Maps of Meaning Quotes

“En estado natural, por decirlo de algún modo, a los seres humanos no les gusta pensar como lógicos, ni siquiera como empiristas. Hace falta entrenamiento para pensar así. Pero aun en ausencia de ese entrenamiento, seguimos pensando, aunque lo hacemos de manera más subjetiva, como seres -poco razonables-, idiosincráticos, emocionales que habitan unos cuerpos de tamaño determinado, con unas propiedades particulares y constreñidas.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“Dicho de otro modo, nuestras creencias pueden modificar nuestras reacciones a todo, incluso a aquellas cosas tan primarias y fundamentales como son la comida y la familia.
Con todo, seguimos constreñidos indeterminadamente por el hecho de nuestros límites biológicos.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“Hemos perdido el universo mítico de la mente preexperimental, o al menos hemos dejado de propiciar su desarrollo. Esa pérdida ha dejado nuestro creciente poder tecnológico más peligrosamente a la merced de nuestros sistemas de valoración, que todavía son inconscientes.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“Como individuos medievales, ni siquiera necesitamos que la persona genere afecto. Con el ícono basta. Pagamos grandes sumas de dinero por prendas de ropa y objetos personales levados o creados por los famosos e infames de nuestro tiempo.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“Después de todo, nuestras grandes teorías racionalistas -fascistas, pongamos por caso, o comunistas- han demostrado su inutilidad esencial en el espacio de unas pocas generaciones, a pesar de su naturaleza intelectualmente atractiva.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“The 'natural,' pre-experimental, or mythical mind is in fact primarily concerned with meaning - which is essentially implication for action - and not with 'objective' nature.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“The world can be validly construed as forum for action, or as place of things.

The former manner of interpretation – more primordial, and less clearly understood – finds its expression in the arts or humanities, in ritual, drama, literature, and mythology. The world as forum for action is a place of value, a place where all things have meaning. This meaning, which is shaped as a consequence of social interaction, is implication for action, or – at a higher level of analysis – implication for the configuration of the interpretive schema that produces or guides action.

The latter manner of interpretation – the world as place of things – finds its formal expression in the methods and theories of science. Science allows for increasingly precise determination of the consensually validatable properties of things, and for efficient utilization of precisely-determined things as tools (once the direction such use is to take has been determined, through application of more fundamental narrative processes).

No complete world-picture can be generated, without use of both modes of construal. The fact that one mode is generally set at odds with the other means only that the nature of their respective domains remains insufficiently discriminated. Adherents of the mythological world-view tend to regard the statements of their creeds as indistinguishable from empirical “fact,” even though such statements were generally formulated long before the notion of objective reality emerged. Those who, by contrast, accept the scientific perspective – who assume that it is, or might become, complete – forget that an impassable gulf currently divides what is from what should be.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world. (Matthew 13:35)”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief

“Behavior is imitated, then abstracted into play, formalized into drama and story, crystallized into myth and codified into religion—and only then criticized in philosophy, and provided, post-hoc, with rational underpinnings. Explicit philosophical statements regarding the grounds for and nature of ethical behavior, stated in a verbally comprehensible manner, were not established through rational endeavor.”
― Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief