he draws two distinctions between different kinds of inquiry. The first, which is just another way of expressing the ontological difference, is between the ontical and the ontological, where the former is concerned with facts about entities and the latter is concerned with the meaning of Being, with how entities are intelligible as entities.
1 Heidegger broadens out the kinds of experience to include our mundane interactions with the world, limiting scientific experience (which Kant focused on exclusively) to only one kind of being: presence-at-hand. 2 Heidegger wants to show how time alone can account for all the ways we experience and understand the world and ourselves, as he starts to do in the second half of Division 2 (38/17). Whereas Kant has a wide assortment of forms, concepts, and ideas structuring experience, Heidegger thinks they can all be reduced to different forms of temporality. 3 Heidegger rejects Kant’s belief that behind the phenomena we experience there lies a noumenal realm of reality-in-itself which therefore limits features like space to just phenomena. For Heidegger, the world we experience is the world as it really is, so the features we “impose” on it are really there, rather than just subjective projections
“There are certain structures which we shall exhibit – not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being” (38/17).
Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something. . . . All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being.
Welcome back. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account.