Dimitri > Recent Status Updates

The surprise blow against a feeble Russia had not been without critics, who pointed out that a Cannae style operation (echoes of Sedan or Schlieffen?) worked better than Bite and Swallow at Tarnow w/ divisionary attacks (Courland) & had a point that it failed to either knock out the Tsar or force him to the negotiation table. Did Falkenhayn hold back because of his Russophilia, compared to his loathing of Britain?

D-Day went pretty well, considering the plan expected the Germans to barely react. the Brits by naval fire support, the Yanks by pluck. Both Special Forces hold their objectives. But that vital airfield remains out of control and the link-up of the invaded beaches didn't happen...

The German outflux shrunk the Eastern Front from over a million to half that with less horses and more men aged 35+, together with 10 divisions/250.000 Austrians still a substantial, but under-utilized force; that could've relieved more young soldiers from quiet sectors in the West. Instead of sitting 600.000 strong in the empty bread basket of the Ukraine.

"But the most terrible proof [of the Wola district massacre by the Nazis] lies in the mosaleum in Sowinski Park , where 1120 kg of human ash are buried. All that remains of the more than 40.000 people killed in that area in the first week of August 1944"

Mental note: see on next visit...

Did the Turkish forts fire on smaller ships that steamed in to rescue survivors once a battleship was hit or sunk by a mine... or did they not? Fitzsimmons & Hart differ in their account.
Was the full-scale landing originally the brainchild of a beleaguered Navy command or did the Army push for a bigger role in the attack on Constantinople ? Sources (diaries, minutes) contradict each other.

How exactly do you use the ANZAC Corps & the 29th (regular) Division "on loan" from the Western Front as a GARRISON force while or after the Royal Navy forces the Straits by itself ? What's there to garrison except rubble forts ?

The French Army deeply felt the need to get its act together after the humiliation of Sedan. It became a keen adopter of quick-firing artillery & building upon the legacy of the Mitrailleuse*
*like the Gatling, this was not truly a machine-gun. Its hand-operated set of revolving barrels didn't sweep across the ranks but pumped a magazine into a single target, capable of desintegrating men into pulp in boots.

"Until from S beach to the Aegean a trench-embattled No Man's Land had been forged facing the main heights of Sari Bair (970 ft) which, though different in detail, bore a distressing resemblance to that from Nieuwpoort to the Swiss frontier. So much for the hopes of politicians, the plans of generals and the gallantry of men."

Non-German units with an assumed ethnic hatred towards the Poles were notably well presented among SS-Hiwis: Russian turncoats, Azeris and Ukranians... who'd wrongly come to be targeted by the AK as the main hereditary enemy. Prisoners of various nationalities would be forced to clear mines with stripped torsos, the back marked with a big painted U.

Even prior, the prompt and customary mass violence by local SS occurred without objection from Wehrmacht generals who later suffered from amnesia in trial. "There was an element of self-pity in the German attitude, with soldiers angry that the Poles had forced them to act in this way." For the new C-in C, gen. Stahel, it was yet another frustrating Fortress command [aren't you supposed to die holding a Festung?]

The notorious Dirlewanger Brigade arrived on August 4, to start an Aktion in the Wola district the next day. Officially it was to clear a path to the Vistula. Underneath the military necessity as urged by the 9th Army lurched the dark echo of Hitler's "Warsaw Order" wherein the SS was responsible for the crushing, including total extermination of the population.

the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive is identified as a proto-Verdun by virtue of its reliance on " bite & swallow" tactics of Galician territory more than stormtroops. By september, Russia was neutralized for the time being, with the occupation of Vilnius cutting its only north to south main railway. This left German hands free to defeat Serbia in october, thereby convincing Bulgaria to join the Central Powers.

The peril at sea from an average dozen U-boats went beyond the sentimental value of American lives lost: half the U.S. export trade was carried by U.K. ships, so the sinkings had a transatlantic economic impact that registered in Washington. Yet a proposal for a state-owned merchant marine died in a record session of Congress, replete with 10 hour speeches & cozy cots on the floor.

Within 4 days the rains came. A pattern of monthly pauses developed. Polygon Wood & Broodseide in early september, Poelkapelle in early October. The superlative mutual experience of Passchendaele will always be "mud" and "shell slugging". Te battle didn't tie down extra troops to facilitate Russian or Italian attacks. The 'hopeless' 4th Army held against the entire BEF, with some units from recent Arras duty.

Former defence minister Massood, veteran of the Soviet war & leader of the Northern Alliance, was killed 2 days before 9/11 by Tunisian suicide bombers who trained as journalists in Belgium.

WHAT IS IT WITH MY COUNTRY & HINDSIGHT ACCESSORY TO HIGH PROFILE POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS ??

Passchendaele was supposed to be a Messines in reverse, but with no mines & no surprise; a brute attack out of the salient with twice the firepower of the Somme. Despite a civilian expert analysis of 18 years of meteorological data, the dry weather window was as underestimated as the resilience of a sevenfold concrete bunker line to a Somme 2.0 opening barrage.

The period 1991-92 could've been a victory for Pakistani moderates under UN aegis, but instead the Kabul saw battle in 1992 & 1996, both times with professional Pakistani support.

The barefoot mullah recruits of the Taliban knew early popularity; religious Law&Order was better than total banditry chaos. But Shia vs. Sunni massacres ruined that credit. their opponent, the Northern Alliance was defeated by 2000.

"Thrown in line in numerous ad dense unit, they [the infantry] are exposed immediately to the fire of the adversary which decimates them"
- Joffre, 25 August 1914.

Something tells me his learning curve took time to become noticable for the poilus.

On August 29th, the 5th Army was pushed back, so a new 'fallback line' was drawn along the Compiègne - Soissons-Reims axis, about 65km from Paris, with a last line projected along the Seine & Aube rivers.

John French would've been the first to propose a stand on the Marne but met Joffre's refusal. The investment of Paris loomed too sinister.

Verdun had practical value as a salient with good railways, but Falkenhayn couldn't resist linking its (perceived) symbolic value to the low spirit of the French Army, rich in deserters & poor in first-trench troops. That last fact was due to the evolution towards a defence in depth.

Ironically, because of his limited means, One Big Attack was also supposed to trigger a premature attack by the green Kitchener Army.

Verdun was a synthesis but also a throwback to the idea of "knock one front out". Originally he'd envisaged 3 (!) attacks along the whole French line but ran into practical problems. For Eaxmple, the storming of Belfort was originally an offensive plan copied off an Italian original. Once Italy entered the Allied camp, it probably passed on this plan to France. Scratch that.

Foley attributes his doubts to the different lessons from both fronts in 1915: great successes in the East, but in the West the artillery of a stretched defender could break the French attack in the Champagne.

Falkenhayn already entertained the notion in November '14 that the main enemy was Britain, who would perhaps fight on after the defeat of her ally France. At the same time, he couldn't decide (yet) beween Ermattung or knocking out 1 front - but which ? [ Most authors see Falkenhayn as a pure Westerner]

Sheer size made the uprising incredulous enough to slow the German reaction time. The presence of veteran SS units could compensate IF they could be made to fight. They had little taste for another round of Rattenkrieg: their first clashes with the insurgents served merely to reach the battleground east of the Vistula.
Model: "the Russians didnt advance beyond the Vistula & we were granted a short breathing spell"

The German garrison was able to implement its regular doctrine to maintain control over those elements of the urban infrastructure that were indispensable to defence. However, the garrison was mainly made up of security personnel rather than frontline troops.

the Royal Navy's blockade was - according to the 1909 Declaration of London - illegal & did hurt the US trade in some ways (77% of Germany's cotton came from the South) but why seek trouble when there was no reward? There was no embargo as befitted a struct neutrality; trade with the Entente made up for the German loss. As a newspaper put it perfectly : "let them shoot! it makes good business for us !"

In his State of the Union address (8.12.14) Woodrow Wilson "In his rejection of a strong military presence on the world scene had skilfully captured the popular mood" despite his own Anglophilism.

25/8: To attack the inner wing of Bülow's First Army, or to envelop the entire German right wing in one swing ? N° 2!
But first the Allied line needed to slow down from retreat intact, onto the Amiens-Reims-Verdun line. Le Cateau happened because the BEF was unaware; after St. Quentin the 5th Army helped them catch up. The left was further strengthened by the new 6th Army, which included transfers from Alsace.

London had a fit over the numbers on the 1st day: 1200 sq mile, 90k prisoners, 1300 guns. But no matter how bad it made Haig look, it was worthless. Bavarian HQ "A great tactical victory has been accomplished, the strategic exploitation must follow" came at parity casualties (240k each) better than 1:3 but hard to replace. No matter matter what Ludendorff did, the American numbers game was on.

Vague "limited offensives", waiting for the Americans to finish the job, isolating Germany by defeat of its coalition partner through "low-cost" victories in Greece or the crusader lands... A conference on 1 May 1917 saw no better proposition than to redirect shipping to food, but even that didn't carry enough weight. The notion that time ran against the Allies was reinforced. A Flanders offensive asap sounded best.