Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Discussion -Boethius
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Consolation of Philosophy - Book 2

Have you..."
Nemo, thanks! I was thinking of the discussions with Eric Kandel. I didn't watch them at the time, but I think I'll do some exploring of the archives. They came highly recommended to my attention.
http://www.charlierose.com/topic/scie...
(I did minors graduate work in the psychology of human learning back in the '60's, but I haven't kept up in any rigorous ways with the work or the many breakthroughs that have happened since those days. At the time, I was interested in the topic from computer and communications industry perspectives.)
(Do I guess correctly from your reading that philosophy is one of your current focuses, Nemo?)

Have you..."
Nemo, thanks! I was thinking of the discussions with Eric Kandel. I didn't watch them at the time, but I think I'll do some exploring of the archives. They came highly recommended to my attention.
http://www.charlierose.com/topic/scie...
(I did minors graduate work in the psychology of human learning back in the '60's, but I haven't kept up in any rigorous ways with the work or the many breakthroughs that have happened since those days. At the time, I was interested in the topic from computer and communications industry perspectives.)
(Do I guess correctly from your reading that philosophy is one of your current focuses, Nemo?)

Here is the video link to Eric Kandel's interview on Charlie Rose, talking about his book In Search of Memory. I'd highly recommend that book, if you haven't read it, both entertaining and informative. I really like Charlie Rose's program, and have learned a lot from his interviews. Thanks for the link to the brain series.
http://bit.ly/lBXPrF
Do I guess correctly from your reading that philosophy is one of your current focuses, Nemo?
I'm trying to read through the entire Western Canon, and just starting from the very beginning, which happens to be Plato and Aristotle. But yes, philosophy is one of my main interests.

Not certain what you mean by "mental images." Certainly, imagination is far vaster than "pictures in the brain."
This is where M-W unabridged goes with the term relative to the indicated synonyms:
"synonyms FANCY, FANTASY, PHANTASY: imagination, freer of derogatory connotations than the other terms, is the most comprehensive, applying to the power of creating, in the mind or in an outward form as in a literary work, images of things once known but absent, of things never seen or never seen in their entirety, or things actually nonexistent, of things created new from diverse old elements, or of things perfected or idealized; it may carry the implication of mere tricky concoction, as of things unreal or odd, but is more frequently nearer the other extreme in suggesting the genuine artist's gift of perceiving more deeply or essentially and creating the interestingly and the significantly new and vital..."
"imagination." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged. Merriam-Webster, 2002. http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com (26 Jun. 2011).

It's been enough years that I'll have to dig out my copy to give you a decent answer.

Give me an example of imagination that is not a "picture in the brain". Having no imaginative powers, I have to learn by concrete examples. :)

Your definition of imagination is much narrower than mine. I think imagination is the faculty whereby we are able to see the Platonic "forms" of ideas; imagination allows us to use maps that are not to scale; imagination lets us put numbers and mathematical formulae in context. I don't think imagination can be completely free from the senses, but it isn't completely dependent on it either. It allows us to "see" things that are reasonable but which aren't actually apparent to us in a concrete way.
Theoretical physicists working on M-theory, which suggests an 11-dimensional universe, must have prodigious imaginations, don't you think?

By your definition, it's unclear to me what the difference is between imagination and abstract reasoning.
Theoretical physicists working on M-theory, which suggests an 11-dimensional universe, must have prodigious imaginations, don't you think?
No, the extra dimensions are required by their mathematical model. It's abstract reasoning, not imagination. OTOH, if they can describe what it is like to live in an 11-dimension world, THAT would be imagination. :)

I would consider the works of Dr. Seuss and of Edwin Abbott 's Flatland as examples of products of imagination. Those do certainly include visual elements, but one thing that is interesting about Flatland is its use of two dimensions to elucidate the concepts of three dimensions and from there, four dimensions. Before Flatland could be produced as a book, it had to be conceived by its author, not necessarily in a straightforward, linear manner and not without the creation of drafts et al.
Would we consider the formulation of a non-Euclidian mathematics to be an act of abstract reasoning, hypothesis testing, an imaginative leap, ....?

You might find Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception an interesting read sometime.
OTOH, if they can describe what it is like to live in an 11-dimension world, THAT would be imagination. :)
It would be a very small world (after all). :)

I'm just starting ancient Greek philosophy, so it might take a while to catch up to the 20th century. :) That book and Heidegger's Being and Time, which one would you recommend for first dip in Phenomenology?

I'm just starting ancient Greek philosophy, so it might take a while to catch up to th..."
Heidegger said the best preparation for reading Being and Time would be to study Aristotle for ten years, so it sounds like you're on the right track. (But don't spend 10 years on Aristotle. Well, unless you really really like Aristotle.)
I'm new to 20th cent philosophy myself so I don't feel qualified to recommend a starting point for phenomenology, but Being and Time was a blast. Really hard stuff though.

Did he say which works of Aristotle specifically?
I'm new to 20th cent philosophy myself
Which century are you from? :)

Yes, that's exactly what I'm say..."
Okay, so far so good. Next clarification-- I understand what you mean by Platonic Ideal Forms, so we just need to define what you mean by the Word. I see the term capitalized, and I immediately think John 1:1; "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Since John actually uses the word "logos", in a way, that could be taking us back to the Platonic Ideal Forms. Are you suggesting something supernatural in your use of "the Word?"

If you scroll up, you'd see that Lily was quoting John 1:1 in her comment, and I was responding to her comment.

There is a difference between imagining a new perspective and transferring one's perspective to another person. As the saying goes, "take a look through my eyes". We can do that because we are all human beings, and presumably experience the same thoughts and feelings under the same circumstances. "If you prick us, do we not bleed?
if you tickle us, do we not laugh?"
You transferred your view (the image of the moon following you) to people in another car. It worked because the circumstances were similar. It wouldn't work for someone on the moon. To me, the latter takes imagination, i.e., forming images in the mind that are not present to the senses or derived from experiences (e.g. memory).

"
I'm entering this fascinating discussion late, and haven't read to the end so maybe this has been said or refuted already, but it seems to me that hallucinations, which you said are not real, are also grounded in reality, though not abstract reasoning. One can only hallucinate about things one has at some point experienced, or which one has pieced together from things one has experienced. In that way they are, just like thought experiments, also grounded in reality, so how are they less real?

Not Homer? And there were the pre-Socratics, particularly since there has been much discussion of mathematics here Pythagoras, whose philosophy was closely intertwined with mathematics. Consider borrowing The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library


Not Homer? And there were the pre-Socratics,..."
I read Homer already, but not the tragedies. The pre-Socratics are not listed in the Britannica version of the Western Canon, though I did ask around and got some recommendations. Guthrie was among them.

Having never hallucinated, I don't know what hallucinations look or sound like. They are not real by definition because they are not present in real life at the time of hallucination, though they appear to the person to be present.
BTW, hope you have a speedy recovery. :)

Man tried to imitate the birds. It's not imagination, it's imitation. :) In fact, in imitating the birds, man forgets that his spirit can soar much higher than a bird.

Aristotle deals with the imagination in a similar fashion. "Without sensation, there can be no imagination, and without imagination there can be no belief." (On the Soul, 427b)
For him, the imagination is "a motion produced by the activity of sense," but it is not the same as sensation. Sensation is also a motion, but it is caused directly by sensible objects. Imagination is "sense activity" when the objects of sensation are not present. The sensible object produces a sensation that lingers even when it is disappearing or entirely gone. It sounds akin to memory.
Do you consider memories to be "real," Nemo?

But neither is any act of imagination.

That presumption simply is not true. Despite all being human beings, different ones of us may experience very different thoughts and feelings under the same circumstances.
This was first most starkly made real to me in some group exercises in which I participated probably thirty years ago now. It always fascinates me now how I was ever able to expect the stranger next to me to feel and think as I did. (And, yes, one can throw up the argument about not really "the same circumstances." But, for all reasonable intents and purposes, the diversity can still hold in any group of considerable size. Some bright souls think and feel just like me, but the rest of those poor souls... ROFLOL!)

I haven't read "On the Soul" yet. I take it that Aristotle doesn't believe in the immortality of the soul or recollection?
The sensible object produces a sensation that lingers even when it is disappearing or entirely gone. It sounds akin to memory.
The description does seem to fit memory. I consider memory real to the extent that it records and replays events without distortion.

But neither is any act of imagination."
The key word is "act". Imagination is a voluntary mental activity, whereas hallucination is involuntary. When imagining, the person is aware that the product of his imagination isn't real (yet), but a hallucinating person believes the hallucinations are real.

Diversity holds because we are unique individuals, but we're are also all human beings, and share common feelings and thoughts. If that's not true, we would not be able to communicate with and understand each other at all.

If you hadn't had the sense experience yourself, you wouldn't have been able to "imagine" it for people in the other car. You projected, rather than imagined, what people in the other car would see based on your own experience.
And Einstein had to "imagine" what would happen to an object moving at the speed of light. That had never happened, it wasn't a sense based imagining.
It wasn't sense-based imagining, it was abstract reasoning.

I think you're onto something here Patrice. We often imagine what to us is seemingly impossible--whether that be the means to fly or living in a lifestyle considerable above our present means. Then we reverse engineer the idea through reasoning to find a way to make the seemingly impossible possible.

Hallucinations are grounded in reality, as are dreams, memory, and objects of the imagination, but they are not real--occurring in actuality. Our experience of them may be real, and produce real physical and mental/emotional reactions.
I think we've gotten lost in our own subjective perceptions of reality and imagination. When I went back to the dictionary for a definition--it helped clarify my thinking.
The Free Online Dictionary defines real as
1.
a. Being or occurring in fact or actuality; having verifiable existence: real objects; a real illness.
b. True and actual; not imaginary, alleged, or ideal: real people, not ghosts; a film based on real life.
c. Of or founded on practical matters and concerns: a recent graduate experiencing the real world for the first time.
2. Genuine and authentic; not artificial or spurious: real mink; real humility.
3. Being no less than what is stated; worthy of the name: a real friend.
4. Free of pretense, falsehood, or affectation: tourists hoping for a real experience on the guided tour.
Like truth, I think reality is subject to being viewed relative to our experience. We often interchange true and real as synonyms--So just as some people try to define their own "truth", we often try to define our own "reality." Perhaps this is the whole aim of Philosophy(reason), to help Boethius to discern between his perceived truth/reality/happiness and the absolute truth/reality/happiness.

We feel uncomfortable and "perplexed"...."
I read Meno but didn't pick up what you gleaned from it. Good point. I think this also applies to Boethius here. His view of the world was going through a break down, and Philosophy was helping him to re-construct a new view. Consolation comes not from restoring the old, but from embracing the new. (Compare this with the Christian Consolation in Col. 3:9-10)
As for imitating birds...if we really were doing that we still would not be able to fly.
We imitated the birds by studying the aerodynamics principles that the birds used instinctively to fly. The object is to imitate something already present to the senses by means of studying empirical data also available to the senses. There is nothing imaginative about this, IMO.

For Aristotle, the soul is what makes a living thing alive; the soul is the "form" while the body is the "matter". But the soul is not one thing, and the higher order a living thing is, the more parts there are. (Boethius uses this in his argument in Book 5 to show that God has a higher order understanding than man -- similarly, man has a higher order understanding than animals, and animals more than plants.) For Aristotle, the lower “affective” parts of the soul die, but the highest “thinking” part is immortal. (He calls this the active intellect, which operates free and clear of sensation.)
The description does seem to fit memory. I consider memory real to the extent that it records and replays events without distortion.
Interesting. How could one compare a memory of a past event with the event itself in order to judge the distortion? (Assuming this was a one-time event.) And how much distortion would you allow, since no memory is going to be as sharp as a present sense impression?

What is abstract reasoning abstracted from?

How can it be true that without senses there can be no imagination or belief, if the intellect is free of sensation (unless he thinks that imagination and belief are not part of the intellect)?
How could one compare a memory of a past event with the event itself in order to judge the distortion?
Compare with other existing records and/or physical evidence of the event itself.
And how much distortion would you allow, since no memory is going to be as sharp as a present sense impression?
I think it was St. Augustine who compared memory to a portrait of a person. The portrait may fade over the years, but the person himself goes through changes too, and yet he remains the same one and can still be recognized by others. Similarly, memory can remain "true" even though it has faded.

How can it be true that without senses there can be no imagination or belief, if the intellect..."
They are separate "powers" of the soul. The active intellect is distinguished from the passive intellect, which can be acted upon. The active intellect only acts; Aristotle uses the analogy of light -- the active intellect makes potential colors into actual colors. (Keep in mind that he is using an analogy of sense for something that acts in a purely noetic fashion. It's confusing.)
Edit: I should say these powers are distinct, rather than separate. At one point he says that apart from the body (after death) the active intellect still "exists" but is no longer able to think because it needs the passive intellect, which is destructible. It is an open question if the active intellect can settle into another body, but if it does it will not be able to remember it previous existence. (This seems to be aimed at Socrates' theory of recollection.)

Actually, this is far from the truth. As a trial lawyer, I've spent a lot of time and effort trying to understand memory and its accuracy, and the more I have studied the more persuaded I am that the truly accurate memory is by far the exception rather than the rule. Many experiments have been done to demonstrate this, and there is the notorious (among lawyers) case of the woman who was raped, clearly saw her rapist, testified in court that he was the rapist, when she was confronted by another suspect by the defense flatly denied that the second person had done it. Her testimony put the defendant in prison. Later, DNA tests and a confession proved conclusively that it was the alternate person who had done it, not the person she identified, and the falsely convicted man was released and the true rapist convicted; it took her a long time to accept the truth, but now she and the man falsely accused have joined together in an effort to help the police and lawyers better understand and process eyewitness testimony, and they have become good friends.
There's also the work of Elizabeth Loftus who has shown conclusively that it is possible to implant totally false memories in a person, and there is brain scan research to show that the brain processes actual and false memories alike, so it has no way of knowing which is actual and which is false.
All of which is a roundabout way of saying that memory is very much not a mechanism for the recording and playback of reality.

Nemo replied: Compare with other existing records and/or physical evidence of the event itself."
So it seems that the reality of the memory is dependent upon its truth. I don't agree with that, but I see your point. The problem for me is that if I don't trust my own memory, how am I going to trust a documentation of that memory, particularly if it conflicts with my personal experience? Who is to be the ultimate arbiter of the truth upon which my reality depends? I am willing to admit that my memory may not be true (indeed, my perception of reality right now may be in question, having broken my eyeglasses) but I have no doubt that the blurry world around me is real, and that tomorrow my blurry memories of today will be as real as they are right now (though tomorrow I presume they will be even blurrier.)

I should say "My condolences", but I couldn't help LOL when I first read this. What else do you have in common with Joyce besides eyeglasses? :)
if I don't trust my own memory, how am I going to trust a documentation of that memory, particularly if it conflicts with my personal experience? Who is to be the ultimate arbiter of the truth upon which my reality depends?
I see your point too, and agree to some extent. Generally speaking, there is no reason for us not to trust our memory. However, I tend to think that we are not our memory, though it is an important part of us. Firstly, we are the ultimate arbiter, as you put it, of the truth of our memory. We're able to judge whether our memory is faulty and decide whether to trust it, and in that sense we transcend our memory. Secondly, if we develop Alzheimer's disease and loses all our memory, we are no less a human being than before, though our life would be entirely different.

Actually, this is far from the truth. As a trial lawyer, I've spent a lot of time and e..."
You do realize that, if memory is inaccurate, your whole argument which is based on evidence you recall from memory becomes indefensible, because the evidence itself is unreliable and inadmissible?

Thanks for the clarification, though it is as confusing to me as before. It sounds like the active intellect is not self-sufficient, and needs the passive intellect to be fully "active". A bow without the strings, or drum sticks without the drum?

You do the Sophists proud! :)

I should take that as a compliment from a modern day sophist :).
Memory is a fascinating subject, and I'd be interested in discussing further if you're willing to present the cases you've studied one by one, preferably with references.

It's very sketchy, I know. Aristotle likes to see things in terms of matter and form, potentiality and actuality, passivity and activity. One part of something is acted upon, and another does the acting. A material object, before it becomes that thing, exists in a potential state as unordered matter. Form actualizes the unordered matter, actively creating the object by forming it into the object with all its attributes.
He applies this to the intellect as well. He wants to say that there is an intellect that is acted upon, that "becomes" knowledge -- the part that is analogous to matter. Then there is an active part, the part that is analogous to form, that "creates" the knowledge out of the raw matter of the passive intellect.
So you're right, I think -- the active does need the passive. But Aristotle says the active part of the intellect does not perish, while the passive part does. In this sense, the active intellect has the same kind of existence as Plato's "Forms", and the analogous part of the soul is indeed immortal.

Yes, I also got that impression from reading his Politics. His conception of justice also consists of two parts, one active and one passive. For Aristotle, justice, as an activity, needs an actor and a person being acted upon, so it's nonexistent when there is only one; whereas for Plato, justice can exist in one person as a state, and a just person is self-sufficient.
"So you're right, I think -- the active does need the passive. But Aristotle says the active part of the intellect does not perish, while the passive part does. "
So the active part of intellect is immortal but useless. What a pity! If all things aim at the good, the active intellect, being useless by itself, is never good.

But aren't the Platonic "forms" are just as useless? The idea of the Good, or any idea for that matter, seems just as useless without some kind of instantiation in the world. (But what's wrong with being useless anyway? Maybe Heaven is all about being absolutely perfect and totally useless. :)

I should take that as a compliment from a modern day sophist :).
Memory is a fascinating subject, and I'd be interested in discussing further i..."
The best thing I can suggest is to read Elizabeth Loftus's Witness for the Defense. Doesn't have the latest few years of research, but very readable and interesting nonetheless. Another excellent book, this one more scientific and geared toward children's testimony. is Stephen Ceci and Maggie Bruck, Jeopardy in the Courtroom.
I have trouble being too specific about my own cases because of confidentiality issues.

As I see it, the Platonic Form is self-sufficient. It is useful, because it serves its own end. It is its own substance, and doesn't need instantiation to be real; The active intellect in Aristotle's theory isn't self-sufficient. It's useless even to itself, because it can't be actualized without the passive part, and in that sense, it's not even immortal. Like the punishment of Tantalus, always the potentiality, but never the actuality.
Books mentioned in this topic
The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library (other topics)Phenomenology of Perception (other topics)
In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind (other topics)
The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales (other topics)
Einstein's Dreams (other topics)
More...
Authors mentioned in this topic
Edwin A. Abbott (other topics)Alan Lightman (other topics)
Bart D. Ehrman (other topics)
Sounds like inspiration to me, not imagination. :)