Kumar

“[S]ituations do not only interact with dispositional factors to affect behavior, they
also shape and change those dispositions.”
― Leonard S. Newman, Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust

“The social nature of anti-Semitic beliefs is substantiated by the fact that dur­ing the late nineteenth century, most Germans had little, if any, contact with Jews. Jews made up only about 1% of the total German population (Goldhagen, 1996). Because of the general anti-Semitic social representation associated with Volkstum, many Jews had left Germany for safer havens elsewhere. Thus, most of what people knew (or thought they knew) about Jews was based on social consensus, not actual experience. As Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory argues, social reality becomes paramount when physical reality provides few, if any, cues upon which one can base an opinion.”
― Leonard S. Newman, Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust

“Thus, social repre­sentations are believed because they are shared, not because they are inher­ently valid outside of our social reality.”
― Leonard S. Newman, Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust

“What conditions are usually necessary for outgroups to be mistreated? Activation of a
social identity leads to such negative outcomes after two conditions are met. First, ingroup members must believe that a common set of norms and values apply to both themselves and to members of the outgroup. Second, the ingroup must see its values as the only acceptable values, so that their values overwhelm those of the outgroup and are the ones that should guide both themselves and the outgroup. The combination of these two factors leads the ingroup to perceive members of the outgroup as deviant, morally inferior, and a potential threat to ingroup values.”
― Kristin J. Anderson, Benign Bigotry: The Psychology of Subtle Prejudice