Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Spinoza - Ethics
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Part Four, Prop 37 to end of Part Four
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Something else that I find difficult to reconcile: When Spinoza says that "No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of something else," is he ruling out the nobility of sacrificing oneself for a higher principle? (P25) Or even for a loved one? (For example, Corey Comperatore, the father who was shot and killed trying to protect his family at the Trump rally. Would Spinoza disapprove? ) Or again at P37: From this we easily understand that there is nothing in the state of nature which, by the agreement of all, is good or evil, for everyone who is in the state of nature considers only his own advantage, and decides what is good and what is evil from his own temperament, and only insofar as he takes account of his own advantage. he is not bound by any law to submit to anyone except himself....
I don't think that he means that everyone gets to make up their own laws -- there is just the law of nature. Does this law preclude self-sacrifice for another? (For love, basically?)
Thomas wrote: "When Spinoza says that "No one strives to preserve his being for the sake of something else," is he ruling out the nobility of sacrificing oneself for a higher principle?"On conatus alone yes, but Spinoza is always stressing acting with reason, and altruism can be seen as rational if it aligns with a broader understanding of one’s own good, which includes the well-being of others.
What do you think Spinoza's response to The Trolley Problem would be? Would he throw the switch to kill one person to save five others; would he push the fat man on to the tracks to save five others?
And probably coming sooner than we think, should the AI of a self-driving car be programed with some version of Spinoza's philosophy in making Trolley Problem-like decisions, or some other decision algorithm?
David wrote: "On conatus alone yes, but Spinoza is always stressing acting with reason, and altruism can be seen as rational if it aligns with a broader understanding of one’s own good, which includes the well-being of others.."
I agree, and the well-being of others is the conatus of a larger community of which the individual is just one part, maybe a dispensable one. But that group is not just everyone, it is the group of people who follow the dictates of reason. A wise man is not going to throw himself on a grenade for a bum.
In the trolley problem, if the fat man is a reasonable, virtuous and joyful man (by Spinoza's way of thinking) and the five are unreasonable people who are affected with passions that make them miserable, I think the fat man lives.
But it's hard to say, because Spinoza doesn't really deal with decision making. The intellect is the same thing as the will, so the trolley problem wouldn't even be a problem. The man at the switch would do whatever is in accordance with the kind of person he is.
Thomas wrote: "But that group is not just everyone, it is the group of people who follow the dictates of reason. A wise man is not going to throw himself on a grenade for a bum."It sounds like there are many things to consider that are justified by our subjective perspectives of good and bad accompanied by reason and their adequate ideas.
Our human nature has a pecking order. Just as we might condemn individuals by degrees based on their harmful actions, it seems logical to act toward others by degrees based on their perceived merit, even in a deterministic framework. This aligns with the idea that rational assessment of individuals involves considering their actions and virtues within the context of the greater good.
Thomas wrote: "Could it exonerate murder of other humans if done on a rational basis? (Such as self-preservation, either of an individual or a group of humans under attack.) ..."Consider the current discussions about the prisoners in Guantanamo associated with the 911 attack planning? Or, elsewhere, do "high value" prisoner exchanges end up encouraging hostage taking, as some claim? Was the death of the Hamas leader by the hidden bomb "rational"? if that is even an accurate description of reality. How does rationality or lack thereof influence subsequent machinations? Not looking for answers or necessarily even discussion, just a comment on the relevancy of Spinoza's explorations to our world.
Lily wrote: "How does rationality or lack thereof influence subsequent machinations?."Spinoza seems to think that knowledge is the key. If proponents and perpetrators of violence and terrorism and retribution were aware that their actions were not useful to self-preservation, they would stop. Acts of terrorism, attacks on civilians, and political assassinations are not effective self-preservation tools; they're passionate responses to injustice that just add more fuel to the fire. I think Spinoza is suggesting that if the parties involved could remove emotion from the equation that a rational solution could be found. To do this, both sides would have to forgive or forget past grievances; in Spinoza's words, they would have to separate the sadness caused by the conflict from the perceived causes. In so doing, the hate they feel for each other would be destroyed, and putting aside generations of hatred would certainly open avenues of negotiation that are impossible otherwise. Spinoza claims this is possible, but only if those in the thrall of hatred understand their hatred for what it is -- a feeling, an affect that enslaves them and binds them to their suffering. Spinoza says this knowledge is possible if one merely thinks rationally about the emotions that fuel violence and injustice.
But that certainly doesn't mean that all violence is irrational. Homicide may even be part of the solution if it is a rational and dispassionate response in support of self-preservation.
Thomas wrote: "But that certainly doesn't mean that all violence is irrational. Homicide may even be part of the solution if it is a rational and dispassionate response in support of self-preservation..."I'm still puzzling over the relationships between emotions and rationality that Spinoza seemingly posits. Some of the "good" emotions, those that support "self-preservation", seem to belong to the "rational portfolio." But .... (I have much the same issues with later writers re emotions -- which, even in Spinoza, often seem short-cut responses to "self-preservation" but often don't stand up (must be modified?) when subjected to the complexities of reality, which seems to be where "rationality" can take over.)
I particularly enjoyed Spinoza's characterization of "laughter."
I am fascinated by the relationship between "emotions" and "rational" processing in the brain (frontal lobes?). It has probably been thirty years since I've looked closely at the research, but as I recall part of what was being investigated was whether (some) emotions provided a "by-pass", permitting more rapid response to environmental stimuli. How should such "thinking" relationships be related to "rationality" or are they parallel concepts? Or intertwined ones? (Sort of like having an accelerated processor that had a higher error rate than the processor it fed.)
I think Spinoza asserts emotions and rationality as intimately interactive but each serves different functions. Emotions provide the energy and motivation for action or inaction, while rationality should be used to guide and shape these emotions to ensure they support true self-preservation and understanding. The idea is not to suppress emotions but to transform them through rational insight, aligning them coherent with our long-term well-being.Viewing emotions as 'short-cuts' for self-preservation aligns with Spinoza’s philosophy, where emotions like fear or anger trigger rapid responses to threats. However, Spinoza argues that these reactions often arise from incomplete understanding and can mislead us. Rationality, in his view, serves as a tool to refine these emotional responses, ensuring they contribute to our well-being rather than detract from it. This reminds me of the hero in a life-threatening situation who, instead of being paralyzed by fear or reacting too hastily, quickly devises and executes a brilliant solution—like MacGyver saving lives in the nick of time with a genius idea involving peanut butter, a ballpoint pen, and a paperclip.
The main thing I get from Spinoza about emotions is that they aren't us, and they don't come from us. They originate in something outside us. He does not subscribe at all to the romantic notion that we are expressing ourselves when we experience or communicate emotions. We are experiencing and communicating something that affects us, like a disease. It's almost like the medieval idea of humours. To be who we really are, we have to free ourselves of these affections because they bind us and bend us in ways that are not true to our essence. If we are able to do that, we eat in a certain way because it is useful to us, not because we are hungry. We fight enemies because they endanger our existence, not because we hate them.
What would Spinoza think of the amygdala?
Spinoza's thought on good and evil seems to rely on "natural law". The good appears to be that which is dictated by reason in accordance with human nature, and evil is whatever detracts from this (the passions in general.)
True virtue is nothing but living according to the guidance of reason (4P37) Weakness occurs when we allow external forces to guide us rather than reason. For example, feeling empathy for non-human creatures like animals is not reasonable because they do not share human nature. It seems clear that Spinoza approves of the use of animals if it is done on a rational basis. Would this include hunting animals for sport? (4P45) Could it exonerate murder of other humans if done on a rational basis? (Such as self-preservation, either of an individual or a group of humans under attack.)
...there is nothing in the state of nature which, by the agreement of all, is good or evil; for everyone who is in the state of nature considers his own advantage, and decides what is good and evil from his own temperament, and only insofar as he takes account of his own advantage. He is not bound by any law to submit to anyone but himself. So in the state of nature no sin can be conceived.
On a less morbid note... A few weeks ago I asked what Spinoza would think about laughter... 4P45 simply states "Hate can never be good," but in the Scholium he notes that laughter is "pure joy." He is making a distinction between mockery, which is hateful, and laughter, which is something else. Does the cause of the laughter make a difference? Is there perhaps a comedy of pure reason?