Phaedrus: The Art of Rhetoric and conclusion

[Thomas]

The last section of the dialogue relates back to the speeches we have heard so far, but the subject is no longer love. The subject is the speeches themselves and the rhetorical arts that they employ.

Socrates conveniently provides a summary of this section at 277b:

Until someone knows the truth about each of the things he speaks or writes about and is able to define everything according to itself and, having defined it, knows how to cut it up again according to its forms until it has come to the state that it can be cut up no more; and until that person sees thoroughly into the nature of the soul according to these same principles, discovering the form that most fits each nature, and accordingly makes and arranges his speech, supplying intricate or multi-colored speeches, covering all the harmonic modes for an intricate or multi-colored soul and supplying simple speech for a simple soul -- only then will he be able to manage the class of speeches artfully, to the degree that it is within its nature to be artful, either with respect to teaching or persuading something, as the entire earlier discussion revealed to us.

This strikes me as a very tall order, starting with the first requirement: knowing the truth about things. After all, who but a god knows the truth in the purest sense? Socrates also argues that a deceiver must know the truth in order to deceive... but this is hardly the case. While it is true that a deceiver may take advantage of "likenesses" and ambiguities and plausibilities, why is knowledge of the truth necessary to deceive?

Socrates criticizes the form of Lysias' speech, saying that it lacks a clear body and head. Is this really necessary to persuade the reader? He also draws a sharp distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, which makes me wonder why rhetoric is necessary if dialectic is capable of demonstrating the truth of things. Why does Plato write dialogues, which are dramatic in nature, when he could have written purely dialectical analyses?

The dialogue takes an odd turn at 274 when Socrates asks about what is "befitting or not fitting for writing." He asks Phaedrus, "Do you know how best to gratify god in the manner of speeches, whether in the making of them or in the delivery?" How did this turn from gratifying lovers or non-lovers to gratifying god? Phaedrus very sensibly answers "no." Socrates then tells the story of the Egyptian god Theuth, who invented letters. The god Thamus (Ammon) says that in doing so, Theuth has not invented a "drug for memory" but one for reminding. If the reader does not already know the truth of the symbols, the writer is only offering an appearance of wisdom. The proper function of writing is twofold: to act as a reminder for the author of things already known, and to write "in the joy of play."

How would you interpret the speeches of the Symposium in light of what Socrates says in Phaedrus?

[Donnally]

I don't think Plato anywhere offers a reason for writing in the dialogue style. Plato learned the Socratic method of leading men to knowledge by question and answer, so it is perhaps natural that he would write this way. Also, it allowed him to exercise his literary ability. I commented earlier that Symposium is a literary tour de force. Plato was both a poet and a dramatist. His work is characterized by the wide variety of human characters we encounter. He is by turns playful, bitter and ironic to a remarkable degree. He could turn on a dime from flights of poetic imagery to the utmost seriousness.

In Phaedrus Socrates argues that writing is like painting: it offers the appearance of life, but if you ask it a question the written word cannot explain itself. Socrates clearly prefers a way of teaching that plants a lesson in the hearer's heart, one that will enlighten him in the various circumstances he will encounter in life. By contrast, the written word will not have the necessary flexibility and once something is written down, it will inevitably turn into a falsehood.

I also find a fascinating echo of the Platonic theory of Forms in Socrates' comments on the written word. The Forms are, essentially, words that are unchanging and always true, unlike the world of things which is in constant flux. Is there a subtle irony here?

[David]

Thomas wrote: "This strikes me as a very tall order, starting with the first requirement: knowing the truth about things. After all, who but a god knows the truth in the purest sense?

Socrates is refuting what Pheadrus heard.

PHAEDRUS: What I have actually heard about this, Socrates, my friend, [260] is that it is not necessary for the intending orator to learn what is really just, but only what will seem just to the crowd who will act as judges. Nor again what is really good or noble, but only what will seem so. For that is what persuasion proceeds from, not truth.

Since the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable opinion, I have to interpret Socrates' response as emphasizing the importance of having a deep understanding of the subjects one is speaking or writing about or of both sides in a case. There are two outcomes.

First, without regard the truth or understanding the subject the art of speaking turns into the art of bullshitting.(view spoiler)[Bullshitting Involves:
1. intentionally or unintentionally,
2. consciously or unconsciously
3. Communicating with or without rhetorical strategies with little to no regard or concern for
a. the truth,
b. genuine evidence,
c. established knowledge.

by:
1. exaggerating
2. embellishing one's knowledge, competence, or skills in a particular area
3. talking about things of which one knows nothing about.

In order to:
1. impress,
2. fit in with,
3. influence,
4. persuade others.
5. control the narrative.

the fault is not in the failure to get it right, but that no effort is made to be right when the distinction between what is true and what is false is crucial.

In an entry for bull as so used, the OED suggests the following as definitive: “trivial, insincere, or untruthful talk or writing; nonsense.” (hide spoiler)]

An example of bullshitting is provided in the argument for fighting one's enemies on donkeys where it is noted that among friends it can be a source of harmless ridiculousness but from an enemy, or the careless, it is a source of harmful deception.

And secondly understanding the subject can be leveraged both for your side and used as protection from the other side. Socrates mentions two sides in an argument when he says,

We can therefore find the practice of speaking on opposite sides not only in the lawcourts and in the Assembly.

Soon after that Socrates explains,

SOCRATES: Could someone, then, who doesn’t know what each thing is ever have the art to lead others little by little through similarities away from what is the case on each occasion to its opposite? Or could he escape this being done to himself?
PHAEDRUS: Never.

[David]

I cannot resist mentioning the other example of bullshitting,

SOCRATES: All right, tell me this. Suppose someone came to your friend Eryximachus or his father Acumenus and said: “I know treatments to raise or lower (whichever I prefer) the temperature of people’s bodies; if I decide [b] to, I can make them vomit or make their bowels move, and all sorts of things. On the basis of this knowledge, I claim to be a physician; and I claim to be able to make others physicians as well by imparting it to them.” What do you think they would say when they heard that?

The actual answer is, of course they would tell him to start his own radio or "news" show, podcast, youtube channel, and social media following.

[Thomas]

David wrote: "Since the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable opinion, I have to interpret Socrates' response as emphasizing the importance of having a deep understanding of the subjects one is speaking or writing about or of both sides in a case."

Is having a deep understanding the same as knowing the truth? What worries me a bit is that Socrates over and over again demonstrates that the truth is, for him, not a practical matter. Truth is an ideal that is never realized in everyday reality; the closest we can get is true opinion, which is not quite the same.

But maybe attitude has something to do with it. Maybe desire and a love for the truth changes the direction of a speaker and the speech produced. Socrates makes a distinction between vulgar rhetoric, which I think we can call "bullshitting," and serious rhetoric. The difference is in attitude. Both are working with true opinion, but one of them is serious and sincere; the other is playing around or angling for some kind of advantage. It's a difference of direction, toward the truth or away from it. (The first line of a Platonic dialogue frequently tells us more than it appears to... in this one Socrates asks Phaedrus where he is coming from and where he is going. Perhaps Socrates' goal is to change the direction that Phaedrus is going.)

[David]

Thomas wrote: "Is having a deep understanding the same as knowing the truth?. . .But maybe attitude has something to do with it"

That is a good question and I have to say answer is most likely no. I felt obligated to use understanding for truth in my original post because truth is often so illusive. However, it seems to follow that someone with a deeper understanding of something has demonstrated seriousness and effort in a desire to find a truth and thus has a better chance of arriving closer to it than their opposite counterpart. If this kind of drive is what you meant by, "the difference is in the attitude", then I certainly agree.

[David]

Thomas wrote: "Socrates over and over again demonstrates that the truth is, for him, not a practical matter."

I am a little unsure of what these demonstrations are unless we are referencing The Noble Lie in Republic or perhaps because Socrates head seemed to reside in an unproveable realm of Forms which he seems to prioritize over the physical world. I understand that If everything only really exists in some ideal realm, then what sort of low quality shadows of the truth will be seen reflected on the cave wall here in the physical realm.? However I don't think it is fair to say truth was not a practical matter.

First he seems to constantly be seeking the truth, through his dialectic, or at least weeding out what is not true. And second, while Socrates prioritizes the realm of Forms and acknowledges the limitations of the physical world in reflecting the truth, he still values the pursuit and understanding of truth as a way to get close to the realm of the Forms. He argues that knowledge of the truth about virtue is necessary for becoming virtuous and living a good life. He also argues that knowledge of the truth about justice is necessary for creating a just society. The byproduct of that truth seeking has a direct and practical impact on how we live our lives in the physical world.

I think we are in agreement with most of the subject here, but who knows since we are merely writing about it. Maybe goodreads should offer Zoom discussions for dialectic.

[David]

Donnally wrote: "By contrast, the written word will not have the necessary flexibility and once something is written down, it will inevitably turn into a falsehood."

I wonder what Socrates would think if the distanced, but back and forth that occurs in texting or on the internet, or what he would think about written posts here on goodreads?

[Donnally]

He would probably see them as an inferior form of dialog.

[Thomas]

David : “However I don't think it is fair to say truth was not a practical matter.”

“Practical” is probably the wrong way to put it, but I’m looking for a word that describes Socrates’ asymptotic approach to the ideal kind of truth that never is quite realizable in everyday life. Plato believes that everyday life is a life of images. We are always the prisoners who have come down from the light of ideal truth into the shadows again. The philosopher is always reaching for that ideal truth but it is never quite commensurate with practical everyday existence. That reaching is vital though. Even though we can never quite grasp the Truth or the Good or Justice itself, we are still reaching for the ideal, and that is the best we can do as earthbound souls. Dialectic is a dynamic manifestation of that reaching, as opposed to the consumption of rote speeches.

(Apologies for the formatting if this looks weird, I’m on the road and doing this on my phone.)

[David]

Thomas wrote: "I’m looking for a word that describes Socrates’ asymptotic approach to the ideal kind of truth that never is quite realizable in everyday life."

Wow! I haven't heard that word since learning about limits in math class; asymptotic seems appropriate. I see what you are getting at and I think Aristotle can help us out with the practicality of it.

Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should?
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle (Bollingen Series) (Nicomachean Ethics I.2, p. 3194). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

I also think I recall Socrates asking someone if archers were shooting sans targets how would we know they were any good.

Having said that, we know Socrates is not above telling an untruth if he thinks it will result in some good consequence. Also I have to question his basing his motivation to aim better at such a questionable conceptual framework, or metaphysical theory. Can we call his ideal realm of Forms and ideas and ideology or, since he as said to be so pious, a religion?

I like the thought provoking dialog/dialectic of Plato/Socrates very much. I even like thinking about the Forms and how they supposedly work as a thought experiment, especially that everything is relatively good, i.e., there is no negative part of the scale, e.g., rather than a perfect Form of bad, there is only absence of good. In the end, I just wish they did not have to rely on a make believe target in some other world to aim for.

[Thomas]

David wrote: "Having said that, we know Socrates is not above telling an untruth if he thinks it will result in some good consequence. Also I have to question his basing his motivation to aim better at such a questionable conceptual framework, or metaphysical theory. Can we call his ideal realm of Forms and ideas and ideology or, since he as said to be so pious, a religion?"

Socrates makes the point in Phaedrus that only someone who knows the truth can lie. Perhaps this is one reason why he repeatedly confesses his ignorance, though not the only reason. And I think his confession is sincere. he really doesn't know because knowledge of the Ideal -- the Good, essentially, and with it Being itself -- is not possible in a concrete way. What he does know, and professes to know, is the direction toward the Good. He may never be able to hit the target, as most of the dialogues demonstrate, but he knows that dialectic will get him closer to the bullseye.

Platonic myths are harder to reconcile. Obviously Socrates does not mean them to be taken as literally real. They are meant to reveal something that he can't demonstrate with dialectic, and they require imagination to understand. At the same time, almost anyone could tear them down dialectically, so it's interesting that he employs them from time to time.