THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP discussion
CAMPAIGNS & BATTLES
>
Books on the Eastern Front of WW2
message 51:
by
'Aussie Rick', Moderator
(new)
May 09, 2012 01:37PM

reply
|
flag

stack.
Happy wrote:Here is another that I've read recently that I found interesting
Frontsoldaten ."




Description:
First-hand accounts of life as a World War II combatant - from the German side. The author interviewed hundreds of German veterans and, for this volume, has them retell in their own words how they viewed the years of victory only to become the vanquished.

Description:
Harvard University Junior Fellow Omer Bartov delivers a detailed account of how Nazism penetrated the German Army during World War II. Bartov focuses on the barbaric struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union--where the vast majority of German troops fought--to show how the savagery of war reshaped the army into Hitler's image.

Thanks Chris for your input, much appreciated.


[bookcover:Leningrad: State of Siege] by Michael..."
I've read The Retreat: Hitler's First Defeat and thought it was excellent. It really evokes the cold and desperation of the front line soldiers.



Description:
On June 22, 1941, before dawn, German tanks and guns began firing across the Russian border. It was the beginning of Hitler's Operation Barbarossa, one of the most brutal campaigns in the history of warfare. Four years later, the victorious Red Army has suffered a loss of seven million lives. Alan Clark's incisive analysis succeeds in explaining how a fighting force that in one two-month period lost two million men was nevertheless able to rally to defeat the Wehrmacht. The Barbarossa campaign included some of the greatest episodes in military history: the futile attack on Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, the siege of Stalingrad, the great Russian offensive beginning in 1944 that would lead the Red Army to the historic meeting with the Americans at the Elbe and on to victory in Berlin.



Totally agree with you Nicole about the stupidity and incompetency of the Russian leaders leading to so many deaths. Plus weren’t the higher echelons of the local Communist Party hoarding all the good stuff and still living like kings?
If you enjoyed his book on Leningrad I think you will also really enjoy his next book:




I heard in an interview with Antony Beevor where he was asked would he next write about Leningrad since he had published books about Stalingrad and Berlin but he stated that the subject matter depressed him so much he wanted to write about something else.


De..."
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "It is a good book eh! Lots of first-hand accounts from the soldiers which I always find interesting."



Description:
This is a brilliantly detailed account of the plans of the Wehrmacht to invade Russia in June of 1941 and of the strategy the USSR employed to defend its frontier. Hitler, as we know, aimed at Moscow but never got there.
Many myths, generalizations, and oversimplifications have long been accepted as to the nature of "Operation Barbarossa". Fluent in both languages, Dr. Fugate bases his analysis on primary Russian and German sources. His arguments are skillful, well written, and controversial. Full documentation and carefully prepared maps of all the plans illustrate the text.
Reader Review:
“I wanted to read this book for several reasons. Operation Barbarossa is a favorite of mine. Second reason is that the book was published in 1984 and wanted to compare it with two recent works. David Glantz's Barbarossa- Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 was published in 2001 and David Stahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East which was published in 2009. These two books have different formats but are excellent in their own right and combined there is not much missing from the operational focus of the campaign. I'm glad to say that Mr Fugate's book is a worthy rival that falls just behind the other two books.
The author has taken a deep interest in Russia and its people, especially during this tumultuous period of between and during the wars, and devoted a lot of time studying it. His book is objective but there is a bias toward the Russian side.
This book is divided into eight chapters with the middle five devoted to the operational aspects of the campaign. The coverage is good and is comparable to Mr Glantz's book. The book under review is made even better with the addition of those three other chapters for it gives background info to give better meaning to the book. The first chapter is devoted to the near term history of the Russian Army, its war doctrine, the defensive strategy and its "preparedness" in June 1941. The author considers this an important aspect of the war and is very deliberate in its explanation. The author admits that his narration in this chapter is partially based on circumstantial evidence but when his work is compared to the newer books, you'll find a competent accounting. If you study Map # 1 in Glantz's book, it clearly shows troop dispositions in three defense zones as described in this book. The first first zone is on the border while the second zone is at the Dniepr River and the last zone is on a line in front of Moscow. This is the foundation that Mr Fugate uses to explain Stalin's battle plan and then builds on it. The author is quite deliberate in his explanation and this chapter is the largest chapter in the book.
The second chapter delivers the German side with special emphasis given to the planning of Operation Barbarossa and broadens the account to include the wrangling between the principles and the determined effort by Halder to make Moscow the main objective. The short comings of the plan as well as in the blitzkrieg technique are elaborately described. David Stahel in his new book also goes to great lengths describing this planning process, the short comings of he plan as well as Halder's manuverings to deceive Hitler to get his own way and the two books are remarkably similar. To me this is another indication Mr Fugate knows the war.
The last chapter of the book deals with the author's comments and analysis. He covers many issues of the German offensive but will mention only couple key points. After the huge German victory at Kiev, it was decided to resume its advance toward Moscow in September. The author believes that was a major mistake that dramatically lowered the German's chances of winning the war. When the Germans didn't stop after their victories at Vyazma and Bryansk and set up a defensive line at Rzhev-Bryansk-Vyazma-Orel for the winter, the Germans lost all chance of winning the war. They would have been better off in moving to Rostov and into the Caucasus. At the time the Russians weren't prepared in the Caucasus and all of their deep reserves were in the Moscow sector. I know this can be argued against but it does have merit.
Another hot topic discussed is the poor long term strategy by Hitler and his OKH. The generals "knew" the war would be short and didn't evolve the plan beyond 1941. Paulus tried to warn them of this short sightedness plus the huge distances involved in reaching Moscow with regards to the logistics of resupplying millions of men such a long ways off.
There are 46 maps and a number of useful tables to help with the narrative. Comparing some of these maps and tables with comparable information with David Glantz's book shows minor discrepancies. There were a few reserve armies missing in the disposition maps and the casualty figures were a little off but it wasn't an extreme difference.
The author provides an impressive Bibliography of primary and secondary sources if further reading is desired. There is also an extensive array of footnotes if you feel corroboration is needed. There was a photo gallery of German and Russian officers.
Overall I was very impressed with this study and highly recommend it to anyone wanting to know about the operational aspects of Operation Barbarossa, the prior planning and insight on how these early events will impact later years.” - by Dave Schranck



Sad eh :)


Description:
A detailed examination of the factors that led to this titanic struggle on the Eastern Front Few battles attract interest so much as the Battle of Kursk. Operation Zitadelle, the code name given by Hitler to the Wehrmacht's last offensive on the Eastern Front in July 1943, has acquired an almost mythic status as one of the greatest clashes of armor in the history of warfare. It has been long depicted as the "the swan song of the German tank arm" by virtue of the huge tank losses experienced by the Germans, however the emergence of new information proves it to be anything but. For all the resources devoted to this operation by the Germans, Zitadelle was an abysmal failure; and while they were not outfought by the Red Army at Kursk, they were out-thought by commanders of outstanding quality. Zitadelle describes the German and Soviet tactics and explores the realities of the battles on sodden ground that culminated in the defeat of the panzers and the Soviet advance on the Reich.
Has anyone read this book yet and want to offer an opinion?


Description:
Josef "Sepp" Allerberger was the second most successful sniper of the German Wehrmacht and one of the few private soldiers to be honoured with the award of the Knight's Cross.
An Austrian conscript, after qualifying as a machine gunner he was drafted to the southern sector of the Russian Front in July 1942. Wounded at Voroshilovsk, he experimented with a Russian sniper-rifle while convalescing and so impressed his superiors with his proficiency that he was returned to the front on his regiment's only sniper specialist.
In this sometimes harrowing memoir, Allerberger provides an excellent introduction to the commitment in fieldcraft, discipline and routine required of the sniper, a man apart. There was no place for chivalry on the Russian Front. Away from the film cameras, no prisoner survived long after surrendering. Russian snipers had used the illegal explosive bullet since 1941, and Hitler eventually authorised its issue in 1944. The result was a battlefield of horror.
Allerberger was a cold-blooded killer, but few will find a place in their hearts for the soldiers of the Red Army against whom he fought.

Last two books I read were Lost Victories
and Kharkov 1942. I am a big consumer of Glantz stuff but I know he is not for everyone. I also have been working through the german generals memoirs and I found Mansteins book is really an oustanding account of his thoughts on the battles and tactics of the eastern front. The Kharkov book is a great example of how Glantz's strengths as a researcher explains and recounts a complex operation while at the same time expose his weakness as a writer as it becomes rather dense with facts as well as repetitive in pacing as he makes sure to cover every units actions.

If you enjoyed Lost Victories by Von Manstein you might also enjoy Panzer Leader written by Heinz Guderian unless you ahve already read it?



..."
Good point about the maps....Guderians book was a good one also and I also have read Raus as well. I think I am going to start on some of the less know generals next

You could check out some of the people mentioned in the personalities of WW2 thread we have:
http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/8...

You could check out some of the people mentioned in the personalities of WW2 thread we have:
http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/8..."
I will thx


Description:
This groundbreaking new study, now significantly expanded, exploits a wealth of Soviet and German archival materials, including the combat orders and operational of the German OKW, OKH, army groups, and armies and of the Soviet Stavka, the Red Army General Staff, the Western Main Direction Command, the Western, Central, Reserve, and Briansk Fronts, and their subordinate armies to present a detailed mosaic and definitive account of what took place, why, and how during the prolonged and complex battles in the Smolensk region from 10 July through 10 September 1941. The structure of the study is designed specifically to appeal to both general readers and specialists by a detailed two-volume chronological narrative of the course of operations, accompanied by a third volume, and perhaps a fourth, containing archival maps and an extensive collection of specific orders and reports translated verbatim from Russian. The maps, archival and archival-based, detail every stage of the battle. Within the context of Guderian's southward march toward the Kiev region, volume 2 in this series describes in unprecedented detail the Red Army's attempts to thwart German offensive plans by defeating Army Group Center in the Smolensk region with a general counteroffensive by three Red Army fronts. This volume restores to the pages of history two major military operations which, for political and military reasons, Soviet historians concealed from view, largely because both offensives failed. This volume includes: The Northern Flank: Group Stumme's (Third Panzer Group) Advance to Velikie Luki, Toropets, and Zapadnaia Dvina, 22 August-9 September 1941; German Strategic Planning, the Tilt toward Kiev, and Second Panzer Group's Advance Across the Desna River, 22-28 August 1941; The Third Soviet Counteroffensive, including the Western Front's Dukhovshchina Offensive, 26 August-6 September1941, the Reserve Front's El'nia Offensive, 30 August-10 September 1941, and the Briansk Front's Roslavl'-Novozybkov Offensive, 29 August-14 September 1941.Based on the analysis of the vast mass of documentary materials exploited by this study, David Glantz presents a number of important new findings, notably: Soviet resistance to Army Group Center's advance into the Smolensk region was far stronger and more active than the Germans anticipated and historians have previously described; The military strategy Stalin, the Stavka, and Western Main Direction Command pursued was far more sophisticated than previously believed; Stalin, the Stavka, and Timoshenko's Western Main Direction Command employed a strategy of attrition designed to weaken advancing German forces; This attrition strategy inflicted far greater damage on Army Group Center than previously thought and, ultimately, contributed significantly to the Western and Kalinin Fronts' victories over Army Group Center in December 1941. Quite simply, this series breaks new ground in World War II Eastern Front and Soviet military studies.
The first volume:


:)

:)"
Outstanding!



Description:
The gripping story of an elite panzer division and its battles in the shattered streets of Stalingrad. In Death of the Leaping Horseman: 24th Panzer-Division in Stalingrad, the untold story of 24th Panzer-Division's savage fighting on Stalingrad's outskirts - and in the devastated ruins of the city itself - is revealed in a detailed day-by-day account. Beginning in the heady days of the victorious march toward Stalingrad in August 1942, the book follows the Division into Stalingrad's suburbs as it is slowly and inexorably suked into the fiery crucible that was Stalingrad. Panzer losses and casualties increased daily until finally, after three months of draining combat, the Division was reduced to a battlegroup consisting of a couple of panzers and a few hundred men. Woven through official combat reports and entries from the Division's war diaries are gripping accounts from the few remaining veterans - including an Oakleaves winner and several Knight's Cross winners. Contains over 200 photos and 85 maps and aerial photos.

Description:
Stalingrad symbolises many things: the ideological clash between Nazism and Communism, the battle of wills between Hitler and Stalin, and the absolute fortitude of the Soviet people.
In many peoples minds, however, it represents the savagery, folly and utter waste of urban combat, a city where dozens of lives were readily exchanged for a ruined building. And nowhere did this senselessness manifest itself more than in the Barrikady Gun Factory and its housing settlement.
The men of the German 305. Infanterie-Division had captured all of the factorys massive workhalls by the end of October 1942. The only obstacles standing between them and the Volga were a few battered houses and the remnants of the Soviet 138th Rifle Division. Five fresh pioneer battalions were brought in to help the Germans and the final attack in Stalingrad (known erroneously as Operation Hubertus) was launched on 11 November, 1942. The push to the river cut off the Soviet troops and left a tiny bridgehead. Grim fighting raged around this fiery perimeter for three months. To the Soviet soldiers, this bridgehead was known as Lyudnikovs Island, or Ognenniy ostrov Island of Fire.
Painstakingly compiled from German and Russian sources such as war diaries, combat reports, published works, eyewitness accounts, letters and photos, this book presents an unbiased chronicle of the pitiless struggle from both perspectives

Description:
Kampfgruppe Scherer’s outstanding feat of arms was one of Germany’s most famous military achievements during the Second World War. With only a few thousand men from all branches of the service, including mountain troopers, elderly reservists, police officers, navy drivers, SS partisan hunters and supply troops, Generalmajor Theodor Scherer was ordered to hold Cholm in the face of a superior enemy force. That Scherer and his men prevailed is now an historical fact but analysis of daily radio traffic and combat reports reveals that the pocket’s survival was precarious; at times, even senior commanders doubted if it could be saved. On several occasions the Soviet onslaught looked poised to inflict the death blow but somehow the exhausted men of Cholm grimly clung to a few resistance nests upon which a new line was anchored. General Scherer, a popular leader and inspiration to all his soldiers, despaired many times and was forced to continually plead for more men, more supplies and more aerial support. Urgent demands by other sectors meant Kampfgruppe Scherer was drip-fed just enough supplies and reinforcements to stay alive until, eventually, a relief force forged a permanent link and freed the exhausted survivors.
After a catastrophic winter of setbacks and resounding defeats for the Wehrmacht, the General and his men were lauded as heroes and recognised with an arm shield that marked them as “Cholmkämpfer,” men of exceptional courage who had prevailed despite overwhelming odds.
Primary sources have been utilised for the first time to present this battle in a detailed day-by-day format, from the forlorn days of January and February to liberation in early May.
For more books published by Leaping Horseman and additional information on these titles check out this web page:
http://www.leapinghorseman.com/

some more good looking books I will add them to my TBR list. I agree with you about having the book on hand to pull to read when you have the time.


Reviews:
"...his authorial skills remain admirably suited to his goal of assimilating and paraphrasing key wartime documents in order to pen the verity of the battlefield. Certainly no one will complain about the mountains of information hitherto unavailable in any English publication. As usual, Glantz has performed a remarkable feat, almost single-handedly expanding and refining the way informed readers view the Russian Front. The study of all those campaigns would be immeasurably diminished without the invaluable catalog of works he's written, and this volume represents another important addition to that growing library ... Highly recommended, and thank you, Col. Glantz, for continuing to successfully conduct the virtual sieges required to produce these kinds of tomes." - Bill Stone, (Stone & Stone Books website review)
"Barbarossa Derailed is a meticulously researched and cogently structured study of the Red Army in the battle of Smolensk … there can be no question Glantz is on the road to another towering achievement in the history of the German- Soviet war. I await volume two with eager anticipation." - David Stahel, (Global War Studies)
"... a meticulous operational narrative covering a key Eastern Front campaign ... Glantz certainly succeeds in providing the best account of Smolensk to date..." - Parameters (US Army War College Quarterly)
"Both author and publisher are to be congratulated for producing such a detailed and comprehensive study of what could turn out to be one of the seminal battles of the Soviet-German War. Given the amount of Russian material in this volume and, presumably, in the volumes still be published, taking all four volumes collectively, this will hopefully mean a more objective and factually accurate description of the roles of both major combatants in th early opening phase of the war on the Eastern Front and may well cause others to re-examine the Battle and assess its overall importance to the eventual victory of the USSR." - Dr Steven J Main, DefAc UK, (British Army Review)

Readers familiar with David Glantz know what to expect in Barbarossa Derailed — a meticulous operational narrative covering a key Eastern Front campaign. In keeping with his works on Manchuria, Kursk, Rzhev, Leningrad, and most recently Stalingrad, he provides precise accounts of maneuvers down to the level of individual divisions, documented by lengthy excerpts from situation reports and operational orders from Germans and Soviets alike. Glantz does not pretend to offer personal touches or gripping man-on-the-ground accounts. He does operational history exclusively and he does it very well. He also does it quickly; his preface notes this massive book took him six months to complete (breaking the hearts of lesser historians).
The book, first of two narrative volumes on the Smolensk campaign, is not easy: Glantz says it “must be studied as well as read.” Readers must possess a firm grasp of mechanized warfare to understand what is going on. A good set of maps needs to be close at hand; sadly, the maps in the book itself are not enough. The maps in When Titans Clashed and The Battle of Kursk, Glantz’s earlier collaborative works with Jonathan House, were models of clarity. This book, like Glantz’s ongoing Stalingrad Trilogy, relies heavily on reproductions of contemporary German operational maps. These are not nearly as good. Unlike the colored German originals, these black and white maps make it far harder to distinguish between German and Soviet forces, and make all lines blur together: unit boundaries, rivers, and axes of advance. Glantz promises a third volume of documents and a fourth volume of colored maps; those might improve the situation.
This volume covers the first half of the Smolensk campaign. As the book opens, the first weeks of Germany’s Operation Barbarossa had succeeded in smashing Soviet border forces, but the German high command was already facing difficulties. Its armor and mechanized infantry were penetrating deeply into Soviet defenses, leaving vast numbers of Soviet troops cut off and encircled. German logistics, however, could not keep up with the pace of the advance, and the bulk of German foot infantry was occupied liquidating vast pockets of Soviet soldiers far behind the armored spearheads. Only Fedor von Army Group Center, having captured Minsk and now headed towards Smolensk en route to Moscow, was truly achieving unequivocal success; Army Groups North and South, possessing less armor, were advancing more slowly and failing to achieve the massive encirclements made possible by Center’s 2d Panzer Group (under Hermann Hoth) and 3d Panzer Group (Heinz Guderian).
On 10 July 1941, Hoth and Guderian crossed the Dnepr River, headed for Smolensk against thrown-together Soviet forces competently led by Semyon Timoshenko. By 15 July, Hoth’s tanks, looping north, had reached the outskirts of Smolensk and brought the Smolensk-Moscow highway under fire. Guderian, taking a southern approach, found himself hampered by the stubborn resistance of encircled Soviets in the city of Mogilev and persistent counterattacks on his right flank. Guderian’s tanks and motorized units lacked infantry, and so failed to close the ring. Three Soviet armies were pocketed west of Smolensk, but they maintained a tenacious hold on a narrow lifeline to the east. Three weeks of stubborn resistance under Pavel Kurochkin before the final evacuation of the Smolensk pocket made a major impression on Hitler and the German generals, particularly when combined with clumsy but worrisome counteroffensives on Army Group Center’s northern and southern flanks.
As a result, concern over Soviet successes and stiffening resistance on the road to Moscow, not merely overconfidence, led Hitler to issue a series of directives putting the priority to the north (Leningrad) and south (Ukraine) and delaying the central drive on Moscow. As early as 19 July, he declared that Army Group Center would advance on Moscow with infantry alone, sending its armor elsewhere. The result was that in early August the main German drive east halted, while Guderian and Hoth shored up their flanks and defended their gains. Taking advantage of the pause, Timoshenko launched Ivan Konev’s 19th Army in a counteroffensive north of Smolensk, while Georgii Zhukov relentlessly pounded the German bridgehead across the Desna River at El’nia, just east of Smolensk. As both Soviet attacks lost momentum, the Germans launched a major offensive by Army Group Center’s left wing on 22 August. As this first volume ends, that offensive had smashed a hole in the Soviet right, setting up what would become another massive encirclement of four Soviet armies at Vyazma.
Some might question the need for four hefty volumes on the Battle of Smolensk, one campaign among dozens on the Eastern Front. On the other hand, Soviet forces committed to the campaign outnumbered today’s US Army; Soviet losses in killed, missing, and captured in this single campaign were greater than for all US forces in all the Second World War. Glantz goes beyond this to argue for the campaign’s intrinsic significance. He charges previous historians with regarding the Smolensk battles as mere “bumps in the road,” neglecting the terrible damage they did to the Wehrmacht and thereby leading to Hitler’s ultimate failure at the gates of Moscow in December 1941.
Glantz certainly succeeds in providing the best account of Smolensk to date, but his relentless focus on operational narrative means that he spends less time on analyzing those broader questions of significance. First, he does not name those historians whom he regards as having slighted the battle. Indeed, John Erickson, the only historian whose work approaches Glantz in comprehensiveness and rigor, calls the Smolensk battles “massive upheavals” which “drew no less than six Soviet armies into the Smolensk and [El’nia] whirlpools. . . . Almost a dozen Soviet armies . . . were flung into these fiery mazes of attack and defense” (The Road to Stalingrad). Certainly the Eastern Front deserves more attention; it’s not clear Smolensk in particular has been slighted.
Next, it is quite possible the Soviets did themselves more harm than good by their fruitless battering of German lines in hasty counteroffensives. The Smolensk pocket trapped and destroyed three Soviet armies; the most successful Soviet counterattack (by Konev’s 19th Army) succeeded in damaging a German infantry division. No Soviet counterattack at Smolensk ever succeeded in the breakthrough and encirclement by which the Germans routinely wiped out Soviet units wholesale. Although Glantz endorses Zhukov’s view that “In fierce combat, it is far better to suffer losses and achieve your mission than not to achieve any sort of aims and suffer losses every day by marking time in place from day to day under enemy fire,” in many cases the Soviets suffered losses and did not achieve their aims. As Chief of Staff Franz Halder remarked on the battering the Germans were taking in the El’nia bridgehead, “No matter how badly off our troops are, it is even worse for the enemy.” It may be that the Soviet soldiers and material lost in disjointed counterattacks left the Soviets vulnerable to the disastrous Vyazma encirclement which immediately followed. Soviet counterattacks certainly shook Hitler’s confidence, and Glantz may be right that they fatally weakened Army Group Center. More analysis is needed to prove it, though; perhaps the second volume will provide that.” - David R. Stone, (author of A Military History of Russia and Pickett Professor of Military History, Kansas State University)



Description:
The complete history of the Slovak Armed Forces during World War II is covered here in this book. Hundreds of period photos, tables, maps, color uniform plates, orders of battle, strength returns/losses abound. This is an academic and authoritative study of the Slovak military, including the Hlinka Guard & Air Force, as well as the Army and Gendarmerie. The political and military history of Tiso's regime is included, as well as a section on the Shoah (Holocaust).

Description:
Romania was the third Axis element in Europe, yet suffered some of the highest casualties of the Allied nations in the last year of the war. This account of Romania's changing allegiance and its part in World War II draws on details from the recently opened archives. Details chart: the relationships between Romania and other Axis powers; the importance of Romania to Hitler, its operational record; the international coup d'etat and liberation; and the change to support the Allied cause. The authors also provide full coverage of the personalities, weaponry and orders of battle.

Third Axis Fourth Ally by Mark W. A. Axworthy
Desc..."
Axworthy has good stuff. goes into
detail on unit operations, so can be a bit
much for some one not needing the low level
info. here's my revu, i could have written
more...
--------------------------------------
I enjoyed this book as I've always been
interested in the little countries during
the war, though their stories can be
difficult to find. a real accomplishment
was acquiring the book. i'd read about
it several yrs ago, so i put it on my used book
store list and dutifully checked on it whenever.
i look it up on the web and it's anywhere from
$150-$250. i finally checked a copy out of the U
of Texas library.
some interesting insights:
you tend to feel a compassion for the little guys
being swept along with events and the major
powers, but really they're all just looking out
for the themselves just as much as the big guys.
translyvannia was awarded to hungary from romania
between the wars, so the romanians continually
schemed to get that back. they hated the
hungarians more than anyone else and bulgaria in
the south had ideas, and then there's poland in
the north and the soviets stole the eastern
province of bessarabia. so even with the war in
russia going on, romania,hungary,bulgaria who
were allied w/germany, still watched and worried
over their borders back home.
with the conduct of war being the major item
associated with hitler, it often overshadows the
reminder of hitler's genius at politics; he kept
the balkan countries on their toes, seeming to
favor each in turn, for example, giving one
country an update on their tanks, which would
worry the other countries.
additionally you'd think w/romanian oil being a
major part of germany's petrol supply that
romania would have had more say, but hitler
managed to keep them in line.
antonescu, the romanian leader, was one of the
few to stand up to hitler in meetings and hitler
respected him for that. antonescu also was a
military man, so the germans found him easier to
work with regarding the war.
Another goal of the book is to dispute the fact
that the Romanian collapse at Stalingrad was
solely responsible for the pocket. Axworthy
contests Guderian's outright blame, and sites a
number of factors, the relative strengths of the
romanians compared to other units, as well as
citing times during the war where german
divisions collapsed.
A chapter on the Romanian navy is equally
interesting. Photos, maps & charts fill the
appendix.



hey mine also, which was also part of my inspiration. he was volksdeutsche from what was then the austro-hungarian empire. his village is now in romania. he came over before ww1, so missed a lot! the book has enough detail that i could tell how the fighting went around his village when the russians came through.

" .... Around the same time, on another battlefiels in the Ukraine, a group of just over one hundred German soldiers were found hung by their hands, from trees, while their feet had been doused with petrol and burnt until the victim was dead. It was a slow, tortuous method of killing known to German soldiers as 'Stalin's socks'."
I've never heard of 'Stalin's socks' before, has anyone else?

" .... Around the same time, on another battlefiels in the Ukraine, a group of just over one hundred German soldie..."
I sure haven't but am not surprised to hear about it unfortunately

"In the twekve-month period from the beginning of August 1941 to the end of July 1942, September 1941 was the costliest month on the eastern front with more than 51,000 men killed. Indeed the first three months of Operation Barbarossa proved the costlest quarter on the eastern front until the first quarter of 1943, when the Germans suffered diaster at Stalingrad. In these opening months of the war the Ostheer suffered an estimated 185, 198 dead, which comes to 14,420 men a week or the equivalent of having one division eliminated to the last man every week, and this does not count German wounded."

"In the twekve-month period from the beginning of August 1941 to the end of July 1942, September 1941 was the costliest month on the eastern..."
Wow, that is not a stat I've ever heard before. My image is the Wehrmacht slicing through with limited casualties.
Books mentioned in this topic
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
More...
Authors mentioned in this topic
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
More...