Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Spinoza - Ethics
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Part One, Definitions 18-36 and Appendix
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Thank you for sharing! I particularly enjoyed the final quote. That would mean (or rather assume), that a sense of likeness-to-God is intrinsic to the mere fact of being sentient (and thus "capax dei"). And yes, I think this would be the same as saying that all human beings desire the good, as you also wonder in (I).
Nothing is contingent, it's also been observed. If the sense of likeness-to-God is caused by God and therefore is intrinsically necessary, can the origin or cause of the parallel sense of mutual exclusion in the exercise of likeness-to-God – the triangle thinking God is not like a circle – be investigated as well?
Nothing is contingent, it's also been observed. If the sense of likeness-to-God is caused by God and therefore is intrinsically necessary, can the origin or cause of the parallel sense of mutual exclusion in the exercise of likeness-to-God – the triangle thinking God is not like a circle – be investigated as well?
Fed wrote: "Thank you for sharing! I particularly enjoyed the final quote. That would mean (or rather assume), that a sense of likeness-to-God is intrinsic to the mere fact of being sentient (and thus "capax dei")."Spinoza's purpose in the Appendix is to examine the prejudices that obstruct rational understanding, and here he describes one of those prejudices, the tendency to see God/Substance/Nature in human, rather than rational terms. I understand Spinoza to reject this prejudice simply because it cannot be deduced from his definitions, axioms, and propositions in a mathematical way.
But he certainly recognizes the human tendency to think this way. One wonders if Spinoza recognized this tendency in himself. If everything is contingent and free will is an illusion, what is the point of doing philosophy? Why not just go for a walk and enjoy life as it comes without thinking about it too much?
Thomas wrote: "One wonders if Spinoza recognized this tendency in himself."
Boxel and Spinoza are discussing the existence of ghosts – opinion supported by Boxel and confuted by Spinoza – and their legendary aspect. In his previous letter to Boxel, Spinoza writes: «In order not to confuse human nature with divine nature, I do not assign human attributes, such as will, intellect, attention, hearing, etc., to God», and: «This I know: between the finite and the infinite there is no proportion, so the difference between God and the highest and most excellent creature is no different from the difference between God and the lowest creature».
Thomas wrote: "If everything is contingent and free will is an illusion, what is the point of doing philosophy?"
It seems to me that Spinoza addresses this point in his next letter to Boxel (the letter quoted in your first post), where he stresses the difference between «compulsion or force, and necessity [Coactionem, vel vim, & Necessitatem]. That man wants to live, love, etc. is not compulsory [coactum opus], but nevertheless is necessary [necessarium]».
The same sentence continues: «and even more necessary is that God wants to be, to know, to act», which in some way could be seen as extending human attributes (will, knowledge, action) to God.
Also related: the prohibition of images of God in Judaism; the syntax of parts of the Hebrew Bible which avoid making God the object of sentences; Christian "Negative theology" and mystics (kenosis).
Boxel and Spinoza are discussing the existence of ghosts – opinion supported by Boxel and confuted by Spinoza – and their legendary aspect. In his previous letter to Boxel, Spinoza writes: «In order not to confuse human nature with divine nature, I do not assign human attributes, such as will, intellect, attention, hearing, etc., to God», and: «This I know: between the finite and the infinite there is no proportion, so the difference between God and the highest and most excellent creature is no different from the difference between God and the lowest creature».
Thomas wrote: "If everything is contingent and free will is an illusion, what is the point of doing philosophy?"
It seems to me that Spinoza addresses this point in his next letter to Boxel (the letter quoted in your first post), where he stresses the difference between «compulsion or force, and necessity [Coactionem, vel vim, & Necessitatem]. That man wants to live, love, etc. is not compulsory [coactum opus], but nevertheless is necessary [necessarium]».
The same sentence continues: «and even more necessary is that God wants to be, to know, to act», which in some way could be seen as extending human attributes (will, knowledge, action) to God.
Also related: the prohibition of images of God in Judaism; the syntax of parts of the Hebrew Bible which avoid making God the object of sentences; Christian "Negative theology" and mystics (kenosis).
Fed wrote: "That man wants to live, love, etc. is not compulsory [coactum opus], but nevertheless is necessary [necessarium]».."This sentence sounds consistent with what we've read in the Ethics so far. Desires are not compulsory, because compulsion implies that there is a free will to be compelled. Ultimately, if Spinoza is correct, our fears and wants and desires are determined by a chain of causes that starts with Substance/God and is therefore necessary, not freely chosen.
The same sentence continues: «and even more necessary is that God wants to be, to know, to act», which in some way could be seen as extending human attributes (will, knowledge, action) to God
This sentence sounds inconsistent, however. Perhaps he is speaking colloquially here, but he denies in the Ethics that God wants anything. That would mean he lacks something, which means he/she/it is not perfect.
Thomas wrote: "This sentence sounds inconsistent, however. Perhaps he is speaking colloquially here..."
Indeed! Private letters often add new, changing shades and complexity to an otherwise monolithic image projected by more polished works intended for the public.
[I find myself thinking of Joyce, who often boasts an independence of means and ideals sharply contradicted by his private letters: endless requests of money, requests of letters of recommendation to the same public institutions he had publicly despised... Speaking of Scholastic (Medieval) Latin, "Ulysses" is a remarkable example of its enduring influence – I think quotes, both real and made-up, from Aquinas and his contemporaries might outnumber those from the Classics.]
Indeed! Private letters often add new, changing shades and complexity to an otherwise monolithic image projected by more polished works intended for the public.
[I find myself thinking of Joyce, who often boasts an independence of means and ideals sharply contradicted by his private letters: endless requests of money, requests of letters of recommendation to the same public institutions he had publicly despised... Speaking of Scholastic (Medieval) Latin, "Ulysses" is a remarkable example of its enduring influence – I think quotes, both real and made-up, from Aquinas and his contemporaries might outnumber those from the Classics.]
Thomas wrote: I am finding it difficult to sum up Spinoza's thoughts here, so I am going to list some of his main points as I understand them. (Without having a lot of confidence in my understanding, I should add.) I so appreciate your comments on this. I definitely have been struggling with this. Boy, I thought in the beginning that I understood what Spinoza was saying, but as I moved forward I felt I was having to re-read multiple times and still came away without understanding. Some of the arguments seemed circular and/or contradictory to me! With your succinct bullets in hand, I may go back through once again & hopefully see the light!
Thanks, Chris. I'm glad that my notes are helpful to you. If there's something in them that doesn't sound right, or sounds circular, please let me know! That could be a good start for a discussion. I'm doing my best to make sense of this stuff, but really it's just my best guess at this point.
Thomas wrote: "- Nature makes no mistakes. The "will" of God/Nature is indifferent and does not have a goal or final purpose. Everything that exists expresses the power of God in a certain and determinate way, but God/Nature has no express purpose."I am assuming many of these points were as hard to accept for Spinoza's contemporaries as they are for some today. I imagine this particular one, that God is completely determinate and without purpose is the hardest to accept. I say this because it reminds me of Darwin's dangerous idea:
Here, then, is Darwin’s dangerous idea: the algorithmic level is the level that best accounts for the speed of the antelope, the wing of the eagle, the shape of the orchid, the diversity of species, and all the other occasions for wonder in the world of nature. It is hard to believe that something as mindless and mechanical as an algorithm could produce such wonderful things.
Dennett, Daniel C.. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning of Life (p. 59). Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition.
David wrote: "I am assuming many of these points were as hard to accept for Spinoza's contemporaries as they are for some today."
They've never been majoritarian in the church tradition, but there is a similar line of thought within the official doctrine – a line sometime bordering or entering 'heresy', depending the thinker and the moment in history – which stretches from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, through the "Cloud of Unknowing", Meister Eckhart and Johannes Tauler, straight to today's Catechism.
• Benedict XVI, General Audience, 14 May 2008:
«The Face of God is our inability to express truly what he is. In this way one speaks - and Pseudo-Dionysius himself speaks - of a "negative theology". It is easier for us to say what God is not rather than to say what he truly is. [...] Dionysius the Areopagite exerted a strong influence on all medieval theology and on all mystical theology, both in the East and in the West. He was virtually rediscovered in the 13th century, especially by St Bonaventure, the great Franciscan theologian who in this mystical theology found the conceptual instrument for reinterpreting the heritage - so simple and profound - of St Francis. [...] Today Dionysius the Areopagite has a new relevance: he appears as a great mediator in the modern dialogue between Christianity and the mystical theologies of Asia, whose characteristic feature is the conviction that it is impossible to say who God is, that only indirect things can be said about him; that God can only be spoken of with the "not", and that it is only possible to reach him by entering into this indirect experience of "not".»
• John M. Connolly, Living Without Why: Meister Eckhart’s Critique of the Medieval Concept of Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, Reviewed by Peter Eardley:
«Eckhart therefore contrasts Aquinas’s "spiritual merchant", who is motivated by reward for his virtuous efforts, with the "just person" (der Gerehte) who "lives without why". As Eckhart puts it, as quoted by Connolly, "[The just person] wants and seeks nothing, for he knows no why. He acts without a why just in the same way as God does; and just as life lives for its own sake and seeks no why for the sake of which it lives, so too the just person knows no why for the sake of which he would do something".»
• Johannes Tauler, sermon V(41)/45:
«This is the Nothingness of which St. Dionysius spoke: God is nothing that we can name or understand or grasp.»
• "The Cloud of Unknowing", late 14th c.:
«If you wish to enter into this cloud, to be at home in it, and to take up the contemplative work of love as I urge you to, there is something else you must do. Just as the cloud of unknowing lies above you, between you and your God, so you must fashion a cloud of forgetting beneath you, between you and every created thing. The cloud of unknowing will perhaps leave you with the feeling that you are far from God. But no, if it is authentic, only the absence of a cloud of forgetting keeps you from him now. Every time I say "all creatures," I refer not only to every created thing but also to all their circumstances and activities. I make no exception. You are to concern yourself with no creature whether material or spiritual nor with their situation and doings whether good or ill. To put it briefly, during this work you must abandon them all beneath the cloud of forgetting. [...] Yes, and with all due reverence, I go so far as to say that it is equally useless to think you can nourish your contemplative work by considering God's attributes, his kindness or his dignity; or by thinking about our Lady, the angels, or the saints; or about the joys of heaven, wonderful as these will be. I believe that this kind of activity is no longer any use to you. Of course, it is laudable to reflect upon God's kindness and to love and praise him for it; yet it is far better to let your mind rest in the awareness of him in his naked existence and to love and praise him for what he is in himself.»
They've never been majoritarian in the church tradition, but there is a similar line of thought within the official doctrine – a line sometime bordering or entering 'heresy', depending the thinker and the moment in history – which stretches from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, through the "Cloud of Unknowing", Meister Eckhart and Johannes Tauler, straight to today's Catechism.
• Benedict XVI, General Audience, 14 May 2008:
«The Face of God is our inability to express truly what he is. In this way one speaks - and Pseudo-Dionysius himself speaks - of a "negative theology". It is easier for us to say what God is not rather than to say what he truly is. [...] Dionysius the Areopagite exerted a strong influence on all medieval theology and on all mystical theology, both in the East and in the West. He was virtually rediscovered in the 13th century, especially by St Bonaventure, the great Franciscan theologian who in this mystical theology found the conceptual instrument for reinterpreting the heritage - so simple and profound - of St Francis. [...] Today Dionysius the Areopagite has a new relevance: he appears as a great mediator in the modern dialogue between Christianity and the mystical theologies of Asia, whose characteristic feature is the conviction that it is impossible to say who God is, that only indirect things can be said about him; that God can only be spoken of with the "not", and that it is only possible to reach him by entering into this indirect experience of "not".»
• John M. Connolly, Living Without Why: Meister Eckhart’s Critique of the Medieval Concept of Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, Reviewed by Peter Eardley:
«Eckhart therefore contrasts Aquinas’s "spiritual merchant", who is motivated by reward for his virtuous efforts, with the "just person" (der Gerehte) who "lives without why". As Eckhart puts it, as quoted by Connolly, "[The just person] wants and seeks nothing, for he knows no why. He acts without a why just in the same way as God does; and just as life lives for its own sake and seeks no why for the sake of which it lives, so too the just person knows no why for the sake of which he would do something".»
• Johannes Tauler, sermon V(41)/45:
«This is the Nothingness of which St. Dionysius spoke: God is nothing that we can name or understand or grasp.»
• "The Cloud of Unknowing", late 14th c.:
«If you wish to enter into this cloud, to be at home in it, and to take up the contemplative work of love as I urge you to, there is something else you must do. Just as the cloud of unknowing lies above you, between you and your God, so you must fashion a cloud of forgetting beneath you, between you and every created thing. The cloud of unknowing will perhaps leave you with the feeling that you are far from God. But no, if it is authentic, only the absence of a cloud of forgetting keeps you from him now. Every time I say "all creatures," I refer not only to every created thing but also to all their circumstances and activities. I make no exception. You are to concern yourself with no creature whether material or spiritual nor with their situation and doings whether good or ill. To put it briefly, during this work you must abandon them all beneath the cloud of forgetting. [...] Yes, and with all due reverence, I go so far as to say that it is equally useless to think you can nourish your contemplative work by considering God's attributes, his kindness or his dignity; or by thinking about our Lady, the angels, or the saints; or about the joys of heaven, wonderful as these will be. I believe that this kind of activity is no longer any use to you. Of course, it is laudable to reflect upon God's kindness and to love and praise him for it; yet it is far better to let your mind rest in the awareness of him in his naked existence and to love and praise him for what he is in himself.»
David wrote: "I am assuming many of these points were as hard to accept for Spinoza's contemporaries as they are for some today. I imagine this particular one, that God is completely determinate and without purpose is the hardest to accept.."Maybe even more difficult to accept was the notion that "God" is impersonal. One of the defining characteristics of human beings is that we care about things, and that is a quality almost always projected onto our beliefs about the supernatural. The idea that God does not care about humans in a human way must have struck Spinoza's community as very disturbing. He was called an atheist, which he wasn't, and a pantheist, which he also wasn't. He seems to have employed a radical kind of rationalism, and that was enough to get him ostracized from his community and anathematized by religious communities (though from what I understand they didn't always agree on what he should be anathematized for... which I find mildly amusing.)
Thomas wrote: "He was called an atheist, which he wasn't, and a pantheist, which he also wasn't."The observation about Spinoza being labeled an atheist despite his profound belief in god by his own definitions is an interesting one. Spinoza appears to have rejected the traditional Abrahamic conception of a personal, interventionist God. Instead, he envisioned God as synonymous with nature itself, an impersonal, deterministic from which everything is. I have to concede, his radical departure from conventional religious views was enough to earn him the label of 'atheist' in the eyes of his culture and his contemporaries.
I am reminded of the Richard Dawkins quote:
We are all atheists about most of the gods that humanity has ever believed in. Some of us just go one god further.
Fed wrote: "They've never been majoritarian in the church tradition, but there is a similar line of thought within the official doctrine – a line sometime bordering or entering 'heresy', depending the thinker and the moment in history."Thank you for those interesting examples. Its a shame that more of these ideas never seem to catch on.
And don't forget Hume,
You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to your deities.It seems Spinoza is trying his best to provide the missing reason. I admit is a more sophisticated argument than most, but I have a note added to my copy of Hume with the above quote that reads, God as a solution for nature is overkill without reason or authority.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Illustrated and Bundled with Autobiography by David Hume) (p. 62). www.WealthOfNation.com. Kindle Edition.
What is really interesting to me is that we are only witness to two of God's attributes - thought and extension. That leaves an infinite number of attributes that we know nothing about. Spinoza's God is largely an unknowable entity, a mystery, but the attributes we can know are entirely rational. But isn't reason a human attribute? Is reason Spinoza's triangle?
Thomas wrote: "but the attributes we can know are entirely rational. But isn't reason a human attribute?"Wouldn't reason fall under the attribute of thought? Spinoza's entire case so far is built only upon thought from a set of givens he claims to be logical necessities, i.e., more thought.
To me he claims humans experience god also by extension, by sensory experiences in the physical world, but interestingly enough he can only assert this as a logical necessity through more thought.
David wrote: "Instead, he envisioned God as synonymous with nature itself, an impersonal, deterministic from which everything is."
Personally, I don't find the equivalence God=nature representative of Spinoza's thought. You might get closer to the equivalence by using Nature (capitalised) or Physis instead, but then you would have to define all terms, and ultimately build your own philosophy as well. Better use Spinoza's words, if we want to understand and represent his thought. It seems to me that «natura naturans» and «natura naturata» don't have much to do with Hume's or Darwin's «nature».
For the same reason, I find misleading (and biased) the use of the terms god (lower case) and "God" (quotation marks, as if debatable or arguably inaccurate); Spinoza only uses the term God.
Coming back to the suggested equivalence God=nature, Spinoza writes that
«between the finite and the infinite there is no proportion, so the difference between God and the highest and most excellent creature is no different from the difference between God and the lowest creature» (letter to Boxel). This draws a clear difference between God and all "creatures" (word interestingly implying creation). He also defines God as «ens absolute infinitum» (Ethica, Pars Prima, Definitio VI), consisting («constantem») of infinite attributes each expressing an eternal and infinite essence. I don't think nature – in its common meaning – can be said to be eternal and infinite (ex.: quanta of energy, limited number of fundamental forces, limited number of chemical elements...).
EDIT: I find "deterministic" equally problematic.
EDIT 2: Something worth noticing: Spinoza's chapter VII of the "Tractatus theologico-politicus" is devoted to the interpretation of the Sacred Scripture («Sacram Scripturam»), including the proof of its divine nature («divinitas»).
Personally, I don't find the equivalence God=nature representative of Spinoza's thought. You might get closer to the equivalence by using Nature (capitalised) or Physis instead, but then you would have to define all terms, and ultimately build your own philosophy as well. Better use Spinoza's words, if we want to understand and represent his thought. It seems to me that «natura naturans» and «natura naturata» don't have much to do with Hume's or Darwin's «nature».
For the same reason, I find misleading (and biased) the use of the terms god (lower case) and "God" (quotation marks, as if debatable or arguably inaccurate); Spinoza only uses the term God.
Coming back to the suggested equivalence God=nature, Spinoza writes that
«between the finite and the infinite there is no proportion, so the difference between God and the highest and most excellent creature is no different from the difference between God and the lowest creature» (letter to Boxel). This draws a clear difference between God and all "creatures" (word interestingly implying creation). He also defines God as «ens absolute infinitum» (Ethica, Pars Prima, Definitio VI), consisting («constantem») of infinite attributes each expressing an eternal and infinite essence. I don't think nature – in its common meaning – can be said to be eternal and infinite (ex.: quanta of energy, limited number of fundamental forces, limited number of chemical elements...).
EDIT: I find "deterministic" equally problematic.
EDIT 2: Something worth noticing: Spinoza's chapter VII of the "Tractatus theologico-politicus" is devoted to the interpretation of the Sacred Scripture («Sacram Scripturam»), including the proof of its divine nature («divinitas»).
Fed wrote: "Personally, I don't find the equivalence God=nature representative of Spinoza's thought. "This is where I am having difficulty, separating natura naturata from the empiracle nature that with all of its modes is contained within. When I think of modes, I think of nominalist ideas:
Nature has, in truth, produced units only through all her works. Classes, orders, genera, species, are not of her works. Her creation is of individuals. No two animals are exactly alike; no two plants, nor even two leaves or blades of grass; no two crystallizations. And if we may venture from what is within the cognizance of such organs as ours, to conclude on that beyond their powers, we must believe that no two particles of matter are of exact resemblance. This infinitude of units or individuals being far beyond the capacity of our memory, we are obliged, in aid of that, to distribute them into masses, throwing into each of these all the individuals which have a certain degree of resemblance; to subdivide these again into smaller groups, according to certain points of dissimilitude observable in them, and so on until we have formed what we call a system of classes, orders, genera and species. In doing this, we fix arbitrarily on such characteristic resemblances and differences as seem to us most prominent and invariable in the several subjects, and most likely to take a strong hold in our memories.I am also having difficulty separating modes from Platos form's and all of their reflections.
Thomas Jefferson to Dr. John Manners, Feb. 22, 1814
Apparently nominalism and Platonic forms are not what Spinzoa's is pre-supposing and modes are more easily grasped in reviewing the Library of Babel, a concept introduced by Jorge Luis Borges. (view spoiler) Each book in the Library of Babel can be considered a mode. The physical form of the book represents a mode of the attribute of extension, while the content of the book represents a mode of the attribute of thought. Each book, is a unique and finite expression as specific manifestations of the infinite substance. Maybe?
Thomas wrote: "...The idea that God does not care about humans in a human way must have struck Spinoza's community as very disturbing. ..."I think that it struck so strongly because this idea makes us doubt what is the purpose of following religious teachings. If God does not care about us humans, then does it make any difference if I behave like a good person or not? Does God care if I participate on the religious rituals every week?
David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "but the attributes we can know are entirely rational. But isn't reason a human attribute?"Wouldn't reason fall under the attribute of thought? Spinoza's entire case so far is built..."
That sounds right to me. The attributes of thought and extension run in parallel to each other, independently, but they both operate in a purely rational fashion. Causality in the attribute of extension is just as mathematically justifiable as logic is in the attribute of thought.
Curiously, thought and extension are are the only two attributes that Spinoza acknowledges. What other attributes could there be?
I suspect that there are none, for us, because our capacities for understanding the world are limited to these attributes by reason itself.
Monica wrote: "If God does not care about us humans, then does it make any difference if I behave like a good person or not? Does God care if I participate on the religious rituals every week?"The ethical implications are interesting! I expect we'll be reading more about this... based on what we've read so far I am expecting a completely rationally based ethics that ignores actual human behavior. But there's a way to go before we get to the ethics in this book called Ethics...
David wrote: "This is where I am having difficulty, separating natura naturata from the empiracle nature..."
I would personally say that in empiric nature (the nature we apprehend through the senses, sometimes with the help of instruments) the existence of God is not self-evident: indeed thought-systems exist that don't admit the existence of God. On the other hand, Spinoza's empiric nature («rerum natura») descends from God, or, in Spinoza's terms, is made of the same substance as God (Pars Prima, Propositio XIV, Corollarium I). For this reason and in this sense, Spinoza can also use the term «Natura», capitalised (Pars Quarta, Propositio II).
Thomas Jefferson wrote: "...we must believe that no two particles of matter are of exact resemblance. This infinitude of units or individuals being far beyond the capacity of our memory..."
Leaving Spinoza's thought aside, I can't personally agree with Jefferson on the infinitude of [his] nature: the moment I'm typing this, in the universe(s) there is a precise number of blades of grass and a precise number of atoms of oxygen, not one more, and they are not infinite. It is through thought and within thought only that we meet infinity and somehow can even experience it. I find also helpful to remember that maths contemplates the existence of different "orders of infinity": one infinity can be more infinite than another. Not even the assumption of the infinity of nature could exclude the possible existence of a higher order of infinity.
In order to introduce and explore the concept of infinity, Spinoza himself chooses to start from God («ens absolute infinitum», infinity of the highest possible order – maths would say) and, moving down, derives from the infinity of God the infinity of «Nature» (and of «rerum natura»); he doesn't use the bottom-up approach.
I would personally say that in empiric nature (the nature we apprehend through the senses, sometimes with the help of instruments) the existence of God is not self-evident: indeed thought-systems exist that don't admit the existence of God. On the other hand, Spinoza's empiric nature («rerum natura») descends from God, or, in Spinoza's terms, is made of the same substance as God (Pars Prima, Propositio XIV, Corollarium I). For this reason and in this sense, Spinoza can also use the term «Natura», capitalised (Pars Quarta, Propositio II).
Thomas Jefferson wrote: "...we must believe that no two particles of matter are of exact resemblance. This infinitude of units or individuals being far beyond the capacity of our memory..."
Leaving Spinoza's thought aside, I can't personally agree with Jefferson on the infinitude of [his] nature: the moment I'm typing this, in the universe(s) there is a precise number of blades of grass and a precise number of atoms of oxygen, not one more, and they are not infinite. It is through thought and within thought only that we meet infinity and somehow can even experience it. I find also helpful to remember that maths contemplates the existence of different "orders of infinity": one infinity can be more infinite than another. Not even the assumption of the infinity of nature could exclude the possible existence of a higher order of infinity.
In order to introduce and explore the concept of infinity, Spinoza himself chooses to start from God («ens absolute infinitum», infinity of the highest possible order – maths would say) and, moving down, derives from the infinity of God the infinity of «Nature» (and of «rerum natura»); he doesn't use the bottom-up approach.
Fed wrote: "David wrote: "Instead, he envisioned God as synonymous with nature itself, an impersonal, deterministic from which everything is."Personally, I don't find the equivalence God=nature representativ..."
He hasn't said that God = Nature yet, has he? (I think it's later in the book.) So far he has said that Substance = God. And substance is what causes itself. This is troubling enough, because it means that substance is prior to itself. He can only assert this as a definition because it can't be proven logically. It makes no sense, logically. Substance can't come from nothing, so the only solution is to say that it didn't come into existence at all; it has always already existed.
The term "God" seems to me superfluous anyway. He could have left it at Substance and avoided a lot of the religious implications... from which I think we can conclude that he *wanted* it to have religious implications.
Thomas wrote: "The term "God" seems to me superfluous anyway. He could have left it at Substance and avoided a lot of the religious implications... from which I think we can conclude that he *wanted* it to have religious implications."
I perceive Spinoza's thought and language perfectly in line with traditional philosophical language. For instance, and despite their reputation as materialists, in relation with Nature Stoics also speak of God.
Mikolaj Domaradzki: Theological Etymologizing in the Early Stoa; p. 125-148
«Generally speaking, the Stoics identify God with the world and assume that the whole of reality can be derived from this all-encompassing God-Universe. While this pantheism is already to be found in Zeno who identified “the substance of God” (οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ) with “the whole world and the heaven” (τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν), the idea was embraced by other Stoics who also equated the cosmos with God. Yet, for the Stoics God is not only identical with the world. The philosophers asserted also that “God permeates the whole of reality” (διὰ πάσης οὐσίας πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν), assuming the form of “Intellect” (νοῦν), “Soul” (ψυχήν), “Nature” (φύσιν) etc. This means that just as God is everything, so is He in everything. Accordingly, God is the principle that flows through all matter, thereby animating and administering it.»
I perceive Spinoza's thought and language perfectly in line with traditional philosophical language. For instance, and despite their reputation as materialists, in relation with Nature Stoics also speak of God.
Mikolaj Domaradzki: Theological Etymologizing in the Early Stoa; p. 125-148
«Generally speaking, the Stoics identify God with the world and assume that the whole of reality can be derived from this all-encompassing God-Universe. While this pantheism is already to be found in Zeno who identified “the substance of God” (οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ) with “the whole world and the heaven” (τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν), the idea was embraced by other Stoics who also equated the cosmos with God. Yet, for the Stoics God is not only identical with the world. The philosophers asserted also that “God permeates the whole of reality” (διὰ πάσης οὐσίας πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν), assuming the form of “Intellect” (νοῦν), “Soul” (ψυχήν), “Nature” (φύσιν) etc. This means that just as God is everything, so is He in everything. Accordingly, God is the principle that flows through all matter, thereby animating and administering it.»
Thomas wrote: "He hasn't said that God = Nature yet, has he? (I think it's later in the book.) So far he has said that Substance = God. "I admit that having an idea where he is going with this helps, but he does seem to be guiding us to this conclusion.
PROPOSITION 11 God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. This means the infinite attributes of God encompass all possible expressions of existence, including everything we perceive as nature.
PROPOSITION 14 There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God.
PROPOSITION 15 Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.
Since everything that exists is in God, the totality of nature (everything that exists) is in fact a manifestation of God’s infinite attributes.
Spinoza seals it early with PROPOSITION 5 In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.
Therefore, it seems to follow if Spinoza similarly defines god and nature so similarly, then they must be the same thing, or some subtly nuanced equivalent.
David wrote: "I admit that having an idea where he is going with this helps, but he does seem to be guiding us to this conclusion."
I just think it's strange that this is the part of the book specifically about God and he doesn't use the phrase "God or Nature" until Part 4. I would think that if God = Nature were a point of emphasis he would use in somewhere in Part 1.
It might also be important that his notion of God, based on the ontological argument, only applies to natura naturans. Natura naturans is infinite and eternal, without limit or definition. It doesn't apply to the world as we know it, which might be confusing if we are thinking of "nature" as the finite knowable universe. God/Substance is not that kind of nature, though God is "in" that kind of nature.
Thomas wrote: ". I would think that if God = Nature were a point of emphasis he would use in somewhere in Part 1."
Agree. For the same reason – the mere number of occurrences of the term – I think it could be said that God is central in this work. I also think we should be aware of the potential risk of [desperately] scanning the book while awaiting the arrival of the lifeboat "Nature", ready to jump on that as soon as we can hope to reach it.
Thomas wrote: "God/Substance is not that kind of nature, though God is "in" that kind of nature.."
On the relationship container-content ("in"):
Spinoza says that all that exists, exists in God («in Deo»; Propositio XV). He's precisely referring to nature («rerum natura»), mentioned immediately above (Propositio XIV, Corollarium I).
Agree. For the same reason – the mere number of occurrences of the term – I think it could be said that God is central in this work. I also think we should be aware of the potential risk of [desperately] scanning the book while awaiting the arrival of the lifeboat "Nature", ready to jump on that as soon as we can hope to reach it.
Thomas wrote: "God/Substance is not that kind of nature, though God is "in" that kind of nature.."
On the relationship container-content ("in"):
Spinoza says that all that exists, exists in God («in Deo»; Propositio XV). He's precisely referring to nature («rerum natura»), mentioned immediately above (Propositio XIV, Corollarium I).
Thomas wrote: "Substance can't come from nothing, so the only solution is to say that it didn't come into existence at all; it has always already existed. "My book's translator's Preface explains that Spinoza bypasses the notion that cause is a temporal process.
12. Cause (causa) The reader will find that Spinoza’s ‘cause’ is not quite what he is used to. It need not imply temporal succession; indeed, for Spinoza a cause is more the logical ground from which a consequent follows, in the logical sense of ‘follow’ noted in item 10. Hence, Spinoza occasionally couples the word ‘cause’ with the term ‘reason’ (‘ratio’).I will also note that I have heard modern theists try to get around the temporal problem of cause by suggesting that God exists outside of time.
Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics: with The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters (Hackett Classics) (p. 25). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. Kindle Edition.
Fed wrote: "Leaving Spinoza's thought aside, I can't personally agree with Jefferson on the infinitude of [his] nature: the moment I'm typing this, in the universe(s) there is a precise number of blades of grass and a precise number of atoms of oxygen, not one more, and they are not infinite."I agree there is a count between zero and finite number of things that varies at any given time and "mode". Could infinitude in Jefferson's case just be meant to convey some large amount that is practically infinity? Like multitudes on steroids?
Spinoza writes at the start of Part II,
we proved in Proposition 16 Part I that from his essence there must follow infinite things in infinite ways—PROPOSITION 16 From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite ways (modis), (that is, everything that can come within the scope of infinite intellect).
Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics: with The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters (Hackett Classics) (p. 63). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. Kindle Edition.
David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Substance can't come from nothing, so the only solution is to say that it didn't come into existence at all; it has always already existed. "My book's translator's Preface explains that Spinoza bypasses the notion that cause is a temporal process..."
I think that would work if causality were merely a logical relation, but it's also something that happens in the physical world of finite things in time. It's easy to see why Spinoza wants to keep the attributes of thought and extension separated, but at the same time I feel the need to reconcile them. Maybe that simply isn't possible when Spinoza's God/Substance must somehow be both inside and outside of time. It must be out of time insofar as it is eternal, but in time insofar as it is in finite things. I think this is where the naturans/naturata distinction comes into play, but I'm not sure that really resolves the problem.
What kind of a thing is time for Spinoza anyway? Is it an attribute or a mode, or what?
David wrote: "Could infinitude in Jefferson's case just be meant to convey some large amount that is practically infinity?"
Sure; somehow human beings have the innate understanding of infinitude and, moving from the observation of a finite number of elements, acquired the ability to even express infinity by recourse to myths and maths – the myth of Sisyphus, mathematical limits. «He took him outside and said, “Look up at the sky and count the stars—if indeed you can count them.” Then he said to him, “So shall your offspring be."»
Our ancestors were even capable of conceiving and expressing the existence of different orders of infinity: what is impossible to man is possible to God: «He determines the number of the stars and calls them each by name». By paradoxes like "Achilles and the tortoise", Zeno uses infinitude to dismantle the equally instinctive experience of multiplicity in nature.
Sure; somehow human beings have the innate understanding of infinitude and, moving from the observation of a finite number of elements, acquired the ability to even express infinity by recourse to myths and maths – the myth of Sisyphus, mathematical limits. «He took him outside and said, “Look up at the sky and count the stars—if indeed you can count them.” Then he said to him, “So shall your offspring be."»
Our ancestors were even capable of conceiving and expressing the existence of different orders of infinity: what is impossible to man is possible to God: «He determines the number of the stars and calls them each by name». By paradoxes like "Achilles and the tortoise", Zeno uses infinitude to dismantle the equally instinctive experience of multiplicity in nature.
Thomas wrote: "What kind of a thing is time for Spinoza anyway? Is it an attribute or a mode, or what?"Time is not physical, i.e., extension, so I am going to guess it is a mode of thought and for humans it is a construct used to order our experiences.
And like the thought of a triangle which exists eternally without duration, i.e., temporal constraints, god, by thought and extension would also exist without temporal constraints and exist in all of time at once.
I am reminded of the analogies made to help understand the 4th. dimension. A flat-lander or two dimensional being would see a sphere, a 3 dimensional object, only as a circular cross-section as it passes through its flat-land plane of existence. Now just make that same leap, but with time, maybe?
Thomas wrote: "What kind of a thing is time for Spinoza anyway? Is it an attribute or a mode, or what?"
I think this might be answered, at least in part, by Pars Secunda, Propositio XI-XII. Time is an idea («objectum ideæ») in the mind («humana Mens»). Spinoza draws a distinction between the idea of something non-existent («non existentis») and the idea of something existing «actu» (in act, actually?). The former type of idea – the idea of something which doesn't exist – cannot be said to exist («ipsa idea non posset dici existere»). The second type of idea is a «modum» of the attributes of God (Propositio XIII).
Did Spinoza consider time real, a real idea, a «modum»? Later he discusses movement, which might bring some light on this as well. Right now I'm not sure.
If we had to apply Spinoza's terminology to our own understanding of time, especially in the light of timeless physics (*), we could probably say that time is the idea of something which doesn't exist; therefore the idea itself doesn't exist either.
(*) «Timeless physics is an attempt to construct a useful formulation of physics that does not rely on a "t" term as fundamental, but rather has what we perceive as "time" emerge from the model.»
I think this might be answered, at least in part, by Pars Secunda, Propositio XI-XII. Time is an idea («objectum ideæ») in the mind («humana Mens»). Spinoza draws a distinction between the idea of something non-existent («non existentis») and the idea of something existing «actu» (in act, actually?). The former type of idea – the idea of something which doesn't exist – cannot be said to exist («ipsa idea non posset dici existere»). The second type of idea is a «modum» of the attributes of God (Propositio XIII).
Did Spinoza consider time real, a real idea, a «modum»? Later he discusses movement, which might bring some light on this as well. Right now I'm not sure.
If we had to apply Spinoza's terminology to our own understanding of time, especially in the light of timeless physics (*), we could probably say that time is the idea of something which doesn't exist; therefore the idea itself doesn't exist either.
(*) «Timeless physics is an attempt to construct a useful formulation of physics that does not rely on a "t" term as fundamental, but rather has what we perceive as "time" emerge from the model.»
David wrote: "I am reminded of the analogies made to help understand the 4th. dimension. A flat-lander or two dimensional being would see a sphere..."
But, without recurring to fictional beings, we make the direct experience every day! When you heat-up some food in the microwave and can't tell whether it's hot enough in the middle (other than by trial-error) – the dish being inside the oven and your sense of touch thus impaired –, you don't have access to temperature-related information (at least locally): that's like one dimension lost and then regained.
But, without recurring to fictional beings, we make the direct experience every day! When you heat-up some food in the microwave and can't tell whether it's hot enough in the middle (other than by trial-error) – the dish being inside the oven and your sense of touch thus impaired –, you don't have access to temperature-related information (at least locally): that's like one dimension lost and then regained.
Thomas wrote: "David wrote: "I admit that having an idea where he is going with this helps, but he does seem to be guiding us to this conclusion."
I just think it's strange that this is the part of the book spe..."
I agree with this! I'm wrestling with if I should cut Spinoza some slack in that his references to God including gender being he is just the restrictions of the world he lived in. I found it enlightening at the end of Part I that he measured God as being like nature and not like a reflection of a human version.
Thomas wrote: "(Spinoza is in agreement with Leibniz on this point. Voltaire not so much.) ..."Why Spinoza in agreement with Leibniz versus Leibniz in agreement with Spinoza?
I'm not sure I understand the question. The implication in Spinoza is that this is "the best of all possible worlds," which was Leibniz's opinion (according to Voltaire.) Having read a bit more of the Ethics, I'm not sure anymore that Spinoza would say it is the "best," but he would say it could be no other way. As a proponent of free will, I think Voltaire would disagree with them both on this point.
My reading to date implied to me, if I read correctly, that Leibniz drew from Spinoza's work, rather than the other way around. And not necessarily being wiling to give credit where credit was due -- professional/academic/?? rivalry?
- The attributes of God express existence; God's essence is existence itself. To be at all is to be in God.
- God cannot be limited to any idea in thought.
- Essences do not necessarily have to exist as beings; if they do so it is because God causes them to exist.
- God is the cause of all things and determines the effects of all things.
- Particular things are modes. Modes are the means by which the absolute (God) affects the finite world. (Prop 28 -- any thoughts on the rigor of this argument? I'm very interested in knowing how the eternal infinite and the finite world interact.)
- Nothing exists that is contingent. Everything is determined and in God; i.e. everything has a cause, no matter how random it may appear... Or as Einstein said, "God does not play dice".
- Spinoza makes a distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata. Natura naturans expresses an eternal and infinite essence; God in this expression is active and free. Natura Naturata pertains to things that have been caused or affected in some way and are determined. These are the effects of God, and are therefore ultimately determined by God.
- The will is a mode of thinking which is caused by something else, and is therefore determined by prior causes. "Free will" appears then to be an illusion.
- Nothing is contingent; things have been caused by God to be the way they are by necessity and they can be no other way. And since they have been caused by the absolute, they have been produced with the highest perfection. (Spinoza is in agreement with Leibniz on this point. Voltaire not so much.)
- Nature makes no mistakes. The "will" of God/Nature is indifferent and does not have a goal or final purpose. Everything that exists expresses the power of God in a certain and determinate way, but God/Nature has no express purpose.
Appendix
Spinoza examines some of the prejudices which stand in the way of understanding God in the terms he has just described.
- The primary prejudice is the tendency of people to think that things happen for a purpose, that there is a final goal to which all things tend.
I. The reason for this is that people are ignorant of causes and at the same time want what is advantageous for themselves. (Is this any different than saying "All men desire the Good"?) For this reason they think they are free and can will what they want by taking action in order to achieve their goal. They make tools with a certain purpose for a certain end, from which they infer that God gave them tools and tool-using abilities for a certain purpose, and that God has a purpose for them. But this purpose is not deducible from first principles and leads to superstitious beliefs. Luckily, mathematics comes to the rescue and gives humanity another standard of truth
II. Nature has no end and any final cause assigned to it is a human fiction. If God acts for a certain end, it means he wants something he doesn't have. This means he lacks something and is not in fact perfect, which he must be by definition.
III People have a utilitarian standard of "Good"; what is useful for them they call the good, and this standard applies to other people as well. Their standards of morality are formed on this basis, along with the notion that people are free to choose good or evil.
People prefer order to confusion, so they see order in the universe, and they see this order as God's will.
In a letter to Hugo Boxel, Spinoza wrote:
"I believe that, if a triangle could speak, it would say, in like manner, that God is eminently triangular, while a circle would say that the divine nature is eminently circular. Thus each would ascribe to God its own attributes, would assume itself to be like God, and look on everything else as ill-shaped."