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Books on the Eastern Front of WW2

I started the abridgement of Glantz' Stalingrad series today

I really don't have the time right now to read all 4 volumes of their "Trilogy" I think I'll save ..."
Glantz is taking volume counting lessons from Douglas Adams.

So far, it actually been fairly readable. I'm to the point that the 6th Army has arrived on the banks of the Volga north of the City and the battle is about to begin.
Glantz' opinion is that the Germans bit off more than they could chew from the Git-go and only Soviet inexperience and C&C problems allowed them to be as successful as they were. The Wehrmacht had major logistical and manpower problems and couldn't support the two major axis of advance.

It was actually a pretty good read. As always with a Glantz book it is extremely well researched and I learned some tidbits.
One is that in Glantz' opinion Von Manstein fudged the dates a bit on the relief/breakout attempt to make himself look better. At the beginning he was supportive of Hitler's order to the 6th Army to stand fast. The 6th Amry probably didn't have the capability to break out any way. By Dec it was almost immobile - very little fuel for vehicles and they had sent 2/3rds of their horses south and west to winter pastures
It wasn't just Goring who said the Luftwaffe could supply the 6th, but his CoS, Hans Jeschonnek, originally said it.
Glantz states that the 6th Army needed at a minimum 750 tons of supplies a day to keep fighting and 300 tons/day just to stay alive. The Luftwaffe came nowhere close to delivering that much tonnage. They averaged less than 100 tns and on there best day 119.3 tons.
There were appox 60k Russians working for the Germans trapped in the pocket - Glantz doesn't speculate on their fate.
All-All one the better Glantz books that I've read - solid 4 stars
Currently reading another Glantz book

After this I think I'll take a break from Glantz for a bit :)



That's a common issue with all his books sadly.

It was actually a pretty good read. As always with a Glantz book it is extremely well researched and I learned some tidbits.
One is that in Glantz' ..."
Jeschonnek made the idiotic claim based upon two beliefs; 1-There would be enough fighters to cover the transports, 2-There would be enough transport aircraft to do the job pulling von Richthofen's Fliegerkorps into it full strength, 3-The ground forces maintining control of the airfields, despite their being shelled all the time.
Goering bought into it, and neither man had been to city to see for themselves what the hell the situation was. The only clear eyed man of the hour was von Richthofen himself. See the Galland interview in my book The German Aces Speak (Vol 1), which has this data.

Good read. As is usual for him, well researched, obviously lots of time spent in the Soviet archives.
He tells both the strategic and tactical battle, what both sides were trying to accomplish and probably more importantly the aftermath - the Soviet offensives at Orel and Karkov.
A couple of take aways,
Many historian feel that if the battle had been fought in May, there was a good chance of success. Glantz disagrees. He feels that the Germans were in no condition to launch an offensive that early. They were still recovering form the Soviet winter offensives and didn't have the men or the tanks to launch an offensive that early
The German Generals as a rule were very contemptuous of their Soviet enemies, in spite of Stalingrad, and many felt they could just show up and would repeat their successes of the summers of '41 and '42.
Everybody knew the attack was coming and where - the Soviet defensive belts were up to 200 KM deep. Both Guderion and von Manstein felt it would cost too much and should be called off.
After the German failure at Kursk, the strategic iniative went irrevocably to the Soviets
This is probably the best of Glantz' book that I've read. Very readable, with lots of and fairly decent maps - solid 4 stars.
I'll type up my thought more completely when I get the chance.
Now I think I'll take a break from Col Glantz for a while :)

https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

The Blue Division: Spanish Blood in Russia, 1941-1945

SYNOPSIS:
This book, translated from the original Spanish, is the primary academic and historical study of the Blue Division -- a Falangist initiative involving the dispatch of some forty-thousand Spanish combatants (over a half of whom paid with their lives, health, or liberty) to the Russian Front during the Second World War. Xavier Moreno Julia does not limit himself to relating their deeds under arms, but also analyses -- for the first time -- the political background in detail: the complex relations between the Spanish government and Hitler's Germany; the internal conflicts between the Falangists and the Army; the rise and fall of Franco's brother-in-law, Minister Ramon Serrano Suner, who inspired the Blue Division and became the second most powerful person in Spain; and the attitude of General Agustin Munoz Grandes, commander of the Blue Division, who was encouraged by Berlin to seriously consider the possibility of taking over the reins of Spanish power. In the end, there were 45,500 reasons that led to joining the Blue Division -- one for each young man who decided to enlist. To understand all of the complex reasons behind their military service under German command is impossible at this juncture. It is an irrecoverable past that lies in Spanish cemeteries and on the Russian steppes. This book, based on massive documentation in German, British and Spanish archives, is an essential source of information to understand Spain in the 1940s -- an epoch when the Caudillo's power and the regime's good fortune were less secure than is often believed. Published in association with the Canada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies, LSE.


Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series)
Pretty interesting read.




"Of the 214 knocked-out, 139 were irrecoverably lost, which amounts to almost 65 percent. The high percentage of irrecoverable losses was also the result of a change in the tactics of struggling with tanks. The German anti-tank artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns didn't cease firing at a tank, if it had stopped as a result of a shell hit, but continued to fire at the immobile target until it caught fire. Such a tactic against attacking tanks leads to large irrecoverable losses in their formations. In contrast, the effectiveness of air strikes against tanks, hunkered down in a positional defense, is quite insignificant."


"The T-70 tank in view of its high mobility best corresponds to the task of pursuing a retreating enemy. In distinction from the T-34 and KV, the tank of the indicated type possesses a relatively quiet engine (the sound of the tank is no greater than that of a car), even when moving at high RPMs, which together with the small dimensions of the tank itself allows the T-70 platoons to approach practically right up to the enemy, without provoking his alarm too soon. If the German artillery gunners can fire at a T-34 tank from a range of 800-1,200 meters, then the small dimensions of the T-70 tank in the field reduces this range to 500-600 meters. The light weight of the tank facilitates its transportation, both to the front and during evacuation of knocked-out tanks to the rear. The T-70 tank is simpler to master and handle by poorly-trained drivers, and is amenable to repair in field conditions. All the available cases of large losses in the T-70 platoons are explained more by the unwise use of them, and not by design flaws in the tank itself. I consider the decision to stop producing the T-70 tank premature. Production of the tank should be maintained, having increased its firepower by switching its main armament to the 45mm Model 1942 gun or the [76mm] model 1943 Regimental Gun."
The T-70 Tank:
http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2...

The author provided numerous charts & tables outlining nearly every conceivable detail about the combat readiness of various Soviet units within the 2nd Guards Tank Army throughout the period covered by the first volume.
He also listed some interesting web sites which may interest some members of the group:
Memories of veterans of the Great Patriotic War:
https://iremember.ru/en/
Digital bank of documents "Feat of the people in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945":
http://www.podvignaroda.mil.ru/?#tab=...
United open access data bank "Memorial" is a bank of personal information about the defenders of the Fatherland, killed in action, dead and reported missing during the Great Patriotic War and in the post-war period:
https://obd-memorial.ru/html/


Description:
In the summer of 1942, the Germans launched Case Blue, a strategic offensive into the Caucasus, a region rich in oil, birthplace of Stalin, and gateway to Iran and the Middle East, where the Germans could obtain more oil, cut off a vital corridor for Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviets, threaten the British Empire, and even perhaps link up with the Japanese (then advancing in Burma toward India). It was a pivotal moment of World War II, which history remembers primarily for the titanic clash at Stalingrad during the fall and early winter of 1942-43, but less well understood is the series of summer operations that led to and shaped that turning-point battle. In Prelude to Stalingrad, Igor Sdvizhkov reconstructs the fighting in the northern sector of the Case Blue offensive, near the city of Voronezh. Using German documents as well as previously classified Soviet sources, Sdvizhkov zooms in on the nine days of see-saw fighting―involving tens of thousands of men and hundreds of tanks and guns on both sides―that threatened to derail the German offensive north of Stalingrad. In response to the withdrawals and mass surrenders on the Eastern Front during the war’s early months a year before, Stalin ordered that no ground be given up, that his armies fight instead of pulling back, ensuring that the fighting would be brutal. Ultimately unsuccessful in denying the Germans a bridgehead on the Don River, the Red Army inflicted heavy losses, eroding the Wehrmacht’s fighting power before it even reached Stalingrad.
Also posted in the New Release thread.
A note of caution though, this new release may be a paperback edition of this 2017 HB release:


https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/i...

"Tarasov and his staff derisively referred to these half-trained troops as 'Army Group Center's Rumanians'. He hoped that they would oblige by collapsing like the real Rumanians had a week before along the Don, but privately he was not so sure they would."
2nd Luftwaffe Field Division in Operation Mars:
https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2015/09...

"The victorious Germans suffered wounds in November and December that fatally weakened their Rzhev defences, but the Soviet losses were severe, if not catastrophic. The initial strength of the seven Soviet armies committed in Operation Mars amounted to about 667,000 men and over 1,900 tanks out of the 1,890,000 men and 3,375 tanks that comprised the Kalinin and Western Fronts and the Moscow Defense Zone in November 1942. Additionally, at least 150,000 men and several hundred tanks reinforced the attacking armies during the operation.
German sources estimate total Soviet personnel losses at over 200,000 men, including about 100,000 dead, and total Soviet tank losses at between 1,655 and 1,847 out of an estimated total of over 2,000 tanks committed to combat. The German count of Soviet prisoners of war and deserters was 5,272 men, although usually prisoners were not taken on either side.
The records of lower-level German units confirm these stark figures. For example, during the period from 25 November to 5 December along the Vazuza River, the 5th Panzer Division recorded that the Soviet initially committed a force of 44,000 men and 550 tanks and that during the attacks they lost 42,000 dead and 183 tanks destroyed. The German Ninth Army's records claim that the Russians lost 300 tanks in a four-kilometre-wide sector during forty-eight hours of combat from 12 through 14 December. The 1st Panzer Division reported that the Soviets lost 121 tanks in combat and numerous other tanks abandoned in the encirclement battle south of Belyi."
Operation Mars:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww...


Horrific fighting on the Eastern Front! However while the Russians were losing huge numbers around Rzhev they were smashing the Germans around Stalingrad during Operation Uranus:
https://www.stalingrad.net/russian-hq...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operati...

"On Christmas Day, Balck visited the 7th Corps and witnessed a shattered force in the bleak landscape. The disintegration of a once proud army reminded him of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow:
Slowly I drove through the Russian winter landscape, past the 1812 battlefields of Borodino. I could still see the heaps of earth from the Russian positions. There was sunshine but no wind in the -5 to -20 degrees Fahrenheit weather. The smoke from the villages rose straight up in long, solid columns, high into the sky. It was a picture that could have been inspirational, were it not for our desperate situation and the Napoleonic memories."


"The 15th Panzer Regiment had only nine operational Panzer IV medium tanks left. Freiherr von Hauser's 61st Motorcycle Battalion had experienced near continuous combat for three weeks and had conducted eight attacks, repelled forty-two attacks and launched twenty-three counter-attacks, destroying eighty-five Russian tanks including fifteen in close combat. Balck accordingly praised Hauser's exceptional leadership:
… he was not only tough, he was also caring and skilful. He led from the front, conducting numerous, rapid, and unpredictable counterattacks, so that his unit was never taken under flanking fire and his soldiers were always able to counterattack from secure positions."


"On 23 December, the 48th Panzer Corps went on the defensive as Balck lacked the strength to recapture Kiev.
Mellenthin nevertheless noted the great tactical success Balck had achieved during the campaign:
… the conduct of operations was the most brilliant in my experience. General Balck handled his corps with masterly skill; he showed a complete understanding of the classic principles of maneuver and surprise, and he displayed a resourcefulness, a flexibility, and an insight into tactical problems, strongly reminiscent of the methods of the great captains of history.
Balck's troops had destroyed two Russian armies, crippled a third and knocked out 700 Soviet tanks."


'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Another great account from the book; "Panzer Commander":
"

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Another great account from the book; "Panzer Commander":
""
It is a good read Carl :)


I have his new book on order and can't wait to start reading it.


Pretty good narration, and easy to follow and listen to, but damn glad for google for looking at the maps of the battle.
For some reason I can't post the link to the book and author.
I get this warning:
Search is temporarily unavailable.
Use this time to read a book!


Pretty good narration, and easy to follow and listen to, but damn glad for google for looking at the maps of the battle..."
Working now:




Yep, I got that from my Army days as well.

"Observing some of the costs of this fighting, one man from Dehner's 106th Infantry Division wrote in a letter on December 29:
If one stands in Timonion or Pashkovo on a high hill and looks around, one can see a strange rampant, of dark color. Looking through binoculars, one sees - these are all corpses of Soviet soldiers. They are piled around two villages. These are all consequences of endless Soviet attacks inflicted upon us. Three to four times a day, sometimes even more that that they are charging us, advancing with companies and battalions, frequently from two of three sides - and all are mowed down my machine guns … One can say that we are not in a war here, but in a slaughterhouse … How our boys are holding on despite all this is beyond comprehension."


Naro-Fominsk:
https://www.historynet.com/wwii-trave...
T-34 Tank Naro-Fominsk:
https://www.tracesofwar.com/sights/10...

" … If all else failed, the firing bolt could be carried inside a man's uniform, using the body warmth to keep it from freezing before a battle. Those too lazy or careless to maintain their weapons in proper order adopted a quicker solution to freeing up their machine guns: they doused them with gasoline and set fire to them, which apparently had the desired effect."
EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT
IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA - a study by a committee of former German generals and general staff officers under the supervision of the Historical Division:
http://www.allworldwars.com/Effects-o...

I recall reading of Germans building fires on the ground under the oil pans of vehicles to prevent freeze up. Sounds dangerous to me.

"Willy Peter Reese wrote how a soldier desperate to find himself a pair of felt boots found some on a frozen Soviet corpse. There was no way to separate the boots from the man without damaging them, so the soldier took an axe and chopped off the legs at the thigh. As Reese recounted the event: 'Fragments of flesh flew everywhere. He bundled the two stumps under his arms and set them down in the oven, the legs were thawed out, and he pulled on the bloody felt boots'. Walter Tilemann described the same process but wrote of whole bodies being thawed out at large fires in order to salvage everything from the jacket to the boots. Indeed, sometimes the morbid practice took place on a truly industrial scale. After one Soviet attack in which some 200 bodies were left on the battlefield, the Germans set about claiming sufficient clothing to outfit every man in their battalion, as Heinrich Haape wrote: 'The bodies were carried, frozen into grotesque shapes, to a sauna house and there the saw commandos got to work. It was a filthy business, but there was no place for the niceties of human contact when death was waiting to claim the man who lost his body heat'."

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I started the abridgement of Glantz' Stalingrad series today
I really don't have the time right now to read all 4 volumes of their "Trilogy" I think I'll save ..."
I've read two of the four books so far. Let me know how you go with the abridged edition.