Declaration of the Rights of Man

[Nemo]

Everyman wrote: "..As you well know; one of your typical forms of argument is to deny, either explicitly or implicitly, all postulates, and therefore to deny all logical conclusions...."

Hmm, I wasn't aware of that until now. Thanks for letting me know how my comments have been perceived by you.

I was asking for clarifications and explanations about those "postulates" , and I don't think it is reasonable to demand accepantance of any postulate without explaining its meaning as clearly as possible.

[Everyman]

Nemo wrote: "We cannot know whether the earth is round or flat, unless we come into existence and investigate into the matter. There were/are different theories about the earth, but it doesn't mean that the earth is a mere fantasy of the mind.."

We agree, don't we? The earth is round or flat without our existence or investigation, and whatever our investigation may at any given time say doesn't change the reality of whether it is round or flat or something else (which is what current science says; it is roundly round, but not actually round).

But whether cannibalism is good or bad does require our existence and investigation. And the "reality" of whether it is good or bad does change based on the current status of our investigation and experience. (In certain cultures it was, and apparently remains, acceptable[1]. Then there was Donner Pass. And the famous case of Rex v. Dudley and Stephens, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Dud... )

[1] "Cannibalism was widespread in the past among humans in many parts of the world, continuing into the 19th century in some isolated South Pacific cultures, and to the present day in parts of tropical Africa....Cannibalism has been well documented around the world, from Fiji to the Amazon Basin to the Congo to Māori New Zealand....It is still practiced in Papua New Guinea as of 2012 for cultic reasons and in ritual and in war in various Melanesian tribes. Cannibalism has been said to test the bounds of cultural relativism as it challenges anthropologists "to define what is or is not beyond the pale of acceptable human behavior."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canniba... (citations omitted)

[Nemo]

Everyman wrote: "..the "reality" of whether it is good or bad does change based on the current status of our investigation and experience...."

I think you're conflating reality with opinion. Our opinion of good or bad may change based on our investigation, but the reality of good or bad doesn't.

(As I said before, I don't expect what I say will change your mind, and vice versa. Let's agree to disagree, shall we?)

If I follow your logic about cannibalism (and other similar examples) correctly, you're saying that because the same act can be morally acceptable in some cultures and not acceptable in others, we cannot draw any definite conclusions about its morality.

As i see it, morality does not consist in the act per se, but in will and reason as well. For example, killing someone is not acceptable in the case of murder, but it is acceptable when the murderer is sentenced to death. The same act is morally acceptable in one but not in the other.

Similarly, the act of eating human flesh in and of itself does not decide its morality. In order to make a just judgment, we need to look into each individual case, and investigate into the origin and motive of the act, and whether the act is consistent with the person's moral understanding.

I think it is possible that morality manifests itself in different forms and disguises in different cultures, just as the same object or idea can be expressed in different words and in different languages.

[David]

@ Everyman and Nemo:
How about this excerpt from the notes in my copy of our current reading, Cicero's On Duties which seems to integrate both sides of the argument?

Anthropologists confirm what Cicero says. Morals may vary from time and place and from society to society; in a narrow sense they can thus be said to be “relative.” But this certainly does not mean that morals are worthless. Their relativity only proves their flexibility and resilience as to time and place. Every society has had them and every society needs them. They are products of human social activity and are the glue that hold us all together.

Curtius, Quintus. On Duties: A Guide To Conduct, Obligations, And Decision-Making (Kindle Locations 1619-1623). Fortress of the Mind Publications. Kindle Edition.

[Roger]

Everyman wrote: "Roger wrote: "So your own personal distaste for human sacrifices of captives by the tens of thousands, or for the conquest and extermination of peoples to gain grazing land, is just a personal quir..."

Well, people sometimes reject the morals they are brought up with. Even me, sometimes.

Consider this: If a prophet appeared among the Aztecs and asked people to consider their common humanity and have sympathy with their victims, that we are all equally children of the gods and should treat each other with respect, I think he might get a pretty good following. On the other hand, if a prophet appeared today to tell us that torturing prisoners is jolly good fun and there's nothing wrong with it if you can get away with it, I think he could attract only a handful of psychopaths.

[Nemo]

Speaking of the Trojan War, there seems to be a consensus among both ancients and moderns that certain acts are acceptable in war though not in peace. For example, if someone is killed by another in war, it is not acceptable to seek vengeance after the war is over, but if someone is killed in peace, vengeance is acceptable. I've never quite understood the rationale behind it.

[David]

Roger wrote: "If a prophet appeared among the Aztecs and asked people to consider their common humanity and have sympathy with their victims, that we are all equally children of the gods and should treat each other with respect, I think he might get a pretty good following. . ."

I myself do not give prophets much credit, but I am not so immoral to send one to certain death on a mission like that. What do you have against prophets? Jesus couldn't even pull it off with the Romans and live, although I understand that is a topic of debate :) The prophet and any followers he might acquire would quickly be killed and their blood used to maintain the sun and prevent it from destroying the world, as was the belief. What was perceived by the Aztecs of the time as more beneficial to their society; the burden of maintaining a thousands of captured enemies and safeguarding their rights as human beings, or preventing the world from being destroyed? I would call that an Aztec no-brainer. Again, tantum religio potuit suadere malorum What chance does "be nice to each other" have against a belief like that? And no, before I am accused of it, I am not pro-blood sacrifice.

I have to give some of the blame for these misguided expectations to Mel Gibson. Didn't he make one movie about what happened to a certain prophet with a similar message and another movie about a Mesoamerican attempting to escape being a blood sacrifice. Don't let their profound endings mislead you. :)

[Roger]

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "If a prophet appeared among the Aztecs and asked people to consider their common humanity and have sympathy with their victims, that we are all equally children of the gods and should..."

And yet that doomed self-sacrificing prophet had a good deal of success persuading people to adopt his views, despite the example of his gruesome end. Why is that?

[David]

Roger wrote: "And yet that doomed self-sacrificing prophet had a good deal of success persuading people to adopt his views, despite the example of his gruesome end. Why is that?"

Because people prefer killing an unarmed prophet to dealing with a horde of Spanish conquistadors and the smallpox? :)

[Nemo]

Roger wrote: " If a prophet appeared among the Aztecs and asked people to consider their common humanity and have sympathy with their victims, that we are all equally children of the gods and should treat each other with respect, "

If the Greeks and Trojans didn't refrain from killing each other although they all claimed to descend from the gods, I doubt that plea would move the Aztecs. Having a common father didn't keep the sons of Oedipus' from killing each other. Throughout history, princes killed their brothers (and fathers) just so that they could posses the kingdom.

[Everyman]

Nemo wrote: "I think you're conflating reality with opinion. Our opinion of good or bad may change based on our investigation, but the reality of good or bad doesn't. "

What is the reality of good and bad absent of our opinions about it?

Are you arguing Platonism, that there is an eidos of good? Or that anything is good in every society at every moment in time for every person? If so, I would love to hear what that is.

At least when it comes to good and bad, I'm with Protagoras; man is the measure of all things. I agree that man isn't the measure of whether the earth is round or flat, but as to whether, for example, cannibalism is good or bad, I suggest that he is.

Can you prove logically that cannibalism is at all times and places a good or a bad? [g]

[Everyman]

David wrote: "@ Everyman and Nemo:
How about this excerpt from the notes in my copy of our current reading, Cicero's On Duties which seems to integrate both sides of the argument?Anthropologists confirm what Cic..."

I think that confirms my view. I'm not sure sure that Nemo will agree that it confirms his.

[Everyman]

Roger wrote: "Consider this: If a prophet appeared among the Aztecs and asked people to consider their common humanity and have sympathy with their victims, that we are all equally children of the gods and should treat each other with respect, I think he might get a pretty good following. ."

What you're asking them to do, I think (to the minimal extent that I understand Aztec morality) is to say that we should on the one hand consider the gods when they say we are all equally their children and on the other hand reject the gods when they demand human sacrifice. Not sure you can have it both ways.

And how long do you think the priests would let you get away with this before tossing you into the pit yourself? Don't forget, it was the people who demanded that Jesus be crucified and Barabbas that they wanted freed. Do you think you could do better than Jesus did? [g]

[Everyman]

I have to say that this group never ceases to amaze me. That we could get 250 intelligent and in many cases insightful posts from a two week discussion of the Declaration of the Rights of Man is impressive.

[Nemo]

Everyman wrote: "What is the reality of good and bad absent of our opinions about it?."

Just as there is much more to the Earth than our personal opinions about it, I think there is much more to the reality of good than our personal opinions.

Nobody can tell you everything that is good in every society at every moment in time for every person, unless he is omniscient and omnibenevolent. But, if I've learned anything from Plato, it is that Good is worth exploring and pursuing.

I agree that man isn't the measure of whether the earth is round or flat

Last time we discussed this type of topic, you wouldn't agree there is objective (scientific) reality. So in the words of Justice Breyer (spoken during his debate with Justice Scalia), "we're making progress". :)

[Roger]

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "And yet that doomed self-sacrificing prophet had a good deal of success persuading people to adopt his views, despite the example of his gruesome end. Why is that?"

Because people pr..."

Sorry, I don't follow the logic. Christ won followers because it was easier to kill him that fight Spanish conquistadors and die in plagues?

[Roger]

Nemo wrote: "Roger wrote: " If a prophet appeared among the Aztecs and asked people to consider their common humanity and have sympathy with their victims, that we are all equally children of the gods and shoul..."

When such prophets did appear among the Greeks, they did follow them, gradually over a period of centuries. Maybe the ground was prepared by the Roman peace, but it happened.

[David]

Roger wrote: "Sorry, I don't follow the logic. Christ won followers because it was easier to kill him that fight Spanish conquistadors and die in plagues?."

Nothing to follow. I was just trying to lighten the mood with a witless comparison. A real answer would be that good ideas tend to take root and grow.

[Nemo]

Roger wrote: "..When such prophets did appear among the Greeks, they did follow them, gradually over a period of centuries...."

Yes, but the prophets' main message to the Greeks was not that they were all children of the gods, as I understand it. The children of the Greek gods were not paragons of peace.

[Roger]

Nemo wrote: "Roger wrote: "..When such prophets did appear among the Greeks, they did follow them, gradually over a period of centuries...."

Yes, but the prophets' main message to the Greeks was not that they ..."

All the more astonishing then that Christ's message took hold, isn't it?

[Roger]

I'm wrestling with this idea that social mores (including what counts as the "rights of man" we all should recognize) are just social constructs. Of course in a sense they are, but they are also to be judged by some standard, aren't they? Some sets of recognized rights are surely better then others, I suppose because they are more in accord with humankind's true nature.

I just cannot accept that all the general changes in recognized rights over the last couple of millennia--the abolition of slavery and of torture as punishment, fair and open and speedy trials, universal suffrage, freedom of speech and of the press, and so forth--are just random variations. These rights may not be perfectly observed, and in some places grievously violated, but they are much more widely accepted than they used to be, and even those who violate them generally feel obliged to pretend they don't. That's objective progress, isn't it?

But where do the standards by which we judge such things come from? They can't be just social constructs, because the standards by which our ancestors judged slavery to be OK were just as much social constructs as our standards. The founders described certain rights as "self-evident," but they weren't self-evident to their ancestors. These rights seem to become self-evident once they are brought to your attention and you have lived with them for a while. It's somehow like arithmetic--you don't automatically know it, but once it's taught to you, it's impossible to deny.

[Tamara]

Roger wrote: "I'm wrestling with this idea that social mores (including what counts as the "rights of man" we all should recognize) are just social constructs. Of course in a sense they are, but they are also to..."

Roger, could the issue boil down to a question of faith and the nature of one's belief system?

For example, if a person believes in the existence of God and believes we are all created in God's image, then it follows that we are all equal in the sight of God and, therefore, deserving of the same rights. In other words, one's belief in the equality of all people is derived from one's faith and the struggle lies in manifesting that belief individually and collectively.
.
But if, for example, you grew up in ancient Greece where the belief was in multiple gods, many of whom were notoriously selfish, cruel, misogynistic, and violent, your value system and behavior would reflect that. Hence men rape, pillage, and loot ("the spoils of war") in Greek epic poetry with impunity.

But if you are an atheist or an agonistic, you cannot derive your standards from a belief in a higher being(s). So they have to come from somewhere else. And I think that may be where social constructs enter.

Whether we believe in a higher being or not, we have to develop rules and guidelines to co-exist. These vary from one culture to the next, from one timeframe to the next. They can be derived from one's faith and/or as guidelines arrived at collectively (social constructs). The examples of progress you cite above can perhaps be seen as a recognition that the world is shrinking, that we are dependent upon each other, and that we are evolving toward an understanding that in order to survive, we have to accommodate each other by granting each other the same rights and privileges.

There maybe ups and downs in the process, and we may veer off track for a while, but ultimately, whether one derives one's belief in the equality of all human beings from one's faith, or whether one thinks all standards are social constructs, we are all moving toward the same goal. It may take us many life times to get there, but in order to survive as a species, we really have no other choice. I guess what I'm trying to say is even though we may be starting from different places, faith and social constructs are not irreconcilable in my view.

I hope I haven't muddied the waters. But I suspect the debate has taken the form it has because we are approaching it from entirely different vantage points.

[David]

Roger wrote: "But where do the standards by which we judge such things come from?"

I sense your frustation (existential angst) in searching for something absolute when it comes to morals and the rules we decide to live by. The following may be a place to start.

The objectively right act is the act which a man will hold that he ought to perform when he is not mistaken. This, we decided, is that one, of all the acts that are possible, which will probably produce the best results. Thus in judging what actions are right we need to know what results are good. When a man is mistaken as to what is objectively right, he may nevertheless act in a way which is subjectively right; thus we need a new pair of notions, which we called moral and immoral. A moral act is virtuous and deserves praise; an immoral act is sinful and deserves blame. A moral act, we decided, is one which the agent would have judged right after an appropriate amount of candid reflection, 1 where the appropriate amount of reflection depends upon the difficulty and importance of his decision.

Russell, Bertrand. Philosophical Essays (p. 59). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

Standards of good, moral, and immoral then seem to be the sources by which we judge. It seems to me some of these standards are more stable across time and circumstance than others. This relativity in standards is what gives morals their relative, flexible, and resilient properties as mentioned in message 243. While this may explain our frustration to judge absolutely, it does allow us to adapt to different circumstances and discriminate by degrees.

[Roger]

Tamara wrote: "Roger wrote: "I'm wrestling with this idea that social mores (including what counts as the "rights of man" we all should recognize) are just social constructs. Of course in a sense they are, but th..."

Certainly if you base your view of rights on revealed religion, then your problems are solved (or at least made different). I'm interested in what one does without such a basis.

You say, "in order to survive, we have to accommodate each other by granting each other the same rights and privileges." Well, maybe and maybe not. Some say that in order to survive we need to obey the right leader. Maybe I can survive just fine by preying on others. I any case, even if we didn't need to respect each other's rights in order to survive, I'd still want us to do so. This is a utilitarian argument, and I'm not sure it takes us to the right place.

I'm not sure that pure reason is going to lead us to the same goal as traditional theologically based humanitarianism. I'm not sure it will lead to any goal, actually. Reason can lead from premises to conclusions, but it's not good at coming up with premises.

[Roger]

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "But where do the standards by which we judge such things come from?"

I sense your frustation (existential angst) in searching for something absolute when it comes to morals and the r..."

"A moral act, we decided, is one which the agent would have judged right after an appropriate amount of candid reflection"--this, I submit, is baloney. There have been plenty of agents who have done the most vicious acts without regret, after reflecting about them for any amount of time.

[Roger]

Patrice wrote: "sometimes our morals are derived from real, practical experience.
for example, cannibalism can cause what we call mad cow disease.
maybe trial and error taught people that eating human flesh was no..."

So cannibalism is OK as long as you cook the flesh long enough to destroy the mad cow disease virus, right?

[Nemo]

Everyman wrote: "David wrote: "@ Everyman and Nemo:
How about this excerpt from the notes in my copy of our current reading, Cicero's On Duties which seems to integrate both sides of the argument?..."

To me, the meaning of "relative" needs clarification. I think moral understanding is not relative, but diverse, that is, the truth of morality does not depend on our opinion, but the manifestation or application of it may vary across cultures and times.

Here is an example used by Plato: The doctor's purpose is to promote or restore the health of his patients. There are objective standards for a healthy state, which can be measured. However, the doctor doesn't prescribe the same regimen for all, like Procrustes, but adapts the regimen to the individual constitution of his patient. There is an objective standard, but the application of it is diverse.

I don't think we're in a position to judge other cultures based on our own limited understanding of morality, chaining others to our Procrustean bed. On the other hand, it is desirable that we come to an understanding of our own condition and moral needs of our time through candid and civil dialogues and discussions.

[David]

Roger wrote: "There have been plenty of agents who have done the most vicious acts without regret, after reflecting about them for any amount of time."

I could not agree more. But do take into account the first part which was, A moral act is virtuous and deserves praise; an immoral act is sinful and deserves blame.

1. This simply demonstrates the relativity of their subjective nature. John Brown's actions were judged by some as virtuous and deserving of praise, and judged by others as sinful and deserving of blame. I am sure John Brown counted himself among the former.
2. The amount of time a person reflects upon an action is no guarantee that they are not mistaken either at the time or in hindsight at some future time.

The problems of this subjective situation would appear to be best remedied by justice in the creation of rights that are both as objective and inclusive as possible

[Tamara]

David wrote: "The problems of this subjective situation would appear to be best remedied by justice in the creation of rights that are both as objective and inclusive as possible..."

Is objectivity in the eye of the beholder? For example, a glass has the same amount of liquid in it. One person sees it as half full, the other as half empty. Objectively speaking, they are both correct. But their perception differs on a number of factors that are highly subjective--their culture, upbringing, experiences, etc. etc.

I remember reading about cultural historians who observed story telling techniques of indigenous people. They wrote down the story as objectively as possible, but they completely neglected to document the interaction of the audience with the story teller because they were predisposed to perceive such interaction as irrelevant digressions. However, to the indigenous people, the interaction, the give-and-take between story teller and audience, was an integral part of the story and influenced the narrative.

Even our understanding of what can be considered objective may be based on our subjective predispositions.

[Roger]

Nemo wrote: "Everyman wrote: "David wrote: "@ Everyman and Nemo:
How about this excerpt from the notes in my copy of our current reading, Cicero's On Duties which seems to integrate both sides of the argument?...."

I am of quite another opinion. I feel quite secure in judging that the Aztecs were wrong to slaughter tens of thousands of captives on their altars, and that the old South was wrong to hold slaves.

[Roger]

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "There have been plenty of agents who have done the most vicious acts without regret, after reflecting about them for any amount of time."

I could not agree more. But do take into acc..."

"A moral act is virtuous and deserves praise; an immoral act is sinful and deserves blame."--if this is supposed to be a definition, it is circular.

[David]

Tamara wrote: "Is objectivity in the eye of the beholder? For example, a glass has the same amount of liquid in it. One person sees it as half full, the other as half empty. Objectively speaking, they are both correct."

No, Objectively speaking, the glass is at 50% of its capacity. :) But I understand your implication that true objectivity can have some subjective obstacles.

[David]

Roger wrote: "I feel quite secure in judging that the Aztecs were wrong to slaughter tens of thousands of captives on their altars, and that the old South was wrong to hold slaves."

There is a school of thought that denies the relativity, or diversity of morals consistent with your statement that says:

man is always the same, facing a situation which is always changing, and choice remains always a choice in the situation. The moral problem has not changed since the time when it was a choice between slavery and anti-slavery – from the time of the war of Secession, for example, until the present moment. . .

. . .We can judge, nevertheless, for, as I have said, one chooses in view of others, and in view of others one chooses himself. One can judge, first – and perhaps this is not a judgment of value, but it is a logical judgment – that in certain cases choice is founded upon an error [blood sacrifice is needed, slavery is good], and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man [or the Aztecs and slave holders] by saying that he deceives himself. Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice, without excuse and without help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver. One may object: “But why should he not choose to deceive himself?” I reply that it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error.

Furthermore, it is within your right of freedom to morally judge the choices of others, past or present in a manner consistent with your own choices. I would only caution that doing so without regard for the context in which those choices were made to avoid the appearance of providing excuses for them, may deprive one of some deeper understanding that would allow for the improvement of their own, which could be judged an error.

[Nemo]

Roger wrote: "I feel quite secure in judging that the Aztecs were wrong to slaughter tens of thousands of captives on their altars, and that the old South was wrong to hold slaves. ..."

I'm sure you're sincere in your convictions. But, one's opinion about morality, however sincere, is not the same as the object truth of morality, don't you agree?

It is one thing to have convictions, it is quite another to convince others that your conviction is correct by reasoning from a consensus, and it is still another thing to judge others based on our convictions.

For starters, let's think about judgement from the Christian perspective. Imagine it is Judgement Day, and we're all summoned before the divine tribunal. Do you think you will feel secure then to take the position of a prosecutor, and charge the Aztecs and the people of the old South with immorality? What if their defence lawyer can stand up and provide evidence that your own people (including yourself) have committed immoral acts similar in nature and even worse?

[David]

Roger wrote: ""A moral act is virtuous and deserves praise; an immoral act is sinful and deserves blame."--if this is supposed to be a definition, it is circular."

I love spotting fallacies, but I am not seeing this as either a circular argument or a fallacy even if we could call it circular. I would also be surprised to learn Russel would make such a basic error. Please explain.

[Tamara]

David wrote: "Roger wrote: ""A moral act is virtuous and deserves praise; an immoral act is sinful and deserves blame."--if this is supposed to be a definition, it is circular."

I love spotting fallacies, but I..."

Isn't it a type of logical fallacy called a tautology?

[David]

Nemo wrote: "For starters, let's think about judgement from the Christian perspective. Imagine it is Judgement Day, and we're all summoned before the divine tribunal. Do you think you will feel secure then to take the position of a prosecutor"

Is this the famous, "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone" defense?

[Roger]

David wrote: "Roger wrote: "I feel quite secure in judging that the Aztecs were wrong to slaughter tens of thousands of captives on their altars, and that the old South was wrong to hold slaves."

There is a sch..."

Sounds like an existentialist.

[Roger]

Nemo wrote: "Roger wrote: "I feel quite secure in judging that the Aztecs were wrong to slaughter tens of thousands of captives on their altars, and that the old South was wrong to hold slaves. ..."

I'm sure y..."

"I'm sure you're sincere in your convictions. But, one's opinion about morality, however sincere, is not the same as the object truth of morality, don't you agree?" -- I can't imagine anyone disagreeing with the notion that an opinion is not necessarily the truth. The issue here is whether there is a truth, outside of societal mores, to determine morality.

"It is one thing to have convictions, it is quite another to convince others that your conviction is correct by reasoning from a consensus, and it is still another thing to judge others based on our convictions." -- I'm wondering how our consensus on certain rights (life, freedom) came to be. They can't just come from changing society--what makes society change, other than the sensibilities of the people who make it up?

"For starters, let's think about judgement from the Christian perspective . . . " -- If the prosecutor on Judgment Day succeeds in condemning me for my many sins, that will not exonerate the Aztecs.

Surely we should have some sympathy for people who acted according to the mores they were brought up with, but that should not stop us from identifying them as wrong.

[Roger]

David wrote: "Roger wrote: ""A moral act is virtuous and deserves praise; an immoral act is sinful and deserves blame."--if this is supposed to be a definition, it is circular."

I love spotting fallacies, but I..."

All I got out of it was moral=virtuous=praiseworthy, all of those words meaning about the same thing. Similarly immoral=sinful=blameworthy.

[David]

Tamara wrote: "David wrote: "Roger wrote: ""A moral act is virtuous and deserves praise; an immoral act is sinful and deserves blame. . .

isn't it a type of logical fallacy called a tautology?"

it seems suspicious, I am still researching. . .but so far it seems OK.

Wikipedia says:Circular reasoning differs from tautologies in that circular reasoning restates the premise as the conclusion, instead of deriving the conclusion from the premise. (This is often conflated with begging the question, in which the premise relies on the assumption of the conclusion). A tautology simply states the same thing twice.

[David]

Roger wrote: "Sounds like an existentialist."

I didn't want to call anyone names since the E word gets mixed reviews around here sometimes, but you are correct. :) Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism

[Nemo]

Roger wrote: "...I can't imagine anyone disagreeing with the notion that an opinion is not necessarily the truth. The issue here is whether there is a truth, outside of societal mores, to determine morality. ....."

I tend to think there is truth outside of social mores, but the question is whether anyone can be certain that his/her opinion of morality is not a product of social mores. When we judge other cultures, are we not presuming that our opinion IS the truth?

If the prosecutor on Judgment Day succeeds in condemning me for my many sins, that will not exonerate the Aztecs.

Perhaps, but the point is that we're not in the position of the Judge, or the Prosecutor.

Even if we can be the prosecutor, shouldn't we acknowledge the right of the accused to meet his accusers face-to-face? Is it fair to charge the Aztecs with wrongs when they cannot defend themselves?

[Nemo]

David wrote: "..Is this the famous, "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone" defense?..."

A popular story in the Bible that probably isn't.

Close, but not quite what I had in mind.

[Roger]

Nemo wrote: "Roger wrote: "...The issue here is whether there is a truth, outside of societal mores, to determine morality. ....."

I tend to think there is truth outside of social mores, but the question is wh..."

I don't get it. Surely we have to make judgments about what is right and what is not. That's not sentencing anyone to anything, just making a judgment. When we hear of a great wrong, surely it's the right thing to do to remark on its wrongness.

[Nemo]

Roger wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Roger wrote: "...The issue here is whether there is a truth, outside of societal mores, to determine morality. ....."

I tend to think there is truth outside of social mores,..."

We all make moral judgments. But simply making a judgment isn't enough, especially when discussing morality with those whose perspective is different from our own, as Tamara pointed out.

I think what is largely missing is moral reasoning. On what ground do we judge whether something is right or wrong? From what premises do we draw our moral conclusions?

"I'm not sure that pure reason is going to lead us to the same goal as traditional theologically based humanitarianism. I'm not sure it will lead to any goal, actually. Reason can lead from premises to conclusions, but it's not good at coming up with premises. "

Spoken like a true mathematician. :) I agree that secular and Christian humanism have different premises, and conclusions. But even Christians often disagree among themselves on moral issues. Slavery is one prime example, same-sex marriage another.

To carry on a public dialogue about these moral issues, it's not enough to simply pronounce our judgment, but rather, as it is written in the Old Book, "Let us reason together".

[[deleted user]]

At #1Everyman wrote: ...one reason for choosing...is there is a free course on the French Revolution

1) I HAVE Enjoyed reading all the posts in this thread. And not wishing to disrupt the flow..

Anecdotally aside for others who may have also chosen to take Eman's recommendation. (view spoiler)[

Names.

The lecturer spoke of how following the revolution, people tended to stop using traditional names. I found myself thinking about that. In the past --- and to some extent still today --- names were given to honor people (relatives, perhaps; Lincoln), values ("Endurance" or "Hope" or "Faith" from Pilgrim times)(or, I remember suddenly knowing when reading _The Foundationhead_ that Rand had named her hero Howard Roark because it sounds like Hard Work).
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The French were naming their children after the names of the new months, Liberty, etc. Yes! My husband's cousin --- his family didn't make it out of China before the revolution -- is named "Red Army Man." (hide spoiler)]