Human Ethics: Basis, Principles, Applications

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Robert wrote (#108): "And given Aristotle's description of the megalopsuchos, I'd say that s/he isn't an egoist in the above sense at all, but in fact someone who's simply a great & "larger-than-life" person, like Winston Churchill, with all the outstanding virtues & genuine flaws or vices that go along with that...

Leo Strauss said that he couldn’t figure out what Aristotle meant by the great-souled person (Nicomachean Ethics, book 4, chapter 3) until he read and watched Churchill. Then he knew.

I’ve now looked at your linked discussion of egoism and altruism but have not had time to study it in depth. Within the parameters of your definitions, Aristotle’s great-souled person is not egoistic. I do think it is arguable, however, that Aristotle’s great-souled person is egoistic in another sense: such person, as described by Aristotle, is concerned with his/her own “ego” (in the Merriam-Webster definition of “the self especially as inside one as contrasted with something outside [such as another self or the world]”), albeit in a way that Aristotle regards as admirable. Here are a couple of quotations from chapter 3 of book 4 of Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics”, translated and edited by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011):

He, then, who deems himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them is held to be great souled. (1123b)

. . . .

It belongs to the great-souled man also not to go in for the things that are generally honored or in which others hold first place, and he is idle and a procrastinator, except wherever either a great honor or a great deed is at stake; he is disposed to act in few affairs, namely, in great and notable ones. He is necessarily open in both hate and love, for concealing these things is the mark of a fearful person, as is caring less for the truth than for people’s opinion. He necessarily speaks and acts in an open manner: he speaks freely because he is disposed to feeling contempt for others, and he is given to truthfulness, except inasmuch as he is ironic toward the many [AEJ: That’s a big exception, as Plato’s student Aristotle knew]. And he is necessarily incapable of living with a view to another—except a friend—since doing so is slavish. Hence too all flatterers are servile, and all lowly types are flatterers. (1124b-11251)

Space does not permit me to elaborate further what Aristotle says about the great-souled person, but you will be familiar with this discussion, and readers of this post who are not familiar with it can look up the above-referenced book and chapter.

I don’t necessarily agree with everything in Aristotle’s delineation of the great-souled person, but I think the modern terms “egoism” and “altruism” are not applicable. This brings me to the reference in your essay to Ayn Rand. It happens that, during the 1970s and early 1980s, I read all of Rand’s major works, some of them several times. As you may be aware, the common view that people have of Rand is that she advocated selfishness and even illegality à la Wall Street predators. But, although she titled a book The Virtue of Selfishness, she made it clear that she did not mean “selfishness” in the popular sense. Rather, she meant something closer to what is meant by “rational self-interest.” The emphasis here is on the word “rational.” Rand repeatedly said that it was unethical and should be illegal for a person to initiate force or fraud against another (called “the nonaggression principle,” which, as you undoubtedly know, goes back at least to Locke and is also shared by some other political libertarians and—before they morphed into theocratic ideology—anarchocapitalists). Rand did oppose altruism, though in The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged she approved of a wealthier person assisting a poorer but deserving person with financial assistance. Rand’s rants against altruism may (or may not) be explained by the fact that she grew up in the Soviet Union at a time when totalitarianism was perpetrated under the name of altruism (see her semi-autobiographical novel, set in the Soviet Union, titled We the Living). To her, altruism meant sacrifice of the self to others in the manner of Soviet or Nazi totalitarianism.

I don’t agree with most of Rand’s philosophy, especially her political and economic doctrines. But she did have a few insights that appear, here and there, in her writings. These insights are not, however, what are conveyed in the secondary literature, whether of her epigones or of her critics. It suffices for popular consumption that her views are portrayed in simplistic and somewhat inaccurate terms. But, as I say, I don’t agree with most of what she wrote in any event.

June 16, 2020 Note: See my comment about Churchill at post 97 here.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Allen, it is interesting that your views are almost the exact opposite of my own. That’s all right. It serves the purpose of a discussion group such as this one for different views to be elaborated and discussed. I don’t have time to address all of your points (many of which I’ve already addressed), but I would note the following for now:

Allen wrote (#109): "If someone were to grow up in a social vacuum, totally alone from the day they are born, would an ethical life be possible for them? My answer would be in the negative. Ethics is only possible when we are enmeshed in a community, with other people who hold us accountable for our decisions."

Of course, one could not be totally alone from the day they are born. No infant would survive more than a day or two, if that.

Further, I disagree with your statement that “[e]thics is only possible when we are enmeshed in a community, with other people who hold us accountable for our decisions." I think there are two kinds of ethics: (1) ethics toward oneself, and (2) ethics regarding others. Assume the scenario that a person was marooned on an island otherwise uninhabited by humans. Suppose that such person was so disheartened by the situation that s/he just sat down on a rock and wailed for hours and days on end instead of rationally figuring out how to survive; the end result would be death caused by an irrational failure of nerve. Suppose, in the alternative, that such person was shipwrecked with 100 crates of liquor and enough food to last for many weeks and that the person, in another act of irrationality, simply drank to the point of oblivion and, ultimately, death. Both of these scenarios—and probably many more that I have not yet thought of—would exhibit unethical human behavior destructive to one’s own well-being and survival.

The ancients did not limit ethics to interpersonal relations. They also considered ethics that applies only to oneself. See, for example, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. See also the illustrations of disordered souls (minds) in Plato’s Republic, where the principal effect of the unethical conduct was not on others but on the person perpetrating that conduct. Thus, Aristotle discusses such virtues as courage and moderation, wholly apart from the effects on others. Plato makes similar observations in the Republic and other works. I am happily a couple of millennia or so behind the times in this regard.

[Allen]

Alan wrote: "Allen, it is interesting that your views are almost the exact opposite of my own. That’s all right. It serves the purpose of a discussion group such as this one for different views to be elaborated..."

It's lunchtime now, so here's my reply.

Let us assume for a moment that a child could be brought up from infancy by robots, and that those robots could care for every basic need of this individual from birth to old age and death.

Such an individual would lack the capacity for morality or ethics in several important respects.

1) In a trivial sense, such an individual would not be capable of morality because he or she would only possess the most primitive means of using language to make moral claims and moral commitments.

2) Let us suppose this individual was taught a language or invented one so that he or she could formulate coherent attempts to reason about goals and his or her present state. Such an individual would still lack the capability for morality, because the morality that the language would presuppose would never be exercised. By that I mean use of vocabulary such as "morally necessary" or "demanded by morality" would simply be stand-ins for strictly ratiocinative, calculative attempts to achieve a goal, even if the individual used these words to describe why he or she was doing something.

What I mean is, let us suppose that the individual has access to distilled spirits and discovers it is not a good idea to drink to excess. One might argue that this individual has discovered the cardinal virtue of temperance. I would disagree. They would have discovered temperance, but it would not be a moral virtue because morality is fundamentally concerned with social display and adherence to standards first defined by a community. Standards imposed internally without any reference to a community standard do not, in my view, constitute morality.

So far, I would concede that my argument is merely assertive without appeal to a further layer of justification. However, my opinion is based on how I have observed children are taught morality - namely, by virtue signaling. I think our discomfort with virtue signaling is not because it is wrong, but because it is childish. But morality is fundamentally something social, and even when one comes into maturity and ceases to speak about moral matters, one is forever indebted to the moral habits first inculcated in childhood. And those moral habits were first learned in an environment where moral display was fundamental to their acquisition. In fact, I think for adults, without exercise of our capacity for moral display with other human beings, our moral impulse gradually atrophies. Morality withers in a social vacuum.

To return to my previous post, I think I have been far too verbose in how I have formulated what I was trying to say. The argument is very simple, possibly simplistic. I have included it below formulated in terms of propositional logic.

S: Human beings solve moral problems
M: Morality exists

P1: S
P2: S -> M

1) S [P1]
2) S -> M. [P2]
3) M. [(1) and (2), modus ponens]

Expanded into everyday language the argument is as follows: 1) Human beings solve moral problems. 2) If human beings solve moral problems, morality exists. 3) Since (1) and (2), morality exists.

Note that whether we have free will is not necessary to my argument, which is why I say I do not think it is important to ethics or morality whether we have free will.

Of course, I should close by saying I know that neither Bob nor Alan (and possibly others) will find this argument convincing. But this is my attempt to formulate a coherent argument.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Allen wrote: "Alan wrote: "Allen, it is interesting that your views are almost the exact opposite of my own. That’s all right. It serves the purpose of a discussion group such as this one for different views to ..."

Again, I totally disagree. I don't think morality (ethics) is fundamentally social, which would mean it is fundamentally conventional, which would mean that it is fundamentally relativistic (culturally and historically). The socially conditioned morality of a Nazi regime (see the recent "Man in the High Castle" series on Amazon Prime Videos), in that view, would be morally equivalent to the morality of people raised in a more enlightened environment. To the contrary, I think morality/ethics is rooted in human nature, especially human reason (both ends and means).

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

ADDENDUM TO MY PRECEDING POST:

As I have said repeatedly on this site, I am interested in informal logic (applicable to human ethics and politics) rather than formal, symbolic logic. Human beings are not computers. Nevertheless, it is important for humans to engage in critical, rational thinking about matters that concern them, and this is why the study of both inductive and deductive fallacies is so important. I don’t have time to try to decipher your symbolic logic, and I have no interest in doing so.

[Allen]

Thank you for your quick reply. I will reply in turn when I get off from work.

Regarding the symbol M, I think a better definition is "Morality is possible for humans." It is more precise than the nebulous "morality exists."

[Allen]

It is a slow Friday, so had time to write a response while still at the office.

About the point whether morality is social, let us leave aside for the moment whether morality is, as you say, conventional. Let us discuss what I mean when I say morality is social. I have already made one observation about how children learn morality. Let us explore another sense in which I mean that morality is social. I am referring to morality talk

For example, if I were to say, "One must not inter Jews or homosexuals in concentration camps." I am not simply saying that I must not inter Jews and homosexuals in concentration camps, but that you shouldn't either! That is what I mean when I say it is social. It makes a truth claim about validity with implications of universality. One may not always follow through on those universal implications, but they are always implicit, however much one states that, "This is what works for me, what works for you may be different." If one truly believes those words, then one is no longer making a moral claim, but simply expressing a moral preference. In some sense, such a preference ceases to be moral at all.

My point about persons who grew up surrounded only by robots is that, without an ability to refer to actual, other human beings, such persons would be unable to sensibly mean what they say when making a universal moral claim, even if forming the words on their tongues or writing the words on a piece of paper proved to be of no difficulty. Perhaps you might object that such persons could simply conceive of individuals other than themselves abiding by some moral rule, in which case their understanding of the semantic meaning would be there as they made a given moral claim. I would respond that the lack these orphans have of actual experience relating to other people would deprive them of an ability to make moral assertions with what I would call the necessary import to be moral. In other words, I don't think they could mean it in a way people who had grown up around actual people could mean it.

Regarding the indeterminacy of unreconcilable values as simply conventional, I want to say that one can always try to find an objectively universal basis for one's morals. One can always appeal to more fundamental values that guide one's morality when making judgment calls, so that it is not just "merely" conventional when I condemn the actions of Nazi Germany. I can argue that there is an uncontroversial human desire to remove human suffering that serves as a basis for my opinion. And I would intend my moral claim to be universally binding. But if the person I am talking with cannot agree even to that, it is there I stop mentioning "universal" and "objective" values," and instead go to the ballot box, or as the case may be, the army registration office. (I should note that I am by temperament a pacifist.) The point is that the values cannot be universal if there are biologically healthy people who can reject them and give plausible reasons for doing so. Perhaps you might still make the case that the values are still objective for all that, and if people were only rational, they would accept them as true. That is possible, although I disagree that such is the case. People are selectively rational, so that I am not even sure I can even conceive of someone being "fully rational." I'm not sure someone like that would continue to qualify as human.

Nevertheless, I see the value of universal, objective values, precisely because without them humans are conflict-prone. If human beings were governable purely by reason, and objective morals existed, we would be able to settle differences with appeal to a universal standard instead of engaging in political elections or armed conflicts. However, I do not think such values exist, even though I sincerely wish they did. So, in retrospect, I have to concede that you have described my position aptly - that I do think values are ultimately conventional. Or to use Alisdair MacIntyre's term, I think all morality is ultimately "emotive," especially when it seeks to be universally binding, (as it must be according to me.) When rational appeals and other forms of persuasion no longer suffice, and tolerance is unconscionable, the alternative is the strategic and selective use of material force, which I think must always be a choice of last resort. But I think it may be legitimately pursued in many situations. (Of course, you would be right in saying such "legitimacy" would itself be simply conventional.) My point is that where words fail, deeds must suffice.

Regarding my attempt to summarize my argument in propositional logic, I now think my attempt rather misses the point. (I also understand, Alan, if you do not care for symbolic logic.) Let us say the premisses are all sound, and that we accept the conclusion. So humans are capable of morality. But without free will, what does that tell us? Surely for the sake of universal human dignity we would want to guarantee all people are capable of morality, that the choice should be up to them whether to live up to it. In consideration of this objection, I think the only thing to do is to return to my original approach: to show that free will, even if it exists, is necessarily circumscribed by the demands of morality, and that in the case of determinism, free will and agency are not necessary to morality. I am now somewhat skeptical about the whole approach, to be honest. However, I would like to maintain, separate from this argument concerning free will, that morality is fundamentally social. Of that, I am convinced, which is something unusual for my skeptical self.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Allen, you are a good writer and you have thought these issues out. I disagree with several of your premises, as I have stated in previous comments. One of the things I said was that there is such a thing as ethics that applies only to oneself and that is apart from ethics that applies to interpersonal relations. With regard to ethics that applies to oneself (rationality regarding ends and means, moderation, courage, etc.), neither other people nor words are necessary. Again, the lone individual marooned on an island in the middle of the ocean has no "other" human with whom to communicate or interact. Such lone individual must mobilize reason and courage to figure out how to survive with no help from anyone else. There are many other situations in which ethics applies only to an individual who is alone and not interacting with other people regarding same. I discussed some of these scenarios in my 2000 book on ethics (which is out of print and some statements in which I no longer agree) and will develop them further in my forthcoming Reason and Human Ethics.

You also seem to conflate what I would call "natural" principles of morality/ethics—above all, reason in both ends and means but also courage, moderation, noninitiation of force (apart from governmental matters), treating others with Kantian “dignity” (as Bob Hanna would say), etc. etc.—with whether they are “universal,” by which I gather you mean universally accepted. There are no “universal” moral values in the sense that they are universally accepted. That does not mean, however, that there are no objective, “natural” moral principles that some but not all (in the foreseeable future) humans recognize and attempt to follow in their daily lives.

[Robert]

I guess it is a sign of my predilections that as I read these interesting exchanges I find myself seeing them framed, at the most general level, by an opposition between variants of dualism (Alan, Robert) and monism (Allen, Chris).

The dualism sees two realities, but in this variant the two are not totally separated but instead linked, this linkage presumably centered at the mind-body problem.

The monism sees one reality, totally determined and therefore presumably necessary (not sure you can have determinism without necessity, but maybe I'm wrong about that). In this variant, what is distinctive is that the determined totality contains one level where there is an illusion of freedom.

Whereas the dualism has the difficult mind-body problem, the monism has the difficult problem of why the deterministic totality contains an illusion of freedom. Not sure, but the totality seems to need the illusion to perpetuate itself.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Robert wrote: "I guess it is a sign of my predilections that as I read these interesting exchanges I find myself seeing them framed, at the most general level, by an opposition between variants of dualism (Alan, Robert) and monism (Allen, Chris)."

I am not a dualist, Cartesian or otherwise. Rather, I agree with neuroscientists William R. (W. R.) Klemm and Peter Ulric Tse and philosopher-astrophysicist Bob Doyle (whose books I have respectively reviewed here , here , and here ) that free will is the result of evolution by natural selection. There is no “soul” that mysteriously inhabits a body while the body is alive. In an unusual twist, hearkening back perhaps to Plato’s metaphysical (exoteric?) speculations, quantum physicist Henry P. Stapp posits that free will appears to be dualistic but ends up being monistic in the sense that everything is ultimately nonmaterial. See my review of one of Stapp’s books on this subject here .

[Allen]

To Alan: I think what I have learned from these exchanges is that I am in fact a communitarian. Without having discussed this here, I would not have realized this. Regarding "natural" principles of morality and ethics, I am not sure what I think about this idea, although our modern conception of human rights I've been told can be interpreted through a natural law framework. I will have to think more about this issue.

To Robert: I actually have a reply to the question of why we have the illusion of freedom. It occurred to me as I was drafting my other replies. I will share it sometime later. I'm not sure I actually believe this argument, but it is a coherent one. I was inspired by the notion of sankhara from the Buddhist doctrine of pratityasamutpada. It "feels" like an explanation that should be reserved for a scientific finding about neurons and perception, and hence I do not like my explanation, but I think it is worth sharing, if only as a curiosity.

[Allen]

Regarding the monism and dualism discussion and its implications for free will: Donald Davidson's anomalous monism when I first heard it seemed to be a "way out" for proponents of free will to insist that they are monists as well.

I just checked the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on anomalous monism, and it seems the topic has a few nuances that might escape those (like me) who are first coming to the topic. I have not read the whole article, or even the entire section on free will, but I leave the link here for those interested.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/an...

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Allen wrote: "Regarding the monism and dualism discussion and its implications for free will: Donald Davidson's anomalous monism when I first heard it seemed to be a "way out" for proponents of free will to insi..."

Thank you for the SEP reference, which I will check out. Although I have not yet read Donald Davidson’s writings, I have encountered his ideas in other sources, e.g. discussions in Robert Kane’s The Significance of Free Will and in his edited collection of essays titled The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed.; Timothy O’Connor’s Persons and Causes; the discussion here of Davidson on Bob Doyle’s Information Philosopher website; and the Wikipedia article on anomalous monism. I also note that Bob Hanna and Michelle Maise have an extended discussion of Davidson in their book Embodied Minds in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). I have begun reading Embodied Minds in Action but have not yet reached that discussion. Bob Hanna may have more to say about Davidson in the present forum.

Although the discussion of anomalous monism might more properly belong in the Free Will topic, the present topic is interrelated with the Free Will topic, and I may eventually cross-reference discussions of free will herein in the Free Will topic.

[Robert]

This is another interesting discussion!

For the record, I'm not a dualist either, but instead defend what I call "the essential embodiment theory."

This view says that conscious minds are nothing more & nothing less than the irreducible global dynamic structures of suitably complex living organisms, as per this book--

https://www.academia.edu/21620839/Emb...

Or as a bumper-sticker slogan:

Conscious mind is a form of life.

And here's an essay-length version of that, called "Minding the Body"--

https://www.academia.edu/4458670/Mind...

And the extension to free will & persons says that free will & real persons are irreducible forms of rational, conscious minded life.

Or as another bumper-sticker slogan:

Conscious mind & free will are forms of life, & you are your life--now do something with it.

Here's the book-length version of that--

https://www.academia.edu/35801857/The...

And here's an essay-length version, called "Natural Libertarianism: A New Theory of Free Agency"--

https://www.academia.edu/40466800/Nat...

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

I have just added the following to post 1 in the present topic:

2/29/2020 Note: There are some discussions of free will in the present topic. Please note that there is also a separate topic titled Free Will, which includes many additional comments about that subject.

[Robert]

Here's a quick note about Davidson's anomalous monism, which I'll also cross-post in the Free Will thread.

Davidson's "Mental Events" is a classic (& I think the first explicit) statement of non-reductive materialism, aka non-reductive physicalism.

Davidson holds that (i) the world is made entirely & exclusively out of physical objects & events, governed by strict natural causal laws,

(ii) mental events are 1-1 identical with physical events,

(iii) some physical events can also have rational mental properties characteristic of language-use, thinking, & rationality, truly attributed to them &

(iv) those rational mental properties are holistic & not reducible to strict natural causal laws (this thesis is also called the "anomalous character of the mental").

So, although every mental event is identical with a physical event, irreducible rational mental properties can be truly attributed to some physical events.

Hence this view is a version of property dualism without substance dualism.

Many philosophers have noted that there are at least two big problems with Davidson's view.

First, D ignores consciousness & reduces mentality to rationality.

Second--& this is a big problem for every version of non-reductive materialism/physicalism, even those versions that identify mentality with consciousness--mental properties are epiphenomenal & causally inert, because all causal efficacy is exclusively located in physical objects & events, hence mental properties are mere shadows of the physical world, & thus the physical causally excludes the mental.

This latter criticism, most famously made by Jaegwon Kim, is sometimes called "the causal exclusion argument," & he also combines it with the further thesis that unless human rationality is causally efficacious, then rational human moral agency is impossible.

Interestingly, Kim is (was--he died a few months ago) a reductive physicalist.

But of course anti-materialists/physicalists--e.g., I--can ALSO deploy his causal exclusion argument against non-reductive materialism/physicalism....

[Allen]

Thank you Robert. I plan to read the entire SEP article on anomalous monism before returning to your post.

I just want to note a few thoughts that occurred to me as I was driving to the office this morning.

1) Regarding "natural" principles of morality and ethics, I am aware of Jonathan Haidt's attempts to describe morality in terms of his moral foundations theory. His theory attempts to classify different political beliefs according to their adherence to different moral foundations. If I remember his argument correctly, Haidt's contention is that morality is driven by "low-level" psychological impulses that we are not fully conscious of. I am not sure if Haidt uses the word "emotional" to describe these impulses, but I think it is an apt characterization.

2) Since Alan has said there is a long history in philosophy of describing morality and ethics as possible for a single individual, then I would submit what I am describing is a view of morality separate from that tradition. I do not think it is a novel view, as I am sure it has occurred to many people before. I would venture to suggest a change of terminology so that we can be clear in our discussion. My description of morality and ethics I would demarcate with the word 德 (romanized as de, pronounced "duh") in Chinese. It is here that I wish I had a better command of the classical works of Chinese philosophy than merely having read them in English translation. My understanding however is that 德 refers to more than morality and ethics as some kind of norm for behavior, but also connotes the gravity when so invoked as a standard in a social context. I don't want to make it seem it is just a foreign concept with no relevance to us, but that perhaps with the rise of social media it represents a way of engaging in moral discourse that has entered the mainstream. So too, given the influence of Christianity, it is perhaps not so foreign a conception of morality and ethics after all, although before the rise of social media we would have primarily associated it with a religious context.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

In response to Allen’s preceding post, please note that my “natural” basis for ethics is not found, to my knowledge, in any twentieth- or twenty-first-century philosophical system. It is rooted (to the extent it is rooted at all in previous philosophy) in Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethical understandings. Compare Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

I am still working out the details of my approach and also have to write my book on free will first. Thereafter, I will write and publish my final statement on ethics, provisionally entitled Reason and Human Ethics.

[Allen]

I forgot to state this in my post, but one thing I wanted to point out was that if Haidt is right, then ethics in practice is divergently realized because people have differing moral foundations. That is, if people have differing moral foundations, and this causes different moral and political beliefs, doesn't that suggest that the account of a natural basis for ethics must be modified to account for different realizations of morality and ethics in practice? Especially consider if the tendency to hold different moral foundations has a genetic basis - wouldn't that upend the natural conception of ethics as traditionally conceived by a still-more "natural" basis with a biological origin? (Of course, these two uses of the word "natural" have nothing to do with each other. I am just comparing them to make a point.)

I am not conversant at all with the literature concerning natural law, natural rights, or a natural basis for morality and ethics, but this is what occurred to me as I was driving to work this morning. I am not sure I would say that I disagree that a natural basis for morality and ethics exists, as traditionally conceived. But I would be skeptical that it could survive unmodified in light of Haidt's work.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Allen wrote: "I forgot to state this in my post, but one thing I wanted to point out was that if Haidt is right, then ethics in practice is divergently realized because people have differing moral foundations. T..."

All this modern/postmodern cultural and historicist relativism leaves me stone cold.

Sure, there are different historical and cultural traditions. But philosophical inquiry used to mean (see: Plato) that we use rational (not historical) dialectic to ascend from opinion to knowledge. That's the difference between history and philosophy.

Additionally, there are genetic differences among humans that affect, for example, their susceptibility to particular diseases, but there are no genetic differences that would necessitate different moral/ethical orientations. That view would be akin to the racial theories (cf. Herbert Spencer and Social Darwinism) of yesteryear.

We should indeed be respectful of long-established moral/ethical traditions (I have always respected Confucianism, for example), but there are other traditions (e.g., Nazism and racism) that are not admirable and that deserve to disappear (even if they keep popping up later, as we see in our own time). The existence of different moral traditions does not mean, however, that philosophical inquiry should not attempt to ascertain the proper basis for human ethics by way of rational reflection.

[Allen]

I won't reply at length to your post, Alan, because there is something else that I am supposed to be doing right now. But I want to say I actually don't like the idea that our political and moral beliefs are influenced by genetic factors. However, I have encountered evidence (and by that I mean scientific studies) that such is the case. I should say that I am not sure if Jonathan Haidt actually makes this claim in his book The Righteous Mind, but it is consistent with his account.

[Allen]

Actually, what I said is incredibly sloppy. There is no direct evidence that there is a genetic basis for our moral or political beliefs, but there is evidence that our moral and political beliefs are correlated with qualities that might contribute to our moral and political beliefs. There is reason to believe (and by that I mean I think it is plausible) that they qualities have a genetic component. Since I'm not able to call to mind the studies themselves, I should be clear how tenuous the claim I am making really is.

[Allen]

I think the gold standard in the way of scientific studies of whether our personality, political beliefs, and personal interests have a genetic component is identical twin studies. The researchers in these studies compare identical twins who were separated at birth to compare how similar they are. Based on what I am able to recall about these studies, these twins separated at birth share deeply similar qualities, including but not limited to personality, political beliefs, and personal interests, that cannot be explained by a shared upbringing. After all, they were separated by birth.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Allen wrote: "I think the gold standard in the way of scientific studies of whether our personality, political beliefs, and personal interests have a genetic component is identical twin studies. The researchers ..."

So should all ethical orientations be considered equal just because they are influenced by different genetic makeups? Should we then give the psychopath (which has been proved to have a genetic basis) the same moral standing as Socrates? Should we have different laws for different people?

There are genetic differences, of course, but humans have, in my view, an ability to reason their way free of minor genetic differences.

[Allen]

Alan wrote: "Allen wrote: "I think the gold standard in the way of scientific studies of whether our personality, political beliefs, and personal interests have a genetic component is identical twin studies. Th..."

I don't think we should have different laws for different people, but I do think that laws are different because different people write them. And that people may be different for reasons such as, but not limited to their genetic makeup. (Of course, there is not going to be one gene that makes you a Republican.) And I think we should do our best to structure society so that people who have a natural disposition to psychopathy will not be driven to be psychopaths.

In any case, I am not sure how important genetic factors are. We are ill-equipped to deal with how differing genetic makeup will affect us, so as to reverse its effects, even when we know genetics could be a cause. My understanding is that there is just very little known.

[Robert]

Does human morality have its foundation in God or religion, & if not, what is the relationship, if any, between human morality on the one hand, & God or religion on the other?

Just in case those questions interest you, here's the third section of the chapter on "Morality and Religion" in Morality and the Human Condition--

Morality and the Human Condition, #10–Religion and Morality.
https://againstprofphil.org/2020/03/0...

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

THE TROLLEY PROBLEM—TODAY

I always considered the trolley problem to be somewhat trivial on the ground that such a situation is unlikely to happen to any individual and, if it did happen, there is no right answer, ethically speaking.

Fast forward to today—or, literally, this week. See this March 25, 2020 article titled “Hospitals Consider Universal Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders for Coronavirus Patients.” The situation is chilling. I was wrong in assuming that no such situation would occur in our lifetimes. However, again, I have no idea what the right answer is.

[Allen]

Alan wrote: "THE TROLLEY PROBLEM—TODAY

I always considered the trolley problem to be somewhat trivial on the ground that such a situation is unlikely to happen to any individual and, if it did happen, there i..."

Tragic. I'm curious to see what the inside of a hospital in New York looks like right now, but I'm not, well, dying to satisfy my curiosity.

[Robert]

Cuomo may have been preparing the way for something similar at his news conference today when he talked at length about how data was showing that the longer you are on a respirator the greater the chance that you will not survive.

[Allen]

I just read that the researcher who came up with the figure of 2.2 million deaths if no intervention is attempted has downgraded his figure. That's good news for us.

https://www.dailywire.com/news/epidem...

[Robert]

Here's a quick follow-up thought about Alan's & Allen's very interesting comments, in ##136-137, on the Trolley Problem today.

I completely agree that after Philippa Foot's & Judith Jarvis Thomson's original articles on the Trolley Problem in the context of the doctrine of double effect & the killing vs letting die distinction, then the secondary literature snowballed & became very scholastic in the bad sense, especially once the cognitive scientists got into the act.

But the original intention of the Trolley thought-experiment was to show that (i) sometimes it's morally permissible to kill a few innocent people in order to save many others from dying, (ii) but that this isn't unrestrictedly true, & there are some such cases in which it's morally impermissible, so (iii) what's the moral difference between the cases in which we can save many mortally-threatened people by killing a few innocents, & the seemingly very similar cases in which, although we could also save many mortally threatened people by killing a few innocents, it's morally impermissible?

Utilitarians generally think that there's really no moral difference at all, hence we can always permissibly kill a few innocent people in order to save many other mortally threatened people, & that the belief that there is one is just a cognitive illusion, which, when we've liberated ourselves from it, will enable us to maximize utility unrestrictedly.

But Kantians think that the difference between the permissible cases & the impermissible cases is that (i) in the permissible ones, the few innocent victims are just morally unlucky in being caught up in the threat-situation & would (if they could distance themselves from their actual situation & reflect on it) rationally consent to dying in order to save many others, whereas (ii) in the impermissible cases, the innocent victims are innocent bystanders, not caught up in the threat-situation, who are being treated merely as a means for saving many others.

So as applied to the NY case, the Kantians would say that although it's very bad moral luck for a few people in NY not to be resuscitated so that many others can live, it's still morally permissible, whereas the Utilitarians would say that if, somehow, you could save hundreds or thousands just by coercively snatching a few uninfected people off the street & killing them (perhaps in order to use them to create a serum), then that would be not only morally permissible but also morally obligatory.

Not surprisingly, I side with the Kantians on this one, & agree with them that the latter scenario is clearly morally impermissible, even though the NY no-resuscitation policy might still be morally permissible.

But in any case, it turns out, as Alan & Allen pointed out, catastrophically & unhappily, that the Trolley Problem is morally relevant after all....

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Robert wrote: "Here's a quick follow-up thought about Alan's & Allen's very interesting comments, in ##136-137, on the Trolley Problem today.

I completely agree that after Philippa Foot's & Judith Jarvis Thomson..."

Thank you, Bob, for your thoughtful comment.

[Jim]

Thanks for your reply Alan.

Alan wrote (#136)

I always considered the trolley problem to be somewhat trivial on the ground that such a situation is unlikely to happen to any individual and, if it did happen, there is no right answer, ethically speaking.

Unless I mis-understand the "trolley problem", it seems essentially the same as "triage problems" in war and to address disasters where demand for care greatly exceeds the supply.

and thanks for this:

See “Hospitals Consider Universal Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders for Coronavirus Patients.” The situation is chilling. I was wrong in assuming that no such situation would occur in our lifetimes.

"universal" - whatever - triage protocols are considerably more subtle than blanket ("universal") policies.

As the article pointed out - some of the motivation is to limit exposure to nurses/doctors/orderlies - especially when the patient is old (has fewer life-months than other patients) and less-likely to survive even with "heroic" (extreme) measures.

It seems to me this and other considerations are the essence of triage - not a new problem - though such certainly may be for most Amercian health care professionals.

Triage of Suspected COIVD-19 Patients in non-US Healthcare Settings

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-...

"This document is provided by CDC and is intended for use in non-US healthcare settings."

"NEWS"

I have mostly stopped reading/listening/watching "the news" - since so much of it is a litany of infection, testing, and death figures - without "leavening" context - population stats, rates, definitions of those rates.

I invite anyone in this discussion to help filter that stuff to the relevant.

For those that "do numbers", see the link below to daily WHO updates with gross statistics at the front - on the right sidebar - with more detail by region further down:

A crucial definition- a comfirmed case is "A person with laboratory confirmation of COVID-19 infection, irrespective of clinical signs and symptoms."

The set of those hospitalized would almost certainly be a subset of those "confirmed cases".

For most of us, the concern is (should be) NOT how it goes in the most "newsworthy" locations (the hardest hit cities and their hospitals) - but the broad snapshot for the nation.

(apologies for folks in those cities)

To that perspective - and for my own peace-of-mind - I grabbed five snapshots of the WHO date for the US-at-large - at five-day intervals

SUMMARY

As of 03APR - the WHO "death rate" for the U.S. is 2.2% - this is:

(Total deaths )/(Total confirmed‡ cases)

Growth Rates for WHO confirmed cases and deaths, are, as one might expect, growing exponentially:

Cases - daily rate doubling every five days
Deaths - daily rate doubling every 3-4 days

Total U.S. Deaths (WHO) 03APR - 4793
Total U.S. Deaths (CDC) 03APR - 5443

Total U.S. "Confirmed Cases" (WHO) 03APR - 213,600
Total U.S. Cases (CDC) 03APR - 239,279

I have not had any luck finding an explicit definition of "Cases" as used for covid by CDC - however, the close match of WHO and CDC case figures suggest they both represent "confirmed cases" as used by by WHO (see above).



WHO link:
https://www.who.int/emergencies/disea...

CDC link:
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-...

[Smitvikas]

Hello, I want to begin with ethical philosophy reading. Can anyone suggest a book on ethical philosophy considering I am new to the philosophy genre ?

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

Smitvikas wrote: "Hello, I want to begin with ethical philosophy reading. Can anyone suggest a book on ethical philosophy considering I am new to the philosophy genre ?"

In various posts in the present thread, I have discussed some books I have read concerning ethics. I have not, however, been satisfied with those books for the reasons I have stated. I am preparing my own book on ethics (replacing an inadequate book I published in 2000), provisionally entitled Reason and Human Ethics, which will not be completed and published until a few years from now.

In the meantime, I recommend books that Robert Hanna (a member of this group) has written on the subject of ethics. These books are more technical and scholarly than my forthcoming book will be, though I have not yet read them. Bob, a member of this group, has listed some of these books (which can be accessed at no charge in preprint/internet form) in other topics in this group. I request that he provide a list in this topic after my present post.

To my mind, the foundation of ethics is in a (nonreligious) teleological understanding of human nature, with reason (properly understood, for example, as in Plato and Aristotle) being the ultimate principle and all else following from it. My view might be similar to Kant’s in some respects (for example, in what I understand to be his rejection of Scottish “common sense” ethics) but different in others (for example, in my rejection of deontological rules [“categorical imperatives”] and adopting an approach something like—but not identical to—that in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics).

Thus, in my understanding, “ought” derives from “is” where the “is” is human nature, understood in light of the above-indicated teleological principle. And, yes, I have just uttered words—“human nature” and “teleological”—that are absolutely verboten (forbidden) in contemporary academic discourse. And that macht nichts (doesn't matter) to me.

[Smitvikas]

Alan wrote: "Smitvikas wrote: "Hello, I want to begin with ethical philosophy reading. Can anyone suggest a book on ethical philosophy considering I am new to the philosophy genre ?"

In various posts in the pr..."

Thanks Alan

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

ADDENDUM TO MY POST 144:

The one book I have read on ethics that I have found most enlightening is Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, though this is a difficult work that requires some effort in understanding and interpreting. See the “Ethical Philosophy of Aristotle” topic of the present group for additional information. For my interpretation of Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics, see my essay here.

See also the “Free Will” topic as well as other topics in the “Ethics” folder of this group.

[Robert]

In #143, Smitvikas wrote: Hello, I want to begin with ethical philosophy reading. Can anyone suggest a book on ethical philosophy considering I am new to the philosophy genre ?

Of course, there are many very good introductory ethics texts out there, & probably the most widely used ones are these two--

https://www.amazon.com/Elements-Moral...

https://www.amazon.com/Fundamentals-E...

But aside from those, if you'd prefer something that's less orthodox-professional-academic, here's a free downloadable .pdf of the current working draft of a book based on my lectures for an undergraduate Introductory Ethics course I taught for several decades--

https://www.academia.edu/41451992/Mor...

And for those who are gluttons for philosophical punishment, here are three more advanced & systematic books, one on Kantian ethics & human existence, one on moral theology & political philosophy, & finally a third on social philosophy--

https://www.academia.edu/36359647/The...

https://www.academia.edu/36359665/The...

https://www.academia.edu/38764188/The...

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

My 2000 book First Philosophy and Human Ethics: A Rational Inquiry set forth my argument (held by me as long as I can remember) that human ethics is/should be governed by human nature in a teleological sense (reason, rightly understood, being at its peak). Hume to the contrary notwithstanding, the “is” (teleological human nature) dictates the “ought.” Since I now disagree with some other statements I set forth in the 2000 book, I have taken it out of print. I will elaborate my more developed theory of ethics in my forthcoming book Reason and Human Ethics (provisional title).

[Feliks]

I just learned of a book on ethics, which until today I had not known or heard about: 'The Extremes of Good and Evil' by Cicero. Supposedly it experienced a resurgence in popularity during the Italian Renaissance.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

With regard to nonhuman free will and ethics, see posts 165-67 and 170-71 in the “Immanuel Kant” topic.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

For the disagreement between Aristotle and Kant regarding the basis of ethics, see my post 226 in the “Immanuel Kant” topic. Comments on Kant's ethical philosophy are interspersed throughout this topic.

[Robert]

Dear All,

I was thinking that some of you might be interested in this--

Philosophical Foundations for Digital Ethics and AI Ethics: A Dignitarian Approach.
https://link.springer.com/article/10....

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

My recently published book Free Will and Human Life discusses arguments against free will (Chapter 1), arguments for free will (Chapter 2), and my own views about free will (Chapter 3).

I have now resumed work on my book provisionally titled Reason and Human Ethics. I anticipate that this book will be published sometime in 2022.

July 9, 2022 NOTE:

My book Reason and Human Ethics has now been published in both paperback and Kindle. The Amazon link is at https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Human-E.... A book description and synopsis is posted at https://www.academia.edu/82205975/_Re....

Today, I posted the following on Academia.edu: “Excerpts from Reason and Human Ethics by Alan E. Johnson” (https://www.academia.edu/82835731/Exc...). The front matter (excerpts), Chapter 1 ("What Is the Basis of Human Ethics?"), and Chapter 2 ("Human Reason") of Reason and Human Ethics were included in this public post. These excerpts are from the published book. Chapters 3 ("Individual Ethics"), 4 ("Social Ethics"), 5 ("Citizen and Media Ethics") 6 ("Political Ethics"), and the Appendix ("Conflicts among the Claims to Revelation") were not included.

I also deleted the previous papers on Academia.edu that constituted excerpts from earlier drafts of this book.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

I have reviewed Alasdair MacIntyre’s book After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory here.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

I have just posted the current draft of Chapter 1 ("What Is the Basis of Human Ethics?") of my forthcoming book Reason and Human Ethics at https://www.academia.edu/65022633/Wha.... This chapter discusses the following theories of the basis of ethics: relativism, classical reason (Plato, Aristotle), religion, modern moral sentiment/emotion (Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Jonathan Haidt), utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill), virtue ethics, evolutionary biology, and a secular teleological view of human nature (my own view). If any member of this Goodreads group has any questions or comments after reading this chapter, they can post them in the present thread, and I will respond accordingly.

Chapters 2 ("Human Reason"), 3 ("Individual Ethics"), 4 ("Social Ethics"), 5 ("Citizen and Media Ethics"), and 6 ("Political Ethics") are still in progress. An appendix will discuss the theological and military conflicts among the competing claims to revelation.

The book will be completed and published in 2022.

Alan E. Johnson
Independent Philosopher and Historian

July 9, 2022 NOTE:

Today, I posted the following on Academia.edu: “Excerpts from Reason and Human Ethics by Alan E. Johnson” (https://www.academia.edu/82835731/Exc...). The front matter (excerpts), Chapter 1 ("What Is the Basis of Human Ethics?"), and Chapter 2 ("Human Reason") of Reason and Human Ethics were included in this public post. Chapters 3 ("Individual Ethics"), 4 ("Social Ethics"), 5 ("Citizen and Media Ethics") 6 ("Political Ethics"), and the Appendix ("Conflicts among the Claims to Revelation") were not included.

The above-referenced excerpts are from the published book (see https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Human-E....

I also deleted the previous papers on Academia.edu that constituted excerpts from earlier drafts of this book.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

ADDENDUM TO MY PRECEDING POST:

This morning, I posted a revised draft of Chapter 1 (“What Is Human Ethics?”) of my forthcoming book Reason and Human Ethics on Academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/65022633/Wha.... The revised draft makes a few substantive and stylistic changes to the earlier draft.

July 9, 2022 NOTE:

Today, I posted the following on Academia.edu: “Excerpts from Reason and Human Ethics by Alan E. Johnson” (https://www.academia.edu/82835731/Exc...). The front matter (excerpts), Chapter 1 ("What Is the Basis of Human Ethics?"), and Chapter 2 ("Human Reason") of Reason and Human Ethics were included in this public post. Chapters 3 ("Individual Ethics"), 4 ("Social Ethics"), 5 ("Citizen and Media Ethics") 6 ("Political Ethics"), and the Appendix ("Conflicts among the Claims to Revelation") were not included.

The above-referenced excerpts are from the published book (see https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Human-E....

I also deleted the previous papers on Academia.edu that constituted excerpts from earlier drafts of this book.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

ADDENDUM TO MY POSTS 146 AND 147:

I have now posted April 3, 2022 revisions to my drafts of Chapters 1 (“What Is the Basis of Human Reason?”: https://www.academia.edu/65022633/Wha...) and 2 (“Human Reason”: https://www.academia.edu/74417357/Hum...) of my forthcoming book Reason and Human Ethics.

I have added epigraphs to the previous drafts, which also changes the endnote numbering.

I modified what is now endnote 12 on pages 35–36 of Chapter 1.

With regard to Chapter 2, I have, in light of Bob Wess’s comments (thank you, Bob!), modified the discussion of postmodernism near the bottom of page 6 of Chapter 2 and have also changed the content of endnote 13 in that paragraph. Furthermore, I have added two paragraphs to my discussion of the principle of (non)contradiction on pages 26–27.

Bob Wess and Jim Vice will both appreciate the new epigraph to Chapter 2, which quotes Wayne Booth, Dean of the College (and professor of literature) when we were all at the University of Chicago during the 1960s. Booth’s 1970 book Now Don’t Try to Reason with Me: Essays and Ironies for a Credulous Age contains as chapter 1 his 1967 essay titled “Now Don’t Try to Reason with Me! Rhetoric Today, Left, Right, and Center” from which my quotation is taken. An excerpt from this essay (which was originally a talk to students) was posted by the University of Chicago Magazine at https://mag.uchicago.edu/arts-humanit.... (This magazine article incorrectly states the title of Booth’s 1970 book; the correct title is set forth above.) My update: the more things change, the more they stay the same. It might as well have been written in 2022. I was unaware of Booth’s 1967 essay or his 1970 book until recently. I wish I had read the essay during the late 1960s, as it expressed almost exactly what I was thinking (and even writing) during that period, and my views on that subject have not changed one iota since that time.

This comment is being filed in both the “Reason, Informal Logic, Evidence, and Critical Thinking” and the “Human Ethics: Basis, Principles, Applications” topics of this Goodreads group.

(edited April 4, 2022)

July 9, 2022 NOTE:

Today, I posted the following on Academia.edu: “Excerpts from Reason and Human Ethics by Alan E. Johnson” (https://www.academia.edu/82835731/Exc...). The front matter (excerpts), Chapter 1 ("What Is the Basis of Human Ethics?"), and Chapter 2 ("Human Reason") of Reason and Human Ethics were included in this public post. Chapters 3 ("Individual Ethics"), 4 ("Social Ethics"), 5 ("Citizen and Media Ethics") 6 ("Political Ethics"), and the Appendix ("Conflicts among the Claims to Revelation") were not included.

The above-referenced excerpts are from the published book (see https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Human-E....

I also deleted the previous papers on Academia.edu that constituted excerpts from earlier drafts of this book.

[Alan, Founding Moderator and Author]

ADDENDUM TO MY PRECEDING POST:

I strongly recommend reading the except from Wayne Booth’s 1967 talk to students at https://mag.uchicago.edu/arts-humanit.... I have rarely. If ever, seen such an excellent summary of the meaning of human reason.

[Peter]

Alan wrote: "ADDENDUM TO MY PRECEDING POST:

I strongly recommend reading the except from Wayne Booth’s 1967 talk to students at https://mag.uchicago.edu/arts-humanit.... I have ra..."

Read with thanks. I am trying to understand Prof. Booth's term "honest rhetoric", which on face value seems contradictory. Any more full treatment in your copious reading/writing?