Introduction to Iran's Intelligence Community

[M.J.]

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Intelligence Community (similar to the regime it protects), is obsessed with the desire to keep up with its declared nemesis, the United States. In keeping with this tradition, a news release in October of 2014 declared that IRI's intelligence community is composed of 16 agencies. Similar to the US, most of these "agencies" are components of military intelligence.

It should be noted that IRI has two separate militaries. The first is the Artesh, which is the regular military that the Islamic regime inherited from the Shah in 1979.
The second is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which was created to safeguard the new regime. Over time the IRGC has developed its own sea, land, and air force. There is also the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) which combine national and local police in addition to border guards.

With this background a partial list of these 16 intelligence agencies include the following:

Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS)
IRGC Intelligence Organization
IRGC Counter Intelligence
Artesh Intelligence
Artesh Counter Intelligence
LEF Intelligence
Armed Forces General Staff Counter Intelligence
Armed Forces Logistics (military industries) Counter Intelligence

[Feliks, Moderator]

One post only please. I've deleted the other three.

Reminder: no spamming the discussion board with personal or political agendas. If you have such voluminous information, please keep it in one post, or contact me to assist.

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Thanks...

[M.J.]

The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS)

Of the 16 agencies mentioned in the previous post, the most important organizations are the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS or VAJA in Persian) and the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO).

The MOIS was established to perform a similar function to what the CIA, or currently the DNI, perform in the US. That is the coordinator of the Iranian intelligence community. To assist the MOIS in its function as a Central Intelligence Coordinator, an Intelligence Coordination Council has been formed with the following functions among others:

1. facilitating discussions on intelligence topics between the various organizations.
2. exchange of ideas on the best practices to obtain objectives
3. delineation of the powers and responsibilities of each organization

Besides its coordination/centralization function, MOIS has the classic responsibilities of intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. It must be noted that similar to the former Soviet KGB, the MOIS combines internal and external functions (FBI and CIA) under one roof.

Similar to other classic agencies, there are various groups that analyze data for dissemination to policymakers while spies in the field collect intelligence to be sent back to headquarters. However, the MOIS was best known for its lethal operations units that were very successful in the 1980's and 1990's against Iranian dissidents abroad. Among their declared successes was the assassination of Iranian opposition leader Shahpour Bakhtiar in Paris (1991) under the nose of French Police protection. Another success was the Mykonos Restaurant murders in Berlin (1992) where 4 Iranian Kurdish opposition figures were murdered in broad daylight, mafia style.

Since the 2009 "Green Revolution" in Iran, and the belief by the Iranian Supreme Leader that elements in the MOIS were sympathetic to the reformers, the IRGC-IO has become the primary instrument of repression inside Iran. The IRGC-IO will be the subject of the next post.

[M.J.]

IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO)

The sudden onset of events surrounding the "Green Revolution" caught the Iranian regime by surprise. Reform minded Iranians believed that their votes in the Presidential election of 2009 had been stolen, allowing Ahmadinejad to become President. During these events, it was necessary to use state security organizations to repress the people and absolute loyalty by these institutions was imperative. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his advisors, felt that many individuals in the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) were sympathetic to the reformers. This meant that the vast powers of internal suppression had to be transferred to a new organization. This move would also allow the Supreme Leader to use the IRGC-IO to check the powers of the MOIS so that the latter organization could not act in a rogue manner in sympathy with the Green Movement.

That is when the Supreme Leader upgraded the IRGC Intelligence Bureau to the IRGC Intelligence Organization. The IRGC-IO immediately became the frontline organization for cracking down on the dissent against the regime. The IRGC-IO today is arguably more important to the regime for internal security matters than the MOIS. It has all the same authorities and instruments for monitoring and repression. The one difference between the IRGC-IO and the MOIS is that the former does not conduct lethal operation abroad. Those activities are reserved for the external branch of the IRGC known as the IRGC-Qods Force, discussed in the following post.

What is unique about the IRGC-IO is that it still performs the classic functions of a military intelligence organization such as gathering information about military capabilities of regional rivals, their weapons systems, order of battle, and fighting doctrine. However, in addition to these responsibilities, the IRGC-IO also has a unit for combatting cyber threats (IRGC Cyber Defense Command) in addition to its new responsibilities of monitoring the Iranian population. Suffice it say that many in Iran are more fearful of running afoul of the IRGC-IO than the MOIS which would have been unthinkable 20 years ago.

[M.J.]

IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF)

The IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF) is the external operation arm of the Iranian IRGC. Very little was known about this secretive organization until the outbreak of the Iraqi insurgency in 2004. After a series of incidents in 2007 that led to the deaths of many US military personnel in 2007, the US Government began to discuss the activities of the IRGC-QF in Iraq. At that time it was revealed that the IRGC-QF was helping to arm, equip, and train Shia militia groups fighting against US coalition forces. Then, according to news reports, in early 2008 General David Patraeus,received a text message from IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. The message allegedly said: ""General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Soleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan."

From these tidbits we can deduce that the IRGC-QF plays a large role in the Iranian regime's lethal activities outside its border. Indeed, similar to the situation with the IRGC-IO on matters related to internal security, the IRGC-QF and the MOIS likely compete over foreign intelligence collection, lethal terrorist operations, and the training, arming and equipping of foreign groups sympathetic to the Iranian regime. News reports indicate that IRGC-QF members may even be involved in intelligence activities in countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela in Latin American along with Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Kenya in Africa.

There is little available information to indicate how the IRGC-QF and the MOIS coordinate overlapping responsibilities abroad with respect to intelligence collection, analysis, and lethal operations. News reports indicate that the IRGC-QF likely has a monopoly on liaison and training relationships with foreign militia, paramilitary, and special forces units similar to US Green Berets and special forces. It is also likely that whatever coordination exists between the IRGC-QF and MOIS on these endeavors occurs during the meetings of Intelligence Coordination Council which was created for this purpose. Suffice it to say that the IRGC-QF plays a huge role in the projection of the Islamic Republic of Iran's power outside of its borders and can be considered a unique external intelligence organization in competition with the MOIS