THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP discussion
CAMPAIGNS & BATTLES
>
Books on the Eastern Front of WW2
message 651:
by
'Aussie Rick', Moderator
(new)
Jan 13, 2020 04:58PM
They did indeed MR9, plus warming huts built around the nose of German airplanes with a fire inside to keep the engine oil from freezing!
reply
|
flag
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "A bit more from the book; "Retreat from Moscow" - in regards to the lack of proper winter uniforms & equipment for the German army in Russia . I've read this before but figured I'd mention it again..."The traditional Russian felt boots, valenki, were considered ideal in Russia during winter when all water was frozen. They repel wetness and are very warm. The Russian peasants wore foot wrappings under them, not socks.
An account from the book; "Retreat from Moscow":"There was heavy defensive fighting south of Belev in the area of Weikersthal's LIII Army Corps, which was preventing an expansion of the Soviet breach farther to the south. Here there was desperate fighting, especially for the elite infantry regiment Großdeutschland, which was placed in the most threatened sectors. When one of its officers was inspecting the front line, he came across a lone man in a foxhole surrounded by twenty-four dead Soviets. He had shot them all with his rifle. As the officer wrote: 'He had remained completely alone at his post during a snowstorm. His relief had not turned up and despite dysentery and frost-bitten toes he stayed there a day and a night and then another day in the same position'."
Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942 by David StahelGroßdeutschland:
https://www.axishistory.com/books/150...
I've read about this incident previously but I figured it wouldn't hurt to quote it again for those who haven't heard the story in regards to Field Marshal Model:"That Model was an entirely different brand of commander was immediately apparent upon his arrival at Ninth Army's headquarters on the morning of January 16. One story from this initial meeting, which may be apocryphal, was that Model insisted upon closing the gap between Schubert's XXIII Army Corps and the remainder of Ninth Army's forces east and south of Rzhev. Upon hearing this a skeptical Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Blaurock, who served as Ninth Army's operations officer, reportedly inquired: 'And what, Herr General, have you brought us for this operation?' To which Model responded sternly: 'Myself!'"
For those interested this is a pretty decent book on Model:
Hitler's Commander: Field Marshal Walther Model--Hitler's Favorite General by Steven H. Newton
Another account from the book; "Retreat from Moscow", this time covering the issue of evacuating German wounded during the Soviet winter counter-offensive:"In the most desperate cases, German units unable to transport their wounded (either for lack of transport of the seriousness of the wound) on occasion set them up to fight rear-guard actions so their comrades would have a better chance of escaping. If a wounded soldier survived the journey to one of the main hospitals he usually had to again wait for treatment. The surgeons had the most oppressive workload. Rest often came only at the expense of treating men in serious need of operations. By this time, however, the fact that many men had been wounded days, or even over a week, earlier and had taken so long to arrive on the snow-covered roads meant even relatively benign wounds were at risk from life-threatening infections. Anton Gunder, who served as a medical orderly, noted:
Many presented themselves for treatment with emergency bandages that had been applied more than a week before. One soldier had an exit wound in his upper arm. The whole arm was now black, and puss [sic] was running from his back down to his boots. We had to amputate it at the joint. Three of my helpers smoked cigars during the operation because the stench was so great."
Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942 by David Stahel
carl wrote: "Harrowing tales AR !"Indeed Carl, it would have been a horrific campaign to serve it eh!
Whenever I'm in a frozen situation I put on my Eastern front mindset and ponder having to stay out in it all night, after night, let alone having to worry about the other side. 'Aussie Rick' wrote: "carl wrote: "Harrowing tales AR !"
Indeed Carl, it would have been a horrific campaign to serve it eh!"
Some may find my book, Occupation and Insurgency: A Selective Examination of The Hague and Geneva Conventions on the Eastern Front, 1939-1945 of interest. Has interviews also.
Just happened upon this article about Simo Häyhä of Finland. The guy was amazing.https://narratively.com/the-deadliest...
Mike wrote: "Just happened upon this article about Simo Häyhä of Finland. The guy was amazing.https://narratively.com/the-deadliest..."
Quite a guy, Mike. I've had an eye out for his bio.
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Is this the book you been on the eye out for MR9?
The White Sniper: Simo Häyhä by Tapio Saarelainen"Perhaps. I requested an ILL on a bio, but it wasn't obtainable.
They made a film about him a few years ago. As a former military sniper, I studied his tactics (along with others).
Manray9 wrote: "This afternoon I started --
War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 by Robert Kershaw."I will look forward to your views on the book MR9, its one of Robert Kershaw's books that I am yet to read.
One of his in depth "bricks"... I found it pretty insightful, hope you enjoy MR
From Robert Kershaw's War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942.Much has been written on the initial collapse of Soviet forces in the surprise attack of 22 June 1941, but here's an interesting tidbit from Kershaw's book --
During the first 24 hours of the assault on the citadel of Brest, the German 45th Division suffered 21 officers and 290 enlisted men KIA. That equals two-thirds of the division's casualty count for the entire six-week campaign in France.
Sounds like some heavy fighting took place for Brest. I have this book to read on the subject:
The Siege of Brest 1941: A Legend of Red Army Resistance on the Eastern Front by Rostislav Aliev
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Sounds like some heavy fighting took place for Brest. I have this book to read on the subject:[bo..."I read this a few years ago and found it very interesting. Definitely shows that not all of the Red Army was a pushover in the early days of Barbarossa.
From Robert Kershaw's War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942.Kershaw's book makes two signal points in the first 200 pages. One is the major intel failures of the Germans -- in particular regarding numbers of Soviet troops and armored vehicles and the technological sophistication of Soviet tanks -- and, secondly, the corrosive impact upon their own forces of the huge battles of encirclement fought early in the advance into the USSR. According to the author, the Germans did not appreciate the sizable numbers and combat effectiveness of Soviet tanks -- T-34s and the KV-1s.
Kershaw recounts the engagement at Raseiniai in which a single Soviet KV-1 held up replenishment of the 6th Panzer Division vanguard for 48 hours. Eight German 50 mm antitank rounds and multiple tanks rounds failed to penetrate the KV-1 and only two of the seven strikes from 88mm Flak guns broke through. The Soviet tank crew was finally neutralized by two combat engineers pushing grenades through shot holes pierced in the base of the turret.
The Soviets had more and much better tanks than the Germans anticipated. Although the majority of tanks in the first days of the invasion were obsolete T-26s, the Soviets also fielded 1,200 T-34s and 582 KVs.
The Bialystok-Minsk encirclement and the Smolensk kessel were great victories, but at great cost too. Kershaw argues that 50-60% of the fighting power of Army Group Center was expended holding the Bialystok-Minsk pocket and then the same troops marched directly to the Smolensk battles. As he wrote concerning the Smolensk fighting:
At this point Blitzkrieg momentum had petered out. There were no further German formations of appreciable operational size available to continue eastward until this pocket was annihilated. Breathtaking though the victories were, the price was now becoming apparent, even to the highest commanders at the front.
Von Bock concluded: "the fact is our troops are tired and are not exhibiting the required steadiness because of heavy officer casualties." Kershaw added that certainly the Germans concluded the vast battles of encirclement intended to destroy the Soviet forces, but only then was "the Pyrrhic nature of this achievement becoming apparent..."
Great post MR9, very informative. Those Russian KV-1's were a real shock to the Germans as was the T-34 tank.
I always appreciate these posts by you guys. So knowledgeable.
I interviewed Gregor Koronov, who was a gunner on a KV-1, and later a commander in T-34s, great stories. My interviews with German tankers were also enlightening.
Colin wrote: "I interviewed Gregor Koronov, who was a gunner on a KV-1, and later a commander in T-34s, great stories. My interviews with German tankers were also enlightening."Have you published those accounts Colin?
From Robert Kershaw's War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942.A couple interesting tidbits --
The typical combat equipment of a German infantryman marching into the USSR was spartan by American standards. The basic kit weighed only 14 kg. It consisted of a leather harness with ammo pouches for 60 rounds, an entrenching tool, a gas mask (usually discarded) with the cylindrical container kept for personal effects or food, water bottle, a cooking/eating can, a bread bag, and a bayonet. A helmet was usually not worn on the march, but slung on the harness. Personal items were carried in the pockets of the tunic. Any other items such as extra clothes, tents, blankets, etc. were kept with the regimental transport and often lost or rarely available.
The greatest morale booster for troops at the front was the (supposedly) daily arrival around noon of the Goulash-kanonen (soup cannons). They were horse-drawn field kitchens. Each contained a 175 liter cauldron usually filled with stew. The fires in the carts would be started at dawn, vegetables and meat (if available) thrown in, and the stew cooked as the vehicles were drawn to the front. The cauldrons had a special liner to prevent burning. The Goulash-kanone was the social and organizational center of each company. It was the collection site, rally point, mail distribution center, and haven for the company. Attempts were made to have a one-hour stop for a mid-day meal. This was the only organized meal of the day provided on the march.
Here are some photographs from Operation Barbarossa that may be of interest:https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/oper...
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Here are some photographs from Operation Barbarossa that may be of interest:https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/oper..."
Good pics.
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Here are some photographs from Operation Barbarossa that may be of interest:https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/oper..."
Thanks for the link, great pictures.
Thanks Rick, some interesting pictures there.
From War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 by Robert Kershaw.If you've read a bit on the German effort on the Eastern Front, many of the personal accounts and anecdotes in Kershaw's book are familiar. He does, however, cast a different light on some aspects of the campaign. One is the impact of space and time on the campaign. If you assess the entire geographical area encompassed by the campaigns in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, France and the Balkans (including Greece and Crete) it will not contain a total landmass equal to that included within the German operational zone in Russia at the six-week point of Barbarossa. If you superimpose that total geographical area of the earlier Blitzkrieg campaigns on a map of the Russian front, it covers only an area from the Black Sea to south of Lake Ilmen, and from the Brest-Litovsk border to approx. 100 km WEST(!) of Moscow. This was complicated for the Germans by the fact that as they advanced, the fighting zone became even wider and deeper. Six weeks into Barbarossa, the Eastern front was 2,800 km in length and almost a 1,000 km deep. Based on typical operational standards, such a battle zone required 280 divisions. The Germans had only 139. The only hope for German victory was a rapier-like stroke to end the war. Instead, Hitler dispersed efforts instead of concentrating them.
More on the intel failures of the German military hierarchy. Chief of Staff (OKH) General Franz Halder was quoted in von Bock's war diary on 11 August 1941 saying "the whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian colossus... At the outset of the war, we reckoned with about 200 enemy divisions. Now we have already counted 360... If we smash a dozen of them, the Russians simply put up another dozen."
Really was a case that they had bitten off more than they could chew eh!I am thinking of reading von Bock's war diary one day soon:
Generalfeldmarschall Fedor Von Bock: The War Diary, 1939-1945 by Klaus Gerbet
I read these posts by Manray and others who have studied the Russian Front and I shake my head. What were they thinking?! And then it was the Germans who declared war on us, the Americans! Not to say that we were so super and all that but we did have a strong industrial base. They were already fighting on a two-front war. But then to answer my own question, clearly they were NOT thinking! So tragic for all of us on both sides.
Mike wrote: "Colin wrote: "I interviewed Gregor Koronov, who was a gunner on a KV-1, and later a commander in T-34s, great stories. My interviews with German tankers were also enlightening."Have you published..."
No, I have not published them yet. I submit proposals on my book subjects to my agent, and she farms them out. I pretty much become a slave to what the editors want. I also have rarely had any control over my titles. The only two titles I ever had stay put from the manuscript were Four War Boer and Noble Warrior. They kept The Star of Africa and then added a ridiculous subtitle.
I submitted proposals for The German Aces Speak Vol. III and The U-Boat Commanders Speak, as well as The SS Officers Speak. They wanted instead my American pilot interviews, so that is the next book in that series that I am now working on.
Marilyn wrote: "I read these posts by Manray and others who have studied the Russian Front and I shake my head. What were they thinking?! And then it was the Germans who declared war on us, the Americans! Not to s..."Insanity? Yes. But by then the US Navy's increasingly inappropriately named 'Neutrality Patrol' was escorting convoys as far east as Iceland. For which those of us who know about it remain very grateful. Hitler (Doenitz?) may have felt he was already fighting an unofficial war with one arm tied behind his back, so he might as well go the full hog. See Joining the War at Sea 1939 - 1945 by Franklyn E. Dailey Jr. for a first-hand account.
Interesting pics AR! anyone remember the Avalon hill game 'Stalingrad'? the box top had about 20 pics of the Russian front. I used to study them intently. https://boardgamegeek.com/image/91706...
From Robert Kershaw's War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942.Mistreatment of POWs was widespread by both sides on the Eastern Front. Only 3% of Soviet POWs in German custody survived. Germans in Russian hands had a survival rate of around 5-6%. The Germans excused mistreatment of prisoners by arguing the Soviet Union was not a signatory to the 1929 Geneva Convention relating to prisoners. Germany, however, was bound by international law to provide humanitarian treatment in the absence of a standing agreement. The Soviets were too. It didn't matter.
The Germans were overwhelmed by Soviet POWs. They took 328,000 at the Bialystok-Minsk pocket and 310,000 at the Smolensk kessel. By the end of July, the Germans had over 800,000 POWs. That figure rose to 3.30 million by December. Kershaw wrote:
By the end of July the Germans had to administer 49 enemy division equivalents in terms of medical care, transport, and rations in addition to their own existing order of battle... Even if one German soldier was allocated to secure 50 men each, 18 battalions or six regiments were needed to administer the 800,000 POWs taken by the end of July alone.
Soviets in German hands had very little food, almost no medical care, scarce shelter, and virtually no water. Typhus raged in the POW pens. The response of German health officials was a recommendation that all infected prisoners be shot. A German guard dog received a ration 50 times greater than that of a single Russian POW.
That final sentence really sums it all up MR9; "A German guard dog received a ration 50 times greater than that of a single Russian POW."
From War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 by Robert Kershaw.As the German pincers enveloped the remnants of five Soviet armies at Kiev, many senior military leaders -- to their credit -- begged Stalin to withdraw to a new defense line. He refused. Marshal Zhukov was relieved as Red Army Chief of Staff and sent to Leningrad for the temerity of suggesting the surrender of Kiev and the retreat of the Southwest Front. Even the obsequious and incompetent Budenny urged Stalin to draw back. Stalin's response was: "... not a step backwards, hold and if necessary die."
Dmitri Volkogonov of the Soviet staff wrote:
All dictators are similar in certain respects. Victories are explained in terms of genius and of personal merit. But when dictators experience defeat, they attempt to pass the guilt to those executing their orders -- the generals for example.
Stalin canned 100 military commanders in 1941 alone. General Dmitri Pavlov (Commander, Western Special Military District), General Vladimir Klimovskikh (Pavlov's Chief of Staff), another army commander, the front signals commander, as well as several subordinate generals were all arrested, charged with incompetence, and shot in July, 1941 -- "pour encourager les autres.
Another great post MR9. It's interesting to see how the pendulum swung the other way as the war progressed and Stalin learned to trust his commanders a bit more to take control over the direction of the fighting while Hitler went to the other way and started to micro-manage the direction of the campaign.
From War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 by Robert Kershaw.Another interesting facet expounded upon by Kershaw is logistics. The Barbarossa plan necessitated the defeat of the Soviet armies within 500 km of the border. The limiting factor was transport. Each German division needed a bare minimum of 70 tons per day to advance. The 500 km point constituted a "trip wire" beyond which any offensive would falter due to shortfalls of fuel, ammo, and food. This 500 km limit was based on the inherent inferiority of transport by trucks as opposed to trains. No fewer than 1,600 trucks were required to equal the capacity of one double-track railway. Such a truck fleet devoured resources in its own right -- fuel; drivers, security, and support personnel; spare parts and maintenance time and equipment. Consumption of resources in relation to the payload capacity made railways the most efficient primary carrier at ranges in excess of 320 km (the distance from the border to Moscow was over 1,000 km as the crow flies). As Kershaw wrote: "Lorry columns were a tactical rather than strategic asset." The Wehrmacht was allocated only 1,000 new trucks per quarter. This figure did not come close to covering losses from normal wear and tear plus enemy action.
The Germans neglected vehicle maintenance out of necessity. The Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler SS Division reported only 50% of its motor fleet was fully serviceable by August of '41. The standard 5,000 km overhaul was ignored. Vehicle conditions were undermined by fine dust from Russia's unpaved roads. No proper filters were available, so pistons and cylinders wore out quickly. Reliance on low-grade oils caused widespread piston-rod failures. Captured Soviet fuel had an octane content so high it could only be used in German vehicles after treatment with benzol at special facilities. In France, the Germans often filled up from civilian gas stations in towns and villages along the way. This was impossible in Russia because there were no gas stations. Another complicating factor: there were 2,000 different vehicle types in German units. They relied upon captured French, British, Czech, and other vehicles. Kershaw stated: "Some 40% of Wehrmacht divisions were equipped with captured French motorised vehicles..."
The need to establish quickly an operational railroad network was neglected. The German railway forces (Eisenbahntruppen) did not spend the winter of 1940-41 preparing for the full and rapid conversion of Russian railways to European gauge. In fact, the General Staff assigned the railway troops very low transport priorities so fuel, equipment, and personnel to improve the railways within the Soviet Union was slowed. The railway forces were so poorly supplied their signals and communications assets could only stretch 100 km within the USSR. Per Kershaw on restoration and conversion of rail lines:
By 10 July 480 km had been completed but only about one-tenth of the load capacity required was reaching army groups. Russian rail-track was lighter than German variants and supported by one-third fewer sleepers, which prevented running heavy locomotives over converted track. Soviet locomotives were larger, their water stations further apart... Russian coal, it was discovered, could not burn efficiently in German engines without German coal or petrol additives... Army Group North calculated it needed 34 trains per day (carrying 450 tons each) to meet operational requirements. The maximum achieved on only exceptional occasions was 18.
This is one area in which the vaunted German General Staff failed miserably. There is no glory in logistics, but neglect of the matter results in defeat. Kershaw attributed the shortcomings to "ideological arrogance."
Great post MR9, very interesting indeed. Have you read any of David Stahel's books on the Russian campaign?
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East by David StahelPlus a host of other great tiles which I found to be very interesting accounts.
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Great post MR9, very interesting indeed. Have you read any of David Stahel's books on the Russian campaign?[book:Operation..."I have not read Stahel.
Maybe your local library may have one of his books on the shelves you could check out.
It won't be soon. All the libraries are closed for lending.
Manray9 wrote: "It won't be soon. All the libraries are closed for lending."Bugger :)
Manray9 wrote: "It won't be soon. All the libraries are closed for lending."What about checking out an audio book or a digital copy? Our physical libraries here are closed but we can still do the electronic side. Not as satisfying but an option. I found ebooks at the main Univ of New Mexico campus but can't check them out. Not a student, only a taxpayer :(
Mike wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "It won't be soon. All the libraries are closed for lending."What about checking out an audio book or a digital copy? Our physical libraries here are closed but we can still do the..."
The ebooks and audio downloads are still available.
From Robert Kershaw's War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942.The unanticipated level of casualties inflicted upon the German forces was the next factor blunting Barbarossa. During the first few weeks of the campaign, officers were being killed at a rate of 500 per week (the first week it was 524). There were a total of officer casualties of 1,540 in the first seven days of the invasion. By the end of July, the 18th Panzer Division had to combine two regiments to form one of only 600 men in two battalions. The division commander warned such a situation could not continue: "Wenn wir uns nicht totsiegen wollen" ("if we do not intend to win ourselves to death" or "if we do not want to be destroyed by winning").
Kershaw wrote:
There were approximately 16,860 soldiers in a German infantry division. By the end of July casualty figures reveal that the equivalent of 10 full divisions had been lost. August was even worse, with 11.6 divisions, and a further 8.3 divisions were removed from the order of battle before the end of September... Before the onset of Operation Taifun at the beginning of October, nearly 30 divisions worth of casualties had been lost. This figure exceeded the entire strength of Army Group North's 26 divisions...
Kershaw described loses among experienced NCOs as "fearsome." By the time of the Moscow offensive, a number of NCOs equal to the manning strength of 39 divisions had been KIA, WIA or MIA. That was one-third of the NCOs in the entire army at the start of Barbarossa. Officer and NCO losses were accompanied by serious negative consequences for everyday operations and troop morale.
THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP
Books mentioned in this topic
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
Opening the Gates of Hell: Operation Barbarossa, June–July 1941 (other topics)
More...
Authors mentioned in this topic
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
Richard Hargreaves (other topics)
More...
