Chapter V: Action, §§ 24-29

[Thomas]

Arendt seems to be moving toward an argument that supports "human plurality." She calls this kind of plurality paradoxical because the individuals involved are all distinctly unique, as all individuals are, but they inhabit a common "space," or reality. The distinctiveness of individuals is revealed through action and speech, and this distinctiveness can only be recognized in a public environment. She seems to be calling for a kind of togetherness that still allows for distinctiveness. Indeed, she argues that only by revealing one's distinctiveness to others can an agent truly be unique.

What happens when "human togethernes is lost, that is, when people are only for or against other people"? Does polarization lead to the loss of meaning or truth when speech becomes "mere talk" that fails to express the uniqueness of the individual?

Is her distinction between a "what" and a "who" a sound one?

Why do stories matter in the web of human relationships?

Why does she say that human affairs suffer from frailty? How is the "boundlessness of action" a remedy for that frailty, and do you buy this argument?

Is the "Greek Solution" something available to us now? Or is the Greek polis an historical construct that has no modern application?

How is Arendt's distinction between strength and power useful? How is it that power can ruin strength?

[Alexey]

Thomas wrote: "Is the "Greek Solution" something available to us now? Or is the Greek polis an historical construct that has no modern application?"

I would say it is Arendt’s construct that never existed, but it would be an obstruction of the good question. The ‘Greek Solution’ is a powerful image in this chapter, which seems to mend problems of the society and human nature.

However, if thinking about the picture Arendt showed in this section, not the polis of the Greeks, but a pre-writing society, where kipping history is not remembering it but retelling and re-enacted it, pops up in my mind. It is the tradition of the living history, where deceased lived in the minds of the living, while in the written society history contains the results of actions, not the actions and lives itself. What looks like this type of society today? Only aristocracy has the same attitude towards history. They preserve it as the living part of their life; indeed, Arend’s words reminded me of de Saint-Exupéry passage about what it means to be born in an aristocratic family, in the mansion that had existed before your father was born and will exist after your death. Of course, I do not insist aristocracy always live up to its ideal. However, they resemble the society she depicted. Therefore, if my mumbling has any sense, we may rephrase the question as two: ‘Does aristocracy have any use today?’ and ‘Can aristocracy be scalable?’

[Mike]

I think that aristocracy can be scalable in the sense of items that are passed down through generations. I have one item that was handed down to me that belonged to grandfather, it is not much but it was given to accompanied by a story which is similar in spirit.

[Thomas]

I don't see that she is arguing for aristocracy exactly. The problem that the Greek Solution intends to solve is that human beings have gradually come to be treated as things, as parts of a great social machine with defined characteristics. People are treated as "whats" instead of "whos." Against this is what she calls "the boundlessness of action." Action requires other people in addition to the actor who acts or speaks and in so doing creates a web of relationships. These relationships are not clearly defined, and the outcome of the actions/speeches is undefined -- just the opposite of the social machine in which every person is limited and defined, usually as an isolated individual who has a specific function in society. Arendt seems to think that the ancient Greek polis is what a society built on this web of actors and relationships looks like.

Whether the Greek polis was actually an example of this is debatable, especially if one considers that most of the population was excluded from the web and unable to 'politeuesthai." But within the community of citizens, individuals were able to speak and act within the web of relationships where people were treated as individual "whos" instead of "whats". In modern political terms, this might translate into a polity consisting entirely of independents, with no parties or factions whatsoever. No one knows how anyone is going to vote. This means that everyone has to participate in the process thoughtfully, speak and listen to others, and make up their own minds.

[Alexey]

I have not stated she argue for or about aristocracy, only that, in relatively modern world, the best resemblance to her 'ideal' polis is aristocracy, an 'ideal' of aristocracy of course. Although real aristocracy is very prone to factions and parties, its ideal is very similar to what you've written in the last paragraph. The same could be said about Greek polis, very partisanship reality and simultaneously individualistic-monolithic ideal. Of course, I do not pretend to understand Arendt, just trying to make sense and check my understanding.

[Thomas]

How about an aristocracy that doesn't exclude people based on class, wealth, education, etc.? The only requirement to be a member is to act/speak and participate thoughtfully. It sounds to me like she's talking about Athenian democracy without the class distinctions. I don't think this is realistic on a national level, but I think it might be possible for smaller communities. Difficult, but possible.

I admit Arendt could explain herself much better. I feel like I'm trying to guess the ending of a strange mystery story, and my guess could be totally wrong.

[Roger]

I find her bafflingly obscure, and I ask myself, "Is it worth putting the time into carefully figuring out what she's saying, on the off chance that it's something profound?"

[David]

Maybe I watch too much Star Trek, or The Orville, but Arendt seems to go against the head vs. heart, or emotional human being vs. unfeeling robot paradigm. According to her it is not our emotions that make us human, but it is our action including speech that defines us, both collectively and individually, as a who instead of a robot-like what.

I wonder what Spock would think of this? If action and speech are essential to making us human, is it not also essential to making Spock a Vulcan? What would humans and Vulcans be if they shared action and speech, such as negotiating a peace treaty; would the humans and Vulcans become something else or remain human and Vulcan and just expand their own species' condition?

[Thomas]

One of the interesting things about being a "who" is that being a "who" is not definable. Being free, and also being unable to act with precisely predictable consequences, humans never entirely know who they are until they have acted and left a story behind that tells of their actions.

Lots of people can relate to Spock, and I wonder if this is because, in Arendt's terms, he tells a human story. I think you're right that Arendt goes against the reason/passion dichotomy (which in the west is largely a Platonic distinction) as well as any other attempt to describe human nature, because that would be reducing a who to a what. She claims the temptation to do this is natural; it's even embedded in our language, which relies on definitions. But the human condition for Arendt is fuzzier than that. Speaking and acting create a web of relationships which have unpredictable consequences. Maybe that's why there is no end to the number of stories that are told.

[Sam]

For me, the difficulty in responding to David and Thomas is just how many "issues" are encompassed in these remarks.
David: Maybe I watch too much Star Trek...but Arendt seems to go against the head vs. heart or emotional human being vs. unfeeling robot paradigm. According to her, it is not our emotions that make us human, but our actions, including speech, [that] define us, both collectively and individually, as a who instead of a robot-like what.. Oh, it is not the "unfeeling" robot but the mute one that is a "what."
There is an unavoidable flaw in taking Spock as an example: He is a character written in a script. Anything and everything he does is human. How could it be otherwise?
The question Arendt says is asked when the subject appears, through natality, is "Who are you?" She does not make an attempt to define "man" (including "woman") and does, in fact, state that this has not ever been possible. But she does write that "meaning" is about difference, distinction. David writes: "According to her, it is not our emotions that make us human, but it is our action including speech that defines us...." First (or second?), where was it said that our emotions make us human? Dogs seem to have emotions but are not human.

And then I do not understand what David and Thomas brought up about the "reason vs. passion" dichotomy. Can anyone apprise me of where they see that unless it is in the case that I don't see her ever referring to it?
I like her emphasizing that meaning, and definitions, are about differences. The "who" vs. "what" and mention of robots would hinge upon the way David stated that"it is our action including speech that defines us." Action does not include speech; they are different "things," and to be a "whom," the action must be accompanied by speech. It is the robots who act without speaking.

My apologies for being a little disorganized in my response; I find that Arendt coils everything in anything, so her whole thing must be deconstructed to find singular elements.

[Thomas]

Sam wrote: "And then I do not understand what David and Thomas brought up about the "reason vs. passion" dichotomy. Can anyone apprise me of where they see that unless it is in the case that I don't see her ever referring to it?"

She doesn't, though she does write a bit later about passion and love. What she does here is to reject the Platonic notion that the state can be seen as the soul writ large, and the soul for Plato is largely a reason/passion dichotomy. Plato writes about the soul as a "what" because he looks for universals and definitions, whereas Arendt is looking for "how" people and polities are, which according to her are not defined from the beginning but initiated and developed by the actions and speech of citizens.

[Sam]

Rather than the simplistic "Star Trek" for the exemplary, I would look to the film "Metropolis" for manifestations of Arendt's views.