2017 - October - Theme Read on book/s covering 1917 (Western Front & the Russian Revolution)

[Manray9]

Haaze wrote: "I heard in a lecture the other day that the French still used runners for messages during WW2 (1940 - just before the German invasion). Is that true? Especially after reading this post focused in C..."

Haaze: The U.S. still used runners in WW II.

[zed]

Manray9 wrote: "Haaze wrote: "I heard in a lecture the other day that the French still used runners for messages during WW2 (1940 - just before the German invasion). Is that true? Especially after reading this pos..."

Showing my ignorance here. In a couple of WW2 films I have watched I have heard the term Sound Power used for what I thought was radio communication. What were they? An internet search has been a bit fruitless.

[Haaze]

Manray9 wrote: "Haaze: The U.S. still used runners in WW II."

Not as a rule though, right? As the main way to communicate on the front or just in "tight" situations? Just curious.....

[Manray9]

4triplezed wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "Haaze wrote: "I heard in a lecture the other day that the French still used runners for messages during WW2 (1940 - just before the German invasion). Is that true? Especially after ..."

4triplezed: Sound-powered telephones don't require external electrical power, just a wire connection. They function through electro-mechanical transducers changing voices into electricity. They are still used on U.S. Navy vessels today. When you notice in films the unusually large helmets on sailors, that's to accommodate the sound-powered telephone earsets. All stations aboard a warship are connected by sound-powered phones. There are hand-held phone units (typical of a house phone) and earsets with a separate mouthpiece mounted on the chest. The systems are "push-to-talk" simplex connections. They are excellent comms systems for many uses, but are limited by the need for a wire connection and, therefore, a range of a few miles.

Here's a photo of a U.S. Navy petty officer with a sound-powered phone rig:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...

Here's the handset with the push to talk button shown:

http://www.smp-ltd.com/products/277__...

Some U.S. Army field telephones are sound-powered, such as the TA-1.

http://www.stardynamic.com/product_ph...

[Manray9]

Haaze wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "Haaze: The U.S. still used runners in WW II."

Not as a rule though, right? As the main way to communicate on the front or just in "tight" situations? Just curious....."

Not as a rule, but field radios of the era had short ranges, poor batteries, and were subject to environmental vagaries. Field telephone systems had to be run out by hand and maintained by signals troops often under dangerous situations. Lines were cut by the enemy and by artillery fire.

[zed]

Manray9 wrote: "4triplezed wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "Haaze wrote: "I heard in a lecture the other day that the French still used runners for messages during WW2 (1940 - just before the German invasion). Is that true..."

Thanks. Much appreciated.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Great account from my book on the Russian Revolution:

"The failure to beat the Germans in the Zlota Lipa Valley bode poorly for any chance of capturing Lvov. More damaging still, there were signs that the object of the entire offensive—capturing “Lemberg” (as the Austrians called Lvov)—had become controversial among the men, even (in fact especially) in those units that had conquered enemy territory. A soldier named Miroshkin, in Thirty-Fifth Division, after his unit had captured some well-appointed Austrian trenches, convened a soviet and shouted, “Comrades! Whose land are we on anyhow?… Let’s give the Austrians back their land and return to our own borders; then if they try to go further, over our dead bodies!” In a worrying sign for morale, the unit doctor pulled a copy of Okopnaia Pravda from his pocket and read out a Bolshevik “sermon” to the men. After a vigorous discussion, the men agreed on the resolution: “Ours we will not yield, but others’ [lands] we do not seek.” It was an elegant formula that made more sense than the muddled thinking of Kerensky about war aims. For why, after all, were Russian muzhiks now being asked to die for Austrian Lemberg, after the Soviet had sworn off annexations and fired liberal imperialists,"

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Great replies MR9, thanks for taking the time to post those details, very interesting.

[Dimitri]

About 50% into Stevenson "1917" a linked pattern begins to emerge; the impatience of politicians in the face of U-boats and the imminent collapse of Russia.

Chemin des Dames, the Kerensky offensive in July & to a lesser extent Passchendaele - where the Haig/Robertson team was the most eager but could argue the geostrategic value of the Channel coast and its U-boat bases - were all attacks in a hurry, to win the war before one's own morale and manpower/food runs out.

Less of a wonder in this light that 1917 was a disastrous year on land.

[Derek]

Haaze wrote: "I heard in a lecture the other day that the French still used runners for messages during WW2 (1940 - just before the German invasion). Is that true? Especially after reading this post focused in C..."

Len Deighton in Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk is good on the sclerotic French chain of command.

[Manray9]

Dimitri wrote: "About 50% into Stevenson "1917" a linked pattern begins to emerge; the impatience of politicians in the face of U-boats and the imminent collapse of Russia.

Chemin des Dames, the Kerensky offensi..."

Dimitri:

From Nick Lloyd's Passchendaele: The Lost Victory of World War I.

The pressure to free the Belgian coast was strong, but Lloyd George was unenthusiastic about a renewed offensive on the Western Front. The impact of another setback could be a serious wound to morale at home. The military leadership saw it differently: Russia was collapsing, Italy was feckless and weak, Salonika was deadlocked, Mesopotamia was irrelevant, and France was exhausted and mutinous. Only a victory against Germany on the Western Front would be impactful -- and such a victory would be up to Britain. Nick Lloyd points out: British war planning depended on four "pillars" -- the size of the Russian army, the effectiveness of the French, the dominance of the Royal Navy and the vast financial power of London. By the later half of 1917, three of these four "pillars" were eroding quickly.

[Dimitri]

Haaze wrote: "I heard in a lecture the other day that the French still used runners for messages during WW2 (1940 - just before the German invasion). Is that true? "

For the same reason as the forward gear on their tanks... :-D

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

The issue between the War Cabinet and Haig over his proposed Flanders offensive which Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir William Robert Robertson, tried to convey to Field Marshal Haig without much luck:

"Evidently there were still concerns about the ambition of what Haig was proposing and a 'fear', as Robertson explained, that 'you might endeavour to push on further than you were justified pending further artillery preparation'. He reminded Haig that 'it is well understood that the extent of the advance must, roughly speaking, be limited by the assistance of the guns until such times as a real breakthrough occurs' and that if this 'step by step system of advance' was maintained, then there would be real support for his operations."

[Manray9]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "The issue between the War Cabinet and Haig over his proposed Flanders offensive which Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir William Robert Robertson, tried to convey to Field Marshal Haig..."

AR: It seems Lloyd doesn't think too highly of Robertson. Apparently Lloyd George didn't either. Lloyd mentioned Robertson was the only man to serve at every rank from private to field-marshal. Quite a few years ago, I read his memoirs:

From Private to Field-Marshal.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

I get the impression so far that poor old Robertson was stuck between the Prime Minister and Haig and tried to do his best to steer a path between the two without causing any major disruptions to the war effort on the Western Front.

That book looks like one that I may need to track down, thanks for the recommendation MR9!

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

A first-hand account of Passchendaele from a German soldier in a signalling company in a concrete bunker off the Menin Road at Gheluvelt:

"We could not imagine how it was possible to bring up ammunition on this heavily shelled approach road - it could certainly only have been in frantic, life-or-death journeys. An ammunition wagon that had been shot to pieces lay in front of the bunker in the middle of the road, and in front of that, there were horses, still in their traces with their bodies ripped open, and the fallen drivers. In the ditches of the road, there wee bodies who had been horrendously mutilated. One of the dead had his face severed from the back of his head by a grenade splinter, in such a way that it was only hanging on from his chin and stared back at us, a horrifically contorted, bloodless yellow mask. How can one endure such a sight for weeks on end? Dying loses its horror when it is one's constant companion every day and night."

[Manray9]

From Nick Lloyd's Passchendaele: The Lost Victory of World War I.

The political situation and it's impact on the high command during Passchendaele was strange. The War Cabinet did not discuss the offensive in detail until August 17th (18 days after it began). Major-General Sir George Macdonogh, Director of Military Intelligence, submitted a detailed report. As Lloyd wrote:

Macdonogh's report, when stripped of it's War Office gloss, revealed a number of things: Haig's attacks had not been entirely successful; the Germans were still resisting fiercely; the enemy remained in possession of the crucial high ground; and casualties had been heavy. Yet Lloyd George failed to act upon this sobering information. When Hankey (Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the War Cabinet) pressed him on it, he found him to be curiously lethargic and 'unresponsive'.

Haig downplayed the news. Much like some U.S. generals in Vietnam, Haig was not above dissembling when dealing with his political masters.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Manray9 wrote: "From Nick Lloyd's Passchendaele: The Lost Victory of World War I.

The political situation and it's impact on the high command during Passchendaele was strange. The War Cabinet did ..."

It would seem that both Haig and Lloyd George share responsibility for the slaughter at Passchendaele.

[Dimitri]

The skinny on the introduction of the convoy system in the Royal Navy, 1917 (chapter 3 of 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution):

The U-boat crisis was largely invisible to a British public already accustoming to volatile rationing, but the naked numbers are there: food imports between January-May '17 dropped to 2.9 million ton compared to 4.9 million pre-war. It also starved the French arms industry of coal.Same for the efficiency of the convoy system: by Oktober, the round trip loss rate stood at 1.23% compared to 25% during "Black April".

While the convoy system is rightly termed essential in the long term for shipping U.S. troops & goods, its slow piecemeal implementation insufficiently explains British survival. It succeeded only in conjunction with wider measures that the Asquith cabinet initiated & Lloyd George's followed through. ex. improved direction in congested harbours & a focus on the shortest but most dangerous North-Atlantic route.

But if the submarine campaign now seems a desperate gamble at the time, adopting the convoy system posed greater risk than it does in retrospect. Nocturnal navigation in formation & a zig-zag pattern was demanding for the average merchant pilot. Adequate protection was a matter of stretching resources: various smaller ships were nibbled away from the Grand Fleet & graciously augmented with American destroyers. Visibility at 20 miles for a ship (compared to 4 miles to spot a periscope in fair weather) was less alarming as the accumulated impact of technological advances permitted the existing escort craft to get an edge on the U-boats. Improved hydrophones & catapults to launch aimed depth charges which were carried in ever greater numbers ...were much more effective than passive countermeasures such as nets and mines, which either the tides or the enemy often cut loose.

[Manray9]

From Nick Lloyd's --

Passchendaele: The Lost Victory of World War I.

"It was an old joke that the sun always shone in the (Ypres) Salient whenever the British were not attacking..."

[Jonny]

Dimitri wrote: "The skinny on the introduction of the convoy system in the Royal Navy, 1917 (chapter 3 of 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution):

The U-boat crisis was largely invisible to a British pu..."

Aha... explains Kipling:
"I was a shepherd to fools, causelessly bold or afraid. They would not abide by my rules, yet they escaped. For I stayed."

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Good posts everyone!

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

From the same book Manray9 is reading on Passchendaele:

"German losses had been heavy. Between 21 and 31 July Fourth Army sustained about 30,000 casualties, including 9,000 missing in action, with thirty-five guns being lost. It has also been extremely expensive in munitions. Field batteries would have fired (on average) about 300 rounds per day during July, but on the first day of the offensive, this soared to over 1,200. It was estimated that on 31 July Fourth Army's batteries fired off the equivalent of twenty-seven ammunition trains - almost quadruple what had been regarded as heavy consumption on the Somme. This was the reality of the Materialschlacht."

[Manray9]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "From the same book Manray9 is reading on Passchendaele:

"German losses had been heavy. Between 21 and 31 July Fourth Army sustained about 30,000 casualties, including 9,000 missing in action, with..."

AR: The numbers are mind-boggling: dead, wounded, captured, number of machine guns, artillery pieces, shells, etc. All for little ground.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Very true MR9, a terrible battle for very little gain.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Some more interesting figures from the German perspective:

"The enormous expenditure of artillery ammunition - which in September could reach 400,000 rounder per day across the whole Ypres sector - put gun barrels under intensive strain. Between 31 July and 25 September, Group Ypres had to replace 1,775 field and 1,250 heavy guns due to wear and tear."

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Details of two of the VC's won at Passchendaele during September:

William Francis Burman, Rifle Brigade:
http://vconline.org.uk/william-f-burm...

Corporal Ernest Egerton, Sherwood Foresters:
http://vconline.org.uk/ernest-a-egert...

[Manray9]

From Nick Lloyd's Passchendaele: The Lost Victory of World War I.

The repeated bloody attacks on Passchendaele Ridge, under the most miserable conditions endurable by humans, proved ultimately not worth the cost. After the ridge was secured in November 1917, an assessment revealed:

"...Passchendaele Ridge was virtually indefensible...a detailed appraisal admitted that the newly won positions were hugely disadvantageous. Front-line troops could 'now be shelled from any point on an arc of 240 degrees'; there was 'no cover for supports or close reserves'; it was only with 'great difficulty' that supplies could be moved up; and it was almost impossible to reinforce the garrison in an emergency.

Haig had pushed on as "a reaction to growing unease in London, and a need to give them something, anything."

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Manray9 wrote: "From Nick Lloyd's Passchendaele: The Lost Victory of World War I.

The repeated bloody attacks on Passchendaele Ridge, under the most miserable conditions endurable by humans, prove..."

I've read that many of Haig's commanders believed that they should have finished the offensive once they had captured Broodseinde Ridge.

There really was no need to go any further or to try and capture Passchendaele. However Haig's belief that he had the Germans on the ropes and one more attack would knock them out and he would achieve his cherished breakthrough that would allow his cavalry to run rampart in the German rear.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

One of the Australians awarded a Victoria Cross for his actions at Passchendaele:

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/P10...

https://monumentaustralia.org.au/them....

[Manray9]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "One of the Australians awarded a Victoria Cross for his actions at Passchendaele:

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/P10...

https://monumentaustralia.org.au/them......"

Lloyd mentions Bugden.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

The author of the book on Passchendaele mentions that during the fighting for Broodseinde Ridge; "Eight Victoria Crosses were won that day, including those of two Australians, Lance Corporal Walter Peeler and Sergeant Lewis McGee (of 37 and 40/Battalions respectively). Both men showed enormous courage in taking on enemy blockhouses and pillboxes singlehandedly."

Lance Corporal Walter Peeler:
https://www.gov.uk/government/case-st...

Sergeant Lewis McGee:
http://members.pcug.org.au/~pdownes/m...

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

MR9 we have a street named Bugden Avenue in the suburb of Gowrie in Canberra that is named for him.

[Manray9]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "MR9 we have a street named Bugden Avenue in the suburb of Gowrie in Canberra that is named for him."

A fitting tribute.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

We have a number of the streets in the national capital named after VC winners and other famous Australians:

Gowrie:
A suburb of Canberra, located in the northern end of the Tuggeranong Valley. Tuggeranong suburbs are the southernmost of Australia's capital city. Gowrie is named after the Earl of Gowrie, Brigadier-General Alexander Gore Arkwright Hore-Ruthven (1872-1955) VC; PG; GCMG; DSO; 1st Baron of Canberra and Dirleton; Governor of South Australia, 1928-34, and New South Wales, 1935-36; Governor-General of Australia, 1936-44. Gowrie's streets are all named after members of the Australian Defence Force who won decorations, including the Victoria Cross. Gowrie is the former site of the Athllon Homestead.

[Manray9]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "We have a number of the streets in the national capital named after VC winners and other famous Australians:

Gowrie:
A suburb of Canberra, located in the northern end of the Tuggeranong Valley. Tu..."

Yesterday I was looking online for a better map of Passchendaele. I googled it and clicked on the map. I thought: That looks odd. Then I noticed I was looking at a map of Passchendaele State Forest in Queensland.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Oh, I didn't know we had a State Forest named after Passchendaele!

[zed]

Manray9 wrote: "'Passchendaele State Forest in Queensland."

Long time since I have been out that way. The area gets snow about once a decade and Brisbanities will take a day trip in to take a look. (And a good excuse to visit the wineries as well.)

[Manray9]

4triplezed wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "'Passchendaele State Forest in Queensland."

Long time since I have been out that way. The area gets snow about once a decade and Brisbanities will take a day trip in to take a look..."

Any reason is a good reason to visit a winery.

[Manray9]

From Nick Lloyd's Passchendaele: The Lost Victory of World War I.

From the German Fourth Army's report, Passchendaele "exceeded the horror of anything previously experienced...In the judgement of front-line soldiers who also served at Verdun and the Somme, the strength of the firestorm that preceded and accompanied the charges of the attackers in Flanders in 1917 was far greater than ever before."

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Poignant account from; "Passchendaele: A New History" by Nick Lloyd (same book Manray9 is reading, UK title I think):

" ... 'If I were asked to name the heroes of the Third Battle of Ypres', wrote the gunner Frank Mellish, 'my vote would go to the pack horses which brought up the field artillery ammunition ... They carried or pulled prodigious weight through country practically devoid of roads or tracks, and more often than not they were up to their hocks, and sometimes their bellies, in sticky mud. When shelling began there was no means of getting them under cover and they stood patiently until either they were hit of the shelling stopped. They never seemed to panic and yet seemed grateful if anyone stood near them during their ordeal'."

Passchendaele: A New History by Nick Lloyd

[Manray9]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Poignant account from; "Passchendaele: A New History" by Nick Lloyd (same book Manray9 is reading, UK title I think):

" ... 'If I were asked to name the heroes of the Third Battle of Ypres', wrote..."

I felt sorry for the horses and mules. Just dumb animals caught up in the folly of men.

[Deborah]

Have you guys been reading this book for a while ? When will you change books ?

[Manray9]

Deborah wrote: "Have you guys been reading this book for a while ? When will you change books ?"

Six days? I'm finished.

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Deborah wrote: "Have you guys been reading this book for a while ? When will you change books ?"

I finished last night but have a few more pages marked out for quotes :)

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

The Australian attempt to take Passchendaele in early October. Haig wasn't the only one who was blind to the fatal flaw in thinking that one more push would break the German lines. A total disregard for conditions on the ground, actual resources available and the views on the commanders on the ground who were asked to make the assault:

"For his part, Monash was much less enamoured of the prospect facing him. 'Things now rushed. No time to prepare, refer to orders as we go along' was one instruction he dashed off to his brigadiers. Not only was it almost impossible to bring up the number of guns and tons of ammunition they would need, but they also had to attack more formidable positions than had been the case on 4 October. It was evident that if the New Zealand Division failed to capture the Bellevue Spur on their left, the Australians would be exposed to deadly enfilade fire and cut to pieces (as had happened to 66th Division). On 11 October, Monash pleased with his superiors for a delay, perhaps just twenty-four hours, to give them more time to get ready for the assault. But it got him nowhere. Godley was all for pushing on, confident that his divisions would take the high ground. As for Plumer - for so long the Apostle of order and method on the battlefield - he was convinced that conditions were favourable and turned Monash's request down. They would attack, as scheduled, on 12 October."

Australians at Passchendaele:
https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/blog/...

New Zealand's 'blackest day' at Passchendaele:
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/new-zealand...

[Deborah]

Okay I will wait for the next book . Thanks for responding guys

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

Deborah wrote: "Okay I will wait for the next book . Thanks for responding guys"

Deborah, you can join in with any book that fits the theme if you like.

[Deborah]

Thanks Aussie

['Aussie Rick', Moderator]

From the book; "The Russian Revolution", chapter titled; "Army on the Brink":

"On July 22, the Russian attack began after a three-day artillery barrage. By all reports, the Women's Death Battalion fought magnificently, advancing even when the men on their flanks refused to, seizing enemy trenches and taking nearly one hundred German prisoners. At the sight of this, the men in nearby units joined in and moved forward. But the first day's gains were erased when the Germans counterattacked on July 23. Within days this offensive, too, had petered out, with both sides returning to their original positions and digging in. General Anton Denikin, commander of the western front, gave a depressing post-mortem. Although he thought artillerists had done 'astounding work,' and the Amazons had fought bravely, Denkin noted that most infantrymen had merely 'carried out a ceremonial march through two or three lines of enemy trenches and [then] returned to their own lines'."

The Russian Women's Death Battalion:
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/worl...