Hitler freely chooses to reject God and is lost.

In world 2, Randal freely chooses to reject God and is lost while Adolf Hitler freely chooses to follow Go and is saved.

God ultimately decides to create world 1 (*fingers crossed!*) instead of world 2. By doing this, God effectively chooses Randal and all others that freely choose God in that possible world. And God is effectively rejecting Adolf and all others that freely reject God in that possible world.

Note how close this picture is to the Reformed picture. In both cases, God is seeking to attain a particular good (Calvinist: maximization of divine glory; Arminian: free will), and in each case the desire to attain that good results in the effective “sacrifice” of a subset of creatures (i.e. the reprobate).

This suggests that if Zeno’s argument did work, it would arguably apply not merely to Calvinists but Arminians as well.

But it doesn’t work, not least because Zeno has yet to address Calvinism in its strongest and most plausible forms.

Two final caveats

First, the Calvinist is not committed to a pessimistic view on the ratio of elect to reprobate. Indeed, it could be that the elect vastly outnumber the reprobate. So one cannot sustain an objection based on a pessimistic assumption that the number of the reprobate is substantial relative to the number of the elect.

Finally, also note that the Calvinist need not be committed to eternal conscious torment. It could be, for example, that annihilationism is true and that final destruction resulting in the cessation of existence is sufficient to demonstrate God’s glory. The nature of hell is also an intramural debate among Calvinists. So one also cannot sustain an objection based on an assumption about the eternal horrors of hell since a Calvinist need not endorse eternal conscious torment.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by reiterating that I am not a Calvinist. Indeed, I have written many articles critiquing Calvinism. But I always try to make it a point to consider my interlocutor’s position in its strongest forms. And when I do that in this case, I am persuaded that Calvinism can be articulated as a logical and possibly true position, even if it remains in my opinion a very implausible view.

Calvinism as a logical contradiction

This is a guest post by Zeno. It started life as a comment in the discussion for my article “If the God of Calvinism exists, would you worship him?” However, it seemed to me that this comment was of sufficient length, depth, and careful crafting (and carries such delightful terms as “Randal’s burden” and “Randal’s abominable conjunction”) that it was proper to place it on the main stage. To that end, I have taken the liberty of titling it “Calvinism as a logical contradiction.” And so, now without further ado, Zeno’s demonstration that Calvinism presents an incoherent picture of God which could not possibly be true…

* * *

There is a lot going on here, so I would simply ask that you consider this carefully so that my work isn’t entirely wasted. Of course, I have no reason to doubt that you will.

Sorry, I concede nothing of the sort. When I said that if you help yourself to an implausible view, you are then able to defend other implausible views, I radically understated the claim. My claim—put more exactly—is that if you help yourself to incoherent or necessarily false views, then you can use them to defend other incoherent views. Let me say a bit about why that’s true, and the relevance it has to this discussion.

It is a principle of logic that incoherent statements entail everything. To illustrate, let us say that someone affirms A and ~A. Then we can infer B from their view, regardless of what B is. Witness:

(1) Suppose A and ~A.

(2) Therefore, either A or B. (from 1)

(3) Therefore, ~A. (from 1)

(4) Therefore, B. (from 2, 3)

So suppose someone offers us a conditional with an incoherent antecedent. Perhaps the conditional is “If God both is a square and is not a square, then we ought to worship God.” Another way to write this conditional is as an argument where the antecedent is the premise and the consequent is the conclusion:

(5) God both is a square and is not a square.

(6) Therefore, we ought to worship God.

Is this a valid argument? Of course it is, since we have already shown that everything follows from an incoherence. So the conditional “If God both is a square and is not a square, we ought to worship God” is true. But likewise for the conditional “If God both is a square and is not a square, we ought not to worship God.”

Now it will do you no good to say, “But the premise above is an explicit contradiction, but nothing is explicitly contradictory about the claim that God is perfectly good and decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for God’s glory.” The reason this will do you no good is not because this claim is false; it isn’t. Rather, the problem is just that something can be incoherent without being explicitly so. For example, the concept of a barber who shaves all and only those who don’t shave themselves is incoherent, but it does not where its incoherence on its sleeve. Further reasoning is required to bring out the incoherence. So, just because something is not explicitly contradictory upon first glance does not entail that it is not in fact incoherent. There could be, after all, a chain of reasoning using entirely a priori principles from the supposition to a contradiction. So we cannot satisfy ourselves that a proposition is coherent merely because its incoherence isn’t evident upon a superficial, first glance. And it could very well turn out that the proposition “God is perfect and decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for God’s glory” is a proposition that, when conjoined with other a priori truths, entails a contradiction. In fact, I think this is true, and will argue for this below.

So here is the sense of my claim: if you help yourself to incoherent views, then you can defend anything. I hope it is clear why I would say that. And by saying that, I hardly concede anything of substance to what you’re defending.

OK, now back to the issue at hand. You offer us the following conditional:

The Worship Conditional: “If God is absolutely perfect and freely decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of God’s glory, then we ought to worship God.”

Now presumably you not only think that this is true, but that the following conditional is false:

The No-Worship Conditional: “If God is absolutely perfect (a redundancy, given your notion of God) and freely decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of God’s glory, then we ought not to worship God.”

The burden of your posts, after all, has been to argue against this conditional, the No-Worship Conditional. It is entirely fair, therefore, for me to assume that you think it is false. So your position is the following:

Randal’s Burden: The Worship Conditional is true and the No-Worship Conditional is false.

By now it should be clear that Randal’s Burden is true only if the antecedent of the Worship Conditional (which is identical to the antecedent of the No-Worship Conditional) is coherent. For if it is incoherent, then it entails everything, and the No-Worship Conditional will come out true(for the reasons clearly and meticulously spelled out already), contrary to Randal’s Burden.

OK, so far so good. At this point, I came in and argued that the proposition “God is absolutely perfect and decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for God’s glory” is incoherent. My thesis is not that it is explicitly incoherent, but rather that when it is conjoined with other a prior principles, it entails a contradiction. My argument—recast a bit, but essentially the same—is as follows:

(7) Suppose that God is absolutely perfect and that God freely decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of God’s glory.

(8) Therefore, God is absolutely perfect. (from 1)

(9) Necessarily, if God is absolutely perfect, God does nothing that is wicked. (a priori truth)

(10) Necessarily, it is wicked to freely decree the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of one’s glory. (a priori moral truth)

(11) Therefore, God does nothing that is wicked. (from 8, 9)

(12) Therefore, God does not freely decree the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of God’s glory. (from 10, 11)

(13) Therefore, God freely decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of God’s glory. (from 1; contradiction).

I believe that this argument shows that the Calvinist view entails a contradiction. Calvinism, therefore is incoherent, on my view.

Now here is an interesting point, one that has been glossed over in this discussion. If you are going to defend Randal’s Burden, then you must argue that the Worship Conditional is true but the No-Worship Conditional is false. (And in fact, that IS what you have been arguing.) But that entails—please see this, because it is hugely important—that the antecedents of those conditionals are coherent. (If they aren’t, then for the reasons given earlier, both conditionals will come out true, contrary to Randal’s Burden. Please review those arguments carefully if this point is not yet clear.) Your thesis—Randal’s Burden, that is—entails that the proposition “God is perfectly good and God freely decrees the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of God’s glory” is at least coherent. But the argument I have given, if sound, entail that this proposition is not coherent, since, if sound, the argument shows that the supposition implies a contradiction. (My argument is plainly valid, so the only thing preventing it from being sound is if it contains a false premise.) You are therefore committed to rejecting a premise of my argument. But the only premise you could possibly reject is premise (10). So, perhaps without noticing it, you have committed yourself to the falsehood of (10). On your view, then, it is possible—at least in the epistemic, if not the metaphysical, sense of ‘possible’—that God freely decrees the eternal ruin of human persons but thereby does nothing wrong. You are committed, therefore, to what I shall call “Randal’s Skepticism”:

Randal’s Skepticism: Given what we know about morality, we cannot know that it is wicked to freely decree the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of one’s glory.

Now I think all fair-minded readers of this blog—not all readers are fair-minded, of course—will see this as quite a substantive claim, even a quite astonishing claim. The reason I brought up the torture case is because I assume that you are sensible enough to know that the following is true:

Zeno’s Non-Skepticism: Given what we know about morality, we can know that it is wicked to command humans to inflict torture on innocents merely for amusement.

Now, from what you’ve said, it’s obvious that you agree with Zeno’s Non-Skepticism. Your position about our moral knowledge, therefore, entails the following conjunction:

Randal’s Abominable Conjunction: Given what we know about morality, we cannot know that it is wicked to freely decree the eternal ruin of human persons for the sake of one’s glory but we can know that it is wicked to command humans to inflict torture on innocents merely for amusement.

You are committed to Randal’s Abominable Conjunction. Your position, therefore, can be no more plausible than Randal’s Abominable Conjunction, since your position entails it. (It is a truth of probability that if P entails Q and Q has a probability of N, then P has a probability less than or equal to N.) Presumably you think your views are very plausible indeed. So, you are committed to thinking that Randal’s Abominable Conjunction is very plausible.

At this point I believe that argument might have run out—it always does, doesn’t it?—and I have to simply confess that I have no idea why someone would find Randal’s Abominable Conjunction plausible in the least. It is as though we were told that, on the basis of perception, we can know that there are trees but cannot know that there are flowers. In the perception case, we would say that the same tools that enable us to know there are trees also enable us to know that there are flowers. Likewise, I think that the same moral reflection that enables us to know that it is wicked to torture innocents for fun also enables us to know that it is wicked to intentionally issue a decree that guarantees the eternal ruin of human persons for one’s glory. But to a moral skeptic of the sort that you seem to be—which is not, let us note, to say that you are a total moral skeptic—will likely find this psychological report uninteresting. And here we simply part ways, I with my moral conviction, you with your theologically-induced moral doubt. But what more could be expected from a conversation in which it is disputed whether we can know that the God of Calvinism is a horrific figure indeed?

Debriefing Calvinism and an article on hell

Yesterday I posted an article posing the question: “If the God of Calvinism exists, would you worship him?” My answer is, yes, of course! Why? Because within Calvinism (as within Christian orthodoxy generally) God is understood to be morally perfect, and it is right and proper to worship a morally perfect being.

Of course, I presently have strong moral and rational intuitions that Calvinism is not true. But if the God of Calvinism does exist, then those moral and rational intuitions would be errant. Since I value truth more than my current beliefs, if I have errant moral and rational intuitions about the divine nature, I would want to know about it.

So I am a bit disappointed by the number of people who have responded “no” to my question.

Be that as it may, at present I am not a Calvinist. Nor, for that matter, am I a proponent of the doctrine of hell as consisting of eternal conscious torment, i.e. the everlasting physical and mental torture of the reprobate. The blog “Unfundamentalist Christians” just posted a rewrite of an article I wrote a couple years ago called “Could you be so holy that you wouldn’t be sad when your children go to hell?” Check it out and join the conversation!

If the God of Calvinism exists, would you worship him?

Yesterday I wrote an article critiquing Justin Schieber’s tweeted declaration “I refuse to repent to a god who, if real, has far more to repent about than I.” It turns out that by “god” Justin was referring to a morally monstrous deity which lacks the moral perfection of God as defined in classical theism and the orthodox confession. And every Christian should likewise refuse to submit to this being who bears no relation to their beliefs.

But many others insist that they would not repent should the God of Christian theology exists. Yesterday in the comment section to the above-mentioned article Zeno wrote:

“God, as described by many contemporary Christians, is a disgusting figure indeed. God is described by many as inflicting both antemortem and postmortem horrors on humans that only those who are both clever and obtuse could defend. Such a god would have a lot to repent of.”

Walter followed up Zeno’s comment by adding:

“The God of Calvinism is about as monstrous as they come. And Calvinism appears to be on the rise in evangelical circles.”

So let’s consider the possibility that “The God of Calvinism” (aka, God as described within Calvinistic theology) exists. If it turns out that this theology describes God, should we repent to (and worship) him? Zeno and Walter presumably say no. Such a god is a “disgusting figure” and “about as monstrous as they come”. Are they right?

Long time readers of this blog might expect me to say “yes”. After all, in the past I’ve often been a critic of Calvinist theology. However, “critic” means that I’ve raised objections to the likelihood that Calvinist theology provides an accurate description of God. In this scenario, we’re assuming that Calvinist theology does provide an accurate description of God. And with that concession, everything changes.

Consider an analogy. Imagine that you are absolutely persuaded that your brother-in-law murdered one of his two kids. Despite the weight of evidence against him, he has always maintained his innocence and insisted that a mysterious figure broke into their house at night and murdered the child. He could be innocent, but he sure doesn’t appear to be. But if it turns out that he is innocent, your entire attitude toward him should change. And if you still refuse to change your attitude even on the premise of his innocence, then you are behaving in an irrational manner.

Now consider the God of Calvinism. On the one hand, this being is understood to be perfectly good, maximally loving, and absolutely wise. On the other hand, this being is understood to elect a subset of the human population for redemption whilst electing (or “passing over”) others in what constitutes a decree of reprobation which results in damnation in hell.

This decree of reprobation provides the putative evidence (or at least much of the evidence) that the God of Calvinism is evil and not worthy of repentance and worship. In other words, it provide the evidence that the God of Calvinism is not perfectly good, maximally loving, and absolutely wise.

But now let’s consider the scenario. Just as one could misread the evidence that suggested your brother-in-law’s guilt, so one could misread the evidence that suggests the “disgusting” and “monstrous” moral status of the Calvinist God. And our hypothetical scenario asks us to consider precisely that possibility. What if God is the Calvinist God? What if God both has the attributes of perfect goodness, maximal love, and absolute wisdom and God elected (or passed over) a subset of the human population in a decree of reprobation?

In that case, God is not disgusting or monstrous. Rather, the problem lies with our human moral intuitions and human reason. And in that case, a continued refusal to worship and repent is as irrational as the refusal to embrace the brother-in-law who has been vindicated by the evidence.

I refuse to repent to a god who…? A response to Justin Schieber

Let’s take a look at one of Justin Schieber’s tweets from this morning:

I replied:

Let me unpack my tweet.

Justin claims that if God exists then he needs to repent. (Repent of what? Justin doesn’t say. But we can assume this is a reference to the many evils in the world.)

The problem is that Christians understand God to be maximally perfect, a claim which encompasses all great-making attributes including moral perfection, knowledge and wisdom. Needless to say, any being that is maximally perfect (i.e. perfect in his moral nature, wisdom, and knowledge) could have nothing for which he must repent.

Consequently, it is flatly contradictory to suppose that a maximally perfect being might shoulder moral culpability which would require repentance.

We can redeem this tweet by supposing that Justin is not dealing with God in Christianity, western monotheism more generally, and academic philosophy of religion. Perhaps he is instead supposing the existence of “God” as a morally fallible being like the lowly denizens of the Greek pantheon. Should it happen that God exists, where “God” is understood to be a fallible, morally unreliable and only moderately wise and knowledgeable being, then God would have much for which he should repent.

That works. Except that Justin spends his time as a committed “atheologian” attacking not religiously and philosophically irrelevant conceptions of deity like those that crowd the Greek pantheon. Instead, he supposedly devotes his time to critiquing religiously significant and intellectually robust conceptions like that which we find in Judeo-Christian theology and academic philosophy of religion.

In which case Justin is guilty of a strawman fallacy.

God’s not Dead in 7 Minutes

Regular readers of this blog (and those who have read Is the Atheist My Neighbor?) will know I’m no fan of the 2014 conservative Christian breakout hit God’s Not Dead. (Indeed, “not a fan” is an understatement. See my review here.)

Today I discovered a 7 minute summary of the film which effectively presents the film’s extremely inhospitable depiction of atheists. And if you miss anything, you can rely on the humorous commentary to highlight incongruities and offense.

Finally, to Christians everywhere I say: if you don’t want others to broad-brush you as foolish and/or wicked, then don’t broad-brush others as foolish and/or wicked. It’s really that simple.