Apr. 12: Book II. par. 81-90

[Nemo]

86. The Egyptians' free will caused all these things according to the preceding principle, and the impartial justice of God followed their free choices and brought upon them what they deserved. As we follow closely the reading of the text at hand, let us not draw the conclusion that these distresses upon those who deserved them came directly from God, but rather let us observe that each man makes his own plagues when through his own free will he inclines toward these painful experiences.

88 ... Since then in the same place evil comes to one but not to the other, the difference of free choices distinguishing each from the other, it is evident that nothing evil can come into existence apart from our free choice.

Gregory seems to emphasize free will almost to the point of denying divine agency and election. How then is the justice of God manifested when all things are caused by our free will?

[Ruth]

I stumbled a bit on the part you quote in paragraph 88. When he says: it is evident that nothing evil can come into existence apart from our free choice, is he forgetting about the baby boys that were killed by Pharao?

Nemo, you wrote: "How then is the justice of God manifested when all things are caused by our free will?". But I don't understand the reasoning in that question. Wouldn't most people say that consequences of free will is just, much more so than a God who elects some people and not others?

[Nemo]

Ruth wrote: "I stumbled a bit on the part you quote in paragraph 88. When he says: it is evident that nothing evil can come into existence apart from our free choice, is he forgetting about the baby boys that w..."

Your first question shows the difference between sin and suffering, the free will and sin of some people causes the suffering of other people. But perhaps we need to consider Gregory’s statement in context, that all external circumstances being equal, good and evil come from our free choice.

The question about justice is a little more complicated. I think Gregory’s interpretation reflects a difference between the Platonic abstract idea of justice, which has no personal agency, and the justice of God, which is always executed through divine agency.

If our free will is the cause of everything good and evil that happen to us, then divine agency is rendered not only inculpable, but also irrelevant. Does that make sense?

[Ruth]

Yes, I see what you mean now. But I think that Gregory is not saying that God is completely out of it. Because he says that God sends the events, and then it depends on the life of the people how these events affect them. See for example also p.87: When the physician induces vomiting by his medicines, he does not become the cause of the sickness in the body, but on the contrary it is disorderly eating habits which bring it about; medical knowledge only brought it into the open.
So God sends these events, that have a painful influence on those who are living sinfully, but not on others who are living virtuously.

On the other hand, I think that for us humans it is really hard to speak about what God 'does' without making him somewhat human, but we also know that God is unchangeable and outside time. So then the idea of Plato that you mentioned doesn't strike me as opposing divine agency.

[Kerstin]

My thoughts go toward the direction of love. God is Love, and in order to love sincerely it has to be given freely. God wants us to love him sincerely, he didn't make us puppets, therefore he gave us free will. He loves us already, but are we ready to love him in return? It is our choice to reciprocate what is readily offered. God does not force himself on anyone. So God is never out of the picture here, the divine agency is ever present.