On ethnic identity: What does it mean to be Chinese?

[David]

On ethnic identity: What does it mean to be Chinese?

David Y. F. Ho

The question of how to define ethnic identity is complex, as I have explained in my 2019 book Rewriting cultural psychology: Transcend your ethnic Roots and redefine your identity
(https://www.universal-publishers.com/...). In this article, I use the case of Chinese identity as an illustration.

A person’s identity may be defined in multiple ways: Legally (“What is your nationality?”), historically (“What is your lineage or who were your ancestors?”), geographically (“Where and for how long have you been located, in a rural or urban setting?”), linguistically (“What is your mother tongue?”), and psychologically (“What is the group to which you feel you belong, or toward which you owe loyalty and allegiance?”).

The term Chinese does not connote a monolithic collectivity based on ethnicity, political orientation, geographical location, nationality, or any other criterion. Take the case of a smaller collectivity: The term Chinese-Americans includes the native born as well as Chinese originating from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, or elsewhere. Cultural and linguistic differences exist between these groupings, making it well-nigh impossible for them to cohere into a collectivity with a uniform identity.

The difficulty in stating what it means to be Chinese relates to the question of how identity is defined, as I have explained in Rewriting cultural psychology: Transcend your ethnic Roots and redefine your identity. A person’s identity may be defined in multiple ways: Legally (“What is your nationality?”), historically (“What is your lineage or who were your ancestors?”), geographically (“Where and for how long have you been located, in a rural or urban setting?”), linguistically (“What is your mother tongue?”), and psychologically (“What is the group to which you feel you belong, or toward which you owe loyalty and allegiance?”).

Obviously, these different definitions may yield highly divergent results. In my own case, my mother tongue is Cantonese, but I consider myself a bilingual-bicultural person; at one time, I held three passports, one British, one American, and one issued by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (which renders me legally a Chinese citizen). So it is difficult to say who I am. Actually, I reject all designations of identity, except that of a world citizen.

Viewed in this light, it is not difficult to see why the legal definition of identity imposed by the central government on various Chinese groups has met with strong opposition: in Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Taiwan, and even tiny Hong Kong. How can legal definitions guarantee loyalty or obedience?

Another question has to be addressed: The violent protests in Hong Kong have their roots in the intense, long-term animosity between quite a number of Hongkongers and mainlanders, which baffles many Westerners (visit https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2020/08/1...).

One happy family of Chinese nationalities?

Since the founding of the Qin dynasty, Chinese leaders have upheld the doctrine of Grand Unification: China is a unified, indivisible nation with a central government ordained to govern all subjects within its domain; fragmentation leads to chaos and threatens the legitimacy of the leadership. Indeed, for past emperors and present leaders alike, it a sacred duty to keep the nation united and to protect its territorial integrity. Grand Unification thus provides an underlying justification for political leaders to maintain their stranglehold on power.

Officially, China is comprised of 56 ethnic groups or nationalities, of which the Han has an overwhelming majority of 92% of the population. All ethnic groups are supposed to live happily within the Chinese family under the leadership of the central government. The policies of the central government are often biased in favor of minority groups. For instance, minority students are given preferential treatment in admission to institutions of tertiary education; some minority groups were exempt from the one-child policy (now changed to two-child)—affirmative action, Chinese style. Large-scale programs of poverty eradication, especially among minority groups, have an impressive record: Worldwide, the percentage of people living below the poverty line has fallen, due largely to the success of Chinese programs.

Han ethnocentrism and prejudice against non-Han minorities were not grounded in racism (or biological superiority) but in culturocentrism: a conviction in the pliable endurance and superiority of Han culture as well as the tendency to apply Han values in judging minority groups. The Han view of a happy family is based on maintaining harmonious relations with minority groups, coupled with perhaps partial or eventual assimilation with the Han. More recently, progressive views that favor the preservation of minority cultural distinctiveness have gained ground. All these contrast with the view of White supremacy based on racial superiority in the U.S., from which inequality and segregation between Euro-Americans and minor groups (especially Afro-Americans) follow.

Historically, the centrally located Han people view themselves as being surrounded by the “barbarians on all four sides.” Take myself as an illustration. I am Cantonese (also a member of the Han majority). This means that I am a nanman (“southern barbarian”) vis-à-vis the civilized Mandarin-speaking peoples of the north. Do I feel insulted? No, otherwise I wouldn’t joke about it with my Mandarin friends. The term simply reflects a historical reality.

The founder of the Republic of China, Dr. SUN Yat Sen, was also a “southern barbarian,” born in a Cantonese village not far from Hong Kong. So, a “southern barbarian” was revered as the “National Father” during the days of the Republic. And the Hong Kong Cantonese are “barbarians” not only in name but in substance. They make a lot of noise to make known their demands persistently to the governing body in Hong Kong, during colonial days as well as after the transfer sovereignty to China in 1997. Take note that “barbarians” are not easy to govern.

Having lived or travelled in China extensively, I can testify that I have not found evidence pointing to discrimination against minority groups based on racial grounds. By the large, the Han majority gets along with their minority compatriots; interethnic marriages are common. But do these make a happy family?

Of course not, at least not yet! Historically, the Han majority has engaged minority groups in countless battles, intermingled with periods of calm. Today, the central government’s approach to achieve a happy family of all Chinese nationalities by decree or heavy-handed measures has resulted in more discord than unity. It does not measure up to the height of the Tang dynasty during which peoples from distant lands came to participate in Chinese life and commerce, willingly.

Obedience and loyalty hold the key to how a Chinese polity is treated by the central government. Thus, Macao is treated much more favorably than Hong Kong. In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, the polity that declares that its citizens are not Chinese is the worst—like a wayward son who no longer acknowledges his parents.

By this count, the Taiwanese opposition to the central government is the most dangerous and disintegrative. The Democratic Progressive Party has pursued policies of de-sinofication: Taiwanese are not Chinese and do not belong to the Chinese family. Whereas the naughty Hongkongers who have irritated the central government to no end may be disciplined into submission, the rebellious Taiwanese collaborating with foreign powers are threatening peace in the western Pacific.

Concluding thoughts on self-determination

I owe the reader on where I stand with regard to the plight of Chinese peoples who want to be autonomous or independent from the central government. In my mind, self-determination should be a right. But I am also mindful of the Chinese “Grand Unification” mindset. I am also a realist and a pacifist who does not want to see the unnecessary loss of lives and even less the horrid specter of war—as in the case of Taiwan crossing the red line and declares that it is an independent country. In the case of Hong Kong, it would be unwise to engage in violent protests that play into the hands of the central government to impose the national security law more harshly on Hong Kong residents. This point has not been acknowledged in the Western media.

Across the world, armed conflicts in the name of achieving independence have resulted in death by thousands. I invite you to look at nationalist-secessionist movements of the Basque in Spain, the Tamil “Tigers” in Sri Lanka, and elsewhere. Do the secessionists fare better after years of strife or civil war that leaves the local economy and living condition in ruins? This should be a lesson for Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan: Don’t play with fire that will engulf yourself and innocent others in flames.

The situation in Tibet is complicated. I don’t see any willful intent to destroy Tibetan culture, or anything remotely resembling mass killings. Rather, I see economic forces leading to socioeconomic disparity at work, leaving Tibetans behind the Hans. These forces are hard to control by the government, at the central or local levels. But they must be addressed to achieve justice and prevent interethnic strife.

I have seen reports of mass incarceration of Muslims, “reeducation” (brainwashing), and false self-confessions of crime induced by coercion in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (see https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/wo... and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-c...). Even if only partially true, they send a chill down my spine. What else can I say?

We need strategy, balance, and rationality no less than courage and determination against political oppression. Learn to bargain. Concentrate our efforts on achievable goals, not on idealistic but unrealistic ones.

Finally, I wish that the central government will accept this simple dialectical formulation: Unity without diversity is boring uniformity; diversity without unity is factionalism. Non-violent expressions of conflict serve an integrative function; moreover, insisting on maintaining harmony, without giving opportunities for conflicts to be voiced and resolved, sows the seed for non-integration. If you do not recognize the value of conflicts and provides no channels for their resolution, the result is pseudo harmony. When underlying conflicts do erupt into the open, as they have periodically in Chinese history, they tend to assume violent forms.

So, why not make your governance less uniform, less oppressive, and more attractive with diversity, such that people would no longer want to leave the Chinese family?

[Penelope]

Excellent. Thank you. Penelope Kahler Swan