Philosophy discussion
This topic is about
Metaphysics
Books and Authors
>
Aristotle's Metaphysics
Nemo wrote: "It's hard to disagree with Luther when one sees how Reason can be employed to justify anything from lying to murder to genocide. How Reason offers her services so promiscuously to rogues and cowards alike... Is it not possible that Reason was abused (raped) by men, though innocent herself? "Very poignant statement, Nemo. I personally believe it is the latter... or at least I hope...
Nemo wrote: "I'm using primarily W.D.Ross' translation (which I posted at the beginning of this thread), as well as consulting Hugh Tredennick from Loeb Classical Library. I own Lawson-Trancred's translation for Penguin Classic, but haven't read it. "I would like to try another translation in the future. Thanks for the alternatives.
I read the dialogue between Alan and Erick with interest, and some satisfaction. This is exactly the kind of dialogue I was hoping to facilitate with this topic/thread.On the whole, I agree with Erick regarding the commonalities between Platonism and Christianity. Plato was rejected and attacked by many, Nietzsche in particular, because of the commonalities they perceived.
I've had a hard time understanding those who claim that Plato didn't really mean or believe what he said. Plato made rational and logically consistent arguments throughout all his dialogues for the Theory of Forms. If people disagree with his arguments, and are able to present counter-arguments, that's a different story. But to say that Plato didn't believe his own arguments makes no sense to me whatsoever.
Now back to Aristotle and his arguments.
Nemo wrote: "But to say that Plato didn't believe his own arguments makes no sense to me whatsoever.... Now back to Aristotle and his arguments. "Agreed and agreed.
Some closing remarks about Plato and Luther before returning to Aristotle's Metaphysics:A major problem in interpreting Plato is his use of the dialogic form. When, if ever, was Plato speaking in his own name? (I set aside, for the time being, the question of the authenticity of the Seventh Letter, which I have studied in depth and which contains its own metaphysical digression.) Strauss and his associates paid careful attention to the question of how to interpret Plato's dialogues, in which Plato never spoke in his own name. To assume that the theory of ideas/forms articulated in some of those dialogues (but contradicted in others) is Plato's own doctrine is to assume that the dialogic character who articulated this theory in each instance is identical to Plato. This, however, is an assumption that needs to be proved, and the only way to prove (or disprove) it is to engage in the kind of careful philosophical/dramatic analysis that Strauss employed. The "evidence" is not—and cannot by its nature be—historical; it is philosophical and literary.
Strauss came to understand that most pre-Enlightenment philosophers used an exoteric/esoteric manner of writing to protect themselves from persecution, which was rampant in pre-Enlightenment ages (see, for example, Plato's Apology of Socrates). Strauss's classic (albeit not exclusive) statement of this problem was his book Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952).
Notwithstanding Plato's exoteric use of mythology, a great divide existed between classical philosophy (especially Plato and Aristotle) and revealed religion on the issue of reason versus revelation/faith/belief. Reason, as both Plato and Aristotle understood it, is not only the deductive logic of the later Scholastics (borrowing only part of Aristotle) but also inductive logic based on reasoning from particulars to universals. Needless to say, this is a huge subject, which I cannot explore in the present limited post.
We have lost Aristotle's exoteric works, which I understand were written in dialogic form. What remains are the writings that Aristotle used in his Lyceum. These are devoid of mythology, except for illustrative purposes. It is possible, however, that Aristotle's exoteric works involved mythology precisely because those works were directed to the general public rather than to his properly prepared students.
The question of Luther's attitude toward reason is also a vast topic, which I cannot fully address here. Let his following written statements suffice for now:
"Contrariwise [to the "popist sophisters and schoolmen"] we, excluding all works, do go to the very head of this beast which is called Reason, which is the fountain and headspring of all mischiefs. For reason feareth not God, it loveth not God, it trustest not in God, but proudly contemneth him. It is not moved either with his threatenings or his promises. It is not delighted with his words or works, but it murmureth against him, it is angry with him, judgeth and hateth him: to be short, 'it is an enemy to God,' Rom 8[:7], not giving him his glory. This pestilent beast (reason I say) being once slain, all outward and gross sins should be nothing." Luther, "A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians," in Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), 127-28.
"Here we see that every Christian is a true priest: for first he offereth up and killeth his own reason . . . . The evening sacrifice is to kill reason; the morning sacrifice is to glorify God." Ibid., 131.
Alan wrote: "A major problem in interpreting Plato is his use of the dialogic form. When, if ever, was Plato speaking in his own name?"Socrates is the main interlocutor in all except a few Platonic dialogues. In all likelihood, Plato does this to honour his beloved teacher. The dubious works falsely attributed to Plato also use Socrates' name. Any worthy interpreter/critic of Plato would examine both the philosophical and literary content of the dialogues to determine their worth, and not make any assumptions on name recognition only.
The dialogic form is necessary for dialectical reasoning, which Plato uses to actively engage the other prominent philosophers of his time. Aristotle explained the difference between demonstrative and dialectical reasoning in his works on Logic, it has nothing to do with being exoteric or esoteric, AFAIK.
Frankly, I'd like to see some concrete arguments from Strauss' philosophical/literary analysis that refute the Theory of Forms. So far I've seen nothing but peripheral speculations about Plato's true belief and intent without any evidence from his own writings.
Speaking of myth and belief in God, here is what Aristotle wrote in Book I, (982b-983a)
It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression raising questions about the greater matters too....Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth-lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders); therefore if it was to escape ignorance that men studied philosophy, it is obvious that they pursued science for the sake of knowledge, and not for any practical utility.
...
For this reason its acquisition might justly be supposed to be beyond human power, since in many respects human nature is servile; in which case, as Simonides says, "God alone can have this privilege," and man should only seek the knowledge which is within his reach.
...
Now there are two ways only in which it can be divine. A science is divine if it is peculiarly the possession of God, or if it is concerned with divine matters. And this science alone fulfils both these conditions; for (a) all believe that God is one of the causes and a kind of principle, and (b) God is the sole or chief possessor of this sort of knowledge. Accordingly, although all other sciences are more necessary than this, none is more excellent.
Hugh Tredennick's translation at Perseus
Nemo wrote: "Frankly, I'd like to see some concrete arguments from Strauss' philosophical/literary analysis that refute the Theory of Forms. So far I've seen nothing but peripheral speculations about Plato's true belief and intent without any evidence from his own writings."Although Strauss's writings sometimes ranged beyond the field of political philosophy, he wrote primarily on the history of political philosophy, not on metaphysics. At the University of Chicago (1949-68) he was a member of the Department of Political Science, not a member of the Department of Philosophy or even the Committee on Social Thought. Perhaps this is a reason why Strauss did not write extensively on metaphysical issues concerning the theory of forms. However, as indicated below, Strauss's approach may have more to do with his interpretation of the doctrine of ideas as a phenomenon of political science, i.e. as a myth, rather than as a question of metaphysics.
See Strauss's "On Plato's Republic," in Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), 119-21. Strauss begins this discussion by stating that "[t]he doctrine of ideas which Socrates expounds to his interlocutors is very hard to understand; to begin with, it is utterly incredible, not to say that it appears to be fantastic." (City and Man, 119.) Strauss points out the fundamental transformation of the concept of justice in the Republic from being "fundamentally a certain character of the human soul or of the city, i.e. something which is not self-subsisting. Now we are asked to believe that it is self-subsisting, being at home as it were in an entirely different place from human beings and everything else participating in justice (cf. 509d-510a7; Phaedrus 247c3). No one has ever succeeded in giving a satisfactory or clear account of this doctrine of ideas." (City and Man, 119.) After further discussion, Strauss observes that "Glaucon and Adeimantus accept this doctrine of ideas with relative ease. They surely have heard of the ideas, even of the idea of the good, many times before. This does not guarantee however that they have a genuine understanding of that doctrine." (City and Man, 120 (footnote omitted).) Strauss explains that Glaucon and Adeimantus "know that there are gods—self-subsisting beings which are the cause of everything good, which are of unbelievable splendor, and which cannot be apprehended by the senses since they never change their 'form' (cf. 379a-b and 380dff). This is not to deny that there is a profound difference between the gods as understood in the theology of the Republic and the ideas. It is merely to assert that those who have come to accept that theology are best prepared for accepting the doctrine of ideas. The movement to which the reader is exposed leads from the city as the association of the fathers who are subject to the law and ultimately to the gods toward the city as an association of artisans who are subject to the philosophers and ultimately to the ideas." (City and Man, 120-21.)
Strauss may have addressed the doctrine of ideas in other contexts, and I may have even read such discussions long ago. The foregoing came to mind in responding to your inquiry, but Strauss published hundreds of pages on Plato, and any additional account will have to await your (and/or my) further or repeated reading. As for contraindications in Plato's dialogues regarding the doctrine of ideas, I believe someone has already cited the Parmenides.
Alan wrote: "Strauss points out the fundamental transformation of the concept of justice in the Republic from being "fundamentally a certain character of the human soul or of the city, i.e. something which is not self-subsisting. Now we are asked to believe that it is self-subsisting,"Thank you for taking the time to respond, Alan.
If I understand Plato's Republic correctly, the principles of justice that govern a human soul or a city are like the science of medicine. They can be applied to many citizens and cities, but don't perish with any individual or city. In that sense they are self-substiting and eternal like the laws of nature.
I haven't read Strauss, but it just seems to me that to reject a theory offhand only because it is "very hard to understand" and "utterly incredible" is not befitting for a serious thinker in philosophy or political science. Aristotle also thought the theory of ideas hard to understand or imagine, but he engaged it in a systematic and thoughtful manner, and we're now benefiting from the fruits of his labour.
Nemo wrote: "I haven't read Strauss, but it just seems to me that to reject a theory offhand only because it is "very hard to understand" and "utterly incredible" is not befitting for a serious thinker in philosophy or political science."You misunderstand/misinterpret Strauss because you have never read him. Under these circumstances, any further comments on my part would be useless.
I was interpreting Plato, whose complete works I have read and some works multiple times, in response to Strauss' criticisms as you presented them. My apologies, if I misunderstood your presentations. Would you be kind enough to correct my misunderstanding?
The last paragraph of your post 109 misses the whole point. Strauss is giving an objective, not a subjective, reaction. But I really don't have time to educate you on these matters. I suggest you read what Strauss himself said instead of my poor attempt to regurgitate it. If you are really ambitious, you could listen to the decades of his classes now available for free on the Internet: http://leostrausscenter.uchicago.edu/.... The original is still the greatest!
Thank you for the link to the Strauss lectures. I'll stay with Plato and Aristotle. The original is still the greatest, indeed.
Nemo wrote: "Thank you for the link to the Strauss lectures. I'll stay with Plato and Aristotle. The original is still the greatest, indeed."Yes, but sometimes it helps to consider the views of others and to test one's own conclusions against theirs. This morning I rediscovered another excerpt from Strauss that may be on point:
"No interpretation of Plato's teaching can be proved fully by historical evidence. For the crucial part of his interpretation the interpreter has to fall back on his own resources: Plato does not relieve him of the responsibility for discovering the decisive part of the argument by himself. The undying controversy about the meaning of the idea of the good is a sufficiently clear sign of this. Who can say that he understands what Plato means by the idea of the good if he has not discovered by himself, though guided by Plato's hints, the exact or scientific argument which establishes the necessity and the precise character of that 'idea,' that is, the argument which alone would have satisfied Plato and which he refused to present to us in the Republic or anywhere else?
"Plato composed his writings in such a way as to prevent for all time their use as authoritative texts. His dialogues supply us not so much with an answer to the riddle of being as with a most articulate 'imitation' of that riddle. His teaching can never become the subject of indoctrination. In the last analysis his writings cannot be used for any purpose other than for philosophizing. In particular, no social order and no party which ever existed or which ever will exist can rightfully claim Plato as its patron."
Leo Strauss, "On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political Philosophy," Social Research 13, no. 3 (September 1946): 351, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40982155.
Alan wrote: ""Plato composed his writings in such a way as to prevent for all time their use as authoritative texts. His dialogues supply us not so much with an answer to the riddle of being as with a most articulate 'imitation' of that riddle. His teaching can never become the subject of indoctrination. In the last analysis his writings cannot be used for any purpose other than for philosophizing. In particular, no social order and no party which ever existed or which ever will exist can rightfully claim Plato as its patron."This ignores the fact that he did have disciples -indeed, some that knew him personally and that were aware of his views and which of those in his dialogues indicated Plato's. Strauss wants to ignore all context of a school surrounding Plato and of a contingent philosophical tradition that he was a part of. He wants to make his dialogues exist in a vacuum where he can impart his own interpretations without recourse to contemporaries like Xenophon and disciples like Numenius, Plutarch etc etc. These contemporaries and followers do indicate what Plato believed and they provide necessary context. That is something I think Strauss seeks to do away with. There is basically no one that I know of that interprets Plato the way Strauss does in the ancient world.
Erick wrote: "This ignores the fact that he did have disciples -indeed, some that knew him personally and that were aware of his views and which of those in his dialogues indicated Plato's. Strauss wants to ignore all context of a school surrounding Plato and of a contingent philosophical tradition that he was a part of. He wants to make his dialogues exist in a vacuum where he can impart his own interpretations without recourse to contemporaries like Xenophon and disciples like Numenius, Plutarch etc etc. These contemporaries and followers do indicate what Plato believed and they provide necessary context. That is something I think Strauss seeks to do away with. There is basically no one that I know of that interprets Plato the way Strauss does in the ancient world."It is not entirely clear to me what you are trying to say, especially in your last sentence. Are philosophical issues to be decided by majority vote or popularity? If so, professional philosophy is in bigger trouble than I thought.
Strauss wrote several books and articles on Xenophon, who was more of a historian than Plato. In fact, Strauss had great admiration for Xenophon, albeit for different reasons than his admiration of Plato. It is quite unlikely from what we read in Xenophon and other of Plato's contemporaries that Socrates held all the views that Plato put in his mouth, especially such abstruse metaphysical concepts such as the idea of the good. The historical Socrates was an ethicist, not a metaphysician, though Socrates did ask "What is?" questions about many matters. Xenophon, Aristophanes, and other contemporaries of Socrates and Plato wrote much about Socrates but hardly anything about Plato. Even Aristotle, when referring to Plato's dialogues, usually referred to Plato's character "Socrates" rather than to Plato when discussing the famous Platonic views. Aristotle apparently understood that the views expressed by Plato's fictional character "Socrates" were not necessarily identical with those of Plato. And who knew Plato better than his greatest student, Aristotle?
Plutarch and Numenius lived hundreds of years after Plato and are not reliable historians. You, like Nemo, misunderstand Strauss, because you haven't taken the time to read him with an open mind. Strauss's interpretations are, admittedly, very nuanced. I don't necessarily agree with him on all interpretive matters. But my own study of Plato resulted in my agreement, long ago, with Strauss's point that "[i]n the last analysis [Plato's] writings cannot be used for any purpose other than for philosophizing."
Disciples are almost always of less intellectual caliber than the great mind being followed. Plato, like all philosophers, had many epigones, contemporary and later, who did not understand him. This fact appears repeatedly in Plato's portrayal of Socrates. The dialogues show Socrates as being usually way, way ahead of his disciples (for example, Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus, as depicted in the Republic).
I could go on and on, but, again, if you want to criticize Strauss, please do him the courtesy of reading him first. Uninformed, gratuitous insults are no substitute for such reading. I am not trying to persuade you or anyone else. I have no polemical purpose. I am merely alerting you to a way of thinking about Plato that, albeit not popular, may just possibly be enlightening. If you don't agree, that's entirely your prerogative. But let's stop with the rude remarks and the crass appeals to popularity.
Alan wrote,"The historical Socrates was an ethicist, not a metaphysician, though Socrates did ask "What is?"Our knowledge of the historical Socrates came from three main sources, Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes. Xenophon and Plato's writings on Socrates are harmonized with one another (see excerpt below). Aristophanes ridicules Socrates for keeping his head in the clouds, not your typical ethicist.
Alan wrote, "Aristotle, when referring to Plato's dialogues, usually referred to Plato's character "Socrates" rather than to Plato when discussing the famous Platonic views....And who knew Plato better than his greatest student, Aristotle?"
In Metaphysics, Aristotle ascribes the Theory of Forms directly and unequivocally to Plato; he uses the name "Socrates" in many places, mainly to denote a man in general, the same way we use "John Doe". If anyone ever suggests that Plato doesn't believe the Theory of Forms, Aristotle himself would contradict him.
As I understand it, Plato's epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and theology are all connected parts of a whole. One cannot make full sense of each subject unless he takes into consideration all other aspects of Plato's philosophy. I think Strauss analysis of Plato is hampered by his rejection of the Theory of Forms, which underlies Plato's philosophy.
Nemo, misunderstand Strauss, because you haven't taken the time to read him with an open mind.
Alan, you wrote that Strauss "never took the theory of ideas seriously". As I said, I'm willing to hear his arguments, but so far I've heard none. I'll be quite frank here. If you, who have taken a course from him and read his books, cannot "regurgitate" any concrete arguments from him, it is highly unlikely that I'll find him enlightening. The impression I got from your posts is that Strauss rejected all the analysis of Plato done by other people in history, and claimed that his own method is "the only way". In other words, he rejected the authority of Plato's writings but wanted to establish his own as "the last analysis". The problem is, now that Strauss is also history, why should others take him seriously?
P.S. Socrates' discourse on the gods in Xenophon's Memorabilia:
Be well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god's eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily, and god's thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once. Nay, but just as by serving men you find out who is willing to serve you in return, by being kind who will be kind to you in return, and by taking counsel, discover the masters of thought, so try the gods by serving them, and see whether they will vouchsafe to counsel you in matters hidden from man. Then you will know that such is the greatness and such the nature of the deity that he sees all things and hears all things alike, and is present in all places and heedful of all things.”
Nemo wrote: "Aristophanes ridicules Socrates for keeping his head in the clouds, not your typical ethicist."In the Apology of Socrates, Plato, through Socrates's defense speech, blames Aristophanes for inaccurately and unjustly poisoning the mind of the Athenian polis against Socrates, leading, ultimately, to his prosecution and execution. See also Leo Strauss, Socrates and Aristophanes.
I have said everything I want to say about these matters at this time and in this forum. I am leaving the Philosophy Group, effective immediately, and will not be posting any further comments in it.
Alan wrote: "...if you want to criticize Strauss, please do him the courtesy of reading him first."Alan, if I disagree with Strauss, it doesn't mean I am criticizing him personally. You should also not take it personally if I disagree with his interpretation.
Alan wrote: "It is not entirely clear to me what you are trying to say, especially in your last sentence. Are philosophical issues to be decided by majority vote or popularity? If so, professional philosophy is in bigger trouble than I thought."
Is it any better if we trust one man's opinion of Plato when there is no ancient support for it? I think it is better to trust ancient witness when dealing with ancient texts rather than a more modern one.
Alan wrote: "Even Aristotle, when referring to Plato's dialogues, usually referred to Plato's character "Socrates" rather than to Plato when discussing the famous Platonic views. Aristotle apparently understood that the views expressed by Plato's fictional character "Socrates" were not necessarily identical with those of Plato. And who knew Plato better than his greatest student, Aristotle?"
This isn't so. Aristotle does attribute the idealist views in the dialogues to Plato himself in this very book we are discussing. So yes, who would know him better than Aristotle, who does attribute to him the idealist views he presents in the dialogues?
Alan wrote: "Plutarch and Numenius lived hundreds of years after Plato and are not reliable historians. You, like Nemo, misunderstand Strauss, because you haven't taken the time to read him with an open mind."
Strauss lived more than two thousand years after Plato. Numenius and Plutarch represented a continuous tradition that was associated with a school surrounding Plato and his ideas. I am not insulting Strauss. I simply disagree with him. If he wants to interpret Plato a particular way personally, that's fine with me; but if he claims to know what Plato believed and how he interpreted religion and myth, I do not have to take Strauss' view as being irrefutable or necessarily authoritative.
Alan wrote: "I have said everything I want to say about these matters at this time and in this forum. I am leaving the Philosophy Group, effective immediately, and will not be posting any further comments in it."I've had great discussions with you before, Alan; I pray you do not let the fact that we disagree here be a hindrance to future discussion. There's got to be room for amicable disagreement when it comes to these kinds of topics.
Alan wrote: "I have said everything I want to say about these matters at this time and in this forum. I am leaving the Philosophy Group, effective immediately, and will not be posting any further comments in it. "Alan, I feel that I'm somehow indirectly responsible for your sudden departure from the Philosophy group, though I don't see what I could have said or done differently. I can honestly say that I've enjoyed our discussion and benefited from you insights and erudition. Your friends in this group may blame me for depriving them of your company, and wish that you stay and contribute to the discussions. I do too. As you say, "Sometimes it helps to consider the views of others and to test one's own conclusions against theirs.".
"Qui tacet consentire videtur". Moving on.One of the amazing qualities of Aristotle is his ability to argue persuasively from both sides of the issue. In Book III, Aristotle makes some good arguments for and against the theory of Forms, and in Book IV, he defends the law of non-contradiction.
There is one particular point that I find fascinating. Aristotle seems to argue that in order to have knowledge of something, there must be many individual instances of that something. In other words, if something is truly unique and different from anything else, we cannot know it.
Nemo wrote: "Aristotle seems to argue that in order to have knowledge of something, there must be many individual instances of that something. In other words, if something is truly unique and different from anything else, we cannot know it. ""I noticed something similar in the Metaphysics. It was one of the reasons I said above that his arguments were interesting. If something can not exist, then exist, and even become various other things, it is a problem that idealism has to address as far as the application of idealist forms go; but it is far from impossible to address. You mentioned above that the key here is his approach to what substance is. Aristotle's approach is different than Plato's.
I will try giving a summary of these books.Book III (Beta) starts with a series of fifteen metaphysical questions. The Loeb (Tredenick) translation has little Roman numerals (and sometimes Arabic numerals) to identify where we are in the fifteen. The Oxford (Ross) translation doesn’t have these helpful indicators.
Here are what I make out to be the fifteen:
1) Does the study of the causes belong to one science or to more than one?
2) Has that science only to contemplate the first principles of substance, or is it also concerned with the principles which all use for demonstration; e.g. whether it is possible at the same time to assert and deny one and the same thing, and other similar principles?
3) And if it is concerned with substance, is there one science which deals with all substances, or more than one; and if more than one, are they all cognate, or should we call some of them "kinds of Wisdom" and others something different?
4) Should we hold that only sensible substances exist, or that there are other besides? And should we hold that there is only one class of non-sensible substances, or more than one (as do those who posit the Forms and the mathematical objects as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things)?
5) Whether our study is concerned only with substances, or also with the essential attributes of substance and further, with regard to Same and Other, and Like and Unlike and Contrariety, and Prior and Posterior, and all other such terms which dialecticians try to investigate, basing their inquiry merely upon popular opinions; we must consider whose province it is to study all of these?
6) Further, we must consider all the essential attributes of these same things, and not merely what each one of them is, but also whether each one has one opposite; and whether the first principles and elements of things are the genera under which they fall or the pre-existent parts into which each thing is divided; and if the genera, whether they are those which are predicated ultimately of individuals, or the primary genera—e.g., whether "animal" or "man" is the first principle and the more independent of the individual?
7) Above all we must consider and apply ourselves to the question whether there is any other cause per se besides matter, and if so whether it is dissociable from matter, and whether it is numerically one or several; and whether there is anything apart from the concrete thing (by the concrete thing I mean matter together with whatever is predicated of it) or nothing; or whether there is in some cases but not in others; and what these cases are?
8) Further, we must ask whether the first principles are limited in number or in kind—both those in the definitions and those in the substrate?
9) Whether the principles of perishable and of imperishable things are the same or different; and whether all are imperishable, or those of perishable things are perishable?
10) The hardest and most perplexing question of all: whether Unity and Being (as the Pythagoreans and Plato maintained) are not distinct, but are the substance of things; or whether this is not so, and the substrate is something distinct (as Empedocles holds of Love, another thinker of fire, and another of water or air)?
11) Whether the first principles are universal or like individual things?
12) Whether they exist potentially or actually?
13) Whether their potentiality or actuality depends upon anything other than motion; for these questions may involve considerable difficulty?
14) Whether numbers and lines and figures and points are substances in any sense, or not?
15) Whether they are separate from sensible things or inherent in them?
He says, “With regard to these problems not only is it difficult to attain to the truth, but it is not even easy to state all the difficulties adequately.”
I won’t try to recite all of Aristotle’s answers to these questions. Typically he considers alternate answers and doesn’t come down on one side or the other. But let’s look at the one question / answer that Aristotle says is “most important,” question 10, whether Unity and Being (as the Pythagoreans and Plato maintained) are not distinct, but are the substance of things; or whether this is not so, and the substrate is something distinct (as Empedocles holds of Love, another thinker of fire, and another of water or air)?”
In his answer to this question Aristotle considers the positions of the most famous of his predecessors: the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles, and Plato. Noteworthy to me is that he here recites a condensation of probably the most famous of Parmenides’s arguments. Parmenides had said “One should both say and think that Being Is; for To Be is possible, and Nothingness is not possible.” (Diehl fragment 6, Freeman’s translation, p. 43.
Aristotle says, “Again, if there is to be absolute Being and absolute Unity, it is very hard to see how there can be anything else besides these; I mean, how things can be more than one. For that which is other than what is, is not; and so by Parmenides' argument it must follow that all things are one, i.e. Being.” He brings up Zeno’s “axiom” concluding the if absolute Unity is indivisible, then it must be nothing. But then concludes that “Zeno’s view is unsound” and that it doesn’t seem to be the case that number can be generated from One. And thus the Being of most things must be substance?
Book IV (Gamma) starts with the famous definition of Metaphysics as the science which studies Being qua Being. This is the study of first principles and causes. This is the study of substance, but also of unity and its opposite plurality, otherness, dissimilarity, inequality and “everything else that is derived from these”. The science of Being is concluded to be appropriate to both the study of substance and mathematics, “the science of the philosopher.”
Next comes the famous discussion of “the most certain principle,” the Law of Non Contradiction (LNC): “It is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same relation.” Many arguments are given for this, the basic one being that if the LNC doesn’t hold one contradicts oneself in discourse. The Law of the Excluded Middle (LEM) also comes up. Aristotle says [1011 b] “to say what is is, and what is not is not, is true; and therefore also he who says a thing is or is not will say either what is true or what is false.” No in between. Ironically (or inconsistently,) Aristotle in de Interpretatione doubts bivalence / LEM for the case of future contingents. I have written about this here.
It is interesting to me that at about the same time as Aristotle was establishing these logical dogmas that have come to be known as “classical logic”; half a world away, in India, a much more varied approach to logic was being explored. I won’t say more about this here. I have discussed it in another Goodreads thread (message 4).
And Aristotle ends Book Gamma with (the first mention of?)"the 'prime mover' . . . itself unmoved."
Erick wrote: "If something can not exist, then exist, and even become various other things, it is a problem that idealism has to address as far as the application of idealist forms go."It is addressed in Phaedo, as Aristotle alludes to. The Theory of Form can explain how things in the sensible world, even contraries, can seem to change from one to another, but it doesn't explain why they change - nor does Aristotle for that matter.
Aristotle's explanation of change and movement is based on his notion of potentiality/actuality. The example he uses is the change from a boy into a man. The change is irreversible, because a man cannot change back into a boy. Once a thing has been actualized, it no longer changes, for otherwise, actuality doesn't exist.
The problem with "actuality", as I see it, is that all things do continue to change in the phenomenal world. Man ages, dies and returns to dust. What is his "actuality"?
OTOH, Pythagoreans and Plato believe all changes are reversible. Through reincarnation, a man can change into a boy.
Randal wrote: "I will try giving a summary of these books..."Thanks for the summary, Randal. You've captured the main points of interest in each Book.
With regard to Unity and Being, Aristotle does a good job of stating the difficulty: how does one reconcile Unity with the apparent multiplicity of the sensible world?
As for the Law of Non-Contradiction, did you notice Aristotle's attack on those who believe things can be both true and false (1008b)? He first compared them to vegetables, and then told them to "walk early one morning into a well or ravine". I always suspected he had a mean streak in him. and he showed it here.
Alan wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Dr. A wrote: "There is a christian reading of Aristotle (and mainstream translations support this) that puts a supernatural deity like the Christian God as first cause..."It's quite ..."
Thanks Alan! I haven't read Cropsey's book, but I have heard good things about it....
Finished Books VII and VIII.Aristotle seems to repeat himself quite often. There is almost nothing in Books V to VIII that wasn't already alluded to in the first four books.
In Book IX (Theta), Aristotle elaborates on his notion of potentiality. As far as I know, this is the only idea that isn't discussed in the Platonic dialogues. A question for those who are more familiar with the Presocratics: Did any of them ever speak of potentiality, or did the idea originate with Aristotle?
If you're following the proposed reading schedule, you'd be finishing Book X (Iota), and starting Book XI (Kappa) now.Aristotle exposition of potentiality makes me seriously doubt the validity and usefulness of the whole concept, which I have taken for granted before. It just seems a clever mechanism to circumvent a paradox that cannot be explained away so easily.
It also makes one wonder whether philosophy has made any real progress in the last 2300 years in understanding being and unity.
Sorry for jumping in cold, but I have been unable to read along with the group. However, I have read many of the comments posted here with interest. Is there a good book that compares Aristotle's metaphysics with Plato's? I missed it if one has been cited, and would be grateful to know of it.
I simply don't have time to read primary authorities much anymore.
Thanks.
Hi Brad,It would take an intellect greater than both Aristotle and Plato to make an objective, clear and comprehensive evaluation of those two. I'm not sure such an intellect exists or ever existed.
Having said that, two books may be of interest to you:
The Enneads by Plotinus
Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy by Harold F. Cherniss
I've read Plotinus and especially enjoyed his philosophy of art;
Randal recommended Cherniss to me.
Brad wrote: "Is there a good book that compares Aristotle's metaphysics with Plato's? ..."Brad,
I agree with Nemo here: The simplest way to compare the two would be to read them. Aristotle's version is more compact. But to get at Plato's metaphysics in his works one needs to do a lot of digging, because of their dialogue form. In whose voice is Plato speaking? This is always a question with him.
As for Cherniss, I "recommended" him to Nemo since they seem to share an attachment to Plato's Theory of Ideas (which I don't.) Cherniss's book aims the big guns at Aristotle's critique of the TOI. Much of that critique finds its way into the The Metaphysics. For a more even handed view, I would recommend Ross's Plato's Theory of Ideas. Ross was the translator for The Metaphysics in the Oxford series. His translation is still there in the current (1984) Complete Works. I have tried to sort out the controversy here.
Gadamer's The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy covers some of the same ground. I find Gregory Vlastos's work on Plato to be the tops. His Socrates book tries to separate out the non-metaphysical Socrates from the metaphysical Plato.
I can't stomach Plotinus.
Cheers,
Randal
Nemo wrote: "If you're following the proposed reading schedule, you'd be finishing Book X (Iota), and starting Book XI (Kappa) now ..."Sorry, Nemo. I have fallen behind. But I will try to catch up!
R
Thanks. Cherniss, Ross and Gadamer sound like what I am looking for.
Thanks for the recommendations, Randal. I've added them to my bookshelf. Unlike Brad, I haven't had time to read the secondary authorities yet.Whose translations of Plato did Ross consult for his book?
Nemo,Ross was a classics professor at Oxford, born in 1877. He read Plato in Greek!
Ciao,
Randal
Yes, Ross translated Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Metaphysics and Physics, and also edited Aristotle's complete works. But, he hasn't translated any works of Plato, AFAIK. I don't think it is unreasonable to assume that he was more knowledgeable in Aristotle than in Plato, and that he consulted other scholars on Plato when writing Plato's Theory of Ideas. I'm just curios who those scholars are.
Nemo,I don't have access to Ross's book at the moment. His book goes through Plato's works looking at the TOI one by one. He responds to Cherniss, but the focus is squarely on Plato. One of the main questions that he addresses is whether Plato turned against the TOI in the Parmenides. Ross concludes not.
Merry Merry and Happy Happy,
Randal
I see that this discussion has gone dead. Sorry if my lack of focus on Aristotle made me one of conspirators in that death. I just couldn't keep up timely reading of The Metaphysics after book gamma (IV) until recently. Having now plowed through the entire text, I wonder if any of my fellow conspirators would be interested to try to sum up what we think Aristotle was doing in The Metaphysics. I have been reading Hegel on Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus (Lectures on the History of Philosophy 2 Plato and the Platonists.) I am partial to Sextus, but his analysis of Plato and Aristotle is more appropriate here. Putting it briefly, Hegel loves Aristotle and sees him as the "true" idealist in that his coupling of sensuous substance and consciousness is a foretelling of his own dialectic. Plato was great, but Aristotle was greater because Plato never got beyond the unattached Idea, separate from the sensuous world. And how could an unattached Idea ever do anything in the world? (This is an argument against Descartes as well.) Hence, Aristotle's insistence that the two are unified: "But, as we have said, the proximate matter and the shape are one and the same; the one existing potentially (δυνάμει), and the other actually (ἐνεργείᾳ). [1045b]" There is lots more to The Metaphysics, but is this unity of matter and Idea the true triumph of Aristotle over his teacher?
And then there is the unmoved Mover: "Since we have seen that there are three kinds of substance, two of which are natural and one immutable, we must now discuss the last named and show that there must be some substance which is eternal and immutable. Substances are the primary reality, and if they are all perishable, everything is perishable. But motion cannot be either generated or destroyed, for it always existed; nor can time, because there can be no priority or posteriority if there is no time. Hence as time is continuous, so too is motion; for time is either identical with motion or an affection of it. But there is no continuous motion except that which is spatial, of spatial motion only that which is circular. [1071b]" The Schoolmen saw this unmoved Mover as a premonition of God, but I wonder if in his speculations on this, Aristotle was more like Einstein and Steven Hawking, than Aquinas.
Thoughts?
Randal wrote: "The Schoolmen saw this unmoved Mover as a premonition of God, but I wonder if in his speculations on this, Aristotle was more like Einstein and Steven Hawking, than Aquinas.Thoughts? "
I do think he was more of a materialist. His apparent deism is rather anomalous within his system as a whole I think. It winds up looking rather stark and requires more explanation than provided in this volume, and begs a lot of questions that are not addressed.
Randal wrote: "Having now plowed through the entire text, I wonder if any of my fellow conspirators would be interested to try to sum up what we think Aristotle was doing in The Metaphysics... There is lots more to The Metaphysics, but is this unity of matter and Idea the true triumph of Aristotle over his teacher?"
No, I don't think Aristotle was any where close to being successful in that supposed endeavor; at least not as far as this work is concerned. In my opinion, he spent an exorbitant amount of time pointing out problems within competing philosophies and no where near the due time needed in addressing the problems of his. He seemed to be better equipped at seeing inconsistencies in the thought of other philosophers, but ill-equipped in seeing obvious inconsistencies in his own thought. That's my opinion of the book as it stands. It was well worth reading, but it didn't make Peripateticism at all compelling as far as I'm concerned. But as I said before, I would have to read more of his works in order to gain a more comprehensive picture. I doubt it would have much of an affect on my opinion of Aristotle though.
Randal wrote: "I can't stomach Plotinus."I was reading somewhere that Maximus of Tyre was a kind of bridge between Early/Middle Platonism and the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. I have purchased Maximus' Dissertations, but have not read any of it yet. He is a rather new figure for me. He seems to be one of the few later Middle Platonists that has a substantial work that is still extant. Are you aware of him at all and if he has any insights into some of the questions we've been discussing? I know that Plotinus did attempt to address some of Aristotle's criticisms of Platonism. I'd like to know if Maximus deals with Aristotle at all.
Randal,You asked us to "sum up what we think Aristotle was doing in The Metaphysics". I don't know about you, but he generated in me a total apathy towards philosophy, which is perhaps worse than aporia.
On the one hand, Aristotle did a great job of enumerating and explaining all the difficulties that philosophers must grapple with; on the other hand, he failed to convince me that he succeeded in overcoming any of the difficulties himself, not even close.
One of Aristotle's main criticisms of Plato is that abstract Forms cannot be the cause of movement or change, but then potentiality/actuality cannot either. To the question, "How could an unattached Idea ever do anything in the world?" A retort can be given, "How can a potentiality do anything in the world?" Aristotle sought to circumvent the problem by the Unmoved Mover, a deus ex machina. But this is nothing new, Plato had already introduced the demiurge in Timaeus.
Has philosophy ever moved beyond Plato and Aristotle? Or has it been dead for the past 2000 years?
Erick wrote: "I do think he was more of a materialist. ... I think Hegel was right here. How do you explain the passage that I quoted from 1045b then, if Aristotle is materialist (meaning that the only thing that is real is matter?) Twentieth century philosophers like Daniel Dennett have taken this position. They have a lot of explaining to do to explain minds, when they do.
I would have to read more of his works in order to gain a more comprehensive picture. I doubt it would have much of an affect on my opinion of Aristotle though."
That would be a good idea. The logical works are totally foundational. On Interpretation, for example, scoffs at the determinism to which many in our own time are tempted. He did this because he accepted the obvious fact that we have minds that are the cause of actions. His doubts about bivalence and the Law of the Excluded Middle which arise in his discussion of the "future contingents" problem are preliminary to much discussion in the twentieth century about intuitionism and anti-realism. I have written more about this here. The Physics, The Politics, The Poetics, and the rest are starting points for many discussions of these topics today.
I am certainly no Aristotelian, but not to recognize his importance would be a mistake, I think. That most of the works that we have from him are apparently notebooks or compilations by students, doesn't help to polish Aristotle's reputation. Having brilliant fully-composed dialogs like those that we have from Plato is a wonderful thing, but that doesn't mean in itself that Plato was a better philosopher. We have to follow the arguments.
Thanks for your reply.
Regards,
Randal
Erick wrote: "I'd like to know if Maximus deals with Aristotle at all. ..."Sorry, I don't know him at all.
Randal
Nemo wrote: "One of Aristotle's main criticisms of Plato is that abstract Forms cannot be the cause of movement or change, but then potentiality/actuality cannot either. To the question, "How could an unattached Idea ever do anything in the world?" A retort can be given, "How can a potentiality do anything in the world? ..." Nemo,
I think you have this exactly backwards, no? Aristotle assigns the motive power to actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), which he associates with mind; not to potentiality (δυνάμει), which he associates with matter. His point is exactly that matter is dead without mind. Potentiality can't do anything in the world.
"Aristotle sought to circumvent the problem by the Unmoved Mover, a deus ex machina. But this is nothing new, Plato had already introduced the demiurge in Timaeus."
The unmoved Mover comes up in a completely different context, it seems to me. It is not the unmoved Mover that moves the (everyday) machine (matter). It is mind. The unmoved Mover comes up only because he saw the motion of the heavens as eternal and that this motion needed a Mover that was also eternal. I would have thought that the quote that I provided from [1071b] would have shown this.
As for the deus ex machina, that was Descartes' (Platonic) error, IMHO! The unmoved Mover is not required to explain minds and bodies in Aristotle, only the motion of the heavens.
And as for the Timaeus, I see that as wonderfully poetic dogmatism. Aristotle tries to present an (ultimately failed) argument why there must be a cosmic clock winder. But the argument in various forms was good enough to be elaborated by countless Schoolmen for the next 2,000 years.
"Has philosophy ever moved beyond Plato and Aristotle? Or has it been dead for the past 2000 years?"
It certainly has moved on. Or what were Sextus, Bacon, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche and even a few alive today doing? Not to mention the greats of India and China. I have tried to give a brief answer to this question here.
Thanks so much for starting the thread. It has given me the opportunity to read The Metaphysics straight through. And that has been good. And I have enjoyed the exchange.
Cheers,
Randal
Randal wrote: "I think Hegel was right here. How do you explain the passage that I quoted from 1045b, then if Aristotle is materialist (meaning that the only thing that is real is matter?) Twentieth century philosophers like Daniel Dennett have taken this position. They have a lot of explaining to do to explain minds, when they do. Well, I don't think he was a materialist in a technical sense; as I said above, he was different than philosophers like Lucretius and Democritus. But his philosophy is more materialist than idealist when broken down I think. In the way I see eidos, it remains distinct from energeia and dynamei, in contrast to how Aristotle seems to want to conflate them; I think that's why I am more of a Platonist. I'm not sure Platonists were ever able to explain the relationship in a direct or absolute way successfully, but Aristotle's method fails I think. And it lends itself to a very materialistic interpretation. I don't know how consistent "an immutable substance" and an "unmoved mover" can be when conjoined. There is a problem of reconciling very distinct modes. What is movement if not change? Maybe "unmoved mover" can be substituted with "unchanged changer" and that might indicate my problem more clearly. At what point does immutable movement become mutable? Infinite regression does not answer the question as to how immutable substance becomes mutable substance. What exactly is the interface between them? He doesn't explain that as far as I can tell. What is the antinomy between these modes, if not an idealist separation which undoes Aristotle's intent? I don't know if what I am saying is being elucidated clearly, but that is the best I can do to describe my issues with this work. His theory of time seems to make his unmoved mover time bound as well and that is problematic. I went over this above.
I don't dislike Aristotle. I just feel that his system is lacking. I am in no way saying that Platonism answered these questions successfully; nor do I think German Idealism did so. But I think Plato's insistence on the distinction was warranted.
Randal wrote: "Aristotle assigns the motive power to actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), which he associates with mind; not to potentiality (δυνάμει), which he associates with matter."I don't think he assigns the motive power to actuality. Here is one of the examples he used: man is actuality and boy is potentiality. How does a boy become a man? What is the motive power that causes the movement from potentiality to actuality? It cannot be man, the actuality, which does not yet exist.
Before Aristotle, Plato had already propounded the idea that the mind/soul moves the matter/body. The motion of the heavens typifies the apparent eternal movement all the matters go through, and the only solution to this problem of movement for Aristotle is the Unmoved Mover, the equivalent of Plato's demiurge.
I've read a few of the later philosophers you named, and none of them have come up with a better answer, ISTM.
Erick wrote: "But his philosophy is more materialist than idealist when broken down I think. In the way I see eidos, it remains distinct from energeia and dynamei, in contrast to how Aristotle seems to want to conflate them; I think that's why I am more of a Platonist...I don't know how consistent "an immutable substance" and an "unmoved mover" can be when conjoined. . . . "Nemo wrote: "I don't think he assigns the motive power to actuality. ..."
Erick and Nemo,
You might consider the bit in Zeta (Book VII) where Aristotle discusses the priority of matter and form (soul): "Thus such parts as are material, and into which the whole is resolved as into matter, are posterior to the whole; but such as are parts in the sense of parts of the formula and of the essence as expressed in the formula, are prior; either all or some of them. [1035b]" This came as something of a surprise to me, as I had previously thought, like Erick, that Aristotle was more the empiricist compared to Plato the idealist. But Aristotle here makes clear that form or soul is prior and, as Hegel insisted in the work that I quoted above, that Aristotle was a "true" idealist. As a sceptic, neither a materialist nor an idealist can I be, but I have a new appreciation for Aristotle as a philosopher trying to apply logic (even if often in failed form) rather than poetic myth to solution of this most profound of metaphysical questions. And debate on this question continued unabated into the twentieth century in English and American "philosophy of mind" with the antagonisms between John Searle and Daniel Dennett, for example. I think they both needed to have read more Aristotle, and more Hegel.
In the passage on the unmoved Mover that I quoted above Aristotle says, "But motion cannot be either generated or destroyed, for it always existed; nor can time, because there can be no priority or posteriority if there is no time." As a sceptic, I see this as Aristotle's error. Why must motion have "always existed"? This is a question that apparently preoccupied the thoughts of Penrose and Hawking in the twentieth century, however. Both of these are smart guys. It didn't interest Reverend Gotama (or Socrates, for that matter.) Einstein was a Platonist, by the way, so you two are in good company.
The explanation of the contradiction between priority and posteriority had to wait for Hegel to notice how important was the "conflation" that troubles Erick. I really would recommend to you Hegel's book on Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus. It is written in a much clearer prose than most of the Hegel oeurve and addresses your interests directly. Another series of books that are inspired by Aristotle but also by the rich history of Indian thought and that address this question of mind/matter would be those by Richard Sorabji (you might look at my review here) and his brilliant student, Jonardon Ganeri. See his books The Concealed Art of the Soul and Self. These two have provided a rich background to this question. They (and you) have caused me take some interest in metaphysics, in spite of my sceptical bias.
Thanks again for your interaction. I think I will close my contributions here.
Best wishes.
Randal
Randal wrote: "I have a new appreciation for Aristotle as a philosopher "Yes, I agree. Metaphysics is Aristotle's magnum opus. The breadth and depth of his mind is formidable to behold. I'm reminded of a story of a young aspiring violinist, who, after listening to a performance by Jascha Heifetz, gave up playing violin altogether. So I'll stay away from philosophy, for a while at least.
Thank you for the book recommendations and thoughtful contributions to this discussion.
Philosophy
Books mentioned in this topic
Plato's Theory of Ideas (other topics)The Enneads (other topics)
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, vol. I (other topics)
Posterior Analytics/Topica (other topics)
Posterior Analytics/Topica (other topics)
More...
I had to laugh when I saw this. What a stunning image! It's hard to disagree with Luther when one sees how Reason can be employed to justify anything from lying to murder to genocide. How Reason offers her services so promiscuously to rogues and cowards alike.
On second thought, perhaps Luther was blaming the victim, so to speak. Is it not possible that Reason was abused (raped) by men, though innocent herself?